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
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VOL. XXXII.

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THE
HISTORY OF THE POPES

FROM THE CLOSE OF THE MIDDLE AGES.

DRAWN FROM THE SECRET ARCHIVES OF THE VATICAN AND OTHER
ORIGINAL SOURCES

FROM THE GERMAN OF THE LATE

LUDWIG, FREIHERR VON PASTOR

TRANSLATED BY

DOM ERNEST GRAF, O.S.B.

MONK OF BUCKFAST

VOLUME XXXII

INNOCENT XI. (1676-1689). ALEXANDER VIII. (1689-1691).

INNOCENT XII. (1691-1700).

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INNOCENT XI. 1676-1689.

CHAPTER I.

ELECTION, ANTECEDENTS AND CHARACTER OF INNOCENT XI.

IN view of Clement X.'s great age, the Cardinals who entered the conclave in the first days of August 1676,¹ had been concerned for some time already with the election of a new Pope. There exist memorandums from as far back as the year 1672 about the candidates who were considered to have a chance of securing the triple crown,² though several of their number had died in the meantime and others, who were not mentioned then, had since come into the foreground. It was impossible to make a sure prophecy about any of the many candidates, for none of the parties disposed of the power of exclusion and still less of that of inclusion³; hence it was necessary to reckon with a long conclave.⁴

The Sacred College numbered 67 members, of whom only

¹ Plan in **Barb.* 4438, Vatican Library. Cf. GIUSSANI, *Il conclave di Innocenzo XI.*, Como, 1901.

² " *Discorso dell' anno 1672 sopra l'elettione del futuro pontefice," *Barb.* 4673, p. 316 *seqq.*, Vatican Library. Another copy, *ibid.*, 4653, which has the title: " *Discorso de' cardinali papabili del pontificato di Clemente X." Concerning the conclave, see also **Memorie inedite di Nitard*, in the National Library, Florence, *Ms.* 8363 (MAURA, *Carlo*, II., Vol. II., 320).

³ See the *Pronostico* in DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 434 *seq.*, and *Discorso primo sopra il conclave de 1676*, in *Conclavi*, III., 5.

⁴ See " *Discorso sopra alcuni cardinali papabili, 1676 ". State Library, Munich, *Cod. ital.*, 178.

44 were in Rome at the beginning.¹ None of the various factions constituted a really compact body. Three of Urban VIII.'s seven Cardinals,² six of the thirteen of Innocent X.³ and two of Clement IX.'s eight⁴ followed a course of their own, whilst five out of Clement X.'s nineteen⁵ and another five out of Alexander VII.'s twenty⁶ refused to follow their respective leaders, Altieri and Chigi.⁷

In addition to D'Estrées the following were considered as avowed partisans of France: Retz, Bouillon, Bonsi, Mardalchini, Grimaldi and Virginio Orsini, to whom must be added, as a result of the dispute with Altieri, the four Venetian

¹ The names of the 67 are given in GUARNACCI, I., 121 *seq.* The gradual arrival of the absent may be gathered from the scrutiny list given below. Cardinals Orsini the elder and Bonelli died during the conclave; see **Avvisi* of August 29 and September 5, 1676, Papal Secret Archives, *Avvisi*, 118. Three were of French nationality: Retz, Bouillon, D'Estrées; two Spanish: Aragona, Portocarrero; three Germans: Bernard Gustavus of Baden, Frederick of Hesse and Nidhard; one English: Howard; all the others were Italians. This disproportion in the representation of the non-Italian nations was bitterly complained of by the Cardinal of Hesse in a *Report to Leopold I. dated Rome, November 3, 1674. State Archives, Vienna.

² Francesco Barberini, Carpegna the elder, Gabrielli, Orsini the elder, Facchinetti, Grimaldi and Rossetti.

³ Ludovisi, Cibo, Odescalchi, Raggi, Retz, Omodei, Ottoboni, Albizzi, Pio, Mardalchini, Frederick of Hesse, Barberini the younger and Azzolini.

⁴ Giacomo Rospigliosi, Bouillon, Portocarrero, Cerri, Pallavicini, Sigismondo Chigi, Acciaioli and Buonaccorsi.

⁵ Massimo, Carpegna the younger, D'Estrées, Bernard Gustavus of Baden, Bonsi, Nidhard, Vincenzo Maria Orsini, Colonna, Nerli, Gastaldi, Crescenzi, Marescotti, Rocci, Albizzi, Spada, Howard, Felice Rospigliosi, Casanata and Basadonna.

⁶ Flavio Chigi, Buonvisi, Bichi, Franzoni, Vidoni, Barbarigo, Aragona, Boncompagni, Litta, Corsini, Bonelli, Piccolomini, Carafa, Paluzzi-Altieri, Conti, Nini, Spinola, Caracciolo, Delfino and Savelli.

⁷ See *Discorso primo in Conclavi*, III., 40.

Cardinals Ottoboni, Barbarigo, Delfino and Basadonna and some others, especially among the Cardinals created by Clement IX., so much so that the French ambassador, D'Estrées, brother to the Cardinal of the same name, could count on twenty votes. The Spanish-Imperial party was likewise imposing, for the two Spaniards and the three Germans were reinforced by a number of Alexander VII.'s and Clement X.'s Cardinals who were in receipt of Spanish pensions. Though the so-called *Squadron volante* consisted of only seven electors, viz. Ludovisi, Cibo, Odescalchi, Raggi, Omodei, Azzolini and Albizzi, its influence was considerable on account of the personal qualities of its members and their independence of the secular Powers.¹

In view of Louis XIV.'s well-known hostility to Cardinal Altieri, none of the many members of the Sacred College who were reputed *papabili*,² could be considered as a possible candidate if he had anything to do with Clement X.'s nephew.³ In like manner none of the *papabili* of Chigi's party had any serious prospects⁴; on the other hand two of Innocent X.'s Cardinals could cherish extraordinary hopes, viz., Cibo and Odescalchi. They were close friends as well as men of merit; Odescalchi in fact enjoyed the reputation of a Saint. People spoke of him as the Charles Borromeo of the Sacred College⁵ and it was known that not only did he not aspire to the tiara but that, on the contrary, he sought to escape it. All contemporary reports are full of his praise; they describe him as an extraordinarily devout man, a stern defender of the Church's immunity, a father to the poor, an enemy of

¹ See *Discorso secondo*, *ibid.*, 42-4.

² The *Discorso secondo* (*ibid.*, 47) gives 14; the *Discorso* in GIUSSANI, 49 *seqq.*, gives the characteristics of 20 "concorrenti al papato".

³ See " *Lettera politica sopra l'elettione del futuro pontefice ", dated August 3, 1676, Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, f. 3, n. 3334.

⁴ See *ibid.*

⁵ See LIPPI, ed. Berthier, 37, n. 1.

nepotism and an advocate of ecclesiastical and secular reform.¹ Small wonder if public opinion had it from the outset that he would be the next Pope, though it was feared that the circumstance of his having been a subject of the King of Spain would render him suspect to the French who had already opposed him in the previous conclave.

None of the Cardinals could fail to realize how much depended on the attitude of the powerful King of France. Even Altieri had sought to conciliate the French immediately after his uncle's death. But this attempt at a rapprochement failed.² How little the French King, in his pride over his political triumphs, was disposed to conciliation, appears from the fact that he did not even deign to answer Altieri but contented himself with the remark, in a letter to Chigi and Rospigliosi, that he left it altogether to the judgment of his ambassador and the members of his party whether or no they were prepared to hold out to Altieri a hope of forgiveness.³

¹ See the *Discorso politico* in GIUSSANI, 44. Cf. *Discorso primo*, *loc. cit.*, 24, where Odescalchi is called "la gloria del sacro collegio"; the *Pronostico* in DÖLLINGER, *loc. cit.*, 436 *seq.*, and the "Compendioso ragguaglio di tutti i cardinali viventi nel pontificato di Clemente X." in *Barb.* 5704, Vatican Library. The author of the *Lettera politica of August 3, 1676 (cf. above, p. 3, n. 3), which Cerri and Facchinetti also designate as very hopeful, says: "Odescalchi tiene il primo luogo nel merito de' porporati, la di cui bontà è così grande nell' opinione di Roma tutta che non ha alcuna difficoltà di canonizzarlo per santo. E tale lo disse ultimamente il card. Chigi alla principessa di Rossano, pregiandosi d'haverlo in conclave vicino alla propria cella. Questa prima base tanto necessaria a formare il solio del supremo sacerdotio si stima così solida in questo soggetto che quando fosse esaltato alla cattedra di Pietro fosse per renderla adorata agl' istessi nemici della chiesa" (Lichtenstein Archives, Vienna). On Cibo, see L. MUSSI, *Il Cardinale Alderano dei principi Cibo-Malaspina*, Massa, 1913.

² See the *Report of Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I., July 22, 1676, State Archives, Vienna.

³ See PETRUCCELLI, III., 285.

The conclave received his royal answer on August 15th : its consequence was that Altieri, heedless of the French, began to work openly for the election of Odescalchi. His first step was to come to an arrangement with Cardinal Nidhard, the leader of the Spanish party.¹ However, at first Odescalchi, like all the others, failed to secure any considerable number of votes ; only on the afternoon of August 15th did he obtain eight votes, and ten on the following day.²

¹ See the report in DÖLLINGER, III., 442 ; GIUSSANI, 66 ; WAHRMUND, *Ius exclusivæ*, 155.

² Instead of the quite unreliable accounts of the scrutinies hitherto known through the *Discorso terzo sopra il conclave (Conclavi*, III., 98 *seqq.*), we give here the *account of *Cod. Barb.* 4438 of the Vatican Library. (The second number indicates the *Accessi*) :

p. 4, die 3 [Augusti] : Cybo 2/2, Odescalchi 11/3, Bonvisius 1, Franonus 1/1, Corsinus 5/2, Bonellus 1/1, Piccolomini 2/2, Carafa 3/3, Rospigliosi 2, De Maximis 1, Nidardus 1, S. Sixti 1/2, Columna 1, Nerlius 3/1, Marescotti 2, Albericius 2/1, De Nortfolk 3/1, praesentes 44, aegr. abs. 2 : abs. a curia 7, extra concl. 16, nemini 25.

p. 6, die 3 : Cybo 1/3, Odesc. 9/4, Carafa 3/5, Spinola 3/1, Nerlius 4/3, nemini 19, praesentes 45.

p. 8, die 4 : Odesc. 7/2, Carafa 2/5, Spinola 1/4, Carpineo 2/2, Maresc. 5, nemini 18.

p. 10, die 4 : Odesc. 5/6, Barbadicus 1/3, Nerlius 4/3, Maresc. 5/2, nem. 19.

p. 12, die 5 : Odesc. 4/6, Carafa 5/2, Maresc. 4/3, nem. 14, praes. 46.

p. 14, die 5 : Odesc. 4/3, nem. 13.

p. 16, die 6 : Odesc. 4/5, nem. 16.

p. 18, die 6 : Barb. 1/5, Odesc. 6/5, nem. 12, praes. 47.

p. 20, die 7 : Odesc. 3/7, Rosp. 3/4, nem. 14, praes. 48.

p. 22, die 7 : Odesc. 3/7, De Albit. 2/1, nem. 14.

p. 24, die 8 : Odesc. 4/4, De Albit. 1/4, nem. 14.

p. 26, die 8 : Barb. 1/5, Odesc. 2/8, De Albit. 1/6, Barbadicus 4/6, nem. 13, praes. 49.

p. 28, die 8 : Odesc. 2/8, Barbad. 4/6, nem. 3.

p. 30, die 8 : Odesc. 4/7, Carafa 6/1, nem. 18.

Contrary to Altieri's view, Chigi and Rospigliosi were of opinion that D'Estrées, as France's representative, should be sounded on the subject of Odescalchi's candidature. The latter declared that he had no objection to Odescalchi's person, but that he objected to the way in which propaganda was being made for him. On the following day the Cardinals learned even more definitely, through Cardinal Delfino, how much D'Estrées resented the fact that the Spaniards worked for the election of "a vassal" of Spain, especially as he had been put forward by Altieri, the enemy of his sovereign; they must wait for the arrival of the French Cardinals, he had said, otherwise he would be obliged "to put his hand to his sword", that is, to make use of the right of exclusion.¹ This threat made such an impression that most of the Cardinals gave way. It was resolved to wait for the arrival of the French and with a view to removing all suspicion, only a few electors voted for Odescalchi, nor did a change occur after the arrival in Rome, at the end of August,

p. 32, die 9: Odesc. 4/7, Carafa 5/3, nem. 19, praes. 50.

p. 34, die 9: Odesc. 4/8, Barbad. 3/4, nem. 15.

p. 36, die 10: Odesc. 2/8, nem. 26, praes. 51.

p. 38, die 10: Odesc. 2/4, Barbad. 1/5, Carafa 8/1, Maresc. 4/2, nemini 27.

p. 40, die 11: Cybo 3/4, Odesc. 4/3, Alberic. 6/2, nem. 25.

p. 42, die 11: Odesc. 3/4, Piccol. 6/1, nem. 25.

p. 44, die 12: Odesc. 5/4, nem. 25, praes. 52.

p. 46, die 12: Odesc. 2/6, Barbad. 3/5, nem. 16.

p. 48, die 13: Odesc. 4/5, Barbad. 4/6, Carafa 7/3, Crescent. 4/1, nem. 21.

p. 50, die 13: Odesc. 5/3, Barbad. 3/11, nem. 21.

p. 52, die 14: Odesc. 5/6, nem. 24.

p. 54, die 14: Odesc. 3/3, Alberic. 5/3, nem. 20.

p. 56, die 15: Odesc. 5/8, Carafa 6/2, nem. 20.

p. 56, die 15: Odesc. 5/8, Carafa 6/2, nem. 20.

p. 58, die 15: Odesc. 8/13, Alberic. 7/2, nem. 17.

p. 60, die 16: Odesc. 10/9, Carafa 3/4, Rosp. 2/4, nem. 21.

¹ See Card. Carlo Pio's report of August 22, 1767, in WAHRMUND, *loc. cit.*, 279.

of Cardinals Retz, Bouillon, Bonsi and Mardalchini.¹ The French ambassador received the latter with unusual pomp.

¹ Already in the second scrutiny of August 16, Odescalchi had only 5/7, Rocci 3/2, nem. 25 votes; in the third scrutiny of the same day Odescalchi had 5/7, Carafa 4/3, nem. 25. On the further scrutinies, *Cod. Barb.* 4438 (Vatican Library) reports:

p. 66, die 17: Augusti: Odesc. 3/9, Barbad. 5/3, Carafa 8/3, nem. 20, praes. 53.

p. 68, die 17: Odesc. 2/8, nem. 31.

p. 70, die 18: Odesc. 2/9, nem. 30, praes. 54.

p. 72, die 18: Odesc. 2/5, nem. 31.

p. 74, die 19: Barb. 4/1, Odesc. 1/7, Alber. 6/3, nem. 33, praes. 55.

p. 76, die 19: Odesc. 2/9, Caracc. 3, nem. 31.

p. 78, die 20: Odesc. 3/5, nem. 32.

p. 80, die 20: Odesc. 3/6, nem. 30.

p. 82, die 21: Odesc. 1/9, Carafa 8/2, Alber. 5/2, nem. 31.

p. 84, die 21: Barb. 6, Odesc. 2/6, Ottob. 2/4, nem. 31.

p. 86, die 22: Odesc. 2/7, Alber. 5/2, nem. 30.

p. 88, die 22: Odesc. 3/6, nem. 29.

p. 90, die 22: Barb. 4/2, Odesc. 3/6, nem. 29.

p. 92, die 23: Odesc. 2/8, nem. 30.

p. 94, die 23: Barb. 5/3, Odesc. 2/8, nem. 28.

p. 96, die 24: Odesc. 4/10, Carafa 6, nem. 26.

p. 98, die 24: Odesc. 1/8, nem. 28.

p. 100, die 25: Odesc. 2/7, nem. 28.

p. 102, die 25: Odesc. 2/6, Cresc. 3/5, nem. 25.

p. 104, die 26: Odesc. 2/8, nem. 28.

p. 106, die 26: Odesc. 2/8, nem. 26.

p. 108, die 27: Odesc. 2/7, nem. 24.

p. 110, die 28: Odesc. 3/8, Piccol. 3/2, nem. 26.

p. 112, die 28: Odesc. 2/8, Alber. 4/5, nem. 24.

p. 114, die 29: Odesc. 2/8, nem. 24.

p. 116, die 29: Odesc. 2/5, nem. 25.

p. 118, die 29: Odesc. 2/5, Carafa 5, nem. 25.

p. 120, die 30: Odesc. 2/5, Spin. 3/2, Rocci 3/2, nem. 31.

p. 122, die 30: Odesc. 2/4, Alber. 4/2, nem. 30.

p. 124, die 30: Barb. 6/2, Odesc. 3/6, nem. 29, praes. 56.

The French Cardinals entered the conclave on Sunday according to Carlo Luigi Scappi's *report of September 2, 1676, State Archives, Bologna.

When on August 20th he escorted them to the conclave with a splendid retinue, he forcibly tore away the chain in front of the steps of St. Peter's which it was customary to remove for the Pope alone. The newcomers' conduct was no less arrogant; they openly declared that, in obedience to the command of their King, they could have nothing to do with Altieri and the Cardinals of the last promotion.¹

However, the French party could not long maintain such an attitude. One of its members, Cardinal Grimaldi, who entered the conclave on September 7th, observed towards Altieri and his followers the same courtesy as towards all the others. With the arrival, within the next few days, of the Emperor's representative, the Cardinal of Baden, and Cardinal Ludovisi, the number of the electors rose to 63,² though none of the subsequent scrutinies yielded any result.³ The cause of this failure lay in the fact that already

¹ See PETRUCCELLI, III., 289; WAHRMUND, 156-157.

² See the **Avvisi* of September 5 and 12, 1676, Papal Secret Archives, and the **Report* of C. L. Scappi of September 9, 1676, State Archives, Bologna.

³ **Cod. Barb.* 4438 (Vatican Library) reports:

p. 126, die 31 [Augusti]: Odesc. 4/4, Barbad. 7/1, nem. 29, praes. 56.

p. 128, die 31: Barb. 6/3, Odesc. 1/5, Retz 2/4, nem. 27.

p. 130, die 1 [Sept.]: Odesc. 3/6, Rosp. 4/3, nem. 30.

p. 132, die 1: Barb. 7/3, Grim. 3/1, Odesc. 2/6, nem. 32.

p. 134, die 2: Odesc. 3/6, Rosp. 3/4, nem. 35.

p. 136, die 2: Barb. 8/4, Odesc. 4/4, nem. 33.

p. 138, die 3: Odesc. 3/9, nem. 31.

p. 140, die 3: Odesc. 2/7, Alber. 4/4, nem. 32.

p. 142, die 4: Odesc. 3/6, nem. 32.

p. 144, die 4: Barb. 7/1, Odesc. 1/9, Alber. 6/3, nem. 30.

p. 146, die 5: Odesc. 2/5, Cresc. 1/4, Nortfolck 1/4, nem. 27.

p. 148, die 5: Odesc. 2/5, nem. 27.

p. 150, die 5: Odesc. 2/4, Alber. 5/3, nem. 28.

p. 152, die 6: Odesc. 2/6, Alber. 5/4, nem. 27.

p. 154, die 6: Grim. 4/1, Odesc. 1/6, nem. 27.

p. 156, die 6: Odesc. 3/7, Carafa 6/2, Cresc. 1/6, nem. 23.

p. 158, die 7: Odesc. 2/7, Cresc. 1/6, nem. 28, praes. 61.

on August 22nd D'Estrées had dispatched a courier to Louis XIV. to ask for his consent to Odescalchi's election. The same courier was likewise the bearer of letters of Cardinals Chigi and Rospigliosi in which they very warmly recommended Odescalchi, representing him as if he were the victim of Altieri's manœuvres. In this way an impression was created that the King's ardent wish to see the election of a Pope

- p. 160, die 7 : Grim. 4/3, Odesc. 4/4, Cresc. 1/7, nem. 28.
 p. 162, die 8 : Grim. 5/2, Odesc. 5/6, Baden 1/3, nem. 28,
 praes. 62.
 p. 164, die 8 : Odesc. 2/5, Rosp. 4/3, nem. 26.
 p. 166, die 9 : Odesc. 4/4, nem. 25.
 p. 168, die 9 : Odesc. 4/4, Vidonus 3/1, nem. 25.
 p. 170, die 9 : Odesc. 2/5, Alber. 6/4, nem. 28.
 p. 170, die 9 : Odesc. 2/5, Alber. 6/4, nem. 28.
 p. 172, die 10 : Odesc. 4/5, Cresc. 2/5, nem. 28, praes. 63.
 p. 174, die 10 : Odesc. 3/9, nem. 28.
 p. 176, die 11 : Odesc. 4/3, Cresc. 1/7, Alber. 7/3, nem. 29.
 p. 178, die 11 : Odesc. 4/8, nem. 28.
 p. 180, die 11 : Odesc. 4/8, nem. 28.
 p. 182, die 12 : Odesc. 1/7, nem. 27.
 p. 184, die 12 : Odesc. 2/6, nem. 31.
 p. 186, die 13 : Odesc. 3/3, nem. 26.
 p. 188, die 13 : Odesc. 3/3, Alber. 4/4, nem. 26.
 p. 190, die 13 : Odesc. 3/6, Alber. 6/2, nem. 28.
 p. 192, die 14 : Odesc. 1/7, nem. 28.
 p. 194, die 14 : Odesc. 4/6, Alber. 5/4, nem. 28.
 p. 196, die 15 : Odesc. 2/7, Rocci 5/1, nem. 27.
 p. 198, die 15 : Odesc. 3/6, Carafa 7/3, nem. 28.
 p. 200, die 16 : Odesc. 3/6, nem. 27.
 p. 202, die 16 : Odesc. 5/3, nem. 31.
 p. 204, die 17 : Odesc. 4/6, Carafa 7, nem. 29.
 p. 206, die 17 : Odesc. 3/4, Alber. 4/5, nem. 30.
 p. 208, die 18 : Odesc. 2/6, Alber. 3/6, nem. 27.
 p. 210, die 18 : Odesc. 3/5, nem. 32.
 p. 212, die 19 : Odesc. 6/2, Alber. 5/5, Casanata 1/4, nem. 30.
 p. 214, die 19 : Odesc. 4/5, nem. 28.
 p. 216, die 20 : Odesc. 4/7, nem. 31.
 p. 218, die 20 : Barb. 6/1, Odesc. 4/4, Rosp. 4/1, Alber. 5/2,
 nem. 30.

who would be hostile to the Cardinal nephew, could not be more effectively fulfilled than by the elevation of Odescalchi. The correctness of this surmise was seen when Louis XIV.'s answer arrived on September 13th. In it the King said he approved Odescalchi's election, with the reservation that his own royal prerogatives should not be tampered with.¹ In pursuance of this instruction the French ambassador, D'Estrées, presented himself on September 20th at the door of the conclave, for the purpose of delivering the King's reply to the letter by which the Sacred College had informed him of the death of Clement X. On this occasion D'Estrées made a speech in which he urged the election of a suitable Pope; he did not mention Odescalchi's name, but everyone knew that the latter was meant.²

There followed the scrutiny of September 21st at which Odescalchi received 20 votes and 42 *accessi*.³ Odescalchi reluctantly accepted the election, but only after insisting on the fourteen articles of a reform already proposed at the last conclave being signed and sworn to by all the Cardinals. This election capitulation was the personal work of Odescalchi who had had no thought of his own elevation to the Chair of St. Peter. The document, which now became the programme of his government, had for its main object the care of the Congregations of the Holy Office and Propaganda, a general moral reform, the choice of Bishops and parish priests, the diminution of clerical luxury, the restriction of expenditure in view of the exhaustion of the Camera, the regulation of

¹ Cf. F. A. PELZHOFFER, *arcana status*, Frankfurt, 1711, lib. 7, p. 340 *seqq.*; WAHRMUND, *loc. cit.*, 157 *seq.*

² See the account of the conclave in EISLER, 166. The *Discours de M. le duc D'Estrées in *Barb.* 4664, p. 69-70, Vatican Library.

³ **Barb.* 4438 (Vatican Library) reports on p. 226, concerning the scrutiny of September 21: *Barb.* 7/1, Fachinettus 1, Grim. 2, Cybo 1, Odesc. 20/42, Retz 1, Chisius 1, Bonvis. 1, Fransonus 1, Vidonus 1, Barbad. 2, De Arag. 1, Boncomp. 1, Litta 1, Cors. 3, Piccol. 3, Carafa 5, Caracc. 1, Rosp. 4, Cerrus 2, Nidardus 4, nem. 20, praes. 63.

the grain trade, the reform of justice and public administration especially with regard to taxes and monopolies, regard for the advice of the Cardinals in ecclesiastical and governmental questions, confirmation of their traditional privileges, and lastly, the peace and concord of Christendom.¹ Odescalchi's election was hailed in Rome with loud jubilation.² His excellent qualities, wrote the envoy of Bologna, were well known.³ In memory of the Pope who had raised him to the purple Odescalchi took the name of Innocent XI.

Benedetto Odescalchi was a native of Como, where to this day the house can be seen in which he was born on May 19th, 1611.⁴ His was an old family which had become rich by trade; it could also boast a number of outstanding personalities distinguished in the service of the Church, notably Bernardo Odescalchi, a friend of Michele Ghislieri, the future Pope Pius V., who was instrumental in settling the Jesuits and the Capuchins at Como, and Pietro Giorgio, the saintly Bishop, first of Alessandria and subsequently of Vigevano (*obit* 1620).⁵

Benedetto Odescalchi began his studies with the Jesuits at

¹ See the Report in DÖLLINGER, III., 441, and GIUSSANI, 67. GIUSSANI, 69 *seqq.*, and BOJANI, I., 31 *seqq.*, give the text of the election capitulation; on the same, LULVÈS in *Quellen u. Forschungen*, XII., 231 *seqq.*

² *Report of the Florentine ambassador Montauti of September 21, 1676: "Nè può dirsi quanto sia grande il giubilo del popolo, perchè veramente era [Odescalchi] in somma stima," State Archives, Florence.

³ *Letter of C. L. Scappi of September 21, 1676, State Archives, Bologna.

⁴ See M. G. LIPPI, *Vita di P. Innocenzo XI.*, ed. Berthier (*cf.* Appendix, 18).

⁵ See *ibid.*, 3 *seq.*; NOVAES, XI., 3. Concerning Bernardo Odescalchi, *cf.* the present work, Vol. XVII, 48, *ibid.*, for the papal diplomatist Paolo Odescalchi. An "*Albero genealogico" in the Odescalchi Archives, Rome, *Arm.*, I., D. VIII., n. 1. For the Family, see also CIAMPINI, *Elenco degli Abbrev.*, XXV.; for the Army, see PASINI FRASSONI, *Armorial*, 45 *seq.*

Como, and in 1636 he went to Genoa and Rome.¹ At that time he had not thought of becoming a priest. His ambition was, on the contrary, to embrace a military career. This desire was not realized,² for the Spanish Cardinal, Cueva, to whom he had been recommended, persuaded him to read law. He took his doctorate in this branch of learning at Naples. At the same time, as a result of his relations with two Capuchins, the desire to embrace the ecclesiastical state matured in him. Returning to Rome, he found influential patrons in Cardinals Francesco Barberini and Pamfili who recommended him to Urban VIII. The Pope made Benedetto a *Protonotario partecipante*, and a Commissary General in the Marches where he gave proof of great gentleness in the collection of the taxes for the war of Castro. After he had splendidly discharged the functions of Governor of Macerata, Pope Innocent X., then newly elected, made him a cleric of the Camera, and on March 6th, 1645, he raised him to the cardinalate.³

So rapid a rise of a man only thirty-four years old gave occasion for the calumnious insinuation that Odescalchi had bought, by means of presents, the favour of the influential

¹ Letters of Odescalchi from Rome, 1637, have been published by MONTI in *Period. della Soc. stor. per la dioc. di Como*, XVI.; 188 seqq.

² The assertion that B. Odescalchi performed military service is contested with good reason by A. I. A. TURREREZZONICO (*De suppositiciis militaribus stipendiis B. Odescalchi*, Comi, 1742), and by MAMACHI (**Liber singularis*, cap. 4, 4, Odescalchi Archives, Rome; cf. Appendix, Nr. 18). The Pope himself could deny it with good reason (see LIPPI, 7). The assertion is already found in P. A. Pancetti, "**Descrizione della vita di molti pontefici da Alessandro IV. sino al regnante Clemente XI.*" (completed 1718), in the *Cod. ital.*, 93, State Library, Munich; the assertion rests on a confusion with another Odescalchi; FRAKNOI (*Innocenz XI.*, 21) seems inclined to give it credit. However, already SCHRÖCKH (*Kirchengesch.*, VI., 334) recognized the weakness of the proofs adduced by Bayle. Cf. also PETRUCELLI DELLA GATTINA, III., 303, and below, p. 40.

³ See LIPPI, 7-10.

Olimpia, but there is no proof of this.¹ The elevation is accounted for by Odescalchi's previous relations with Innocent X. who appreciated Benedetto's sincere piety, especially his great liberality towards the poor, of which he had given proof even in his youth.²

Innocent X. sent the new Cardinal, the "father of the poor", as Legate to Ferrara which had been visited by famine: he did excellent work there until 1650. During the next four years he occupied the See of Novara where by means of visitations and synods, he strove to reform the clergy of that diocese. Besides his liberality, another feature of his character began to show itself then: this was a conscientiousness degenerating into scrupulosity when there was question of appointments to ecclesiastical positions, with the result that there were eventually 300 vacant posts.³ As the climate of Novara was bad for his health, he prayed the new Pope, Alexander VII., to bestow the bishopric on his brother, Giulio Maria Odescalchi. He only reserved for himself an annual pension of 300 scudi which he ordered to be distributed to the poor of Novara; as a matter of fact all his life he retained a strong attachment to his diocese on which he never ceased to bestow considerable subsidies.⁴

Since 1656 the Cardinal had led a quiet and retired existence at the Curia. He was indefatigable in his works of mercy which attracted universal attention during the plague and on the occasion of the inundation of the Tiber.⁵ He took

¹ See besides LIPPI, II and 209, the detailed statement of Mamachi against Bayle. Cf. *Anal. iur. pontif.*, XI. (1872), 297 seqq.

² See the evidence of the acts of canonization in LIPPI, 4, n. 5.

³ See LIPPI, 14 seqq. Cf. UGHELLI, IV., 729 seq.; *Rev. d'hist. ecclés suisse*, IX. (1915), 39 seqq.; *Anal. iur. pontif.*, XI. (1872), 302. The conscientiousness of Cardinal Odescalchi is emphasized in the " *Compendioso ragguaglio di tutti i cardinali viventi nel pontificato di Clemente X. ", *Barb.* 4704, Vatican Library.

⁴ See COLOMBO, 6, and the Letters of Innocent XI. there, 59 seqq.

⁵ Cf. LIPPI, 25, and XXXI, 31 seqq.

particular interest in the hospital of St. Galla,¹ he also gave proof of the nobility of his generous disposition by liberally assisting the Poles in their struggles against the Turks.² At the conclave which elected Clement X. he begged his friends not to think of his person. He expressed his gratitude to Cardinal Imperiali who had opposed his elevation on that occasion, and after the latter's death he had 3,000 Masses said for him. At Rome Cardinal Odescalchi was hardly ever seen, except at the Congregations and in the churches; he never missed the devotions for a good death which were held every Friday at the Gesù.³

Benedetto Odescalchi was determined to continue as Pope the life he had led as a prelate and a Cardinal. He was retiring, devout, conscientious, strict, most liberal towards those in want, exceedingly parsimonious for himself. In this respect he went so far as to use the clothes and ornaments of his predecessors though they were too short for his lofty stature. For ten whole years he wore the same white cassock until it became quite threadbare, and only when a certain prince commented on the subject did he have the old garments replaced by new ones.⁴ By his orders his rooms were furnished with apostolic simplicity. In his study there was only a wooden table with a simple ivory crucifix, a few religious books, three old pictures of Saints, a wooden chair and an old, silk-covered chair for visitors of mark.⁵ Many an Abbot had to confess, to his shame, that he was more splendidly lodged than the Head of the Church. In order to set an example to the wealthy Prince-Bishops of Germany, the

¹ On this Institution he also bestowed his special care as Pope; see Bull., XIX., 669; NOVAES, XI., 50 *seq.*

² Cf. XXXI., p. 460.

³ See LIPPI, 26 *seqq.*, 221. P. A. Pancetti (*loc. cit.*) says of Cardinal Odescalchi: “*Chi scrive questi successi lo ha visto frequentare giornalmente le chiese ove era esposto il Venerabile.” State Archives, Munich, *Cod. ital.*, 93.

⁴ See LIPPI, 44, 63.

⁵ See MARRACCI in LIPPI, 242. Cf. LORIDAN, *Les voyages à Rome des Ursulines de Flandre*, Tours (s. a.), 109.

Pope gave orders for the greatest possible reduction of his stables. At the Quirinal, where after much hesitation he at last took up residence in May, 1677,¹ he chose for himself the worst rooms, from which there was no view. The personnel of the ante-rooms was reduced to a minimum. As a Cardinal, he was wont to say, he had been rich, as Pope he wished to live in poverty. Accordingly he only allowed a few *giulii* to be spent on his table.² On the occasion of the taking possession of the Lateran, on November 8th, 1676, he insisted on the avoidance of all display and expressly forbade the erection of the customary triumphal arches.³ At first he wished to carry out the ceremony without the participation of the College of Cardinals,⁴ and instead of having money thrown to the crowd, as had been the custom hitherto, he had wheat and money distributed in all the parishes of Rome.⁵ He abolished altogether the celebration of the anniversary of his coronation (October 4th).⁶ The Pope's profound humility, of which his confessor relates touching examples,⁷ made the acclamations of the people painful to him; to escape them he showed himself as little as possible in public. In consequence of his gout and kidney trouble this retirement, for which he was often blamed, grew still further in his latter years.⁸ We are reminded of St Charles Borromeo when we read that Innocent

¹ See **Avviso* of July 3, 1677, Vatican Library.

² See MARRACCI, *loc. cit.*, and LIPPI, 63.

³ See the **Report of Montauti*, September 30, 1676, State Archives, Florence; LIPPI, 42; CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 296 *seqq.*

⁴ "Ma ha ceduto alla convenienza ch'intervenghino in un atto da loro tanto bramato," *Avviso* of November 7, 1676, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ See **Avviso* of November 16, 1676, *ibid.*

⁶ See **Avviso* of October 8, 1678, *Barb.* 5831, Vatican Library.

⁷ See MARRACCI, *loc. cit.*, 241, 243, confirmed by the **Avviso* of August 6, 1678, Vatican Library. To the Florentine ambassador, Montauti, Innocent XI. said, "*che quello avesse operato in buono, sarebbe stato effetto della divina misericordia, et gl'errori parti delle sue imperfettioni." State Archives, Florence.

⁸ See MARRACCI, 243 *seqq.*, 273; LIPPI, 192.

XI. not only renounced the customary villegiatura at Castel Gandolfo, but that he did not even allow himself the relaxation of a walk. He never entered the beautiful gardens of the Vatican and the Quirinal,¹ and rarely drove into the city. From morning till night he sat in his plain rooms like a devout hermit, engaged in work and prayer.² His very exterior, his tall, spare figure and stern features reveal the ascetic. Numerous busts perpetuate his strongly marked features, the lofty forehead, the aquiline nose, the prominent chin.³ In conformity with custom he grew a beard and moustaches. His bearing and expression were always dignified and grave, even on

¹ See MARRACCI, 242. Cf. **Avviso* of October 15, 1678, according to which the Pope made over Castel Gandolfo to Cardinal Howard. Vatican Library.

² The **Avviso* of October 15, 1678 (*loc. cit.*) speaks of the "genio anacoretico solitario della S. Stà, tutta applicata allo spirito e contemplatione".

³ Terra cotta bust of Innocent XI. in the private apartments of the Palazzo Doria, Rome; bronze busts in the Bibl. Vallicelliana (signed: Ioh. Gambassius civis volaterranus caecus), and in S. Maria di Monte Santo in Rome; oil-painting from the Palazzo at Bracciano now in the Palazzo Odescalchi in Rome, where there are also many other memorials, among them the death mask of the Pope (reproduced in Berthier's edition of the *Vita* of LIPPI); marble busts in the duomo of Como and in the Ambrosiana at Milan. Marble relief portraits (Italian workmanship) in the Museum of Arts at Copenhagen and in the Historical Museum of the city of Vienna (Room IV.); the most beautiful marble relief portrait (life-size, Roman School), in the Palais Lanckoronski, Vienna; oil-painting by Baciccia (THIEME, XIII., 277) in the Accademia di S. Luca in Rome; oil-painting by an unknown artist in the sacristy of S. Carlo al Corso, Rome. For the half-length portrait in the Pinakothek of Munich, formerly supposed to be that of Clement IX., see Voss, 600. For the portrait of the Pope as Cardinal in the Museo Poldi-Pezzoli in Milan, cf. A. CASTAN, in *Courrier de l'art*, 1890, Nr. 42. Copperplate engravings by Alb. Clouet (in GUARNACCI, I., 106), and by Vandersypen (Fideikommissbibliothek of the Imperial House, Vienna). Cf. also DRUGULIN, *Porträt Katalog*, Leipzig, 1860, 9828/30.

joyous occasions; his mood was often melancholy¹ for he felt the weight of his high dignity doubly by reason of his scrupulous conscientiousness.² This, as well as his health, accounts for the fact that, as a rule, he only said Mass on Sunday,³ and he never did so without first going to confession.⁴ Another consequence of his scrupulosity was an occasional pettiness⁵; and the fact that he habitually proceeded with extreme caution and only came to a decision with difficulty⁶; but once he had made up his mind nothing could induce him to change it.⁷ Another of his peculiarities was that in view of the self-seeking which he had repeatedly observed in the persons around him, he was unwilling to trust anyone or to take advice, and wished as much as possible to do everything himself.⁸

These characteristics had their good as well as their bad side, all the more so as Innocent XI., an unworldly ascetic who had never been a nuncio and had at no time been out of Italy, was but very inadequately acquainted with the political conditions of Europe.⁹ He also lacked knowledge of

¹ See MARRACCI, 242; LIPPI, 188.

² See above, p. 13. Cf. LIPPI, 188, 191; **Avviso* of July 30, 1678, Vatican Library.

³ See MICHAUD, I., 157.

⁴ See MARRACCI, 243.

⁵ Cardinal Omodei remonstrated with the Pope on this account; see **Avviso* of February 6, 1677, Vatican Library.

⁶ Cf. *Report of the Marchese Montauti of September 22, 1676, State Archives, Florence. This "naturale e longhissima irresolutezza fa dire a molti che *Ars longa, vita brevis*", says the **Avviso* of April 23, 1678, Vatican Library. Cf. the *Reports of Alberto Caprara to Leopold I. of June 24, July 1, 8, 29, 1684, State Archives, Vienna.

⁷ See LIPPI, 189.

⁸ Cf. **Avviso* of April 16, 1678, Vatican Library, and the complaints in the report of Alberto Caprara to Leopold I. of July 1, 1684, *loc. cit.* See also the opinion of Giov. Lando in BROSCHE, I., 446.

⁹ This deficiency was immediately taken advantage of against him. A year after his election to the papacy an **Epistola* (State Library, Munich, *Cod. ital.*, 178, p. 987 *seq.*), defends the Pope

men, so that it was easy to deceive him. There were likewise serious gaps in his theological training, hence the Quietist Molinos and his high patrons found it an easy task to mislead him.¹ The Pope's strong point was his lofty conception of the rights of the Church; he would rather be flayed alive, he told his confessor, than allow them to be even slightly curtailed.² But in his audiences, notwithstanding his gravity, he was ever courteous and kind. Towards the diplomatists he observed great reserve; when delicate matters were touched upon he would remain silent, or smile, without renouncing his own view.³ For the improvement of the situation in the Papal States his experience and skill in financial questions were of the greatest importance, as was for his general policy the conviction which he had arrived at whilst still a Cardinal, namely, that everything depended on the restoration of peace between the European States and the uniting of them in a league against the enemies of Christendom and European civilization, the Turks.

The Secretariate of State received its modern constitution under Innocent XI. On September 23rd, 1676, the office was bestowed on Cardinal Alderano Cibo,⁴ though without the position of a Cardinal nephew and Superintendent of the Pontifical States. Cibo's memory is kept alive by his sumptuous chapel in S. Maria del Popolo.⁵ He was an old by quoting Sixtus V., Gregory XIV. and Innocent IX., who also had never acted as nuncios yet had been very good Popes.

¹ Cf. below, Chap. V.

² See MARRACCI, 247.

³ Cf. the French Reports in MICHAUD, III., 122. Concerning the initial ordering of audiences, see the Report of October 8, 1676, in COLOMBO, 15.

⁴ See **Avviso* of September 26, 1676, Vatican Library; Luccan Report of 1687, in *Studi e docum.*, XXII., 236. Concerning the State Secretariate, see RICHARD, in *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XI. (1910), 740 seqq.

⁵ The chapel is one of the earliest creations of Carlo Fontana. The altar piece, "Mary and the four Fathers of the Church," was painted by C. Maratta who did also some other work for Cibo, such as the famous "Death of Mary", now in the Villa

friend of the Pope, and despite the intrigues of Queen Christine and Cardinal Altieri,¹ and occasional misunderstandings,² he maintained himself in office during the whole of Innocent XI.'s pontificate. The Pope held him in high esteem,³ the only thing he disapproved of being the fact that Cibo was not insensible to the favours of foreign Powers. That Cibo, even as Secretary of State, continued to receive a French pension, was kept from the Pope's knowledge⁴; but a feeling that he was on too intimate terms with France led the Pope to give his confidence rather to the Secretary of the Cypher, Agostino Favoriti, who had also long been one of the Pope's friends.⁵ When Favoriti died, on November 14th, 1682,⁶ he was succeeded by his kinsman, Lorenzo Casoni. This clever man found it all the easier to reduce Cibo to being no more than nominally in charge of affairs, as the Cardinal could not stand a prolonged stay in the overheated rooms in which the Pope had the full text of all letters read to him.⁷

Albani; see Voss, 598. The two large lateral paintings are by Daniel Seiter. Cf. BELLORI, III., 174 *seq.*; Voss, 590 *seq.*; ANGELI, *Chiese*, 374; GURLITT, *Barockbau*, 438; MUSSI, in *Arte e storia*, XXXV. (1916), 114.

¹ Cf. about this the *Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio of December 5, 1676, State Archives, Vienna, and the **Avissi* of January 9, 16 and 30, 1677, Vatican Library.

² Of such mention is made already in the **Avviso* of January 9, 1677, Vatican Library. An **Avviso* of February 6, 1677 (*ibid.*) even says that the Cardinal was about to hand in his resignation.

³ During an illness Innocent XI. visited him personally; see **Avviso* of February 18, 1679, Vatican Library.

⁴ See GÉRIN, in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX. (1876), 439 *seq.*

⁵ Cf. GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*; RICHTER, in the *Zeitschr. für westfäl. Gesch.*, LII., 2 (1894), 140 *seq.*

⁶ Cf. the *Reports of Cardinal Carlo Pio of November 14 and 22, 1682, State Archives, Vienna. Concerning the tomb of Favoriti in S. Maria Maggiore, see FORCELLA, XI., 83. Cf. BRINKMANN, *Barock-Bozzetti*, 134, where Favoriti is styled a Cardinal by mistake.

⁷ See the *Reports of Cardinal Carlo Pio of October 20, 1685, August 17 and October 12, 1686, *loc. cit.*; cf. also the Luccan

Among the other trusted advisers of Innocent XI. mention must be made of the Auditor and subsequent Secretary of Memorials, Giambattista de Luca, and the Secretary of Briefs, John Walter Slusius. At the beginning of 1679 people talked of the triumvirate of Cibo, De Luca and Slusius.¹

De Luca, born at Venosa, was a celebrated canonist.² He was believed to be the instigator of the stern reforms in the Orders carried out by the Pope; he was, accordingly, an object of hatred for many.³ Slusius, a native of Liège and a former *Provisor* of the Anima, in the Church of which he found his last resting place, was credited with rough manners, but he was esteemed for his uprightness, his wide scholarship, his untiring industry and his prodigious memory.⁴ The Romans were greatly struck by the fact that Slusius, who was raised to the purple with De Luca, did not obtain a single benefice during his forty years of service, and was not even granted a dispensation from the recitation of the Breviary.⁵ As Datarius and Secret Almoner the Pope appointed Stefano Agostini, and as Secretary of Briefs Mario Spinola. Clement X.'s Maggiordomo, Orazio Mattei, was also retained in his

Report of 1687, *loc. cit.* Already on June 24, 1684, Cardinal Carlo Pio *wrote of Casoni: "É nella confidenza ed è il sol' huomo ch' entri con libertà al Papa e si trattenga seco longamente, ed in ogni occasione di volere fare rappresentare alcuna cosa è il migliore." State Archives, Vienna. For Casoni's relations with the Jesuits, cf. DUBRUEL, *En plein conflict*, 30, 57.

¹ Cf. *Avviso of January 7, 1679, Vatican Library.

² See MORONI, XIX., 220, XLIV., 190; D. RAPOLLA, *Il Card. G. B. Di Luca*, Portici, 1899. (The author writes "Di Luca" and defends this in the *Riv. d. coll. arald.*, VII. (1909), 107.)

³ See the **Avvisi* of July 10 and December 24, 1677, *loc. cit.* Luca, who towards the end of his life got into serious conflict with Cibo apropos of the reform of the coinage, died on February 5, 1683; see the *Reports of Cardinal C. Pio of January 30 and February 6, 1683, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ See SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 490; BROM, *De nederlandsche kardinalen*, Leiden, 1911, 241 *seqq.*

⁵ See SCHMIDLIN, *loc. cit.*

post ; when he became a Cardinal in 1686, he was succeeded, two years later, by Ercole Visconti.¹

Innocent XI. also held in high esteem his confessor Ludovico Marracci, the preacher of the palace Bonaventura da Recanati, several Oratorians, especially Mariano Sozzini, Bonaventure of Barcelona, a member of the convent founded on the Palatine in 1675,² and finally, Cardinal Ottoboni, by reason of his experience in the business of the Church. The Pope's personal physician was the celebrated Giovanni Maria Lancisi who taught at the Roman University and was given a canonry at S. Lorenzo in Damaso in 1688.³ Lancisi was a man after Innocent XI.'s own heart. The piety of the noted physician is attested by the accurate transcriptions made by him of the Lenten sermons preached by Padre Casalini in the above named basilica in 1691.⁴

The Pope showed the utmost consideration for the persons of his entourage, both those who held high offices and those who discharged the humbler duties. If he sent for any official, he was wont to add that he should come if he was not otherwise engaged. But he would stand no moral delinquency or any act of venality. Women were forbidden to enter the Vatican ; the only exception he made to this rule was for sovereigns, as for instance, Queen Christine.⁵

¹ See LIPPI, 40 *seq.* ; MORONI, XLI., 268 *seq.* On Mario Spinola, see BERTHIER, *Epist.*, IV. On the Briefs of Innocent XI., see WIRZ, XXVI.

² Cf. E. CRIVELLI, *Vita del b. Bonaventura di Barcellona*, Quaracchi, 1901.

³ The taking possession of the canonry on November 21, 1688, is recorded in the *Registri del Capitolo di SS. Lorenzo e Damaso.

⁴ See " *Ristretto delle prediche del P. Casalini fatto dal solo averlo udito nel Ornaresimale del 1691 nella basilica dei SS. Lorenzo e Damaso dal canonico G.M.L. ", Bib. Lancisiana, Rome. Cf. A. CANEZZA in *Corriere d'Italia* of March 28, 1922. Lancisi " fa pubbliche lezioni colle necroscopie ", it is stated in E. CURATOLO, *L'arte di Juno Lucina in Roma*, Roma, 1905, 127.

⁵ See LIPPI, 41, 190. Cf. the *Reports of Montanti of December 4 and 19, 1676, State Archives, Florence ; *Aviso of May 13,

Innocent XI. carried the strictness and simplicity of his private life into the administration of the State and the Church.¹ His first care was the improvement of the financial situation. It was high time that in this respect an end was put to conditions which threatened to lead to bankruptcy. In 1677 expenditure amounted to 2,582,296 scudi but was only met with a fixed revenue of 2,408,500 scudi ; thus there was a deficit of 173,796 scudi.² Innocent XI. at once took strong measures. His own personal expenses were reduced to the strictly necessary ; he renounced all taxes (*sportula*) in favour of the Camera,³ insisted on a wise economy in every department of the administration and suppressed the office of a General of the Church and other useless honorary posts which had, for the most part, only benefited the papal nephews. In this way he effected, by a single stroke, a saving of 100,000 scudi a year.⁴

The College of the Apostolic Secretaries, which consisted of six members at the time of Calixtus III. and had gradually grown to twenty, was reduced to two members on April 1st,

1679, Vatican Library, and **Avviso Marescotti* of November 17, 1685 : " Ha ordinato S.S. a tutti suoi familiari che si trovino alle loro stanze in Palazzo a mezz' hora di notte, nè possano uscire più doppo detta hora." Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

¹ Grants of favours were rare ; see the **Avvisi* of February 6, 1677, and February 12, 1678, Vatican Library. Because the Pope answered petitions mostly in the Milanese dialect with the word "Minga!" he was called "Mingone"; see ADEMOLLO, *Teatri*, 149.

² See **Entrate ed uscite della R. Camera Apost.*, 1677, *Cod.* 34, A. 7, Bibl. Corrini, Rome. The manuscript of the Bibl. Albani, Rome, quoted by RANKE (III., 172) (but no longer extant) gives somewhat different figures.

³ See LIPPI, 44.

⁴ The *Pronostico* in DÖLLINGER, *Beiträge*, III., 444-5 (*cf.* the **Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of October 3, 1676, State Archives, Vienna, and LIPPI, 45*), reckons the economies at 200,000 scudi. But this is an exaggeration. An accurate account in the Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, f. 3, n. 3336, puts all the economies at 100,835 scudi.

1678.¹ However, fresh debts of the Camera were for ever coming to light.² According to a statement by a well-informed contemporary, it was found that they amounted to fifty millions.³ But the Pope did not despond. In February, 1679, he was able to confound his self-appointed critics with the information that he had paid five million scudi towards the extinction of the debt and that he had balanced his budget.⁴ In 1684, in order to meet the expenditure for the war against the Turks, he reduced the interest of the debt of the Camera (*Monti*) from four to three per cent.⁵ In this way, and by means of fresh taxation, he succeeded not only in getting a revenue equal to expenditure, but even a surplus.

Innocent XI.'s financial policy, which, however, did not always make sufficient allowance for the paying capacity of

¹ See *Bull.* XIX., 88. Cf. the **Avissi* of January 22 and April 9, 1678, Vatican Library, and MORONI, LXIII., 261. The measure taken by the Pope, which was strongly, but unjustly, attacked by the interested parties, was justified in a "**Discorso sopra la soppressione de' Secretarii Apost. per Innocenzo XI.*", quoted by RANKE (III., 203*) without indication of place; there we also find a discussion of the mode of compensation. The "*Discorso*" is found in *Cod.* 35, D. 2, Bibl. Corsini, Rome. With reference to this, see *Civiltà Cattolica*, 1906, III., 68 seq.

² The two **Avvisi* of June 5, 1677, report: "Il Sommo Pontefice si infastidisce assai, perchè vede, che non li giova radunare denari, per far alcun bene a' sudditi, e se ne vede tuttavia troncane le strade, perchè si scoprono sempre più debiti della Camera dal 74 in quà, onde non bastano per pagare quel che S. S. si trova avanzato in 8 mesi, perchè vi sono 280^m sc. di debito anco dell'annona. — Negli avanzi fatti dal Pontefice si ritrovano sino or posti da parte 400^m sc. de' proprii, non havendone spesi che 100^m in tutte le fonzioni fatte, dachè è Papa, ma con tutto ciò la Camera non si può riporre in piedi, ritrovandosi il depositario con debiti sino agli occhi." According to the **Avviso* of June 18, 1677, a fresh debt had been incurred. Vatican Library.

³ See the "**Epistola*" of the State Library, Munich, quoted above, p. 17, n. 9.

⁴ See **Avviso* of February 18, 1679, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See LIPPI, 46; MICHAUD, I., 321 seq., *Civ. Catt.*, 1906, III., 601 seq.

the people and for the safeguarding of production, had for its result that in addition to a yearly surplus of 300,000 scudi, the public exchequer disposed of one million scudi in ready money. "Since Sixtus V.," says an opponent of the papacy, "no Pope had taken such intelligent interest in the revenues of the Pontifical States and reaped such important results from his solicitude."¹

The financial situation benefited to an extraordinary degree from the determination with which Innocent XI. refrained from every form of nepotism. On the very evening of his election he sent for Livio Odescalchi, the son of his brother Carlo, whose guardian he had been² and to whom he was greatly attached. He explained to his nephew that he must not expect any revenues, but that he should continue to live quietly as a private person and not meddle in the business of government.³ In vain did great personages and ambassadors importune the Pope that his nephew should at least be assigned apartments at the palace. Innocent replied that precisely because he was fond of Livio he did not wish him to endure for ever the pain of not receiving any favours.⁴ It was in vain that ambassadors⁵ and Romans alike looked out for some serious token of the papal favour for the nephew. Equally in vain did the latter hope for a time that he would be raised to the purple.⁶ This was not to be thought of in

¹ See BROSCHE, I., 447. Cf. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 2, 62.

² See BOJANI, I., 7 seq.

³ See *Pronostico*, loc. cit., 444; LIPPI, 4, 6. C. L. Scappi calls Livio in his *Report of October 3, 1676 (State Archives, Bologna) "giovanetto che non fa figura". To the Senator Erba in Milan the Pope sent this message: "che Innocenzio XI. non haveva parenti, e se gli haveva, non voleva haverli, e la sera disse al sig. D. Livio, suo nipote, ciò che haveva ordinato . . . di dire al senator Erba soggiungendo, nè dovrà dolersi, mentre trattiamo Noi nella medesima forma." Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio of November 21, 1676, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ See LIPPI, 47.

⁵ Cf. the *Reports of Marchese Montauti of September 29 and October 13, 1676, State Archives, Florence.

⁶ Cf. for this the *Reports of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of

view of the strictness of the Pope who, for instance, insisted on Livio returning a present he had received from the Duchess of Rossano.¹ At first he was allowed to see the Pope daily, but only to recite the Rosary with him; later on his visits were more and more restricted.² The Romans were amazed, hence when they wanted to wish someone bad luck they used to say: "May you fare like Livio Odescalchi!"³

The Pope observed a like strictness towards his other relatives. Some of these were in real want; to them the Pope granted a subsidy, but out of his own patrimony for, as he observed, he did not consider himself the master, but merely the steward of the resources of the Holy See and he felt that he must use them impartially and equitably and not according to the dictates of his affection for his kinsfolk.⁴ Innocent XI.'s great solicitude for the welfare of his subjects appears from the fact that he was unwearied in works of charity,⁵ and he shrank from no expense for the purpose of importing wheat from abroad, especially from Holland and Dantzic when bad harvests occurred during the first years of his pontificate.⁶ For the draining of the Pontine Marshes the

December 23, 1679, January 27, 1680, November 8 and 15, 1681, *loc. cit.* Later on the rumour was revived; see **Avviso Marescotti*, of December 14, 1686, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

¹ See LIPPI, 47.

² Cf. the **Avvisi* of January 7, 1679, Vatican Library, the report of P. Negri of July 26, 1679, in COLOMBO, 11, and **Avviso Marescotti* of January 12, 1686, *loc. cit.*

³ See MARRACCI, 241.

⁴ See LIPPI, 47 *seq.* The strictness of Innocent XI. towards his relatives showed itself also in his private correspondence with his family; cf. the short letter of condolence, full of supernatural spirit, in the *Epist.*, ed. BERTHIER, I., 279.

⁵ Cf. MARRACCI in BERTHIER, 252 *seq.*; NOVAES, XI., 77.

⁶ See the **Report* of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of November 12, 1678, *loc. cit.*; LIPPI, 51 *seq.* Cf. BOJANI, II., 578 *seqq.*; BENIGNI, 61. Inundations of the Tiber are mentioned in the **Avviso* of April 24, 1677, Vatican Library, and the **Avvisi Marescotti* of November 9 and 16, 1686, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele,

Pope had recourse to the services of the Dutch engineer Cornelius Janszoon Meyer, though this time too the undertaking proved a failure.¹ He also sought to raise the finances of the communes of the Pontifical States. In Rome he took steps with a view to the repression of the evils of mendicancy² and usury; the latter had been practised from time immemorial especially by the Jews of the Ghetto.³ On the

Rome. Cardinal Carlo Pio relates in his *letter to Leopold I. of December 14, 1686, *loc. cit.*, in what fatherly manner the Pope cared for those who had suffered loss. A “ *Relazione sul Tevere present. da Innocenzo Boschi ai Card. Colonna e Azzolini deputati del Papa sopra la nuova navigazione del Tevere ”, 1677, December 16, in *Ottob.* 2479, p. 124 *seq.*, Vatican Library. Monetary ordinances under Innocent XI. in GARAMPI, 160 *seqq.*

¹ See RUHEMANN, 136; KORTHALS, in *Mededeelingen v. h. Nederl. Hist. Institut te Rome*, VI. (1926), 201 *seq.* Cf. HOOGEWERFF in *Oud-Holland*, XXXVIII. (1920), 89 *seq.*; “ *Cornelio Meyer ingegnere Olandese ” to Innocent XI. on the draining of the swamps. On the reverse is written: “ Alla Congr. delle paludi Pontine per il voto per l'em. Chigi.” Appendices: (1) On the efforts of Alexander VII. (see Vol. XXXI., p. 30, n. 2); (2) Report on what happened afterwards (Cardinal Carpegna); (3) “ La visita fatta del 1677 dall' abate Boschi e Cornelio Meyer d'ordine d'Innocenzo XI.”; (4) “ Considerazioni fatte dopo detta visita, sentiti i più vecchi e pratici del paese ”; (5) “ Scrittura tradotta dal spagnuolo fatta dal colonello D. Fernando Gravemberg, ingegnere regio Fiamingo,” who in 1679, by order of the Neapolitan merchants, came to reside at Sezza in view of the draining of the swamps, planned by those merchants. (Bibl. Chigi, Rome, H. II., 43, p. 514 *seq.*) Cornelius Meyer was also consulted about the inundations of the Tiber (**ibid.*, 172 *seq.*). His plans for rendering the Tiber navigable (*cf.* his “ L'arte di restituire a Roma la tralasciata navigazione del Tevere ”, Roma, 1685), and for draining the Pontine swamps failed on account of the opposition of the commissary of the Camera; see NICOLAI, *De' bonificamenti delle Terre Pontine*, Roma, 1800, 145; HOOGEWERFF in *Bullet. v. h. Nederl. Oudheid.*, 1914, 205.

² Cf. the **Avvisi* of February 20, 1677, and August 20, 1678, *loc. cit.*

³ See **Avviso* of February 5, 1678, *loc. cit.*; LIPPI, 52 *seqq.*

other hand he energetically protected the Jews when they were threatened by the populace in August, 1686.¹ He insisted with inflexible severity on a sound administration of justice, though he did not succeed in suppressing all abuses in this respect.² One of the chief duties of princes, he was wont to say, was the administration of justice, not the granting of favours. Another of his maxims was that God appointed the sovereigns for the sake of the people, not the people for the sovereigns.³

The Romans were less agreeably impressed by the Pope's measures, as numerous as they were stringent, for the reform of public morality⁴ and for the restriction of luxury which had grown enormously since the days of Urban VIII.⁵ For so ascetic a Pope as Innocent XI. this was an abomination. How strict his views were appears from the fact that he had the semi-exposed bosom of Guido Reni's Madonna painted over.⁶ No small stir was caused by the Pope's fight against the unseemly fashions of the Roman ladies. Mainly in

¹ See **Avviso Marescotti* of August 31, 1686, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. **Avviso* of February 8, 1677, *loc. cit.*; *Diar. Europ.*, XXXV., 9; LIPPI, 88; MARRACCI, 249 *seq.* List of executions in *Arch. Rom.*, IV., 442 *seqq.* The account of the Marchesa Massimi of the execution of the Brothers Missori, condemned to death for murder (1685) in *Arch. stor. Rom.*, V., 353 *seqq.* Cf. P. COLONNA, *Fr. Massimo*, Rome, 1911, 33 *seqq.*

³ See the notes of Count de Gubernatis in COLOMBO, 52.

⁴ Examples of the corruption of morals are given in the **Avvisi* of October 22 and 29 and November 5, 1678, *loc. cit.*

⁵ In a memoir written, circa 1670 (still under Clement X.), about the necessary reforms in Rome, the Oratorian Mariano, Sozzini says: "In quarant' anni ch'io sono in Roma il lusso è cresciuto evidentemente a gran segno." A palace opposite the Collegio Clementino, which once accommodated two Cardinals, is now occupied by only one prelate. We are told here, among other things, that Cardinal Bandini introduced in Rome the "sedie di velluto" (manuscript of the monastery of SS. Quaranta, Rome). This memoir had a great influence on the reforms of Innocent XI.

⁶ See BELLORI, III., 176.

consequence of the example of Mazarin's niece, Maria Mancini,¹ the French fashion had crept in for women to bare their arms and neck in an unbecoming manner. When warnings proved useless Innocent XI. published an edict by the terms of which only public courtesans were allowed to follow such a fashion.² Great was his indignation when he nevertheless saw at S. Maria in Campitelli a great many ladies of Roman society dressed in the new fashion! A fresh edict ensued but this too was laughed at.³ But the Pope was not to be beaten. Preachers were instructed to urge a return to the old Roman mode, and when this too failed to bring about a change, he ordered in the following year, that unbecomingly attired women should be refused Holy Communion.⁴ How deeply rooted the abuse had become appears from the fact that edicts against it had to be published in the years 1681,⁵ 1683,⁶

¹ Cf. L. PEREY [L. HERPIN], *Louis XIV. et M. Mancini*, Paris, 1894, and: *Une princesse Romaine, ibid.*, 1896.

² See **Avviso* of April 23, 1678, *loc. cit.* Cf. CLEMENTI, *Carnevale*, 513.

³ See the *Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of August 6, 1678, *loc. cit.*, and **Avviso* of August 13, 1678, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See second **Avviso* of August 13, 1678, and **Avviso* of March 11, 1679, *loc. cit.*; *Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of November 18, 1679, *loc. cit.* According to the "Ristretto della congregazione tenuta contro l'immodestia delle donne", the Pope's confessor and other theologians were for the application of temporal penalties as spiritual penalties would do more harm than good. *Cod. ital.*, 552, p. 345 *seqq.* State Library, Munich.

⁵ See the *Reports of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of July 26 and August 6, 1681 (prohibition to absolve persons immodestly dressed), *loc. cit.*

⁶ See **Avvisi Marescotti* of July 10 and 17, October 30, November 27 and December 4 and 10, 1683, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome. Text of the *edict of November 30, 1683, in *Editti*, V., 60, p. 239, Papal Secret Archives. Cf. the *Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of December 4, 1683, *loc. cit.*

1685,¹ 1686² and 1687.³ In the end an improvement did take place.⁴

In other ways also the Pope sought to raise the moral level of his capital,⁵ by dealing with the vice of gambling⁶ and by measures against abuses connected with the stage and music. That he was not a man for half-measures is shown by his conduct on the occasion of the very first carnival; it was with the utmost difficulty that he was prevailed upon to allow the representation of two operettas in a small theatre, but no women were allowed to take part in it. The new theatre, erected at great expense, was turned into a grain store.⁷ The Pope resolutely upheld his prohibition of public operatic representations for money and even saw the private theatres with displeasure and, of course, much more so the amusements of the carnival. In view of the seriousness of

¹ **Avviso Marescotti* of July 21, 1685, *loc. cit.*

² **Avviso Marescotti* of July 13, 1686, *loc. cit.* *Edict of June 22, 1686, *Editti*, V., 7, p. 14, *loc. cit.*

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of January 25 and March 1, 1687, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See **Avviso Marescotti* of August 19, 1684, *loc. cit.*, and P. A. Pancetti, **Stato di Roma (1718-1721)*, *Cod. ital.*, 93, State Library, Munich.

⁵ Decrees against prostitutes and adulterers are frequently recorded; see **Avvisi* of May 29 and September 4, 1677, January 1, August 27, September 24, 1678, *loc. cit.* *Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of September 26, 1682, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See *Report of Montauti of October 6, 1676, State Archives, Florence; *Report of Card. Carlo Pio of October 10, 1676, *loc. cit.*; **Avviso* of December 31, 1678, *loc. cit.*; **Avviso Marescotti* of December 8, 1685, *loc. cit.* Cf. LIPPI, 64 *seq.*

⁷ Montauti reports on December 30, 1676: " *Finalmente ha acconsentito N. S. che si recitino in questo carnevale due operette in musica, una delle quali si rappresentò due anni sono, in un piccolo teatro, che sarà mezzo publico e si pagherà qualche cosa all' entrare, a condicione però che non si cantino donne. Ma, all' incontro, ha ordinato che si riduca a uso di granai il teatro nobile che si era fatto con molta spesa, non volendo in modo alcuno luoghi fermi di recite. Et passate le feste, si comincerà a demolire." State Archives, Florence.

the times he forbade the latter altogether in the years 1684, 1688 and 1689. In the other years he allowed them but took successful measures to prevent all excesses.¹ His scrupulosity appears from the fact that even in the seminaries the customary representation of harmless plays during the carnival met with some objection.² To this feature of his character must likewise be ascribed the prohibition, under severe penalties, for women to take music lessons from men.³ The customary boat races on the Tiber on the feast of St. Roch were likewise forbidden and the money thus saved was assigned to an orphanage.⁴

The ridicule which these measures called forth, and the laments that life in Rome was losing its ancient brilliance,⁵ Innocent XI. bore with characteristic equanimity⁶; he bore in the same way the ingratitude of the eternally dissatisfied Romans who completely forgot the sacrifices made by the Pope in order to provision the city during the year of scarcity 1679, and his solicitude in providing bread of good quality.⁷ Only when those who scattered insulting publications against him exceeded all bounds did he at last take stern measures.⁸

¹ A number of details in CLEMENTI, *Carnevale*, 511 *seqq.*, 526, 530 *seqq.*, and ADEMOLLO, *Teatri*, 149 *seqq.*

² See CLEMENTI, 523, 529.

³ *Edict of May 4, 1686, *Editti*, V., 7, p. 104, Papal Secret Archiv s. Cf. **Avviso* of May 11, 1686, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ *Chirografo di Innocenzo XI. of 1681, *Cod. Ottob.* 2483, p. 240 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

⁵ Cf. **Avviso Marescotti* of December 30, 1684, *loc. cit.* The ambassadors continued to display great splendour; this was especially the case at the delivery of the *Chinea* of 1684; cf. C. PADIGLIONE, *Della Chinea e del modo come veniva offerta ai Romani Pontefici*, Napoli, 1911.

⁶ See MARRACCI, 250.

⁷ See the **Avvisi* of March 11, August 12 and October 7, 1679, *loc. cit.*

⁸ See the **Avvisi* of July 8 and 14, 1679, *loc. cit.* The collection of pasquinades mentioned here " *Il Vaticano languente dopo la morte di Clemente X. con i remedii purparati da Pasquino e Marforio per guarirlo, stampato ad istanza degli amici 1677 "

The growth of Rome up to the last quarter of the 17th century may be seen in Falda's plan of the city dedicated by him to Innocent XI. During the Pope's pontificate of thirteen years the population did not grow, on the contrary, it rather decreased.¹ The city's treasure of antiquities was enriched by various finds,² but also suffered serious loss when in 1677

is ascribed to G. Leti. In 1685 the Pope had to proceed against the excesses of the writers of *Avvisi*; see **Avvisi Marescotti* of May 12, June 2, July 28, and August 25, and September 1, 1685, *loc. cit.*

¹ The population in 1676 was 127,907, it fell in 1681 to 119,722; it rose again slowly to 126,440 in the year 1689; see *Studi e docum.*, XII., 181.

² About the *Scavi per l'apertura della Via Graziosa nel 1684*, see LANCIANI, in *Bullet. d. commiss. archeol. com.*, XXV., 2. The **Avviso Marescotti* of January 26, 1686, reports: "Il S. Duca Santi havendo fatto cavare con la permissione della Camera et assistenza d'un ministro 12 miglia lontano da Roma per la strada della Colonna, si è principiato a trovare alcune statue superbissime antiche, tra quali sin' hora si vedono quelle di Agripina et altra di Claudio Nerone scolpite da eccelso scalpello dell' antichità, et hieri appunto l' Em.^{mo} D' Estrées con l' ambasciatore suo fratello si portarono con alcuni virtuosi Francesi a riconoscerle con molta lor sodisfattione." *Ibid.*, March 30, 1686: "*Fra antichità Romane essendosi ritrovate nel giardino de' SS. Mathei due bellissime tavole di porfido negro, la cui pietra è unica e di singolare bellezza; furono ambe comprate dal S. card. D' Estrées, a' quali li fa far li piedi di bronzo dorato con gran spesa sotto la direttione del S. Domenico Guido scultore, e subito che saranno perfettionate, saranno da S. Em. mandate a presentare alla Maestà christianissima grand' amatore delle rarità." *Ibid.*, April 13, 1686: "*Nel fabricarsi una casa dietro il Monte di Pietà da un tale che fu già agiutante di studio del fu card. Taia, ha trovato ne' fondamenti una bellissima statua di una Venere della vera e buona maniera antica, e poscia un'altra più piccola et un vaso di bronzo con quantità de marmi e pietre fine, sperando di ritrovare altre cose di valore." *Ibid.*, April 10, 1683: "*S'è trovato in distanza a 3 miglia da Roma per la strada de Marino un bellissimo cimiterio con quantità grande de corpi Ss. de martiri, i quali con gran concorso vengon hora venerati dalla

the Grand Duke of Tuscany, Cosimo III., removed the Medici Venus, the "Skater" and the "Wrestlers" from his Villa on the Pincio to Florence.¹ Demand for antique objects remained great and trade was lively. To prevent further losses a decree was published forbidding the export of antiques.²

Building activity was slack in Rome during the pontificate of Innocent XI. Besides the palaces Muti-Papazzurri and Colonna di Sonnino,³ work was continued on the palace for the papal officials on Monte Citorio. The Pope took such interest in these buildings that he was induced, as a very exceptional thing, to inspect them in person, as well as the

curiosità e divotione del popolo." Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome.

¹ See REUMONT, *Toscana*, I., 604. An **Avviso* of August 12, 1679, reports: "Un fulmine, che cadde mercordì sul mezzo giorno, diede nella Colonna Antonina di Piazza Colonna e l'ha dannificata notabilmente, havendola non solamente scrostata in 3 luoghi e buttato abasso alcuni pezzi di quei bellissimo rilievi, ma anco fattavi una picciola apertura et una maggiore nella base di essa." Vat. Library.

² See LEMONNIER, *L'art au temps de Louis XIV.*, Paris, 1911, 112 *seq.*; *L'arte*, XVI., 5 *seq.* In a *Cifra for the nuncio in Paris, dated 1686, June 11 (*Nunziat. di Francia, 172a*, Papal Secret Archives), it is said that the Pope had to prohibit the exportation of thirty-six cases of statues for the King, because so many statues had already been taken away during his reign. From the *Cifra of September 17, 1686 (*ibid.*), it is manifest that the statues were destined for the most part for merchants. Cf. *Mél. archéol.*, XXX., 58. That the Pope was also very particular that no unauthorized excavations should be made, is clear from the following *Report of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I., dated January 19, 1686 (State Archives, Vienna): "La regina di Svezia con licenza di questo Mons. Tesoriere ha fatto aprire una cava a' Termini in faccia alla chiesa di Nostra Signora degli Angeli, dove le è stato supposto vi siano molte statue. Il Papa fece viva doglianza col S. card. Cibo che si rivoltasse Roma senza sua licenza. Il card. si scusò col non haverlo saputo."

³ See ESCHER, 32.

Hospice of St. Michael in the Trastevere founded by his kinsman Tommaso Odescalchi.¹ Livio Odescalchi founded the church of S. Galla.²

Among other new churches mention must be made in the first place of Bernini's beautiful rotunda, S. Andrea al Quirinale, erected by the Jesuits.³ The two splendid Jesuit churches in Rome received their internal decoration at this time; in the Gesù, Giovan Battista Gaulli, surnamed Il Bacciccia, depicted on the soffit of the central aisle the triumph of the name of Jesus⁴; at S. Ignazio that virtuoso of perspective,⁵ the lay brother Andrea dal Pozzo, adorned

¹ See **Avvisi Marescotti* of October 13 and 29, 1685, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome; also for the construction of the "nuovo teatro di Tor di Nona."

² See *Inventario*, 253".

³ See GURLITT, 414; ANGELI, 37; FRASCHETTI, 400; the old church of S. Andrew, near S. Maria Maggiore, was demolished on account of its dilapidated condition; see GRISAR, *Rom*, I., 389.

⁴ The **Avviso* of August 12, 1679 (Vatican Library) records: when the decoration and gilding of the vault of the Gesù was finished, eight Cardinals and several good artists were invited to give their opinion, "che conclusero tutti, che sarebbe bellissima, se fossero pitture meno spropositate et di qualche altra mano." **Avviso* of January 6, 1680 (not 1683, as stated in THIEME, XIII., 276), State Archives, Vienna: "Nella chiesa di Gesù fu scoperta la pittura di quella volta fatta da Baciccio pittore fra primi di questa città, quale ha riportato un applauso universale sì per la vaghezza della pittura, come per la disposizione di diversi stucchi che hanno reso quell'opera maggiormente plausibile." **Avviso* of August 4, 1685 (*ibid.*): On the feast of S. Ignatius the unveiling of the ceiling of the chapel of this Saint, "tutta messa a oro e dipinta da Baciccio." Baciccia was at that time also busy at S. Silvestro, but his work there met with little approval; see **Avviso Marescotti* of January 6, 1685, *loc. cit.* Concerning Gaulli's activity in Rome, see *L'Arte*, 1916, 206 *seq.* Cf. THIEME, XIII., 276 *seqq.*

⁵ Cf. ILG, A. Pozzo in *Berichte des Altertumsvereins zu Wien*, XXIII. (1886); GURLITT, 454 *seq.*; VOSS, *Malerei*, 580; *Civ. Catt.*, 1922, II., 25 *seq.*; *Corriere d'Italia* of June 22, 1926. In

the vault of the central aisle with a picture of St. Ignatius' triumphant entry into heaven.¹ This celebrated work of Pozzo² surpasses that of Gaulli. Giacinto Brandi's fresco on the soffit of S. Carlo al Corso, representing the casting into hell of the fallen angels, was completed in 1679.³ The autumn of the same year saw the opening of the church of S. Maria di Monte Santo at the entrance to the Corso, erected by Cardinal Gastaldi. The chief object of admiration there was the chapel of Carlo Rossi with its pictures by Salvator Rosa.⁴ The chapel of S. Girolamo in S. Maria in Trastevere with its charming dome erected by Antonio Gherardi, also belongs to the period of Innocent XI., as does the gigantic picture on the ceiling of the principal room of the palazzo

the ceiling decoration of S. Ignazio, Pozzo extols the missionary activity of the Jesuits.

¹ See **Avviso Marescotti* of June 23, 1685 (*loc. cit.*): 'Questi Padri Gesuiti han scoperta la cùppola dipinta in prospettivo da uno de' loro Padri Savoiaro [sic!] nella chiesa di S. Ignatio del Collegio Rom., la quale riesce assai vaga et artificiosa, et credesi vi starà molti anni avanti risolvino di farla materialmente.' **Avviso Marescotti* of August 11, 1685 (*ibid.*): On the Sunday after the feast of S. Ignatius one could see in S. Ignazio "scoperta la fabrica nuova delle due cappelle laterali e dell'altare maggiore con la cùppola finta, fatta da un Padre della Compagnia di Gesù, famoso pittore di prospettive." SCHMERBER, *Ital. Malerei*, 215 *seq.*, who puts the completion in the year 1689, must be corrected accordingly.

² See Voss, 579.

³ Cf. besides TITI, 372, the accounts of the **Avvisi* of November 6, 1677 (State Archives, Vienna): "Si videro scoperte le bellissime pitture della tribuna, angoli della cùppola et una navata fatte nuovamente da Giacinto Brandi, che è uno de' famosissimi pittori di questa città." **Avviso* of November 11, 1679 (Vatican Library): "On Sunday the Pope visited the "chiesa di S. Carlo che resta adesso affatto finita e per ogni rispetto vien stimata una delle più belle di Roma." For Brandi, see Voss, 529. *Ibid.*, 593 and 601, about the gigantic altar-piece painted by Maratta, 1685-1690, for Cardinal Omodei. Cf. BELLORI, III., 179.

⁴ **Avviso* of September 9, 1679, Vatican Library.

Colonna, which is also the chief work of Giovanni Coli and Filippo Gherardi.¹

Innocent XI. himself did but little for the arts, though not from lack of interest. As a Cardinal he had had his titular church of SS. Cosmas and Damian decorated, as well as S. Maria de' Monti,² and as Pope he made provision for the protection of Raphael's frescoes in the Vatican.³ But the conditions of the period frustrated the hopes for building activities to which he had at first given rise.⁴ It is characteristic of him that by his orders Bernini transformed the Lateran palace into a home for the poor.⁵ The state of the finances required the utmost economy; to what lengths the Pope went in this respect appears from the fact that he would not appoint another architect for St. Peter's.⁶ Carlo Fontana obtained the post at a later date. Fontana was instructed by the Pope to make an accurate survey of the dome of St. Peter's; the examination demonstrated the baselessness of the current rumours about its insecurity. This survey led Fontana to write a comprehensive work on the basilica, which like the new impression of a similar work by Giovan Costaguti,⁷ was dedicated to the Pope.⁸ In this work Fontana

¹ See Voss, *Malerei*, 511.

² He would not allow that any inscription should record his merits; see LIPPI, 191.

³ See BELLORI, III., 177.

⁴ *Gazette, 1679, n. 6: "Le Pape pour faire subsister les pauvres de cette ville, a résolu de presser ceux qui sont obligez par des testaments à faire bâtir des églises et des chapelles d'y faire travailler incessamment; et mesme on dit qu'il veut faire achever la colonnade de St. Pierre, qui a esté commencée par Alexandre septième. *Nunziat. di Francia*, 160, Papal Secret Archives.

⁵ See FRASCHETTI, 398.

⁶ See *Letter of Cardinal Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of December 7, 1680, State Archives, Vienna.

⁷ COSTAGUTI, *Architettura di S. Pietro* (Reprint according to the edition of 1620), Roma, 1684. Cf. BIBLIOFILO, XXVII. (1925-26), 19 seq.

⁸ D. FREY, *Michelangelostudien*, Vienna, 1920, 99. The

suggested the extension of Bernini's colonnade as far as the Piazza Scossa Cavalli and its rounding off with a triumphal arch and a clock tower.¹ However, the execution of the plan could not be thought of in view of the economic straits of the Papal States. As early as the beginning of 1679 the Pontiff had refused permission to the Chapter of St. Peter's to complete the colonnade.²

Within the Vatican itself the Pope contented himself with various restorations.³ He instructed Carlo Fontana and Giovan Battista Centini to provide the second great fountain in the Piazza of St. Peter's with water from Bracciano.⁴ He also contributed to the restoration of the fountain near St. Mary Major,⁵ as well as that of S. Maria de' Monti.⁶ In 1676

magnificent Rotonda of the Jesuit College at Loyola was built according to the plans of Fontana; see BRAUN, *Spaniens alte Jesuitenkirchen*, Freiburg, 1913.

¹ *Arch. d'arte*, II. (1889), 142; ROSE, *Spätbarock*, 89; THIEME, XII., 171.

² The **Avviso* of January 28, 1679 (Vatican Library), which records the famine in Rome and in the Papal States, says: "Si è ricusato da S. B. di dare licenza al Capitolo di S. Pietro di potere abbellire la piazza col fabricare quel braccio, che gli manca, non regnando nel Pontefice l'ambitione di lasciare di se eterne memorie, ma la sola pietà, acciò nel fortificarsi la Camera con li contanti si possano fare l'esequie a quelli, che hoggi nel panolo di speranze si muoiono della fame."

³ **Avviso* of November 18, 1679 (*loc. cit.*): "Nella prossima settimana andò il Papa ad habitar al palazzo di S. Pietro, ove si son fatte per tal effetto riparationi, che ascendono a molte migliaia di scudi, in diversi luoghi, che minacciavano rovine, essendosi scoperto con tal occasione, che il maggior pericolo soprastava alla sala del Concistoro." Already in January, 1679, on the feast of the Chair of St. Peter, there occurred a **caduta accidentale* di alcune delle famose pitture del Buonarota (*Avviso* of January 21, 1679, *ibid.*). The arms of Innocent XI. in a chapel are mentioned by MORONI, VII., 154.

⁴ COSTAGUTI, *loc. cit.*, XIV.; FRASCHETTI, 396.

⁵ **Avviso* of November 26, 1678, Vatican Library.

⁶ *Inventario*, 18.

he had repairs carried out on the bridge of Quattro Capi.¹

If Innocent XI. did but little for the adornment of the city² and the advancement of the arts,³ his excuse was that more pressing claims, such as the need of remedying the food scarcity in the States of the Church and the struggle against the Turks, claimed all his resources.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, 256. On the bridge over the Paglia I read the following inscription: "Innocentii XI. P. M. iussu—Aquarum inundantium—Vi pontem hunc ab utroque—Latere dirutum Ioseph de—Aste Cam. Apost. dec. et—Viar. praeses reparari curavit—Ad compescendum quoque—Proruentium [?] aquarum—Impetum trabe—Atas interpositiones—Adauxit ut leniter inde per—Alveum percurrentes innoxiae—Redderentur. A. D. 1683."

² Beautiful views of Rome of the year 1683 by Van Witel (Vanvitelli) are to be seen in the Galleria of the Palazzo Corsini, Rome.

³ Innocent XI. presented to St. Peter's a valuable tapestry signed: Innocentius XI. A^o 1^o, which is still preserved in the treasury.

⁴ The works of fortification at Civitavecchia were carried out from necessity; see, besides the inscription in CALISSE, 474, the **Avvisi Marescotti* of April 9 and 24, 1689, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome; MICHAUD, I., 306.

CHAPTER II.

INNOCENT XI. AND THE DEFENCE AGAINST THE TURKISH PERIL—THE POPE'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE AMONG THE CHRISTIAN PRINCES—THE CONGRESS OF NYMEGUEN—FORMATION OF AN ANTI-TURKISH LEAGUE.

(1.)

A FEW weeks after the election of Innocent XI., viz. on October 30th, 1676 the death took place of the Turkish Grand Vizier, Ahmed Köprülü.¹ He was succeeded at the Porte by the man who had been for many years the soul of the re-awakened spirit of aggression against the West, Kara Mustafa, then about fifty years of age.² Mustafa was the son of a poor fruit merchant of Asia Minor. He grew up without any schooling whatever ; it was only at a later date, when he already held high office, that he learnt to read and write. Chance got him into the Seraglio where his ready grasp of things was noticed. An aptitude for affairs, knowledge of men and determination, led to his rise. He soon became indispensable to Sultan Mohammed IV. and his Grand Vizier Mohammed Köprülü, the powerful reformer of a State which had been in a condition of decline and disruption for half a century. Since the death, in 1661, of Mohammed Köprülü, Kara Mustafa had held under the latter's son and successor, Ahmed Köprülü, the post of Kaimakam, the highest office after that of Grand Vizier. The Venetian envoys Morosini and Civrano, who personally knew Kara Mustafa, describe him as a man of handsome and dignified appearance, genial

¹ On the general history of Turkey, *cf.* ZINKEISEN, IV. and V. ; HAMMER, III. ; IORGA, IV.—Chapter 2 was finished by ROB. LEIBER.

² According to the Report of Giovanni Morosini, the Venetian ambassador at the Porte in 1680, BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Turchia*, II., 207.

and extremely religious, though his real character was very different. They say that he was cunning, cruel, dissolute, venal, unjust and exceedingly covetous, haughty, and above all, an irreconcilable enemy of the Christians; a man, in short, born to be a scourge of the nations. His mind was the workshop in which were elaborated the plans the aim of which was the destruction of the Christian princes.¹ Terrifying tales circulated in the West about the intention of the all-powerful minister.² It was said that he was bent on the conquest of Pressburg, Vienna and Prague; after which he would march through Germany in order to measure himself with Louis XIV. on the banks of the Rhine. After defeating the latter he would hasten to Rome where he would stable the Sultan's horses in St. Peter's.³ Though fear of the Turks no doubt greatly magnified these rumours from the East,⁴ it is certain that the ambitious man had set his heart on the possessions of the Habsburgs, and probably on Italy also. The conquest of Candia in 1669, and the favourable issue of the war with Poland in 1676, considerably raised the hopes of the Turks: under the pressure of his Kaimakam, Ahmed Köprülü had secretly planned to invade the Emperor's territory the very next year, 1677.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, 207, 209, 259. Pietro Civrano's report is of the year 1682. KLOPP, *the year 1683*, pp. 49-51, 377.

² Morosini calls him (*loc. cit.*, 207) "imperatore d'effetti", "the actual sultan."

³ DALERAC, *Anecdotes de Pologne*, I., 74 seq., 83 seq., in DU HAMEL DE BREUIL in *Revue d'hist. dipl.*, VIII. (1894), 72. The Marquis de Saint-André-Montbrun also speaks of the designs of the Turks on Rome according to MICHAUD, II., 25 (without indication of source).

⁴ Kara Mustafa undertook the attack on Vienna only after he had assured himself of the neutrality of Louis XIV.; see below, p. 46. Cf. KÖHLER, *Oriental Politik*, 58-68, who bases himself on the correspondence between Louis and his ambassadors at Constantinople; also GÉRIN in the *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXXIX., 104-III.

⁵ BAROZZI-BERCHET, *loc. cit.*, 209, 235. Cf. below, p. 47. The Viennese nuncio, Buonvisi, insists over and over again

At the time of his elevation Innocent XI. had no accurate knowledge of these plans¹ though he thought he would be in a position to forestall any Turkish attack. To the grave responsibility for the Christian cause in the East and in the West which, as Head of the Church, he knew to be his, there was added his own personal enthusiasm for a crusade against the Crescent. As a young man it had been his ambition to fight against the Turks and, if necessary, to give his life in such a struggle.² It is said that as a Cardinal he gave the huge sum of 90,000 gold scudi for the struggle with Turkey.³ From the first days of his pontificate he set his heart on the creation of a defensive league of the Christian princes, the aim of which would be to advance into the heart of the Ottoman empire, to conquer Constantinople and to drive the Turks out of Europe. At the beginning of 1678 he told Cardinal Rospigliosi that peace, the spread of the faith in lands where it had not penetrated up till then, and war against the Turk would be the salvation of Europe.⁴ In 1677 the Duc D'Estrées, Louis XIV.'s ambassador at the papal court, reported to his master that war against the Turks was the Pope's favourite on the fact that with the fall of Vienna the fate of Rome would also be sealed.

¹ Cf. p. 51.

² BONAMICI, XV., *seq.* Bonamici adds that the Pope denied that he had done military service as a young man; *cf.* above, p. 12. Evidently the legend sprang up early.

³ BONAMICI, XXI., maintains that Cardinal Benedetto Odescalchi had sent subsidies to the amount of 90,000 "aurei" to the Emperor Leopold and to King Casimir through Francesco Buonvisi. Put in this way the assertion cannot possibly be accurate. King Casimir died in 1669, whereas Buonvisi was nuncio in Warsaw only from June, 1673, onwards, and in Vienna from September, 1675, onwards. Accordingly, BOJANI, I., 5, must also be corrected. Of a subsidy of 20,000 florins to Poland by Cardinal Odescalchi we know from the report of nuncio Buonvisi, dated January 31, 1674; see FRAKNÓI, *Papst. Innozenz*, XI., 21, n. 2, and above, p. 460, n. 2.

⁴ Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV. on January 5, 1678, in MICHAUD, II., 75.

topic of conversation ¹; it was his opinion that Constantinople should be conquered and that the undertaking was less arduous than was generally believed. The French and the Spaniards must conclude an armistice and march together against the Turk.²

In 1678 the Capuchin Fra Paola da Lagni, who had long lived in Turkey, submitted four memorials, perhaps at the Pope's request, on the prospects of an offensive against the Turks.³ The great mistake of the Christian States in their struggle with the Crescent, the Capuchin explains, is that until then the Christians had invariably allowed themselves to be taken by surprise by them. They must attack themselves. What restrains the Christian Princes is the fear of the Turks. But this fear is quite groundless. Since the battle of Lepanto the Turks retain only a shadow of their former power. The Crescent is on the wane. One reason of it is the very extent of the Ottoman Empire: it is too vast to make it possible to ward off all attacks if these come from different sides. Another cause is the bad government. During a whole century the former strong rule, founded on reason and justice, has been replaced by tyranny. The pashas have but one aim, to squeeze money out of their provinces, and to this end any means is good enough for them. Hence the people's cry of distress. When they send envoys to complain at Constantinople, the pasha is recalled and deprived both of his money and his head and his place is taken by another who, if possible, behaves even worse than his predecessor.

The administration of justice is equally corrupt. The cadis sell it to the highest bidder and practise extortion. The consequence is the impoverishment and decline of the population and general discontent and embitterment. Turkey has

¹ Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV. on November 16, 1677, *ibid.*

² Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV. on September 7 and November 9, 1677, *ibid.*, 74 *seq.*

³ **Vat. Lat.* 6926 f., 1-45, Vatican Library. The date is proved from f. 22^b, where there is question of the clearing of Messina by the French "in questo anno": the Spanish viceroy, Gonzaga, re-entered Messina on March 25, 1678 (*BALAN*, VII., 424).

now less than a tenth of its former population. Under Venice, Cyprus had a population of two millions : at this day it was a bare 50,000. In Negroponte the population had fallen from a million to 200,000 and in Crete from two millions to 100,000. There is a big surplus of women because military service and especially epidemics in the army, devour vast numbers of young men. The Christians suffer most. As things are, they are poorer than the Turks ; they alone are made to pay all the taxes whilst they are barred from all the better posts. However, not only they, but the Arabs, the Mamelukes of Egypt, the Armenians, the Giezides of Mesopotamia, the Druses and the Maronites of Syria, the Mainots of Morea, the Greeks, the Bulgars and many others, sigh with them for the hour of deliverance.

The military equipment of the Ottoman Empire, Fra Paolo continues, is no longer up to the mark. Owing to the State's lack of money, a condition that must be traced to the fall of the tax-paying Christian population, the Turks had never had more than 90 galleys during the whole of the Cretan war. On the other hand the mastery of the Archipelago and communications with Egypt by sea, on which the empire, more especially Constantinople, is completely dependent, can only be maintained with a powerful fleet. A blockade of the Turkish harbours would not prove difficult. The Turkish fortifications have been neglected and their armament and provisioning are extremely inadequate. In Asia and Africa not one fortress is really completed ; as regards the others, their old walls have crumbled in part and they have not been rebuilt. The old spirit of the Janissaries and the Spahis who once inspired so much terror, has likewise vanished. The troops have become soft in the rich provinces conquered by them. Formerly they were all unmarried, but to-day they have wife and family and are more interested in these than in their military duties. Formerly nearly all the Janissaries and Spahis were the descendants of Christians taken from their parents in their youth, as a kind of tribute or tax in boys, brought up with strict discipline, without home or country and completely devoted to the Sultan and to their

military service. To-day the married Janissaries endeavour to get their own sons enrolled in the army. Positions in the army are bought not with a view to going to war but as a means towards the acquisition of profitable posts and as an opportunity for robbing, tormenting and tyrannizing with impunity Christians, Jews and needy Turks, and of committing a thousand injustices against them. When the army takes the field, Turkish officers buy exemptions for themselves. In fact there is no baseness which a Turk will not commit for money. On paper the Sultan has 100,000 Janissaries and 30,000 Spahis, but in reality they only amount to 40,000 men altogether. Formerly the Sultans were themselves a pattern of bravery to their soldiers. That, too, is a thing of the past. For the last forty years the Sultans have abandoned themselves in their seraglios to luxury and sensuality amid their "troops of women". There is no need to be afraid of Tartars: they are brigands, not front line soldiers. The Corsairs of Algiers and Tunis no longer obey the Sultan; for the rest they are pirates and will have nothing to do with a regular war.

Fra Paolo suggests a concentric attack on Turkey. The war should be started simultaneously by the Shah of Persia who, according to the reports of the Capuchins of Babylon, was only waiting for combined action by the West; in the East by the Tsar of Moscow, by the King of Poland in the Ukraine, by the Emperor in Hungary, by Venice in Dalmatia, by Louis XIV. of France, from whom the writer expected particularly great things,¹ in Palestine or Egypt, by the King of Spain on the coast of Barbary and by the Pope in the Archipelago. The King of Arabia and the pashas of that country, as well as those of Syria and Egypt, would join in, for they were only waiting for an opportunity to free themselves from the tyranny of the Grand Vizier. The empire of the Sultan may be compared to a colossus, or to Nebuchadnezzar's statue, which will collapse as soon as it is attacked in the name of God, the Lord of hosts.

The author of the memorials adds the warning that if the Pope does not destroy the Turkish power, the Tsar of Moscow

¹ F. 39^b.

will do so. But there lurked a grave peril in such an eventuality. The Muscovites were hostile to the Holy See and the Greeks shared these feelings. Moreover the internal organization of the Russian State was extraordinarily strong. Everything was decided by the will of the Tsar. And it was a fact that the Muscovites were eager to push forward as far as the Black Sea. They would even go further and with their fleet dominate the Caspian, the Black and the Baltic Seas, to the great injury of the Catholic and Roman West.

Above all it was necessary to act quickly. "We cannot wait until the Turks have come to terms with Poland and Moscow and thus gain a breathing space. However, if war is to benefit the cause of Christendom, it must be a holy war. Discipline must be enforced, especially in regard to cursing, wine and women. To the Turk, woman is sacred. If Christian officers treat women in outrageous fashion, the consequence will be that the Turks will despise us Christians. During the war in Crete the moral excesses of the Christian soldiery exceeded all bounds. Hence the Pope must issue stringent orders with regard to morals."

Fra Paolo da Lagni was certainly right in thinking that the Crescent would not be able to withstand a combined attack by the Christian hosts. On the other hand he probably underrated Turkey's power of resistance in the field. It is true that contemporary accounts confirm his view of the decline of the Turkish army,¹ but Simon Reniger, who was for many years imperial Resident on the Golden Horn, and the Venetian ambassador at the imperial court, Giovanni Sagredo, remark on their part that "Turkey is a great Power, a dangerous, cool and watchful enemy, who can become dangerous once more as soon as a warlike Sultan puts himself

¹ Cf. Leslie's secret report to the court of Vienna of 1665, published by ADAM WOLF in *Archiv. für osterr. Gesch.*, XX.; REDLICH, 246 seq. De Nointel to Louis XIV., dated August 23, 1679, in KÖHLER, 118 seq.; GUILLERAGUES to Louis XIV., December 20, 1679, in GÉRIN, 104 seq.; May 24, 1680, June 14, 1683, in KÖHLER, 119, 124.

at the head of the army".¹ This was precisely what was happening just then and events were about to prove Reniger and Sagredo right. In any case da Lagni's view coincided completely with the plan of the Pope, and Innocent XI. was all the more bound to make the Capuchin's ideas his own as the information forwarded to him not long after, in February, 1679, by the French ambassador to the Sultan, De Nointel, through the Carmelite Angelo of St. Joseph,² confirmed Fra Paolo's observations and likewise counselled a simultaneous attack from several sides. The great offensive against the Turks on land by the Persians, the Muscovites, the Poles and the Emperor, and by sea by Louis XIV., the Pope, Malta, Florence and Genoa, in which Louis XIV. would play a decisive role,³ now became the Pope's dominant thought and on occasion he spoke of it with enthusiasm.⁴

However, Louis XIV. and his policy proved a very great obstacle to Innocent XI.'s designs against the Turks. The King of France had three objects in view, viz. the rounding off of France's frontiers in a northerly and easterly direction as far as the Rhine, the Spanish succession and the imperial

¹ RENIGER, *Hauptrelation*, 144; Sagredo, report of 1665, published by ADAM WOLF, *loc. cit.*, 305; FIEDLER, *Fontes*, II, 27, 101; REDLICH, VI., 247.

² Brief of Innocent XI. to De Nointel, February 21, 1680, in BERTHIER, I., 324. An *extract from Nointel's communications (of February, 1679), written by Fra Angelo a Sancto Josepho himself, is in the Papal Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*, 106, f. 68-71. Nointel, of course, had to act according to the instructions of his king, but he wrote to Paris in the sense of an alliance of the Christian States against the Turks (GÉRIN, 100-4), and was therefore, in the opinion of Gérin, replaced in Constantinople by Guilleragues.

³ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., February 20, 1680, in MICHAUD, II., 80.

⁴ Cardinal D'Estrées to Louis XIV., July 12, 1682, in GÉRIN, 125: " Il prononça toutes ces choses avec tant d'ardeur que je ne puis le représenter à Votre Majesté qu'en lui disant que ce fut un torrent d'éloquence qui m'entraîna presque dans ses sentiments."

dignity.¹ But none of these aims could be realized without a conflict with the Emperor Leopold. As head of the Empire, as a Habsburg, as wearer of the imperial crown, Leopold was bound to offer the strongest opposition possible to Louis' aspirations. The question, therefore, was for the King of France to destroy the German Habsburgs, or at least to reduce them to the same insignificance as the Spanish ones. To realize this purpose Louis took advantage of the Hungarian rising. He gave it extensive material and moral support, with a view to immobilizing valuable fighting forces of the Emperor which could have been used for the protection of the western frontier.² The Hungarian peril was bound to hold the Emperor all the more firmly in check, as the incomparably greater Turkish danger loomed even more largely behind it. To make this peril subservient to his policy, hence not merely in the interest of trade, Louis XIV. had entered into closer and more friendly relations with the Porte since the year 1673, when the war in the Netherlands assumed the proportions of a European conflict. However, to enter into a formal alliance with Turkey was not at all in his interest; it would have damaged his popularity with his people who were thoroughly hostile to the Turks and keen

¹ IMMICH, *Staatensystem*, 29-32. On Louis XIV.'s aspirations to the imperial crown, cf. also KLOPP, 27, 66 seq., 68-70, 100-2, 130 seq., 142 seq.; VAST, in *Rev. hist.*, LXV. (1897); KÖHLER, 33-40; PLATZHOFF, in *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CXXI. (1920), 377-412; REDLICH, 53, n. 1. That Louis XIV. aspired to the imperial crown can hardly be doubted after the above evidence (cf. especially KLOPP and KÖHLER). Whether he followed up his three anti-Habsburg aims in a definite order, and in which and for which of them he made use of the Turkish affair, is to us a matter of indifference.

² KLOPP, 40, 47, 54, 72, 86 seq.; DU HAMEL, whose sources are the documents from the Polish and Paris State Archives, published by WALISZEWSKI and KLUCZYCKI in *Acta historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia*, Vols. III, V-VII (the 4 vols. comprise the years 1674-1683); REDLICH, 288 seq. A valuable supplement to this are the reports of the nuncios in Vienna and Warsaw.

on a crusade,¹ and robbed him of every prospect of obtaining the imperial crown. The *roi soleil's* sole object was to take advantage of his relations with the Porte to fan disturbances in Hungary and to let the Turks know that if they attacked the territory of the Emperor or the possessions of the Habsburgs in Italy, they need have no fear of opposition on his part whereas if they attacked in any other direction, as for instance Poland or Venice, they would have to reckon with France's armed forces. This was bound to stimulate Kara Mustafa's aggressive mood, for the only thing he feared was the intervention of the powerful King of France, whilst it also determined the object of his conquests: their only aim could be the Habsburgs' lands.² Louis himself attached the utmost importance to the attitude of the Porte. Although it was an inflexible principle with him that a State suffers loss of power when it permits even the slightest diminution of prestige,³ yet in the Franco-Turkish conflicts of those years, which were not altogether rare, he departed from this principle and submitted to some sensible humiliations on the part of the Sultan and the Grand Vizier⁴ rather than break with the Porte and throw away a trump card in his conflict with Leopold and the Habsburg policy.

The King of France's policy implied one necessary consequence which grievously interfered with Innocent's plan for a crusade. It was necessary for Louis to detach from the enterprise against the Turks the King of Poland, John III. Sobieski, "the bulwark of Christendom" as the Pope had styled him because of his victories over the Turks,⁵ and to

¹ Cf. IMMICH, *Innozenz XI.*, 16 *seq.* How much what is stated there applies also to France is shown, for instance, by the report to Rome of the Paris nuncio Ranuzzi, dat. September 24, 1683 (BOJANI, III., 759 *seq.*), on the reception in Paris of the news of the deliverance of Vienna.

² GÉRIN, especially 104-111; KÖHLER, 58-68.

³ IMMICH, *Staatensystem*, 48 *seq.*

⁴ KLOPP, 58, 179; KÖHLER, 78 *seq.*, 85-90, 96 *seq.* ZINKEISEN, V., 43-9.

⁵ To the Duke D'Estrées (D'Estrées to Louis XIV., 1676, October 14, in MICHAUD, II., 72).

make of him another link in the chain with which he sought to restrict the imperial policy. His idea was that Sobieski should be the same danger for Leopold in the north-east as the Turks were in the south-east. The plan did not seem too difficult of realization. Sobieski's wife, Maria Casimira, was a Frenchwoman, the daughter of the Marquis d'Arquien,¹ and Sobieski himself had drawn a French pension since 1665 and Maria Casimira also received one in 1669.² When, then, after the death of King Michael Wisnowiecki, the husband of the Emperor's sister Elenore, Sobieski, the strongest opponent of the imperial candidate, Charles of Lorraine,³ was elected King, the event was generally interpreted as a triumph for French policy.⁴ As a matter of fact Louis XIV. had spent 550,000 livres for the purpose of protecting his interests in the electoral struggle, a sum of which perhaps

¹ The remark in SALVANDY, *Sobieski*, I., 297, that Innocent XI., as nuncio in Poland, blessed the marriage of Sobieski with Maria Casimira, is erroneous. Innocent XI. was never nuncio in Poland.

² DU HAMEL, VII., 481.

³ Sobieski remarked to Forbin Janson that he would rather let himself be hacked to pieces than tolerate Charles of Lorraine on the throne. Forbin Janson to Louis XIV., May 11, 1674, in DU HAMEL, VII., 484.

⁴ FERD. HIRSCH, *Die Wahl Joh. Sobieskis zum König von Polen*, in *Hist. Zeitschr.*, LXXXVII (1901), 224-269; DU HAMEL, VII., 481-6. At the court of Vienna Buonvisi, then nuncio at Warsaw, was reproached with having done too little for Charles of Lorraine. Buonvisi justified his conduct in a letter to Albizzi, nuncio in Vienna, dat. May 13, 1674 (BOJANI, I., 409, n. 1, and TRENTA, I., 332); he had thoroughly examined the difficult position of Eleonore and had warned the imperial ministers, who thought that the election was only a question of looking for a new husband for the widowed queen; to work openly for the cause of Eleonore had been strictly forbidden him by Rome. HIRSCH, who takes for his sources, inter alia, ZALUSKI'S *Epistolae historico-familiares*, I., and the *Acta Poloniae*, III., confirms on p. 249 the justification of Buonvisi. Cf. DOUAIS, *Forbin Janson év. de Marseille et l'élection de Jean Sobieski*, in *Rev. d'hist. de l'église de France*, I. (1910), 257-271.

one half came into the hands of the new King himself.¹ So it is not surprising that France had him pretty well in tow. On October 28th, 1676, the nuncio Martelli reported to the Pope that the King never conferred with his counsellors without Louis XIV.'s ambassador being present.² Louis soon let Sobieski know his intentions through Bishop Forbin Janson who looked after the affairs of his sovereign in Poland: they were that he should conclude peace with the Turks, foster the troubles in Hungary, revive Poland's ancient claims to Silesia with a view, as he put it, "to alarming Vienna and forcing the Emperor to recall his troops from the Rhine to the North."³ On June 13th, 1675, King John III., in return for a large money subsidy, to be spent on military objects, bound himself to these points by a special agreement.⁴

However, the King of the Poles was in no hurry to carry them out. Notwithstanding the brilliant victories of Chocim and Lemberg, Poland's situation was none too favourable and Sobieski would have been glad to improve it by going on with the war against the Turks, a project which the papal nuncios did their utmost to encourage.⁵ However, in the following year, whilst he was besieged in the fortified camp of Zurawna by a superior Turkish force, he decided to open negotiations which led to peace on October 27th. Poland was compelled to surrender to the Turks the greater part of Podolia with the important fortress of Kamieniec.⁶ The peace of Zurawna had not been concluded without the active intervention of French diplomacy at Constantinople and Warsaw,⁷ and it is

¹ *Acta Pol.*, III., 33, 49 seq., 95-7 (DU HAMEL, VII., 486, 490).

² BOJANI, 413. Also December 30 (*ibid.*, 429). Cf. what Béthune, the French ambassador in Poland, reports of him to Pomponne on October 14, 1674: *Acta Pol.*, III., 151 (DU HAMEL, VII., 493 seq.).

³ Louis XIV. to Forbin Janson, June 9, 1674; *Acta Pol.*, III., 55 seq. (DU HAMEL, VII., 488). Cf. *Recueil des Instructions, Pologne*, I., by LOUIS FAGES (1888), LII.

⁴ KLOPP, 48; DU HAMEL, VII., 488-495; KÖHLER, 43.

⁵ IMMICH, *Staatensystem*, 81. ⁶ ZINKEISEN, V., 78-82.

⁷ DU HAMEL, VII., 496-502; KÖHLER, 40-3.

difficult to say whether French influence saved King John Sobieski from an even more disastrous termination of the war or whether it induced him to accept an inglorious peace which the military situation did not necessitate.¹ In 1677 a memorial was submitted to the Polish Diet in which it was stated that the peace was the work of the French who hastened its conclusion in order that they might drag Poland into the war against the Emperor.² Both Sobieski himself and Maria Casimira, in a letter to Louis XIV. in July, 1677, lamented the fact that they had concluded, without urgent necessity and only out of consideration for him, a peace so unfavourable to Poland, whereas Louis had not yet paid the compensation that had been agreed upon.³

In any case Louis XIV. had achieved his purpose. Long before the conclusion of peace, as early, in fact, as January, 1676, Sobieski was able to inform Paris that Kara Mustafa's influence had definitely triumphed in the council of the Sultan and that the former was bent on peace with Poland and on breaking with the Emperor.⁴ Shortly afterwards Mohammed IV. caused the French King to be informed, through Nointel, that he would invade Hungary in the following year on condition that Louis promised him not to make peace with the Emperor without his consent. Louis was not prepared to go so far, though he instructed Nointel to assure the Sultan by word of mouth that he would give no help to the Emperor, neither now nor at any future time.⁵ Thus the Porte's war against the Emperor seemed certain, to

¹ ZINKEISEN (*loc. cit.*) and IMMICH (*loc. cit.*, 88) seem to accept the first alternative.

² *Bedencken eines Polnischen Patrioten, warum sich König Iohannes in Polen durch die Frantzösisch- und Schwedische Ministres zu keinem Kriege wider den Römischen Keyser und Chur-Brandenburg verleiten lassen solle, de Anno 1677* (LÜNIG, *Europ. Staatskons.*, II., 927-934).

³ *Acta Pol.*, III., 407, 469; see DU HAMEL, VII., 516, 513, where *Porte* must be read instead of *Pologne*.

⁴ DU HAMEL, VII., 498.

⁵ ROUSSET, *Louvois*, II., 212, n. 2; KLOPP, 51 *seq.*

Louis XIV.'s great satisfaction,¹ and presumably it would have been carried into effect had not certain complications with Moscow necessitated a delay.²

It is not likely that Innocent XI. was adequately acquainted with these schemes³; Louis XIV. did everything to disguise them. His ambassador in Rome was instructed to praise the Pope's efforts on behalf of peace and his plan of an anti-Turkish league as a Christian thought, one worthy of His Holiness' piety. But this approval was to be in general terms; it was useless to enter into particulars since his policy differed completely from that of the Pope.⁴ Hence Innocent XI.'s surprise was all the greater when he heard of the Polish peace.⁵ He had hoped that Moscow would presently fight the Turk by the side of Sobieski,⁶ and to make

¹ Louis XIV. to Forbin Janson, dat. January 31, 1676: "In this case I hope for a double diversion against the emperor" (*Acta Pol.*, III., 249; see DU HAMEL, VII., 499).

² ÜBERSBERGER, I., 32-5.

³ Innocent XI., who had little of the politician and of the diplomatist in his entire composition, and who had never in his whole life crossed the frontiers of Italy, was a tyro when in 1676 he had to face the infinitely complicated political and ecclesiastico-political questions in Eastern and Western Europe. Hence it is easy to understand IMMICH's remark (*Innozenz*, XI., 17) that in general the Pope was not a man of great knowledge of the world and of men, nor an acute statesman, but rather a short-sighted and narrow-minded person. But it was a piece of good fortune that Innocent XI. was well informed about the real state of affairs by his nuncios in Paris, Vienna, and Warsaw. However, Innocent XI. largely compensated for his lack of diplomatic ability by the resolution (which was characteristic of him) with which all his political aims were subordinated to the Turkish question.

⁴ Louis XIV. to the Duke D'Estrées, November 5 and December 25, 1676; see MICHAUD, II., 72 *seq.*

⁵ Innocent XI. to John III., January 2, 1677; see BERTHIER, I., 43 *seq.*; *Diar. Europ.*, XXXIV., 282.

⁶ Cibo to Nuncio Martelli, October 23, 1676, in BOJANI, I., 413, n. 1.

of this junction the starting point of his projected league. The peace just concluded was bound to affect him all the more disagreeably as he appears to have sensed its connexion with a policy hostile to the Emperor.¹ For the rest, immediately after his elevation, the Pope had dispatched to Warsaw, for the war against the Turks, the sum of 50,000 ducats taken for the greater part from his private purse, the papal exchequer not being equal to it. The money came too late and as a measure of precaution nuncio Buonvisi kept it at Vienna.² It was not long before Sobieski made excuses for the peace in Rome. The agreement, he explained, was a very advantageous one in the circumstances; it had not yet been ratified and he could break it at any time; if the Christian princes would lend him help he would gladly renew his attack on the Turks.³ These explanations were calculated to reassure the Pope to some extent. He cherished the hope of a speedy conclusion of the war in the Netherlands, which would enable him to create the league before the ratification of the peace of Zurawna.⁴ Accordingly his chief

¹ Already on October 28 and December 30, 1676 (BOJANI, I., 412 *seq.*, 429) Nuncio Martelli reported the possibility of a Polish attack on Moscow and Brandenburg and on the support of the Hungarian rebels. On December 26, 1676 (BOJANI, I., 429 *seq.*), Cibo charges him to remonstrate with the King on the enrolment of Polish soldiers in the army of the Hungarian rebels, because good relations with her neighbours were a necessity for Poland.

² Cibo to Martelli, October 10 and November 8, 1676 (BOJANI, I., 411, n. 1), to Buonvisi, October 31, 1676 (*ibid.*, 414, n. 1). The statements in BERNINO, 5 *seq.*, and in *Diar. Europ.*, XXXIV., 282, must be corrected accordingly. 50,000 ducats represented in those days about 100,000 florins. Cf. the currency accounts in *Diar. Europ.*, XXXV., 7-28.

³ Sobieski to Innocent XI. from the camp of Zurawna, October 21, 1676; see BERTHIER, I., 457, n. 16, and THEINER, *Monuments hist. de Russie*, 106. Martelli to Cibo, January 13, 1677; see BOJANI, I., 413.

⁴ Cf. the Brief of Innocent XI. to John III., dat. May 28, 1678 (BERTHIER, I., 175) and the reports of the nunciature for 1677 and 1678.

and immediate preoccupation was to procure the pacification of the West.

The courier who reached Vienna on October 5th¹ to announce to the Emperor Leopold the election of Innocent XI., was also the bearer of a letter from the Pope in which the Pontiff urged the Emperor to conclude an armistice.² However, in view of the military situation Vienna deemed it necessary to decline. The Swedes had been beaten, it was argued, and there was a prospect that the recent conquest of Philippsburg would open the way to Lorraine and France.³ Nor could the Pope derive more encouragement from the answers to inquiries which reached Rome from Paris and Madrid. Madrid shared Vienna's fear that an armistice might be the occasion of the break-up of the coalition, a circumstance that would spell the ruin of Spain, and if the military operations were interrupted, Messina would be

¹ Bevilacqua from Vienna to Varese in Paris, dat. October 6, 1676, in BOJANI, I., 251, n. 1. The courier sent by Cardinal Barberini immediately after the election of Innocent XI., presumably to Warsaw, carried the news of the election to Vienna on September 28. Cf. *Buonvisi to Cibo, October 2, 1676, Pap. Sec. Archives, *Nunziat. di Germ.*, 196 f., 452.

² The Pope's letter is not among the original copies of the Pap. Sec. Archives. According to the *autograph answer of Emperor Leopold from Ebersdorf, October 17, 1676 (Pap. Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*, 103, f. 181) it was dated September 24, as were the instructions to Buonvisi and Bevilacqua to support the Pope's request (*ibid.*, *Germ.*, 36 f. 2). A summary of the Papal letter is contained in the *Memorandum of the Emperor to Cardinal Pio, a copy of which Buonvisi sent to Rome, October 18, 1676 (*ibid.*, *Germania*, 196, f. 488-490). The Brief "*Ex quo visum*" which TRENTA (I., 354-6) and BOJANI (I., 41-3) give under date of September 28, 1676, as the first letter of the Pope to Leopold, is from November 13, 1677; cf. Pap. Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*, 73, f. 27b-29b, and BERTHIER, I., 131 seq. The contents of the Brief show that it cannot date from the beginning of the pontificate of Innocent XI.; cf. p. 82, n. 4.

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, dat. October 11, 1676 (Pap. Sec. Arch., *Germania*, 196, f. 471-4; cf. FRAKŃOI-IEKEL, 26-8) and the

irremediably lost to Spain.¹ Louis XIV. repeated to nuncio Varese the declaration which he had made to Clement X. on two occasions, viz. that he was ready for an armistice but that this step did not depend on him alone.² In reality his great concern, as well as that of the Powers of the Coalition, was to secure, by means of fresh military successes, the most favourable basis possible for the peace negotiations³ which were due to begin at Nymeguen.⁴

Jenkins, the envoy of Charles II. of England who had assumed the rôle of a mediator, had arrived at Nymeguen on January 16th, 1676.⁵ The Emperor Leopold was anxious that the Pope should also be represented. At the same time as he rejected an armistice, he informed the Secretary of State, Cardinal Cibo, that the Pope would best serve the cause of peace if he were to make haste to dispatch a nuncio to the peace congress, overlooking the circumstance of the choice of non-Catholic Nymeguen and other religious difficulties, since there could hardly be question of transferring the congress to some other town.⁶ Innocent was prepared to

memorandum of Leopold to Cardinal Cibo (*cf.* the preceding note).

¹ Mellini to Cibo, October 29, 1676, and March 4, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 662, 278, 636. In the autumn of 1677, when on account of the disquieting news from Constantinople Innocent XI. asked again for an armistice, Don Juan of Austria gave the same answer; *cf.* Mellini to Cibo, December 23, 1677, *ibid.*, 680. The Spaniards reconquered Messina in the course of the war; *Cf.* above, p. 40, n. 4.

² Abbé Siri from Paris, October 30, 1676, in BOJANI, I., 251, n. 1.

³ *Cf.* the conversation of Don Gerolamo d'Eguja with Nuncio Mellini in Madrid: Mellini to Cibo, March 4, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 636.

⁴ *Cf.* on the peace negotiations in Nymeguen, IMMICH, *Staaten-system*, 89-97; REDLICH, 193-9; RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, III., 430-7; KLOPP, *Der Fall des Hauses Stuart*, II., 1-162.

⁵ REDLICH, 193.

⁶ *Leopold to Cardinal Cibo from Ebersfeld, October 18, 1676, Pap. Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*, 103 *seq.*, 184 *seq.*

co-operate in the work of peace, but showed greater anxiety than the Emperor with regard to the religious question. With a view to avoiding a papal mediation between Catholic and Protestant Powers, whilst unwilling to leave everything to the English plenipotentiary,¹ Innocent XI. was anxious that another Catholic mediator besides the nuncio should attend the congress. He thought of Venice, remembering probably the peace congress of Münster where the Venetian envoy had co-operated with the Papal nuncio.² With the help of Venice he also hoped to obtain, instead of Protestant Nymeguen, which his predecessor had also deemed unsuitable for a papal representative,³ a Catholic locality as the seat of the negotiations.⁴

However, mediation by Venice was difficult just then owing to the marked tension between the Republic and the two Habsburg courts. With a view to the suppression of a rising against the Spanish Crown which had broken out at Messina in 1674, the Spaniards had sought to transport troops levied in Austria to Sicily through the Adriatic. However, for fear of Louis XIV., who had had a hand in the troubles at Messina, Venice forbade the passage of the troops. The two Spanish ships were compelled to return and disembark the men.⁵

¹ Cf. Cibo to Buonvisi, January 22, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 318, and below p. 67, n. 6.

² Cf. XXX., p. 96.

³ Cf. the Memorandum of Bevilacqua to the Emperor Leopold in *Actes et mémoires de Nimègue*, I., 134-6. Under Clement X. the question was examined whether the Papal nuncio could not take part in the negotiations from Cleve; cf. Pallavicini to Altieri, May 10, 1676, in HILTEBRANDT, *Preussen und die röm. Kurie*, 53 seq.

⁴ Cibo to nuncio Airoidi in Venice, October 7 and 31, 1676, in BOJANI, I., 628 seq. Accordingly IMMICH's doubt (*Innozenz*, XI., 12) whether Innocent XI. had any confessional scruples at all, must be somewhat restricted.

⁵ ANTONIO BATTISTELLA in *Nuovo Arch. Veneto*, XXXV. (1918), 84 seq., according to *Reale Arch. di Stato di Venezia*, *Consult. in iure*, filza, 135.

Innocent XI. had cherished the hope of settling the dispute. Even before Leopold had expressed a desire for a papal nuncio to go to Nymeguen, the Pope had begun negotiations with the Signoria, Vienna and Madrid,¹ on the subject of the dispute in the Gulf and the participation of Venice in the peace negotiations. These discussions continued until the middle of 1678. Innocent XI. proposed that out of regard for the Pope, Spain should declare the incident closed.² Vienna would have been satisfied with such a declaration, but Madrid refused to content itself with a friendly compromise: what was wanted was satisfaction.³ Moreover the courts of Vienna and Madrid did not altogether trust an intervention for peace by Venice, especially if, as even Innocent XI. suggested,⁴ the chosen agent was to be the Venetian historian Battista Nani, a man well qualified for dealing with affairs, who in a recently published historical work had treated the Habsburgs most unkindly.⁵ Venice would have been glad to accept as early as the spring of 1677, the mediation which it was proposed to entrust to her.⁶ At the papal court an appropriate formula was devised to give satisfaction to both parties: it was that in a letter to the Pope, which would contain expressions of attachment to the King of Spain, the Republic was to express regret for what had been done. With its

¹ Cibo to Airoldi (*cf.* above, p. 55, n. 4); to Buonvisi, November 7 and 21 and December 19, 1676; Buonvisi to Cibo, October 18, November 22, and December 20, 1676, in BOJANI, I., 262-7.

² Cibo to Mellini, November 28, 1676, *ibid.*, 630 *seq.*

³ Mellini to Cibo, January 1, 1677, *ibid.*, 632 *seq.*

⁴ Thus Cardinal Nidhard according to the report of Airoldi to Cibo, December 26, 1677, *ibid.*, 632.

⁵ Mellini to Cibo, January 21 and November 12, 1677; Cibo to Airoldi, January 27, 1677; Airoldi to Cibo, November 7 and 13, 1677, *ibid.*, 633, 651, n. 2, 634, 629, n. 1, 647. BATTISTA NANI is the author of the *Historia della Repubblica Veneta* which had appeared in 1676. Don Juan especially complained of the work; see Mellini in the report of November 12, 1677.

⁶ Cibo to Mellini, May 15, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 637; *Memoirs of the imperial ambassadors for the mediators*, May 3, 1677, in *Actes et mém.*, I., 241 *seq.*

consent, the Pope would then forward the letter to Madrid, where it would be kept in the archives for an everlasting memory.¹ The court of Madrid ended by agreeing to this solution; more than that, when at the beginning of 1678 it became evident that England was about to enter the war, thereby putting an end to all thought of her mediation,² Don Juan of Austria, who was at that time responsible for Spain's policy, formally urged Venice's participation in the peace congress and even dropped his objections to Battista Nani.³

However, the whole affair failed owing to one condition which Spain made soon after the opening of the negotiations and to which she stuck tenaciously and with which, in all probability, Cardinal Portocarrero's journey to Rome in the spring of 1678 was also connected: this was that simultaneously with the papal and Venetian mediation at the peace congress, steps should also be taken, under the inspiration of the Holy See, for the formation of a league of all the Italian princes, among whom the Habsburgs were naturally included.⁴ As the object of the league, Spain designated, in the course of the negotiations, the defence against the Turks and against whosoever disturbed public tranquillity.⁵ This amounted to an admission of a fact which papal diplomacy had recognized from the beginning, that the projected league was aimed against France in the first instance. It looks as if the Turks had been included solely for the purpose of rendering the proposal a little less unpalatable to the Pope.⁶ Innocent XI. at once opposed a league of this

¹ Cibo to Mellini, November 19, 1677, in BOJANI, 648-650.

² KLOPP, *Stuart*, II., 86 *seqq.*; Cibo to Bevilacqua, January 22, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 318.

³ Mellini to Cibo, December 24, 1677, and April 2, 1678; Cibo to Airoldi, January 22, 1678, *ibid.*, 652 *seq.*, 654, n. 7, 653.

⁴ Mellini to Cibo, February 5, March 4, June 8, 1677; Cibo to Mellini, May 15, 1677; *Avviso di Roma*, April 3, 1678, *ibid.*, 633 *seq.*, 635 *seq.*, 638 (with note), 637, 655, n. 1.

⁵ Thus expressly the Spanish ambassador in Venice. Airoldi to Cibo, January 25, 1678, *ibid.*, 654.

⁶ Cf. the report of Mellini, March 4, 1677, quoted above.

kind with as much vigour as Spain advocated it. The Italian States, he observed, were politically far too dependent on the Great Powers to enable them to form a league of their own; the moment for the formation of an alliance against the Turks would come after, not before the conclusion of peace, and lastly, the papal mediation at Nymeguen was incompatible with such a league.¹ This last was the capital point for Innocent XI. He was anxious to avoid even the appearance of being mixed up in these European contests and of having taken up a position hostile to France.² As the French ambassador shortly afterwards reported to Paris, the Pope had observed to the Spanish ambassador: "We are the Head of Christendom; we may not be the head of a league or an army."³

¹ Cibo to Mellini, March 2 and 4, November 19, December 23, 1677, and May 29, 1678, *ibid.*, 643 *seq.*, 636 *seq.*, 649, n. 1, 651 *seq.*, 656 *seq.* In the instruction of Cibo dated May 29, 1678, we find an observation which sounds strange in the mouth of Innocent XI.: "His Holiness thinks also that a league is not the proper means of resisting the Turks. It would be difficult to preserve unity among the Allies, as is shown by the experience of the league of Pius V. against Selim. Clement IX. also, in the extreme dangers of the war of Candia, did not want a league, but counselled the separate action of the Powers." Evidently at that moment Innocent XI. was completely dominated by the idea of rejecting the project of a Spanish League.

² *Cf.* the instructions of Cibo to Mellini, dated November 19, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 649, n. 1.

³ The Duke D'Estrées to Pomponne, April 18, 1679, in GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXIII. (1878), 18. IMMICH (*Innozenz*, XI., 12, n. 2) rightly rejects the assertion of F. PETRUCELLI DELLA GATTINA (III., 304) that the Pope had offered his mediation for peace more from sympathy for Spain and the Emperor than for France, as "quite unproven". One could even notice in the Pope a certain reserve with regard to Spain which, of course, can be explained in part by his dissatisfaction with Del Carpio, the Spanish ambassador in Rome. *Cf.* the story of the conflict about the quarter and the efforts made by Del Carpio to promote in Rome itself a mediation of the Pope for peace.

It had not been possible to bring about the co-operation of a Venetian envoy in the Pope's mediation for peace.¹ For the rest Innocent XI. had given priority to the cause of peace over this question and as early as the first days of December, 1676, he had entrusted the duty of representing him at Nymeguen to the titular Archbishop of Alexandria, Luigi Bevilacqua, whom Clement X. had dispatched to the court of Vienna as nuncio extraordinary on matters relating to peace.² However, certain obstacles stood in the way of Bevilacqua's departure. Though Charles II. had expressed, in confidence, his personal satisfaction at the Pope's mediation, out of consideration no doubt for his Parliament, or for Louis XIV., who just then hardly desired any other mediation than that of the King of England who was wholly devoted to him, he had been compelled to instruct his plenipotentiaries not to enter into relations with the papal nuncio and to persuade the envoys of the Powers forming the Coalition to act in like manner.³ To this the latter refused to agree. The Protestant Powers declared that, of course, they would not

Cibo to Bevilacqua and Bevilacqua to Varese, September 18, 1677, Cibo to Buonvisi, October 16, 1677, Buonvisi to Cibo, December 5, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 299, 280, n. 3, 300 seq.

¹ For Innocent XI.'s plans to induce Portugal to mediate, instead of Venice, *cf.* Buonvisi to Cibo, March 21, 1677, and Cibo to Mellini, March 20, 1678, *ibid.*, 280, 325.

² Two *dispatches of Cibo to Buonvisi, December 12, 1676, in Pap. Sec. Arch. *Germ.*, 36, f. 19b-20b. The Florentine ambassador Montanti had already reported on November 22, 1676: " *Tra i prelati che vanno in predicamento per la Nuntiatura al trattato di pace, Mons. Bevilacquaè assai considerato, sentendori che i Francesi non vogliono ni Buonvisi in Pallavicino (State Archives, Florence). For Bevilacqua *cf.* MORONI, XXXII., 45. The credentials for his mission to Nymeguen are in BERTHIER, I., 28-31.

³ Internuncio Tanari in Brussels to Cibo, December 26, 1676, Buonvisi to Cibo, May 16, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 252, n. 2, 274 seq. That Louis XIV. had a hand in the game was the opinion of the Court of Vienna; *cf.* Bevilacqua to Cibo from Vienna, January 24, 1677, *ibid.*, 259.

make use of the papal intervention, but that they would recognize the nuncio as a royal envoy¹; the States General alone, with whom the two Habsburg courts were negotiating at Rome's request for a suitable reception of the nuncio,² refused at first to issue a passport to Bevilacqua so as not to be compelled to mention the Pope's name in an official document. The latter, they declared, they could at most style "Most Serene", nor could they make any promises with regard to the practice of the Catholic religion in the locality where the peace congress would be held. For the rest they would treat the nuncio with every mark of honour and he would be free to settle at Nymeguen as he pleased.³ It was only on May 8th, 1677, that the States General, at the request of Vienna, issued a safe conduct in which the Pope was mentioned.⁴ Innocent XI. decided to forgo the use of one of the churches of Nymeguen in order not to impede the cause of peace. Instead of this a large room was fitted up as a chapel at the nuncio's lodgings and to this, as to the chapel of the French Embassy, Catholics had free access.⁵ In order to avoid a dispute over precedence between the Pope and the King of England, it was agreed that in the letters accrediting the various plenipotentiaries, the mediating courts should only be mentioned in general terms.⁶

¹ Bevilacqua to Cibo, January 10, 1677, *ibid.*, 255 *seq.*

² *Cibo to Buonvisi, December 12, 1676 (*cf.* above, p. 59, n. 2).

³ Bevilacqua to Cibo, January 17, 1677, Buonvisi to Cibo, March 7, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 257-9, 279 *seq.*

⁴ Bevilacqua to Cibo, May 16, 1677, *ibid.*, 274. The Dutch safe conduct of May 8, 1677, in *Actes et mém.*, I., 448 *seq.* The nuncio is styled: "l'Illustrissime et Reverendissime Seigneur Bevilacqua. . . Nonce du Pape."

⁵ Cibo to Bevilacqua in Cologne, April 24, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 269. The Pope was ready even to renounce an outer door for the nunciature if that were to create difficulties. SAINT-DISDIER, *Hist. des nég. de la paix de Nim.*, 68 *seq.*

⁶ Bevilacqua to Cibo, January 10, 1677, Varese to Cibo, January 15, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 252-5, 256, n. 1. The Emperor Leopold issued a double faculty: in the one the Pope is described

Bevilacqua left Vienna on February 9th, 1676, even before the last difficulties had been overcome.¹ On March 21st he arrived at Cologne² where he waited until the ceremonial was fixed, after which he continued his journey through Düsseldorf and Cleve. At the summer residence of the Duke of Neuburg, at Düsseldorf, he met with a splendid reception. All down the Rhine he was greeted with the sound of bells and the thunder of guns.³ The Elector Frederick William had given strict orders to his officials in the territory of Cleve to receive the nuncio with every mark of honour.⁴ On June 1st, after nightfall, and seen by only a few persons,⁵ Bevilacqua arrived at Nymeguen,⁶ with a suite of over fifty persons, among whom were Casoni and two experts in controversy.⁷

as mediator, in the other the King of England; see *Actes et mém.*, I., 274, 277. The Bishop of Strassburg, Franz Egon von Fürstenberg, names both mediators expressly, first the Pope, then Charles II. of England (*ibid.*, 290).

¹ Bevilacqua to Cibo from Tulln, February 12, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 260. The Papal letter of safe-conduct for Bevilacqua, February 26, 1677, in *Actes et mém.*, I., 252-4, and in LÜNIG, *Lit. Proc. Europ.*, II., 844-7.

² BOJANI, I., 261.

³ Bevilacqua to Cibo, May 29th, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 276 *seq.* A full account of the reception at Düsseldorf is given in the “*Istruttione data da persona erudita e politica a Mons. Bevilacqua,” in Pap. Sec. Archives, *Miscell.*, III., vol. 10, f. 114b-117b. This instruction, which (f. 112-123) at the same time gives directions and reports events, occupies itself exclusively with the ceremonial. Cf. on this and on the escort of Bevilacqua, *Nuova antologia*, 1926, Dic. I.

⁴ HILTEBRANDT in *Quellen u. Forsch.*, XV., 2, 362.

⁵ *Istruttione, f. 118.

⁶ SAINT-DISDIER, 65. The statement in *Actes et mem.*, I., 252, that Bevilacqua arrived in Nymeguen on May 22 must be wrong since the report of the journey of the nuncio and his first reports from Nymeguen agree only with Saint-Disdier.

⁷ Bevilacqua sent from Cologne, on April 18, 1677, to Cibo a list of his personnel and an account of his expenditure. The monthly expenditure amounted to 1463,50 scudi for 53 persons

As a measure of precaution he had left two Capuchins at Cleve, for the time being at least, as he wished to ascertain whether they could show themselves without difficulty at Nymeguen, for not so long before a Spanish Jesuit had caused too great a sensation by appearing in the town in his long gown.¹

Bevilacqua was the first papal representative to tread the soil of Holland since the religious division. Saint-Didier, Secretary to D'Estrades, the head of the French delegation to the Congress, has left a vivid description of the reception of the nuncio by the population of Nymeguen. On the evening of June 5th, he writes, the nuncio received the imperial envoys at 5 o'clock, and the French ones at 7.² The

and 25 horses (Pap. Sec. Arch., *Paci*, 34, f. 139 *seq.*; cf. BOJANI, I., 268, n. 1). For Casoni see Bevilacqua to Cibo, May 16, 1677; on the two controvertists May 2, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 274, 272. Saint-Disdier calls special attention to the splendid style and the good order at the nunciature.

¹ SAINT-DISDIER, 69 *seq.* The author of the *Istruzione says (f. 120): "Averta di non condurre frati seco di qualsivoglia religione, perchè in quei sorti di paesi non riescono, e ne parlo per esperienza."

² Bevilacqua sensed how his visit would be taken by the Protestant delegations. When he noticed that it would be unwelcome, he thought he was dispensed from the duty of presenting himself. He communicated the motives of his conduct to the Catholic delegates who resolutely defended him against the complaints of the Danish, Brandenburg, and Dutch ambassadors, who protested that he had slighted them (Bevilacqua to Cibo, June 4 and 11, 1677, in HILTEBRANDT, *Verkehr*, 367, n. 2, 368, n. 1). In his *final Report Bevilacqua says: "Per corrispondere alle cortesie, che avevo ricevute nel mio viaggio da' ministri d'alcuni principi protestanti, stimai bene dichiararmi, che sarei stato pronto di praticare le dovute civiltà con i ministri de' principi eretici ogni volta che avessi avuta sicurezza di ricevere la dovuta corrispondenza." (Barb. 5171, f. 3^b *seq.*, Vat. Lib.) Bevilacqua's final report is also in *Barb.* 5176, f. 1-73, *Ottob.* 1655, *ibid.*, and in Pap. Sec. Arch., *Borghese*, IV., 256^b, n. 3, f. 1-62 v, *Miscell.*, II., 159, n. 47.

curiosity of the burghers was exceptionally great on this occasion for the people were determined to see for themselves what a papal nuncio looked like. The burgomaster of the city and a number of persons had taken their places at the windows of the neighbouring houses in order to watch the nuncio when he received the envoys as they alighted and again when he escorted them back to their carriages. When he appeared he was seen to wear a simple purple cassock with red piping, and a cross set with diamonds. Otherwise he usually went about in a short coat. The simple country people, Catholics and Protestants alike, came all day in great numbers to Nymeguen. The Catholics derived comfort for their souls in so doing whilst the others gratified their curiosity by the sight of a representative of the Pope of whom their ministers had drawn terrifying pictures. The municipality of Nymeguen which, as a matter of fact, did its best to facilitate the free exercise of the Catholic religion during the congress, subsequently called on the nuncio—Burgomaster Welderen, heading the deputation.¹ In his reply to the burgomaster's speech, Bevilacqua observed that he would like the Protestants to render to him the honours given to a secular ambassador; above all he was anxious to establish contact with the English delegates for the purpose of co-operating with them in the work of peace. He then invited the municipal councillors to his table when he entertained them elegantly after the Italian fashion, six courses and various wines being served. As for his own person, he excused himself from not taking part in the feast on the plea of not feeling well and he had his place taken by his auditor. Religion was not mentioned at table.²

One of the first tasks undertaken by the nuncio, at the request of the French delegates, was to draw up rules of conduct for the personnel of the embassy. Bevilacqua's regulations met with so much approval that all the Catholic delegates adopted them and the English expressed their

¹ SAINT-DISDIER, 67-9.

² *Actes et mém.*, I., 444-6; *Istruttione f. 122b.

satisfaction with them.¹ The nuncio's work for peace was circumscribed by the instructions from Rome. They were as follows: He must mediate between the Catholic princes, but not in the interest of the Protestant ones, though he should try to obtain from the Protestant Powers a wider measure of freedom for religion.² It was not his duty, as a mediator, to find out the plans and intentions of the various parties, or those of the English, or to pursue a peaceful policy of his own. If the English, on their part, made peace proposals and wished to act as arbiters of peace, he should let them do so. The Holy Father was not seeking his own glory, but the glory of God and the peace of Christendom. The nuncio need not insist on himself appearing as the author of the peace: his main purpose would be fulfilled if only peace came about.³ His duty was to communicate the suggestions of one party to the other, but this he should do in such wise as to avoid all asperity and to promote peace.⁴

Within these somewhat narrow limits Bevilacqua fulfilled his task with great skill. The various memorials and proposals submitted were forwarded by him in an Italian translation

¹ Bevilacqua to Cibo, June 18, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 289 *seq.* The ruling is in *Actes et mém.*, I., 494-9. The principal directions are: Prohibition of duels; prohibition of carrying arms and of wandering about at night for the lower personnel. Disobedience to these rules, quarrels and disputes are punished with immediate dismissal, without distinction between the aggressor and the attacked. For offences against people of other nationalities there are special penalties. In the case of an offence against the laws of the country, the culprit ceases to be a member of the delegation from the moment the penal action is committed, and is to be handed over to the city police. When two carriages meet in the narrow streets that one must always turn aside which can do so most conveniently, though without prejudice to any precedence.

² Cibo to Bevilacqua, May 29 and June 20, 1677; *cf.* Cibo to Buonvisi, July 19, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 276, 293, 294 *seq.*

³ Cibo to Bevilacqua, September 25, 1677; *cf.* Cibo to Varese, July 13, 1678, to Bevilacqua, July 23, 1678, *ibid.*, 298 *seq.*, 356 *seq.*, 359 *seq.*

⁴ Cibo to Bevilacqua, May 29, 1677 (*cf.* above, n. 2).

and by a skilful turn in the wording he eliminated whatever might have offended the other party. It was precisely on this point that he excelled over the English manner, which was too rough, in fact he roused English jealousy.¹ Judging by existing reports the mediation of the nuncio was especially made use of during France's discussions with the Habsburg Powers.²

From Rome the nuncio received repeated injunctions to observe the strictest neutrality,³ in fact the authorities there desired to see neutrality carried to such lengths that they wished the nuncio's lodgings to be at equal distance from the French and the Spanish embassy.⁴ Owing to the extreme sensitiveness of both parties and the intractibility and

¹ Bevilacqua to Cibo, November 19, 1677; *cf.* the letters of Bevilacqua to Cibo and those of Cibo to Bevilacqua, July 9, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 303-5, 349, 351. As for the rest, the relations between the nuncio and the English seem to have been very good; *cf.* the incident reported by Bevilacqua to Cibo, November 29, 1678, *ibid.*, 383, n. 1.

² *Cf.* Cibo to Varese, November 2, 1678, Cibo to Bevilacqua, April 15, 1679, Buonvisi to Cibo, March 30, 1679, *ibid.*, 374, n. 1, 405, n. 1, 405. The most peculiar case in which the mediation of Bevilacqua (July 7, 1678) was invoked, was undoubtedly that of the Duke of Tremouille, who made claims to Naples, and that with the approbation of Louis XIV., on the plea that he was sovereign of the kingdom in virtue of being a direct descendant of King Frederick of Naples, whereas Charles II. of Spain possessed the country only as a result of the invasion of Ferdinand the Catholic; see LÜNIG, *Lit. Proc. Europ.*, II., 879-881.

³ On June 11, 1677 (in BOJANI, I., 228 *seq.*), Bevilacqua reports to Cibo that he had reminded Ronquillo (one of the two Spanish members of the congress) that it was useless to demonstrate at such length the injustice of the French arms; the French had also something against the Spaniards. On June 11, 1677 (Pap. Sec. Arch., *Paci*, 37, f. 8) Cibo blames Bevilacqua for his remarks to Ronquillo; the Spaniards might have accused him of partiality. He, the Cardinal, had not dared to show to the Pope the nuncio's letter (in code) dated June 11, 1637). *Cf.* Cibo to Bevilacqua, June 25, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 345.

⁴ SAINT-DISDIER, 65.

obstinacy of the French in their demands,¹ the path of impartiality was an exceedingly narrow one; the nuncio, however, succeeded in pursuing it until the end. The best proof of it is that the Emperor Leopold would have been glad if, from Nymeguen, Bevilacqua had gone as nuncio to Paris. Bevilacqua, the Emperor declared, enjoyed the full confidence and goodwill of Louis XIV. and might possibly induce him to adopt a different policy towards the Turks.²

The mistrust which the English mediation met with from the first very soon—in fact as early as March 1677—raised the question whether the Pope's representative might not act as mediator even in the affairs of the Protestants. Even Holland seems to have expressed a wish in this sense.³ More than the rest the Grand Elector was anxious to avail himself of Bevilacqua's services. Since about the end of the first half of the year the Emperor sought to win over the Pope for this plan, on the plea that the coalition was a league of the Catholic as well as the Protestant princes.⁴ However, neither the Emperor himself nor the Cardinal Protector of the Habsburgs, Pio,⁵ could induce the Pope to change his mind. Because Catholics, Innocent XI. firmly replied, formed unlawful coalitions, of the kind that the Church reproves, that was no reason for the Pope to commit the same error

¹ Buonvisi to Cibo, October 30, 1678, Bevilacqua to Cibo, April 15, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 345, 329 *seq.* Cf. the conflict over the Briefs, p. 74 *seq.*, and GUST. GUTMENSCH, *Heiteres und Ernstes vom Nimeghener Friedenskongress*, in *Schweiz. Rundschau*, 1919-20, fasc. 4. About the difficulties which arose at this time for the Holy See on account of a real or supposed violation of its neutrality by French or Spanish ships in papal waters, cf. the reports in BOJANI, I., 662-687.

² Buonvisi to Cibo, June 18, 1679, *ibid.*, 548. The Vicar Apostolic of Holland, Ioh. Hubens, also reported to Rome on the beneficent activity of the papal nuncio at the Peace Congress; cf. the Brief to Hubens, September 4, 1677, in BERTHIER, I., 119 *seq.*

³ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, March 21, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 280.

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 11, 1677, *ibid.*, 294.

⁵ Cibo to Buonvisi, October 16, 1677, *ibid.*, 300 *seq.*

and, as it were, to canonize these coalitions by himself meddling with the affairs of heretics and carrying out their wishes.¹ It would be most unseemly for the Apostolic nuncio openly and directly to act in the interest of Protestant princes²; to do so would be to go against the ancient and invariable discipline of the Church. After Clement X. had done his best to restrain the Emperor from entering into a league with the Protestants, and Leopold had taken no notice of the just protest of the Pope, it was not possible for him to direct the nuncio to busy himself with the wishes of the heretics unless there were a clear prospect that some important advantage would accrue to the Catholic Church from such a mediation.³

Leopold felt he could justify his conduct. He requested nuncio Buonvisi to inform Rome that if he had entered into a league with the Protestants, it was in self-defence, whereas Louis had allied himself with them for the purpose of a war of aggression and even now he still made common cause with the Hungarian rebels, to the great advantage of the Turks.⁴ However, the Pope remained firm. In December, 1677, and in January, 1678, the Cardinal Secretary of State once more pointed out to Bevilacqua that he must make it his rule not to meddle with the affairs of heretics. He should offer his excuses to the Protestant Powers. Such action may look like an act of revenge; but in reality it was inspired by a desire for their conversion and for the sake of safeguarding the Holy See.⁵ In the event of England failing as a mediating power, the Pope considered once more the possibilities offered by Venice.⁶ In his personal intercourse Bevilacqua was told carefully to avoid whatever might seem like a disparagement

¹ Cibo to Bevilacqua, September 25, 1677, *ibid.*, 298 *seq.*

² Cibo to Buonvisi, October 16, 1677 ("in forma publica e direttamente"), Pap. Sec. Arch., *Paci*, 37, f. 14.

³ Cibo to Buonvisi, November 27, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 301, n. 1.

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, December 19, 1677, *ibid.*, 311, n. 1.

⁵ Cibo to Bevilacqua, December 18 and 25, 1677, *ibid.*, 311 *seq.*

⁶ Cibo to Bevilacqua, Jan. 22, 1678, *ibid.*, 318. Cf. above, p. 55, n. 1.

of the Protestant princes, in fact he should speak well of them ; but he must not act in their interest.¹ Accordingly Innocent XI. was not altogether sorry when a dispute with France, in connexion with Bevilacqua's Brief accrediting him as a plenipotentiary, provided the Holy See with an excuse for withholding its signature from the peace treaty, "for the Head of the Church and the Vicar of Christ," Cibo was instructed to write to Varese, the Paris nuncio, "may not have the slightest part in arrangements in which room is likewise made for men who are enemies of the faith and rebels against God and His Church."²

By his distinguished and courteous manner Bevilacqua greatly softened the stern directions of Innocent XI. and on the whole he was on excellent terms with the delegates, even with those of England.³ He had early obtained leave from the Inquisition to enter into relations with the heretics whenever the public good should demand it.⁴ The Congress had an impression that Bevilacqua's attitude towards the Protestants differed extraordinarily from that of former nuncios. An eminent personage of the States General observed that it was all very well for their own ministers to preach that the Pope was Antichrist ; as far as he himself was concerned, he was convinced that the present Pope could not be Antichrist.⁵

¹ Cibo to Bevilacqua, July 17, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 358. Cf. Bevilacqua to Cibo, November 26, 1678, *ibid.*, 381 *seq.* ; the nuncio refuses to make express mention of the Dutch in a memorial of mediation and restricts himself to the formula "the belligerent Powers".

² July 20, 1678, *ibid.*, 358 *seq.* Cf. HILTEBRANDT, *Verkehr.*, 368-371 ; on the conflict concerning the Brief, see p. 74, *seqq.*

³ SAINT-DISDIER, 65 *seq.* Cf. above, p. 65, n. 3.

⁴ Bevilacqua to Cibo, June 15, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 289. But already before, on June 4, Cibo had warned him that he should not show any partiality towards the English, beyond the limits laid down by the Holy Office (*ibid.*, 288).

⁵ SAINT-DISDIER, 143 *seq.* Bevilacqua also reported to Cibo on June 25, 1678, that people gave proofs to him of great veneration for His Holiness (BOJANI, I., 345 *seq.*).

Though it was too late to alter in any way the ecclesiastico-political stipulations of the Peace of Westphalia by diplomatic means, it would have meant a moral victory for the Catholic cause precisely in the sphere of Protestant preponderance if, in view of the favourable state of opinion at Nymeguen, the nuncio had acted as a mediator even in the purely political and material interests of the Protestant princes. But for ideas such as these the memory of the wars of religion and the year 1648 were too recent, and in purely Catholic countries men had not yet sufficiently learned to distinguish between formal heretics, that is people who knew they were in the wrong, and material heretics who were in good faith, between a league for a religious object and a purely political coalition of Powers of different faiths which could be justified by grave motives, such as the European equilibrium or the defence against the Turks, even from the standpoint of Catholic morality. The rigid Innocent XI., who had never set foot in a land of mixed religion, was not the man to be ahead of his time in this respect. It is, nevertheless, a fact that heretics, even Protestant princes, came away charmed from their personal interviews with the Pope and could not sufficiently extol his goodness and courtesy.¹

The Holy See was fully aware of the limited possibilities of papal intervention on behalf of peace. A few years later, on July 18th, 1683, Cardinal Cibo wrote to the nuncio at Madrid, Mellini, that the congress of Nymeguen had clearly shown the futility of papal mediation. The Holy See had no army and was unable to negotiate on behalf of Protestant sovereigns, though the latter's affairs were everywhere linked with the work for peace. This robbed papal mediation of all efficacy.² For the rest we must not forget that, in point of

¹ Cf. MARRACCI, 242 *seq.*, and his evidence, and that of others, in the process of beatification: *Positio*, p. 29, §§ 2, 3, 4; p. 30, § 11, p. 26, § 69, p. 40, §§ 101,

² Pap. Secret. Arch., *Spagna*, 161, f. 9: “*Il congresso di Nimega ha insegnato troppo bene, quanto sia inutile la mediazione pontificia, allorchè s'incontra con un'altra di principe protestante et in affari implicati con quelli di principati eretici, mentre non

fact, peace was not made at Nymeguen, rather was it the result of Spain's weakness and the lust of conquest and the diplomatic skill of Louis XIV. that succeeded in breaking up the league and in preventing intervention by England, by cunningly playing off its King and its Parliament against each other. Innocent XI. had made four different attempts to dispose Louis XIV. in favour of conciliation by Briefs¹ and through Cardinal Bouillon of Paris. Bouillon was instructed to tell the King that the war then in progress could not procure him a victory at all comparable with the glory of giving peace to Christendom and of saving the blood of Christians for glorious triumphs in the land of the infidels.² The Pope also strove, by means of personal negotiations with the French ambassador in Rome and through nuncio Varese in Paris, to obtain for the Duke of Lorraine possession of his own territory,³ for Spain a more favourable peace and, in accordance with the English negotiations of 1678,⁴ the surrender of Tournai, Condé and Valenciennes.⁵ However, Louis XIV. proved intractable. When in the affair of the imprisoned friend of the French, Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, the court of Vienna proposed to the Pope that Leopold should hand over the prisoner to Innocent XI. who would

può camminare concordemente nè le è permesso di porre le mani in tutto. Oltre che detta mediazione, come disarmata, non può operare con tutta quella efficacia che sarebbe necessaria, nè di lei si fa per lo più tutto il conto che si dovrebbe."

¹ February 10, April 29, November 17, 1677, in BERTHIER, I., 66, 88 *seq.*, 135 *seq.*

² January 12, 1677, *ibid.*, 49 *seq.*

³ Cibo to Bevilacqua, June 11, 178; Bevilacqua to Cibo, June 18, 1678, to Varese June 21; Buonvisi to Bevilacqua, February 26, 1679, to Cibo, March 5; Cibo to Buonvisi, March 25 and April 1, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 338, 341, 343, 400, 402, 402 n. 1, 404. The Brief of which Cibo speaks in his letter to Buonvisi, April 1, 1679, in BERTHIER, I., 249 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. KLOPP, *Stuart*, 80.

⁵ Varese to Cibo, February 7, 1678, Cibo to Mellini, March 21, 1678, Mellini to Cibo, April 29, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 320, 325 *seq.*, 331 *seq.*

then procure his freedom, Paris rejected even this compromise which would have safeguarded the imperial dignity.¹

On August 10th, 1678, peace between the States General and France was signed and on September 12th Spain was forced to submit to Louis' conditions. The question now was whether the Emperor would continue the war or make peace. It was the task of Buonvisi, the nuncio, to induce him to adopt the latter course. Buonvisi was personally a determined protagonist of the European equilibrium. At the beginning of the peace negotiations in February, 1677, he wrote to Cibo that France could not be left in possession of all her conquests, which had made her the arbiter of Europe, even to the detriment of the Curia.² The Vienna nuncio favoured a strong Flanders in Spanish hands, an imposing English sea power and a German Alsace,³ but these were aims which hardly entered into the political considerations of Innocent XI.⁴ His policy was wholly dominated by the thought of warding off the Turkish attack and the real or imaginary advantages of the Catholic Church. If, he said at this time, the French military successes had not been opposed, it might have been possible to restore the Catholic religion in Holland and perhaps even in England. Instead of this, the Emperor and his Coalition, had defended Holland against a prince whose victories were also conquests for religion. What the Emperor did may have been in the interest of the German

¹ FLASSAN, III., 455.

² Buonvisi in his report to Cibo, February 28, 1677, about a conversation with the Emperor, in LEVINSON, II., 689.

³ In his (undated) *Memoria* in TRENTA, I., 194-205.

⁴ FRAKNÓI (23) refers, however, but with a wrong indication of sources in n. 1, to the remark of the Venetian ambassador at the imperial court, Domenico Contarini, in his final report of 1685 (FIEDLER in *Fontes rer. Austr.*, XXVII. [1867], 259): "ben conoscendo la Santità Sua, che la conservazione dell' equilibrio fra principi christiani e la venerazione de' popoli sono i cardini del Papato"; but the passage is from the year 1685, and Contarini probably attributed to the Pope his own views, instead of giving those of the Pope.

Empire, but the progress of religion had been hindered thereby. In future he should refrain from such alliances for they cried to heaven for vengeance.¹ At the present moment the Pope was anxious for peace at any price. If a general peace was not possible, the nuncios were told to support every effort for the conclusion of separate treaties of peace.² If the Emperor, so we read in the Instruction for Buonvisi, recognizes the need of coming to an understanding, in view of the Turkish menace, he may have the satisfaction of knowing that his action was inspired by heroic virtue and enjoined on him for the sake of the general good, by the will of God made known to him by His Vicar.³

The nuncio in Vienna worked in this sense. He represented to the Emperor how much anxiety and money he had to expend on the preservation of even one place in the West, and that his frontiers towards France could not undergo any considerable change, whereas he could prosecute the war in Hungary with far fewer sacrifices and much more glory, guarantee the safety of Vienna and extend the boundaries of his Empire. Leopold should have these aims all the more at heart as the imperial Resident at Constantinople wrote that the Turks were preparing an attack on Austria.⁴ However, the difficulties were great. Leopold was anxious to save Freiburg and Philippsburg and not to drop the northern Powers of the Coalition. For a long time Buonvisi hoped that the two plans might be saved. In the course of negotiations it was suggested that instead of Freiburg, Louis XIV. might be indemnified by the offer of some equivalent territorial concessions near Breisach, a kind of bridge-head.⁵ In exchange

¹ Cibo to Buonvisi, July 22, in BOJANI, I., 557.

² Cibo to Bevilacqua, June 25 and 30, 1678, to Buonvisi, June 25 and July 12, *ibid.*, 344 *seq.*, 346 *seq.*, 355 *seq.*

³ Cibo to Buonvisi, July 12, 1678, *ibid.*, 355 *seq.*

⁴ *Buonvisi to Cibo, June 12, 1678, Pap. Sec. Arch., *Germania*, 198, f. 284-7.

⁵ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 24 and December 4, 1678; *cf.* the reports of Bevilacqua to Cibo, August 29, September 3, 9, 18, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 377 *seq.*, 385 *seq.*, 365-8.

of Philippsburg the Holy See appears to have suggested Nancy in Paris.¹ But Louis demanded Nancy in any case.² In the end the Emperor had to deem himself fortunate to keep Philippsburg for the Empire. With regard to the northern allied Powers, Buonvisi maintained at first that they could not be allowed to stand in the way of peace. The Emperor, he urged, need not sacrifice both himself and the public good in order to support princes who might possibly redouble their violence against him if they remained in possession of their conquests. In the event of their becoming dangerous to the Emperor, it would be a very good thing if they had the Swedes at their back.³ In the course of the negotiations Buonvisi came to understand the difficulties better. If the Emperor drops his northern allies, he wrote to Rome, there is a danger that they too will make separate treaties with France, and that against him.⁴ To restore everything to the Swedes and to allow the French a right of way through the Empire he deems intolerable, for it would mean saving one half of the Empire by destroying the other. This would be a peace of the Archduke of Austria but not of the Emperor.⁵ On the other hand if France remains intransigent in her demand, the Emperor would have ground for a secret promise not to oppose it, so as to save at least the appearance of the imperial dignity. But a durable peace was impossible under such conditions.⁶ There can be no doubt that Leopold was impressed by Buonvisi's advice,⁷

¹ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, October 30, 1678, *ibid.*, 376 *seq.*

² Cf. Art. 13 of the Franco-Imperial Peace Treaty of February 5, 1679.

³ *Buonvisi to Cibo, June 12, 1678 (*cf.* p. 72, n. 4), and TRENTA, I., 361-7, where, however, the date (July 17) is wrong.

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, November 27, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 382 *seq.*

⁵ *Buonvisi to Cibo, October 16, 1678, Pap. Sec. Arch., *Germania*, 198, f. 375.

⁶ Buonvisi to Cibo, November 27 and December 4, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 383, 385.

⁷ Cf. the reports of Buonvisi, June 12 (see above, p. 72, n. 4), June 19 and October 16, 1678, the last two in BOJANI, I., 340 *seq.*, 373.

though the final decision was not brought about by its means but rather by the pressure of the so-called third party in the Empire, that is, the large number of princes who wanted peace at any price and who thus enabled France constantly to raise her pretensions.¹ On February 5th, 1679, at a time when the court of Vienna as well as Buonvisi had not yet made up their minds what to do,² there was signed at Nymeguen a peace which is admirably characterized by Leopold's well-known saying that one must thank the good God even for calamities.

The peace treaties of the two Habsburg courts with France contain no mention of the papal intervention nor Bevilacqua's signature.³ The reason was the dispute between the Holy See and Louis XIV. on the subject of Bevilacqua's Brief accrediting him as plenipotentiary. In that document only the Emperor was mentioned by name whilst the other Kings and princes were all included in a general designation. When the Brief was submitted to them in June, 1677, the French delegates, with Louis' approval, insisted that their King must be named immediately after the Emperor. The Holy See declared that it could not accede to this wish seeing that the Brief had been drawn up in the customary style of the Curia and in the same form as that which had been made out for nuncio Chigi at Münster. For the rest, in Briefs in which France and Spain had to be named, the formula "the two kings—*utrumque regem*" was used without further differentiation.⁴ There the matter remained.

¹ Cf. the interesting reports of Buonvisi to Cibo, December 30, 1678, and January 27, 1679, *ibid.*, 387 *seq.*, 390.

² Buonvisi to Cibo, February 5, 1679, *ibid.*, 391-3. The Viennese nuncio maintained that the prosecution of the war could only be beneficial to Catholic interests since it would mean assistance for the Catholics on the part of the Protestant Powers.

³ Cf. DU MONT, VII., I, 365-9, 376-380; *Actes et mém.*, II., 729-751, 405-420. In the Peace between France and Münster the Pope is not mentioned either. (DU MONT, VII., I, 399 *seq.*).

⁴ Bevilacqua to Cibo, 1677, June 11 and 25, July 25, August 6 and 20, to Varese, June 11, August 21; Cibo to Bevilacqua,

Bevilacqua already thought that the French were satisfied when, in June, 1678, they informed the nuncio that if the Pope was unable to make up his mind to name their King after the Emperor, separately and apart from the other heads of States, it was Louis' will that in the instrument of peace no mention whatever should be made of the papal mediation. Bevilacqua suggested four different solutions: viz. either to name no one personally, or to issue two separate Briefs for the Coalition and the King of France, or three Briefs, for the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain, or to oppose in one Brief the Emperor and the Coalition on the one hand to the King of France on the other. The two last solutions were at once rejected by the French, the two others they wished first to submit to their sovereign.¹ Rome ended by consenting to alter the Brief and to designate no one by name, not even the Emperor, but to confine itself to the formula "Christian Kings and Princes" or simply "Christian Princes", provided the Emperor Leopold was willing.² At Vienna the suggestion that because of an unjustifiable demand of France, the Emperor's precedence, though already formulated, should now be sacrificed, was deemed exorbitant.³ As the French persisted in their demand, Innocent XI. announced that he would forgo all mention of the papal mediation in the peace treaties. He had sent his nuncio to Nymeguen, he explained, for the sake of peace and because of the Turkish peril, not with a view to creating difficulties. Bevilacqua was, however, requested to remain in order to watch over Catholic interests up to the last and to be at the disposal of the many people who sought his mediation.⁴ However, Innocent XI. felt

July 3 and 10, August 7, September 4, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 284-8 (at the bottom of p. 287 "Regem" must be read instead of "Regium"; cf. Pap. Secr. Arch., *Paci*, 38, f. 145).

¹ Bevilacqua to Cibo and Varese, June 21, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 342-4.

² Bevilacqua to Cibo, July 3, 1678; Cibo to Bevilacqua, July 9, 1678, to Buonvisi, July 9 and 12, *ibid.*, 348, 350-4.

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 24 and 26, 1678, *ibid.*, 351, n. 1, 361,

⁴ Cibo to Bevilacqua, July 16 and August 13, 1678, to Buonvisi.

deeply hurt by France's treatment of him¹; it was all the more difficult for him to forget it as the very formula proposed in his Brief but which was rejected, viz. compromise between the Coalition and the King of France—was used in the letters accrediting the English plenipotentiary and in the peace treaties between Spain, the Emperor and Louis.² When an offer was subsequently made to the Pope to mention him in an appendix to the treaty, he absolutely rejected the proposal as unworthy of the Holy See: "Do not forget," Cibo wrote to Bevilacqua, "to give the right answer if anyone speaks to you about it."³

August 13, to Varese, July 13 and 20, *ibid.*, 356–363. The change in the Peace proposals between France and Spain on August 12, as also the signing of the Peace on September 12, did not take place at the residence of the nuncio but in the house of the Dutch ambassador (*Actes et mém.*, II., 694, 713, 729).

¹ In the *Réflexions pour servir de réponse sur la lettre en forme de manifeste que M. le cardinal D'Estrées distribue*, subsequently published by order of the Pope, article 10 reads thus: "On refusa à Nimègues d'exprimer dans le traité de paix qu'il s'était fait par la médiation du Pape, sous prétexte que dans la commission du Nonce on s'était servi selon le style et l'usage ordinaire des termes [utrumque regem], sans distinguer le roi de France de celui d'Espagne, encore qu'on n'eut point fait cette difficulté à l'égard des ambassadeurs d'Angleterre qui se trouvaient dans le même cas; et qu'ensuite, lorsqu'il fallut signer le traité chez les ambassadeurs des États généraux de Hollande, on convint de choisir une salle tellement disposée pour les portes et les sièges qu'il ne parut point que l'une des couronnes eût été préférée à l'autre" (GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 420).

² For the English plenipotentiary powers, cf. *Actes et mém.*, I., 220, and Cibo to Bevilacqua, August 13, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 362. The respective formulas in the Peace-instruments are: "entre . . . Louis XIV . . . et ses Alliez, d'une part; et . . . Charles II . . . et ses Alliez, d'autre; Leurs Majestez . . ."; "inter . . . Leopoldum . . . imperatorem . . . ex una, et . . . Ludovicum XIV. . . ex altera parte" (DU MONT, VII., I, 365, 376 s.).

³ Bevilacqua to Varese, September 20, 1678; Cibo to Varese, November 2, to Bevilacqua, November 5 (here the passage quoted in the text), in BOJANI, I., 368 *seq.*, 374, n. 1.

For the Catholics in the Protestant North, over whose interests Bevilacqua was charged to watch up to the end of the congress, it was impossible to obtain any alleviation at Nymeguen. The States General refused the request for freedom of religion for Maastricht. The town had to be satisfied with the small concessions which had been granted to Amsterdam and a few other localities.¹ After the Swedes had been driven from Germany, attempts were made by Rome to compel the then Protestant Administrator of Osnabrück, Duke Ernest Augustus of Brunswick and his successors, to exchange their alternate right to the Bishopric for the hereditary possession of Verden, a step by which the diocese itself would once more have become wholly Catholic.² Efforts were likewise made to get the Elector of Brandenburg to surrender the dioceses of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Kammin and Minden together with some abbeys which had been granted to him in 1648 in compensation for the territories which he had forfeited to the Swedes.³ All these plans failed. Louis XIV. forced the Empire to restore all the territories taken from the Swedes⁴ and the Catholics had to deem themselves lucky that Hildesheim and Osnabrück were not entirely secularized.⁵

¹ Bevilacqua to Cibo, June 25 and July 3, 1678, *ibid.*, 349.

² Buonvisi to Bevilacqua, *ibid.*, 386.

³ Cibo to Bevilacqua, December 3, 1678, January 21, 1679, *ibid.*, 384, 390. The "Memoria" of Bevilacqua to the imperial negotiators for the exchange of the conquests in Brandenburg and Brunswick for the possessions secularized in 1648, is in the *Actes et mém.*, III., 326-8.

⁴ Bevilacqua made every effort at least to protect Münster from fresh injury; *cf.* his reports to Cibo, February 17, 1679, and to Lauri, February 24; Lauri on his efforts with Pomponne; to Cibo, March 3, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 395, 397 *seq.*, 400-2. Bevilacqua's memorial for Münster of February 20, 1679, in *Actes et mém.*, III., 513-15. By the treaty of March 19, 1679 (DUMONT, VII., I, 401 *seq.*, Münster was compelled to surrender all conquests and received 100,000 thalers in compensation for the fortifications erected in those territories.

⁵ *Cf.* Bevilacqua's pressing exhortation of November 10, 1678, to the imperial, Spanish and French negotiators not to

The Holy See hoped that Louis XIV. would at least obtain from Sweden the free practice of the Catholic religion for its German possessions as this would have been a compensation for the favourable peace which that Power, after its defeat in the field, owed solely to the King of France; however, when Paris was sounded on the subject, the answer was that in this respect nothing could be obtained.¹ It proved even impossible to remove the grievances of which the Catholics complained after 1648 because the Emperor's separation from his northern allies diminished the imperial authority and adversely affected the dispositions of the Protestant Princes towards Catholics.²

permit the complete secularization of Osnabrück and Hildesheim, in *Actes et mém.*, III., 111-15; the Briefs of Innocent XI. to the cathedral clergy of Hildesheim, January 30, 1677, and to the Elector Max Heinrich of Cologne, dat. January 8, 1678, on behalf of Osnabrück, in BERTHIER, I., 60, 143 *seq.*

¹ Cibo to Bevilacqua, February 25, 1679, Buonvisi to Bevilacqua, March 16, Lauri to Cibo, March 3, in BOJANI, I., 398, 404, 400 *seq.* For the efforts of the Holy See to obtain for Queen Christine of Sweden the restitution of her possessions in Pomerania, *cf.* Cibo to Bevilacqua March 19, 1678, *ibid.*, 324, and the *final report of Bevilacqua in *Cod. Barb.*, 5176, f. 31a, Vatican Library. According to the *Diarium Europ.*, XXXIV., 277 (for November, 1676) the Queen received from the Pope 12,000 crowns yearly, in compensation for her possessions in Pomerania, which were inaccessible to her during the war.

² *Cf.* Buonvisi to Bevilacqua, February 16, 1679, and to Cibo, March 12, in BOJANI, I., 393, n. 1, 403. On the efforts of the Holy See to retain Dinant and Bouillon for the diocese of Liège, see Bevilacqua to Cibo, February 6, 1679, and Cibo to Bevilacqua, February 18, *ibid.*, 394 *seq.* According to Bevilacqua the Bishop of Liège did not sufficiently defend his rights. The documents about this affair are in LÜNIG, *Bibl. deduct.*, 387 *seq.* On the final fate of Bouillon see Art. 28 of the Peace of February 5, 1679, on that of Dinant, IMMICH, *Staatensystem*, 106. For Innocent XI.'s anxiety lest the English should establish themselves in the cities of Flanders, to the detriment of the Catholic religion, *cf.* Tanari to Cibo, January 29, 1678, Bevilacqua to Cibo, April 15, 1678, and the strong letters of Cibo to Tanari

In view of the fact that the negotiations and stipulations of Nymeguen were based on the Peace of Westphalia, the Holy See felt compelled to renew its protest of 1648.¹ This was done by Bevilacqua in general terms, on October 20th, 1678,² but more specifically against some clauses of the Spanish-Dutch treaty,³ and against the peace treaty between the Emperor and France and that of February 5th, 1679, between the Emperor and Sweden.⁴ The protest bore a more formal character: there was to be no derogation to the dignity of the Holy See and precautions must be taken against the possibility of scandal arising from a wrong notion that the Pope, by participating in the peace negotiations, had submitted to the ecclesiastico-political stipulations of Münster, or even approved them.⁵ However urgent it was to make a

and Bevilacqua, May 7, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 310, 330, 333. The English withdrew already towards the end of 1678 and the beginning of 1679.

¹ Cibo to Bevilacqua, June 12, 1677, Bevilacqua to Cibo, July 9, 1678, *ibid.*, 289, 349 *seq.*; the Brief of Innocent XI. to Bevilacqua, May 15, 1678, in BERTHIER, I., 172.

² DU MONT, VII., I, 374; *Actes et mém.*, III, 93 (not III., 87, as Du Mont indicates).

³ Cibo to Bevilacqua, October 8, 1678. The nuncio must protest to the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries (BOJANI, I., 370).

⁴ Protest of February 19, 1679, in *Actes et mém.*, III., 501-3. Bevilacqua and Buonvisi did not take part in the official congratulations in Vienna and Nymeguen, with the approval of the Emperor; *cf.* Buonvisi to Bevilacqua, February 16, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 393, n. 1. No protest was made against the Franco-Dutch treaty because not only was it not disadvantageous to the Catholic religion but, on the contrary, many disadvantageous clauses, introduced by the States General against the capitulation of 1632, were removed by it. Bevilacqua to Cibo, November 4, 1678, Cibo to Bevilacqua, November 26, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 378, 382, n. 1.

⁵ In his *final report Bevilacqua says that he protested, "accìò non potessero dalla mia taciturnità indurre alcuna nemeno tacita approvazione" (*Cod. Barb.*, 5176, f. 28^b, Vatican Library).

protest, Cibo wrote to Bevilacqua on February 18th, 1679, they must act with prudence, so as to forward peace without creating an impression that they were going counter to the protest.¹ As a matter of fact Rome weighed for a long time the question whether a fresh protest against the Peace of Westphalia was at all necessary, though in the end the Holy See felt it could not be avoided.² Before leaving Nymeguen the nuncio called on the first burgomaster of the town. He was received with every mark of honour by the assembled City Fathers. He once more commended the Catholics to them and begged of them to take steps for the preservation of the chapel of the nunciature. The councillors answered the request in a decided affirmative. To the Catholics themselves and their priests Bevilacqua recommended taking advantage of the peace which the papal mediation had obtained for them with prudence and moderation, and giving an example of a religious, truly Catholic modesty, if they wished the liberties granted to them to be lasting.³ On the return journey, at Ferrara, the nuncio was presented by the court councillor Stratmann, in the name of Leopold I., with a diamond cross as a token of gratitude for his mediation.⁴

¹ Cibo to Bevilacqua, February 18, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 395. Innocent expresses himself in the same sense : Brief to Louis XIV., March 15, 1679, in BERTHIER, I., 241 *seq.*

² Cibo *writes on October 1, 1678, to Bevilacqua (Pap. Sec. Arch., *Paci*, 37, f. 35^b) : "Quanto al protestar contro la confermazione della Pace di Munster, mentre non si aggiungono nuovi pregiudizi alle cose sacre, non par necessario di rinovar le proteste. Con tutto ciò colle seguenti le scriverò sopra questo particolare più accertatamente." On October 8 the Cardinal Secretary of State sent copies of Chigi's protests in Münster, where he said that a repetition of the protest cannot be avoided (*ibid.*, f. 35^b-37^b). Cf. also Cibo to Buonvisi, February 25, 1679 (TRENTA, I., 368 *seq.*) ; Rome's protest was not meant to upset the work of pacification.

³ *Final report of Bevilacqua, *Cod. Barb.*, 5176, f. 32, Vatican Library.

⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 32 *seq.*

He reached Rome with only half his suite, the rest had died on the way, the victims of the plague which was causing terrible ravages in central Europe just then. The nuncio himself does not seem to have escaped unscathed. To this, as well as to the damp climate of Holland, which caused him much inconvenience at Nymeguen, we must, no doubt, ascribe his death soon after his return to Rome, in April, 1680.¹

It was fully realized in Rome how onerous this not very honourable peace² was bound to prove for the Emperor and for Spain, seeing that it had been imposed by the victors,³ and that on this ground alone it was calculated to raise fresh perils within the Empire and in Hungary.⁴ On February 25th, 1679, the Secretary of State wrote to Buonvisi that he should encourage the Emperor in the Pope's name, if he found the conditions of peace too hard. It had been a question of choosing the lesser of two evils, for to continue the war in existing circumstances would certainly have been a greater one. The Holy Father had spoken in the same sense to the Spanish ambassador. For the rest his Majesty the Emperor had already declared his readiness to offer this sacrifice to God so that it was not really necessary to exhort him to resignation.⁵ The Holy See refrained from public demonstrations of joy⁶; instead the Pope gave more abundant alms and dowries

¹ GUTMENSCH in *Schweizer. Rundschau.*, 1919-1920, fasc. 4.

² "una pace poco degna"; thus Cibo to Buonvisi, March 11, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 532, n. 2.

³ Bevilacqua to Cibo, February 6, 1679, *ibid.*, 394. In his *final report Bevilacqua says: "Con la pace di Nimega cessarono le stragi e le operazioni militari, succedendo ad una guerra molto favorevole alla Francia una pace non meno vantaggiosa alla gloria che agl'interessi di quel regno" (*loc. cit.*, f. 39^a).

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, May 13, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 532 *seq.*

⁵ Cibo to Buonvisi, February 25, 1679, *ibid.*, 398 *seq.* The same view in Cibo's letter to the Viennese Nuncio, March 11, 1679, *ibid.*, 403.

⁶ **Avvisi Barberini*, March 11, 1679: "Stupisce il volgo, perchè sin qui non si faccia a Palazzo minimo segno d'allegrezza della pace." *Barb.*, LXXXIII., 23, Vatican Library.

for poor girls. A *Te Deum* was ordered to be sung, but after the fashion of the Capuchins, *in forma paupertatis*.¹

On the whole, however, Innocent XI.'s predominant feeling was one of satisfaction. The long, devastating war was at last ended and, so he thought, the armed forces of the Christian armies would be free for the war against the Turks.² Reports of Turkish armaments and projects of aggression against Italy and imperial Hungary had come in in increasing number, especially since the spring of 1677.³ This was the reason why, in the autumn of that year, the Pope besought the great Catholic Powers with so much earnestness to conclude an immediate peace on the basis of a compromise and mutual concessions.⁴ In Whit week of 1678 he, together with the Sacred College, had joined in the three processions for peace from St. Peter's to S. Spirito, to implore peace from God with prayers and tears.⁵ This aim had now been attained. At a consistory at the beginning of March, 1679, the Pope concluded his address with an expression of his hope that now the war against the Turks would begin⁶; in May he ordered a triduum for Rome, to which he attached a plenary

¹ *Ibid.*, *March 18.

² *Cf.* the letters of Cibo quoted above, p. 81, n. 3.

and the papal Briefs to Louis XIV., March 15, 1679, and to the Emperor Leopold, March 18, in BERTHIER, I., 241 *seq.*, 243.

³ These reports came from Venice and Naples (Mellini to Cibo, March 4, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 635; *cf.* Cibo to Mellini, October 14, 1677, *ibid.*, from Ragusa and from religious in Constantinople (BERNINO, 35), and finally from the imperial Resident on the Golden Horn (see Buonvisi to Cibo, May 1 and June 12, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 464, 338-341, *cf.* above, p. 72, n. 4.

⁴ Briefs of Innocent XI. to the Emperor Leopold, November 13, 1677, to Charles II. of Spain, November 14, to Louis XIV., November 17, in BERTHIER, I., 131 *seq.*, 134-6. For the dates see above, p. 53, n. 2.

⁵ **Avvisi Barberini*, dated June 4, 1678, *loc. cit.*, 6418. The processions were held on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th day in Pentecost Week.

⁶ Servient to Pomponne, March 8, 1679, in MICHAUD, II., 76.

Indulgence, for the purpose of obtaining from God that the Christian Princes would unite in a great alliance against Christendom's traditional enemy.¹ The Pope did not suspect that the enormous difficulties of his enterprise against the Turks were scarcely lessened in any way by the peace just concluded.

* The following sections of this Chapter (to p. 156) were added by the Rev. Fr. Leiber, Berlin, according to the plan of the late author.

(2.)

Ever since the year 1677 it had been the constant aim of papal diplomacy, both in the East and in the West, from Persia to the Pyrenean peninsula,² to prepare the ground for a vast league against the Crescent.

Reports coming in from the East were calculated to encourage the Pope in his endeavours. From Persia the Dominican Piscopo brought a letter to the Pope from the ruler of that country; he likewise informed him that, in answer to the Pope's summons, the Shah was prepared to go to war against Turkey provided the Christian princes also made a joint attack.³ To nuncio Buonvisi Piscopo further represented that it was not practicable to attack the Turks from Babylonia; the barrenness of the land, which had already proved a hindrance for the Romans of old, continued to offer a similar obstacle. Armenia offered the only open gateway but the King of Persia would have to proceed with the utmost caution because the Tartars of Samarkand and the Great Mogul might create difficulties for him, whilst his

¹ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., May 23, 1679, *ibid.*, 77.

² Cf. the Briefs of November 28, 1677, to Don Pedro, brother of the King of Portugal, January 23 and May 29, 1678, and of June 11, 1679, to Charles II. of Spain, in BERTHIER, I., 137 *seq.*, 150 *seq.*, 176, 246. Also BOJANI, I., 653 *seqq.*

³ The Cardinal Secretary of State Cibo to Martelli, nuncio in Warsaw, November 30, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 306, n. 1.

contact with the Christian princes could only be a slender one. But if the prospective expedition against Turkey by the Muscovite empire with which Persia had a common frontier in Astrachan, were to develop successfully, it would doubtless be possible to persuade the Shah to induce the Georgian princes who were his tributaries, to undertake military raids which would of necessity lead to open war.¹

If the reports from Persia did not justify any exaggerated hopes, a feeling prevailed in Rome that a great deal more could be hoped for from Moscow. Tsar Feodore had been at war with the Porte since March, 1677,² the first war between Russia and Turkey. In the circumstances one might think that he would not be averse to an alliance with the western Powers. But it hardly seemed advisable for the Holy See to take diplomatic steps in this direction. A few years previously Feodore's father and predecessor, Alexis, had vainly sought to get in touch with Rome,³ for when in 1672 the Porte threatened Poland, Alexis, though he knew that the treaty of Andrussow of the year 1672 bound him to go to the assistance of his western neighbour, fearing for his own realm, sought to win over the Pope for a great crusade of all Christians against the Crescent. However, the mission of the Scotsman Menzies led to no result because the aged Clement X. and his nephew Altieri took up a negative attitude. Altieri would not even grant to the Muscovite prince the title of Tsar, an attitude which meant a diplomatic rupture with Russia. However, Innocent XI. was able to explain—and he now expressly did so—that he had never approved Altieri's Russian policy and that both he and Cibo, his present Secretary of State, had been among those who voted in favour

¹ Piscopo to Buonvisi, in Buonvisi to Cibo, November 21, 1677, *ibid.*

² Cf. ZINKEISEN, V., 82-7; E. HERRMANN, *Gesch. des russ. Staates*, III., Hamburg, 1846, 700-11; UEBERSBERGER, 29-35; Sobieski's estimate of the capabilities of the Muscovite army in his letter of September 29, 1679, to nuncio Martelli, in BOJANI, I., 588.

³ Cf. Vol. XXXI. p. 459 *seq.*

of the concession of the title,¹ nor had he altered his standpoint in the meantime. The general good, it was said in an Instruction he ordered to be sent to Martelli, the nuncio in Warsaw, on March 6th, 1677,² was above such subtleties; accordingly the nuncio was told to get in touch with the Grand Duke through the Polish envoy who was about to set out for Moscow, on the subject of an anti-Turkish league consisting of the Pope, the Emperor, the King of Poland and the Tsar.

Polish opinion was in favour of the Pope's proposal. Following the example of Gregory XIII., Innocent XI. was to be proposed, in the first instance, as best able to bring about the formation of the league, though nuncio Martinelli raised some objections against this suggestion on the ground that a century earlier the Russians had themselves invoked the Pope's mediation whereas this time the suggestion of a papal intervention originated with Poland.³ Poland desired that an Italian should take the place of the Ruthenian Basilian Monk whom Rome had suggested as a companion to the Polish embassy to Moscow and who had been dispensed from fasting and from wearing the monastic habit.⁴ After the whole affair had been laid before a council of Cardinals in June, the Holy See let it be known that in the event of a diplomatic action similar to that of Possevino, it would prefer to any other diplomatist Paul Menzies, the Russian agent at the Vatican from 1672 to 1673.⁵ On the other hand Rome was anxious to avoid religious disputes with the Muscovites, so as not to create in the minds of a distrustful population, a suspicion that other aims, besides the anti-Turkish league, were being pursued.⁶

¹ PIERLING, 48 *seqq.*; Cibo to Martelli, April 10th, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 434. Cf. TCHARYKOW, 18 *seq.*

² March 6, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 431.

³ Martelli to Cibo, March 10, 1677, *ibid.*, 431 *seq.*

⁴ Martelli to Cibo, May 29, 1677, *ibid.*, 435 *seq.*

⁵ PIERLING, 71-3. On the mission of Possevino, *cf.* the present work, Vol. XX, 437.

⁶ Cibo to Buonvisi, May 7, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 465 *seq.*

It was precisely this insuperable mutual distrust of Poles and Russians that caused the whole plan to collapse in the first instance. It was proposed to discuss the league with the Russian envoys, whose presence was expected at the next Polish Diet to be held at Lemberg in April, 1678. According to the report of the nuncio the members of the Diet favoured the idea of a league with Moscow¹; but on their arrival the Muscovite envoys declared that they had come, not for the purpose of concluding a league against the Turks, but merely to prolong for another two years the armistice of Andrussow; as for a papal mediation, they would not even hear of it. For the rest, they said, Moscow was not averse to an alliance, but on condition that Poles and Russians would make a separate attack on the Turks and the Tartars.² If we may believe a later report transmitted to Vienna by the imperial Resident at Constantinople, and communicated to Poland by nuncio Buonvisi, it would seem that the Muscovite envoys had no powers of any kind.³

Apart from the intrigues of Béthune, France's ambassador at Warsaw, who sought to frustrate the league with Moscow,⁴ the question of Kiew stood somehow in the way of an understanding between Sobieski and Russia. By the treaty of Andrassow Poland had been compelled to give up to Russia not only that part of the Ukraine which lay on the other side of the Dnjepr, but Kiew as well, the latter, however, only for two years, according to the letter of the convention. But the Grand Duke had no inclination to restore in 1669 what he had once got hold of, and in Poland it was felt that, for the time being at any rate, it was necessary tacitly to forgo such a restitution if, in the event of a Turkish war, the country was to be sure of at least the benevolent neutrality

¹ Martelli to Cibo, April 11, *ibid.*, 457-9.

² Martelli to Cibo, April 18, 1678, *ibid.*, 460-3.

³ Buonvisi to Martelli, May 1st, 1678, *ibid.*, 465, according to a courier of the imperial Resident in Constantinople to Leopold I.

⁴ Béthune to Pomponne, July 24, 1678, *Acta Pol.*, V., 106 *seq.*

of its eastern neighbour.¹ An alliance, however, with Moscow might very well have for its consequence a formal and definitive surrender of Kiew, and this was what actually happened in 1686. Hence if from the first the King of Poland could not be wholeheartedly in favour of an alliance with Russia, the peculiar conduct of the Muscovite envoys could only increase his distrust. From the mediation of the Emperor, or that of others, which nuncio Martelli proposed, the King hoped for no results at all; in fact the nuncio was terrified when Sobieski spoke to him of a plan he had conceived of entering into an alliance, after the ratification of the treaty of Zurawna, with the Turks, or at any rate the Mohammedan Tartars, against the schismatical Russians who, he said, were no better than the Mohammedans²; for the rest that treaty would not be confirmed by oath so that it could be broken at any time.

There may possibly have been in the King's remarks more than the expression of a passing impression, for a year earlier Martelli had informed Rome that the Turks were anxious to come to an understanding with Poland with a view to joint action against Moscow, but that the King's answer had been that he would never make war against Christians.³ This time also things did not go so far: "I have come to the conclusion that an alliance with the Turks is out of the question," nuncio Martelli wrote in June, 1678.⁴ All the same the peace of Zurawna was ratified by King John soon after the Diet.

Innocent XI. had done all he could to prevent this ratification for his plan was precisely to bring about the Russo-Polish alliance during the course of the Russo-Turkish war and before the definitive conclusion of peace between Poland and Turkey. His aim was an offensive league of the Christian princes. "The Pope," Cibo wrote to the nuncio at Warsaw,⁵

¹ Cf. UEBERSBERGER, 29-35.

² Martelli to Cibo, April 18, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 460-3.

³ Martelli to Cibo, March 24, 1677, *ibid.*, 433.

⁴ Martelli to Cibo, June 20, 1678, *ibid.*, 472 *seq.*

⁵ On May 21, 1678, *ibid.*, 467.

“ is unable to resign himself to the cession of the four strong places¹ to the Porte, because this surrender robs the inhabitants of their freedom and substance. By the surrender of the two towns in the Ukraine the door is left open for the Turks into Poland, and by the loss of the two places in Podolia the heart of Poland is left bleeding, and all this at a moment when Moscow is engaged in a victorious war against the Turks and there is a prospect of a general European peace.” In official Briefs the Pope appealed not only to Poland by means of a pressing request to Sobieski to refrain from the ratification,² but he also urged eleven Polish magnates and his nuncio at Warsaw to oppose the ratification.³ He also pressed the courts of Paris and Vienna to hasten the peace negotiations and to go to the assistance of Poland where the joint interests of Christendom hung in the balance.⁴ For Sobieski himself the ratification of the almost impossible peace⁵ was a heavy sacrifice and a bitter disappointment. At the very time of the ratification, information reached him from Constantinople that the Porte did not abide by the stipulations; even the restoration to the Catholics of the Holy Sepulchre and the church of the Nativity at Bethlehem was refused, though this was one of the conditions of the treaty.⁶ When the

¹ Bucsacs, Bar, Bialov and Cerkov are meant. Cf. HAMMER, VI., 324.

² Briefs of June 25, July 2 and 9, 1678. Cf. the next note.

³ Brief of May 28, 1678, in BERTHIER, I., 175 *seq.*

⁴ Briefs of July 1, 1678, to Louis XIV. Colbert, Pomponne, Le Tellier, Louvois, of July 12, 1678, to the Emperor Leopold, the Elector Palatine, Philipp Wilhelm, Hocher, Fr. Emmerich. The Briefs to Poland, Vienna and Paris are all in BERTHIER, I., 186-194. BOJANI refers (I., 468, n. 1) erroneously only to the Briefs sent to Vienna on July 12.

⁵ So he expressed himself to nuncio Martelli (Martelli to Cibo, May 20, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 466).

⁶ In paragraph 5 of the Peace treaty. The text in HAMMER, VI., 728. Cf. also Sobieski's letter to Innocent XI., dated Marienburg, June 10, 1677, in which he says that he commissioned his ambassador in Constantinople to do all in his power to get

Polish ambassador expostulated with the Grand Vizier he was told that since two dogs wished to guard the bones it was better to throw them to the house dog, viz. the Greeks, than to a stranger, viz. the Catholics.¹ When Sobieski discussed the matter with nuncio Martelli he added in bitter tones: "The Christian princes should know how much the Turk gains by their disunion. At Nymeguen they quarrel over one town whilst whole provinces are lost in the meantime; there they scatter blood and gold whereas, were they united, important conquests could be effected."²

The negotiations at Nymeguen, however, were not merely concerned with a single town. John III.'s complaint about the Christian princes was in no small degree applicable to himself. The Turks' unscrupulous conduct in his regard was doubtless encouraged by the struggle of the parties in Poland itself,³ a circumstance that paralysed its Turkish policy. Now King John was in large measure responsible for these party struggles. They turned essentially round the question which, together with Louis XIV.'s attitude towards the Turkish war, constituted the cardinal point of the Pope's plan for a league, namely Poland's alliance with the Emperor Leopold.⁴ There were not a few people in Poland who favoured such an alliance which, in view of the enormous Turkish preparations, seemed the most natural thing, one, in fact, that simply imposed itself. Among these persons were included nearly all the delegates of the local Diets to the Diet of the

the Holy Sepulchre restored to the Franciscans (Pap. Sec. Arch., *Lett. di Princ.*, 104, f. 182).

¹ *Avviso* from Constantinople, May 1, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 465, n. 1. About the cruelty and arrogance of the Turks towards the Christians, cf. the letter of Cibo to Buonvisi, July 27, 1679, *ibid.*, 551, n. 2.

² Martelli to Cibo, June 10, 1678, *ibid.*, 469 seq.

³ Cf. Cibo to Buonvisi, June 11, 1678, *ibid.*, 470 seq.

⁴ What this alliance meant for Austria and Poland, Esaias Pufendorf, the Swedish Resident in Vienna, had already pointed out in 1673; see REDLICH, in *Mitteil. des Instituts für österr. Gesch.*, XXXVII., 557-560.

realm, the senators, headed by the Bishop of Cracow, the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania and the two commanders-in-chief of the army.¹ The generals did not trust Sobieski. They were of opinion that he desired discord, so as to weaken their authority, inasmuch as they had always been opposed to his friendship with Sweden and France. They felt that if the King were really in earnest with regard to the Turkish war, he would pursue a different policy.²

Strange as it may seem, Queen Casimira was also one of those who came to swell the ranks of the party that favoured the Emperor. The reason of this conduct lay in the embitterment of that passionate woman against Louis XIV. who had cheated her of her pension to which she attached no small importance. But another factor weighed even more seriously with her, this was her wish that her father, Baron D'Arquien (who subsequently, though not under Innocent XI., obtained a Cardinal's hat), should be made a Duke or a *Pair*. This she desired not only from personal ambition,³ but to some extent from fear also of Sobieski who, she felt, after his election to the throne, might be tempted to look on his marriage with an ordinary French noblewoman as no longer suitable to his new status. Ever since her husband's elevation to the throne Casimira's requests to Paris had become increasingly insistent and by the end of 1677 a note of irritation crept into them. However, Louis XIV. turned a deaf ear to all her entreaties because D'Arquien's scandalous conduct made him the laughing stock of the court.⁴ By the turn of 1678-1679 the Queen's change of mind was complete. According to a

¹ Martelli to Cibo, March 3, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 431. The French reports agree on this; cf. DU HAMEL, in *Rev. d'hist. dipl.*, VII. (1893), 504. The enmity between the Pacs and the Sapiehas naturally played a great part in the party strife.

² Martelli to Cibo, January 30, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 499 *seq.*

³ Cf. her letter to Vidoni, the Cardinal Protector of Poland, *ibid.*, III., 366, n. 1.

⁴ DU HAMEL, *loc. cit.*, 505-7, 513-16. Cf. KLOPP, *Das Jahr, 1683*, p. 44, 57, 75; Béthune to Louis XIV., March 22, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 203 *seq.*

contemporary report of the French ambassador at Warsaw, she obeyed in all things the papal nuncio and the imperial Resident.¹ None the less the dominant influence in political decisions was wielded not by the imperial, but by the French party. This party included the Grand Chancellor Wilopolski, the Vice-Chancellor, The Great Treasurer Morstein, the Palatines of Posen and Lublin, the Bishop of Kulm and King John himself,² whilst at its head stood the French ambassador Béthune, the master of them all in the arts of diplomacy and a man whose power at court was unlimited.³ As for the point of attack against Austria, in view of the fact that after 1677 there was no longer any hope of open war by Sobieski against the Emperor, the French party fixed on Hungary as the most vulnerable spot in Austria's eastern policy.

In the narrow strip of territory remaining from old Hungary, between the Austrian lands and the Turkish conquests, two questions stood in the way of a settled condition, the one of a political, the other of a religious character. Hungary was in no position to defend its territory unaided against the Turks, she needed the help of the Empire and this aid the Emperor granted in a generous measure. Vienna, it is true, deemed a stronger centralization and a more vigorous military administration in Hungary indispensable for the defence of the country, a point of view for which the absolutist spirit of the period may have been largely responsible, whilst the Hungarians were anxious that the military protection should be granted without any interference whatever with their national rights and liberties. This caused a political tension between the imperial court and Hungary which led to the conspiracy of 1670 in which Catholic as well as Protestant magnates were engaged but which, as far as the Protestants were concerned, seeped down very much deeper into the

¹ Béthune's memorials to Louis XIV. of October 31, 1678, *Acta Pol.*, V., 153-7, and of February 11, 1679, *ibid.*

² Béthune to Louis XIV., February 11 and April 7, 1679, and March 24, 1680, *ibid.*, 193, 219 *seq.*, 358-369.

³ Martelli to Cibo, March 3 and April 14, 1677, and January 30, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 431, 535, n. 1, 500.

lower strata of the population. The Catholic clergy, in marked contrast with the Protestant ministers, had remained loyal to the Emperor and had helped to bring the conspiracy to light, a circumstance of which nuncio Buonvisi subsequently took advantage in his negotiations with the Emperor, to induce him to adopt a conciliatory attitude in the Hungarian question.¹

The second difficulty, that is the religious one, cut across the political one: it consisted in the confessional struggle between the Catholics and the religious innovators in the country itself. These two questions threatened to become a catastrophe for Austria when the Protestants who had fled to Transylvania after the above-mentioned conspiracy (the *Curuzzes*, Crusaders—as they proudly styled themselves), began a war of revenge against the hated Germans and the Catholics. Since 1672, by means of an insidious guerrilla and predatory incursions, they had caused incredible devastations in the north-easterly parts of Hungary for which it must be admitted, they were called to account with implacable severity whenever they fell into the hands of the imperial troops. Naturally enough the *Curuzzes* sought and arrived at an understanding with the Emperor's enemies, Louis XIV. and the Sultan. The peril of the Hereditary States and the Empire became still greater when the rebels, in 1678, found a capable leader in young Count Emmerich Thököly, a born popular leader and ruler of men, and when behind their hostility Kara Mustafa's tremendous armaments against Austria came to light. It was necessary for the Emperor to master the Hungarian troubles at any cost, for he could not suffer Hungary to serve as a base from which the Turkish hosts might march to the attack of his hereditary lands. But it was precisely the foreign complications—first the war with France, and after the peace of Nymegen, the policy of Louis XIV.—which favoured the design of the Grand Vizier, complicated the Hungarian question exceedingly for Leopold and made it almost insoluble.²

¹ Buonvisi to Cibo, December 27, 1676, in LEVINSON, II., 588.

² Cf. REDLICH, 248-291.

Sobieski's understanding with the Hungarian rebels was consequently bound to be a particularly sensible blow to the Emperor. Against the will of the nation¹ Poland served during those years as the headquarters of all the opponents of the Habsburgs. Although a special article of the peace of Nymeguen of February 5th, 1679, forbade the support of the Hungarian rebels, the French ambassador at Warsaw, Béthune, entered into a formal alliance with them. He was anxious to levy troops for them in Poland and to provide them with French officers as well as with arms and money, in exchange of which they bound themselves not to treat with the Emperor without Louis XIV.'s consent.² The chief tool for the execution of Béthune's plans in Hungary was the Polish Knight Jerome Lubomirski. Not only are the nunciature reports of those years full of complaints about the intrigues of Béthune,³ but the Pope himself protested vehemently against his recruiting activities in favour of the insurgents. On October 30th, 1677, the Cardinal Secretary of State informed the nuncio at Warsaw⁴ that seven hundred Polish soldiers and eighty officers of other nationalities, under the command of Lubomirski, had joined the Hungarian insurgents. He added that this was ill in keeping with the declarations given by the King to the imperial Resident; the action was not correct towards the Emperor who, as everybody knew, had delivered Poland from the Barbarians,

¹ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, October 17, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 444 *seq.*

² DU HAMEL, VII., 507-510; KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, chap. 2, esp. p. 72 *seq.*, the reports of the nunciatures of Vienna and Warsaw, 1677-9; on Béthune's machinations in particular, Martelli to Cibo, July 19, 1678 (BOJANI, I., 477, n. 1), and the letter of protest of the imperial Resident in Warsaw to John III., May 9, 1678, *Acta Pol.*, V., 79, 462.

³ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, August 5 and 29, 1677; Martelli to Cibo, August 18, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 441-3; also *Acta Pol.*, III., 382, 539. On the abuse of the pontifical college of the Theatines at Lemberg for political ends: Martelli to Cibo, February 21 and July 10, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 454, 476.

⁴ *Ibid.* 445. Cf. Cibo, November 6, 1677, *ibid.*

and it was likewise an injustice towards a neighbouring sovereign.

Cibo's complaint of King John himself was not groundless.

It could not be said that the king only yielded under compulsion and against his will to France's overwhelming pressure.¹ Though Sobieski's enthusiasm for Louis XIV. waned in course of time, his enmity towards the Emperor underwent no change in the immediate future.² It was generally felt that recruiting in Poland on behalf of Hungary would be impossible if it met with the King's disapproval,³ for Sobieski was feared by the people. However, this was not all. Not only Béthune but even Sobieski himself had entered into an agreement with the rebels,⁴ by the terms of which the latter guaranteed to them his protection as well as a refuge on his various estates and that at his own expense. To the French Bishop Forbin Janson he confessed quite openly that not only had troops been enrolled in Poland against Austria, but that the whole rebellion had started by his direction.⁵

Sobieski's opposition to the Emperor was at times so marked that he simply refused to listen to any other opinion on the part of the persons of his entourage. Even nuncio Martelli, though he was really popular at court, complained at the end of 1677⁶ of the bad reception of his exhortations to the effect that the way should be paved for better relations with the Emperor. The court would not realize that he had to act as he did in the Pope's name and that he could not accommodate himself in every way to the party in power, as

¹ This was his and Casimira's excuse to the nuncio ; see Martelli to Cibo, July 19, 1678, *ibid.*, 477, n. 1.

² Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, October 3, 1678, *ibid.*, 482-4.

³ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, August 29, 1677, *ibid.*, 441.

⁴ Casimira in her letter of complaint to Louis XIV., § 2-7, *Acta Pol.*, III., 470. Cf. DU HAMEL, VII., 513 *seq.*

⁵ Forbin Janson to Louis XIV., September 26, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, VII., 24 *seq.*

⁶ To Cibo, November 16, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 466. Cf. Martelli's report to Cibo, April 14, 1677, *ibid.*, 435, n. 1.

those were bound to do who wished to enjoy the King's favour. Even the conversation on the subject of the alliance with Moscow had been put off for over a month, whereas otherwise he had had access to the King every week and even several times a week.

In Sobieski's anti-Austrian policy in regard to Hungary lay the chief obstacle to the alliance with the Emperor Leopold. After the peace treaty of Nymeguen the Emperor was prepared, in principle, to enter into an alliance with Poland and Moscow, precisely for the sake of Hungary, for he saw clearly that the deliverance of that country from the Turkish peril was a vital question for Austria in the East.¹ Now it was precisely the support given to the Hungarian rebels by France and Poland that was of the greatest benefit to the Turks. The confusion of the whole situation is reflected in a letter of the nuncio of Vienna, dated September 4th, 1678, to the Cardinal Secretary of State.² Both himself and Martelli, Buonvisi writes, worked unceasingly in order to remove the tension between the Emperor and the King of Poland. But since on Poland's part deeds belie words, he could not tell whether, in his heart, the Emperor trusted the Poles. Reasons of State made the alliance advisable, but mistrust prevented its realization. Poland's help for Hungary was a great evil. Either Sobieski and Casimira had completely sold themselves to France, or they lacked all authority in the country. In the latter alternative their impotent friendship would form an inadequate basis for an alliance.

The attitude of the King of Poland, who in the north gave his support to Sweden's anti-German policy,³ was a source of grief for Innocent XI. Realizing that existing conditions did not allow of a league between the Emperor and John III.,

¹ Cf. Buonvisi's report to Cibo, November 21, 1677, *ibid.*, 306, n. 1.

² BOJANI, I., 481 *seq.* Buonvisi expresses himself still more strongly in his letter to Martelli, October 24, 1678 (*ibid.*, 489-491).

³ Cibo to Martelli, October 15, 1678, *ibid.*, 488. Cf. *Acta Pol.*, V., 23, 60, 86, 93, 219, 459, 462-4, 469, n. 49.

he strove at least to prevent an open rupture and to pave the way for an alliance at some future date. The nuncio at Warsaw was instructed, by friendly intervention and at times by serious remonstrances, to obtain this much, that at least outwardly the attitude of the Polish court should be that of a friendly neighbour. The King would not find this difficult owing to the Emperor's kindly and upright character. For the rest the nuncio should collaborate with the imperial Resident at Warsaw, prudently, of course, so as not to incur the reproach of partiality.¹ As for the Emperor, Innocent XI. exhorted him to overlook Sobieski's hostile sentiments, to refrain from unmasking him, out of a supernatural motive to return good for evil and even to lend him help in the domestic affairs of Poland, in the interests of Germany and in order to forestall a catastrophe which would bring about the ruin of religion together with that of Poland.²

It was not always easy to calm the Emperor. During the critical summer months of 1677, when the intrigues of Sobieski, Béthune and Lubomirski in Hungary reached their climax, Leopold ended by requesting a formal protest by the Pope to the court of Warsaw. Innocent XI. would have preferred to confine himself to remonstrances through his nuncio, for he feared lest Sobieski should throw off all restraint, whilst the French, who would be sure to see the pontifical letter, would accuse the Holy See of partiality, on the plea of the Emperor's understanding with Protestant princes. Their complaints, the Secretary of State wrote to the nuncio at Vienna, would be groundless, but His Holiness was very well aware that the war psychosis³ sees shadows even where there are none

¹ Cf. Cibo to Martelli, January 9 and November 6, 1677, and October 15 and November 19, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 430, 445, 488, 491 *seq.*; Martelli to Sobieski, January 31, 1678, *ibid.*, 453. The letter was passed from Sobieski to Béthune; see Paris Archives of Foreign Affairs, *Pol.* 58, n. 38 (*Acta Pol.*, V., 458).

² Cibo to Buonvisi, November 6 and December 18, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 445 *seq.*, 449.

³ "le gelosie di guerra."

whatever.¹ The Emperor Leopold was very dissatisfied with the papal objections to an official step at the court of Warsaw. Poland's attitude in respect to Hungary, he told nuncio Buonvisi, amounted to positive support of the Turks. After all, his own league with the Protestants differed greatly from the alliances of the King of France. His federation with them was defensive, whereas that of France with England and Sweden had been an aggressive alliance for the purpose of ruining Europe. In Holland the situation of the Catholics was surely better than in England and Sweden. If the Pope was going to study France so very much, he would pay a heavy price for her mediation at Nymeguen where, after all, she had had England on her side. Buonvisi added that the Emperor was greatly annoyed and that he had carefully weighed his answer; but his final remark had been: "In any case, I submit to the wishes of His Holiness, for I hope that the Pope will see in me a more dutiful son than the King of France. The latter holds the Pope fast by threats whereas I seek to win him over by my devotion."²

Excitement was great at the court of Vienna. The Cardinal Secretary of State had to warn the nuncio in Vienna to moderate his usually somewhat sharp language and to be discreet when speaking about Poland.³ The Pope, nevertheless, felt that he must yield to the Emperor's wish. On September 18th, 1677, he addressed a Brief to King John,⁴ a copy of which was dispatched to Vienna where it gave much

¹ Cibo in his letters to Buonvisi and Martelli, July 10, 1677; Buonvisi to Cibo, August 5, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 437 *seq.*, 441 *seq.*

² Buonvisi to Cibo, July 25, 1677, *ibid.*, 438-440.

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, June 27 and November 20, 1677; Cibo to Buonvisi, January 8 and 29, 1678, *ibid.*, 436 *seq.*, 448, 450 *seq.*, 453.

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 122: . . . "Etiam atque etiam Maiestatem tuam hortamur et obsecramus, ut ea omnia istinc removeri studeas, quae carissimo in Christo filio Nostro Leopoldo . . . iustae adversus regnum istud querelae materiam praebere possent."

satisfaction to the Emperor.¹ At the court of Warsaw, however, it produced no effect whatever. Without breaking off their understanding with Hungary, both the King² and Lubomirski, whom the Pope had threatened with canonical penalties,³ assured the Pontiff and the Emperor that they had never had anything to do with the troubles in Hungary. Innocent XI. nevertheless stuck to his policy which was to prevent an open rupture between Vienna and Warsaw and to promote the foundation of a league. The nuncios, it was laid down in the papal instructions to Martelli for the following year, must not give up the plan of a league. If human efforts do not suffice, the aid of God must be implored, to the end that He may render Poland worthy of the abiding miracle of being saved despite herself and in circumstances as difficult as the existing ones, when her internal divisions could not but rob her of the strength she needed in fighting her external enemies.⁴

The papal policy proved right. In the long run it gave additional weight to the influence of those parties in Poland and at the court of Vienna which were in favour of war against Turkey and the formation of a league. This fact came to light at the very beginning of 1679 at the Polish Diet of Grodno. Notwithstanding some lively recriminations, which were mainly concerned with the support given to the Hungarians, to Lubomirski and the Swedes, disputes that nearly led to bloody strife,⁵ a majority vote in favour of war

¹ Buonvisi to Cibo, October 17, 1677, in BOJANI, I., 444.

² *Letter to Innocent XI. of November 5, 1677, *Lett. di princ.*, 104, f. 328, Pap. Sec. Arch.; Cibo to Buonvisi, January 8, 1678; Buonvisi to Cibo, January 9 and 20, 1678; Martelli to Cibo, March 21, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 450, 452, 451, n. 1, 456.

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, August 5 and 29, 1677; Martelli to Cibo, August 18, 1677, *ibid.*, 441 *seqq.*

⁴ Cibo to Martelli, January 7, 1679, *ibid.*, 494.

⁵ The nunciature reports for January are full of observations on the internal discussions between Lithuania and the Sapiehas, between the King and the General Staff; *cf.* BOJANI, I., 493-9, 508-510; Béthune to Louis XIV., January 27, 1679, *Acta*

against Turkey was given on February 25th, at the very moment when news came from Danzig of the conclusion of peace between the Emperor and France. The Bishops voted unanimously for war and those of Posen and Przemysl even offered on the spot one half of their revenues as a war contribution. On the proposal of the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, the leader of the advocates of the league, it was resolved to leave the decision about war or peace to the King and to a council of Senators and thirty Knights, without consultation of yet another Diet, and to send extraordinary ambassadors to the courts of the Christian princes. The embassy to Vienna, Venice, Florence and Rome was entrusted to Prince Radziwill, who had been in Rome at the beginning of 1678, when Innocent XI. requested him to promote the league in Poland and at Vienna. The Grand Treasurer, Morstein, one of Béthune's most intimate political friends, was dispatched to France, England and Holland.¹ King

Pol., V., 183 *seq.* For the Austro-Brandenburg faction in Poland directed against Sobieski, in which, however, the court of Vienna had no part, *cf.* the memorial of Béthune to Pomponne of October 31, 1678, *ibid.*, 153-7; Cibo to Buonvisi, March 4 and May 6, 1679; Buonvisi to Martelli, April 16, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 505 *seq.*, 527, 506, n. 1. About the attempt, discovered some time after by the Polish Postmaster in Vienna, of the two Italians Piccinardi and Zefirini, to send to the court of Vienna, especially to the Empress-mother, aggravating material against Sobieski, *cf.* the reports of the nunciature in BOJANI, III., 356-361. But the Empress-mother, according to the report of Buonvisi, refused to have anything to do with the affair, in fact she refrained from politics altogether.

¹ Martelli to Cibo, February 27, March 6 and 13, and April 10, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 504, 508-511, 520-2; Béthune to Louis XIV., March 22, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 203. On Radziwill's former journey to Rome, *cf.* *Avvisi di Roma* of February 26 and March 5, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 453, n. 1.; Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, March 12, 1678; Cibo to Martelli, March 2, 1678, *ibid.*, 455. But the question of title (see below, p. 109) made it impossible for Radziwill to do anything in the Turkish question in Vienna; *cf.* Buonvisi to Cibo, June 19, 1678, *ibid.*,

John congratulated the papal nuncio and the imperial Resident on their success. He himself hoped, he said, to raise 46,000 men even before the return of the ambassadors, and to go into winter quarters with them on hostile territory. If the Emperor, Poland and Moscow made common cause, victory was certain. There was even talk of co-operation by France in the Mediterranean.¹ Nonetheless the nuncios at Warsaw and Vienna remained doubtful. "Everything seems to show," Martelli wrote, "that there is question not so much of going to war against the Turks as of talking about it, with a view to extracting contributions from the pockets of the well-to-do among the Poles."² In all probability King John seriously thought at one time of going to war against Turkey.³ It is also possible that he would have liked to head a league of all the Christian princes, a prospect which, according to a report of the French ambassador at Warsaw to Louis XIV.,⁴ the Pope was for ever dangling before him. John III., however, really wished to make war on Turkey with the help and support of Louis XIV. and the purpose of Morstein's mission was precisely to make sure of his assistance before all else.⁵ On the other hand he did not fulfil any of the preliminary conditions, which required among other things a league between the Emperor and Moscow; on the contrary, he only rendered them more difficult. To begin with, the dispatch of ambassadors who, in point of fact, were not to set out until

471 *seq.* On the political conduct of Morstein, *cf. Acta Pol.*, V., 451 *seq.*, and Béthune to Louis XIV., February 11, 1679, *ibid.*, 193.

¹ Martelli to Cibo, April 15, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 522.

² Buonvisi to Cibo, April 16 and May 21, 1679; Martelli to Buonvisi, April 16, 1679; Martelli to Cibo, April 10, 1679, *ibid.*, 525, 537 *seq.*, 521 *seq.* The complaints of Sobieski to Martelli against the suspicions of the court of Vienna, *ibid.*, 587-9.

³ *Cf.* Béthune to Louis XIV., June 5 and 22 and August 25, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 239, 249 *seq.*, 482.

⁴ On March 22, 1679, *ibid.*, 203 *seq.*

⁵ *Cf. inter alia* John III.'s instructions to Morstein and the letter of Louis XIV. to Béthune of May 10, 1680, *ibid.*, 239 *seq.*, 434 *seq.*

the end of May, could only delay the formation of alliances.¹ Moreover the real stumbling-block, namely the alliance with Sweden and the support of the Hungarian rebels, was not cleared out of the way. The King obstinately defended his alliance with Sweden.² With regard to Lubomirski, Béthune had threatened to wreck the Diet if that Knight were condemned. As a matter of fact, under pressure by the King, the Diet pronounced a general amnesty in regard to the Hungarian question and the intrigues went on as before.³

The King's opposition likewise wrecked the alliance with Moscow. In the autumn of 1678 the Tsar had renewed the Treaty of Andrussow with Poland for another period of thirteen years and in this way a decision about Kiew was at least put off once again. To the delight of the Polish court the Grand Duke also restored the territories in dispute and paid a sum of 200,000 roubles, all with a view to preparing the ground for an alliance.⁴ Though the Russian delegates lacked full powers to arrange for a definitive league, it was possible, this time, to put more trust in their offer because the experience of the Turkish war must have shown to the Tsar the value of an alliance and he himself now offered favourable conditions.⁵ Innocent XI. himself,⁶ his nuncio at Warsaw and the whole imperial party in Poland, worked with so much determination

¹ Cf. Béthune's report to Louis XIV. of March 22, 1679, *ibid.*, 203 *seq.*

² Béthune to Louis XIV., January 27 and April 7, 1679, *ibid.*, 183 *seq.*, 219 *seq.*

³ Béthune to Louis XIV., January 16, February 5, March 22 and April 3, 1679, *ibid.*, 471, n. 15, 189, 472, n. 42, 205, 218. Cf. Martelli to Cibo, March 22 and April 3, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 516 *seq.*

⁴ Martelli to Cibo, October 5, 1678, *ibid.*, 485 *seq.*

⁵ Martelli to Cibo, March 27, 1679, *ibid.*, 513 *seq.*; ÜBERSBERGER, 29-35.

⁶ By a Brief to John III., of March 25, 1679, in BERTHIER, I., 247. Cf. Cibo to Buonvisi, March 25, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 513. By a Brief of March 18, 1679 (BERTHIER, I., 244 *seq.*), the Pope urged Venice also to join the league against the Turks.

for the league that, according to Béthune's report, the negotiations should have led to a positive result. This was the moment chosen by Sobieski to request the French ambassador secretly to induce the anti-imperial party to oppose the alliance so long as they were not sure of the co-operation of Louis XIV. and of that of all the Christian princes in the Turkish war, a condition which in existing circumstances was, of course, impossible of realization. Béthune easily secured a sufficient number of vetoes. His secret intrigues at the Diet only cost him 12,000 livres, of which Lubomirski undertook the distribution.¹ Thus was the plan of a league thwarted ; on the other hand Casimira and the generals were so angered by Béthune's intrigues, that the French ambassador had to be warned not to go out alone at night.²

Undecided as he was by nature and distrustful by reason of his painful experiences with his previous alliances, in view of the events in Poland the Emperor was more unwilling than ever to enter into an offensive league. This was seen as soon as, at the end of June, the Tsar's envoys arrived from Poland in Vienna. In obedience to instructions from Rome, Buonvisi welcomed them most courteously ; he called on them and received their return visits. Presents were exchanged. The Muscovite envoys presented the Pope's representative with four sable cloaks. He replied with material from his native city of Lucca. This so pleased the Russians that they declared that clothing so costly only became their lord. They embraced the nuncio and kissed his hand. Buonvisi even risked touching on the question of religious freedom. The Grand Duke's representatives expressed the opinion that if Moscow, with a view to securing recruits, granted the private exercise of their

¹ *Acta Pol.*, V., 221. 12,000 livres are 3,664 ducats and 2 livres ; cf. KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 73.

² Béthune to Louis XIV., February 11, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 193 ; Louis' letter of thanks to John III., of March 10, 1679, *ibid.*, 211 ; Martelli to Cibo, February 20 and 27, March 6 and 13, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 502 *seq.*, 504 *seq.*, 508, 511 ; Cibo to Martelli, March 18, 1679, *ibid.*, 572. Cf. the report of Pietro Civrano in BAROZZI-BERCHET, Ser. 5, *Turchia*, 275 ; DU HAMEL, VIII., 56.

religion even to the Lutherans and the Calvinists—those bestial sects—the same privilege would much more readily be granted to the western Catholics seeing that the Russians agreed with them on almost every point.¹ Meanwhile the court of Vienna treated the Russian embassy with coolness : it would not even concede to the Grand Duke the title of “ Majesty ”.² Buonvisi’s attempts to bring about within a short time an agreement between the Emperor, the Poles and the Tsar, an attempt which was to be furthered by an exceedingly flattering letter of the nuncio of Vienna to Sobieski,³ proved utterly hopeless. On top of everything the plague broke out in Vienna. To escape it the Emperor withdrew into the country,⁴ perhaps not without the secondary intention of thereby avoiding the necessity of treating with the Russians. The envoys of the Grand Duke left Vienna disappointed and dissatisfied, and nuncio Buonvisi had to deem himself lucky to have at least made sure that the conversations would be continued at a later date.⁵

¹ Cibo to Buonvisi, July 15, 1679 ; Buonvisi to Martelli, June 19 and 25, 1679 ; Buonvisi to Cibo, August 5, 20 and 27, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 557, 549, 551, 565, 573 *seq.*, 575-8 ; TRENTA, 376-385.

² Buonvisi to Cibo in the report of August 27, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 575 *seqq.*

³ Cf. July 24, 1679, in TRENTA, I., 375. Buonvisi compares Sobieski to Alexander Severus and Skanderbeg.

⁴ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, August 11 and 27 and September 3, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 571 *seq.*, 575, 578 *seq.* On the plague in the house of the nuncio see TRENTA, I., 386. Cf. KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 85.

⁵ Buonvisi to Cibo in the letter of August 27, 1679 ; to Martelli, September 4, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 579 *seq.* ; Martelli to Cibo, September 6, 1679, *ibid.*, 580-3 (reports of his conversation with John III. on the affair). In 1679 the Saxon adventurer Lorenz Rinhuber came also to Rome with oral commissions, so he pretended, from Menzies. He set forth his proposals in two memorials which were in complete harmony with the ideas of Innocent XI. : An alliance of Poland with Moscow, a mission to the Tartars and to China, recognition of the title of Tsar,

The formation of the alliance, as Buonvisi clearly recognized, depended fundamentally on the attitude of France.¹ After the Peace of Nymeguen, opinion in Vienna, on the whole, was not unfavourable to an offensive alliance against the Porte. With the exception of Schwarzenberg, whose authority, however, carried great weight, everybody at court, even Hocher and Montecuccoli, were in favour of it.² Buonvisi reported that the strength of the army was considerable and the financial situation not too difficult and that Montecuccoli maintained that now that peace had been concluded, he would be able with the troops still mobilized in Hungary and in the Empire, to win back for the Emperor both Gran and Ofen within a month, after which the important place of Neuhäusel would fall spontaneously.³ But a preliminary condition of the court of Vienna was that Louis XIV. should support the war against the Crescent, were it only with his benevolent neutrality.⁴ Herein lay the great obstacle to the alliance, one which until then had been greatly under-estimated on the papal side. Small wonder that Innocent

papal representation in Moscow and commercial relations between Russia and Louis XIV. By his fascinating manners the man succeeded in winning the confidence of the Vatican. He was sent, supplied with financial means, to nuncio Martelli, who was to attach him to the Polish legation in Moscow. Rinhuber, however, went to Moscow only in 1684, but to work there for the Protestant interests (PIERLING, 73-5). Cf. PIERLING, *Saxe et Moscow*, 127; THEINER, *Monuments*, 164, Nr. 151.

¹ Cf. Letter of Buonvisi to Martelli of March 22, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 515. Also WAGNER (*Hist. Leopoldi*, I., 498): "Gallia cogitationes omnes abstulerat."

² Buonvisi to Cibo, June 18, 1679, in BOJANI, 547 *seq.* Cibo draws the attention of the nuncio in Vienna (on June 24) to the fact that they had ascertained from a reliable source that the Venetian ambassador in Vienna was working against the alliance. This Buonvisi contradicted on July 16 (BOJANI, I., 550 *seq.*).

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, February 19, 1678, April 16 and June 18, 1679, in LEVINSON, II., 718-723. LEVINSON does not seem to know BOJANI's work.

⁴ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, August 12, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 569.

XI. who, according to Cibo's report,¹ busied himself day and night with the Turkish question, and who had hoped for great things as a result of the Peace of Nymeguen, should have been considerably annoyed by the hesitations of Vienna. It is evident that vehement altercations on this subject occurred between him and Cardinal Pio, the Emperor's Protector, at a consistory held in mid-June.² In reality, as Innocent XI. was bound to learn precisely during those weeks both from his own diplomatic steps with Louis XIV. and the reports of his nuncios, French diplomacy constituted as great a difficulty in the question of the Turkish war after the Peace of Nymeguen as it had done before. Louis XIV. was at the height of his power. From the political point of view Italy and Germany lay open to invasion by his armies. The electoral Palatinate, Mayence, Cologne, Trèves, Brandenburg, Saxony and Bavaria were completely under his influence, in fact he had compelled the three last named, by a special treaty, to vote for him at the next imperial election. Spain was powerless against Louis; the King of England was completely dependent upon him financially and at the court of the King of Poland, French influence was still predominant.³ In addition to all this Louis' plan of so-called *reunion*, with which his policy of hostility towards the Emperor and of friendship with the Turks was intimately linked, began to assert itself at this time. An echo of it is also found in nuncio Buonvisi's reports. "France," the latter reported to Rome, "refuses to restore the towns in Alsace which the Peace of Westphalia assigned to Austria, she fortifies Schlettstadt and Hüningen and gives cause for the fear that she has a mind to annex also Cologne and Strassburg. The imperial ambassadors are of opinion that since the signature of the last Treaty at Nymeguen they have more ground for anxiety than even during the war."⁴

¹ To Buonvisi on July 22, 1679, *ibid.*, 558.

² On June 17, 1679; see **Avvisi Barb.*, LXXIII., 23, Vat. Lib.

³ Cf. REDLICH, 199.

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 23 and 30, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 563, 555, n. 1.

Innocent XI. met the obstacles against an anti-Turkish alliance which arose from France's policy with all his characteristic vigour. During the summer of 1679 he made repeated attempts in Rome itself and through his nuncio in Paris, to induce Louis to join the alliance or at least to declare that France would not disturb the Powers which were resolved to join in the war against Turkey. However, the replies from Paris never went beyond the vaguest promises; in fact a hopeless attempt was even made to secure from Innocent XI. certain advantages in the field of ecclesiastical policy in exchange for these promises.¹

On August 3rd Cibo had to inform Buonvisi that it had not been possible to obtain a clear answer from Louis XIV. whether he would help or remain neutral.²

In view of this attitude of the "lord of Europe" it was a foregone conclusion that the Polish embassies, whose mission it was to pave the way for an offensive alliance, were doomed to failure. When the Grand Treasurer Morstein, in the course of a conversation with Louis, expressed his fear of an early Turkish attack on Poland, the King interrupted him with the remark that the Porte was still too deeply committed in its war with Moscow.³ Louis spoke more clearly when

¹ Cibo to Buonvisi, May 20 and 27 and July 8, 1679; to Lauri in Paris, June 21, 1679; to Martelli, July 1, 1679, *ibid.*, 537-9, 555, 548, n. 1, 552 *seq.* Buonvisi to Béthune, June 26, 1679 (TRENTA, I., 369): In order to decide the Emperor for the anti-Turkish alliance "è necessario che S. M. Cristianissima assicuri di voler sospendere il corso delle sue conquiste con mantenere stabilmente la pace già conclusa . . .". Cardinal D'Estrées to Cibo, July 14, 1679 (MICHAUD, II., 79 *seq.*): D'Estrées refers to the "just and reasonable" demands, which Louis XIV. proposes to the Emperor and which must first be fulfilled. If, moreover, the Pope shows condescension in French affairs, there is every reason to believe that work for the Turkish question will not be in vain.

² BOJANI, I., 565.

³ Pomponne to Béthune, November 3, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 312.

Morstein, with the knowledge and approval of Innocent XI.,¹ informed him that the Pope had dispatched 500,000 florins to Poland for the Turkish war. He would never advise Poland to declare war on Turkey, he said ; on the other hand, should the Turks attack Poland he would not leave her in the lurch. When Morstein asked him what would be his contribution in such an eventuality, the King replied that he could make no definite statement for the moment ; he would first wait and see whether the Turks attacked the Poles.²

These declarations of the King become intelligible when it is borne in mind that Morstein's mission synchronized with the relief of Nointel, until then French ambassador at Constantinople, by Guilleragues.³ This change of ambassadors was made for a definite purpose. Louis XIV. was determined to use Guilleragues in the pursuit of a more intensive Turkish policy, the aim of which was to protect Poland from a Turkish attack and to divert the Grand Vizier's aggressive energies from Poland and Venice by directing them towards Hungary and Austria.⁴ A formula to justify a policy of this kind had long ago been devised by Louis XIV.'s council. This is how the council reasoned : generally speaking it was, of course, immoral to lure the Turks into a Christian land, but it was lawful in the present extraordinary circumstances, when a Turkish irruption into Austria, that is into a country hostile to France, would have the effect of saving Poland, a friendly Power.⁵ Already now the King probably felt certain that, on the whole, his policy would prove successful.

¹ Cf. Cibo's instructions to Lauri, January 3, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 345, n. 1.

² Lauri to Cibo, February 1, 1680, *ibid.*, 352, n. 1.

³ Guilleragues arrived in Constantinople on November 3, 1679. His instructions are dated June 10 of the same year ; see KÖHLER, 72, 74.

⁴ Cf. KÖHLER, 72-100. Buonvisi reports to Rome on April 16, 1679 (BOJANI, I., 524, n. 2) that Louis XIV. had sent a new ambassador to Constantinople in order to make an alliance with the Turks.

⁵ DU HAMEL, VII., 500 *seq.*, according to ROUSSET, *Louvois*, II., 212-15.

Even before this reply to Morstein and about the very time when the latter informed Lauri, the Paris nuncio, of Louis XIV.'s general assurance that he would grant Poland considerable assistance,¹ at the same time also as Martelli, the nuncio at Warsaw, was circulating over the whole of Poland a letter of Sobieski according to which Louis XIV.'s ambassador at the imperial court, the Marquis de Vitry, had been instructed by his sovereign to give the Emperor every guarantee of security on the part of France in the event of an Austro-Polish anti-Turkish alliance being formed,² Louis had let his ambassador at Warsaw know³ that he had given Morstein no hope of assistance. As for Sobieski, it was enough to tell him that in the event of the Emperor and the other Christian princes assisting him in a war for the greater good of Christendom, the King of France would also give him such support as would openly testify to his zeal for the defence of holy religion against its natural enemy, as well as to his goodwill towards Poland.⁴ Morstein, to whom Sobieski wrote in a somewhat angry tone that he had asked the King of France for money, not for good advice,⁵ understood the nature of the answer, if he did not already then work in Louis XIV.'s interest, as his subsequent conduct leads one to suspect. At the beginning of the following year Buonvisi wrote to Rome that according to Morstein Louis XIV. gave fair words, though without binding himself in any way, with a view to inducing the Emperor to undertake a war against Turkey, a circumstance which would give the King of France a free hand elsewhere.⁶

¹ Lauri to Cibo, September 4, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 580.

² Béthune to Louis XIV. and Pomponne, November 17, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 316 *seq.*, 485, Nr. 45 and 46.

³ On September 14, 1679, *ibid.*, 296.

⁴ Louis XIV. to Béthune, October 24, 1679, *ibid.*, 311.

⁵ Martelli to Cibo, January 24, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 348-350.

⁶ Buonvisi to Cibo, January 28, 1680, *ibid.*, 349, n. 1. Cf. King John III. in his "Deliberatoriae" of September 10, 1680 (*Acta Pol.*, VII., 24): "A Serenissimo Rege Galliae quamvis honorifica recipiamus promissa, quod rebus nostris tam pro

If Morstein's mission to Paris resulted at least in throwing light, to some extent, on the intentions of Louis XIV. with regard to the Turkish question, Radziwill's embassy to Austria and Italy was utterly fruitless precisely in consequence of the negative attitude of the King of France. The dispatch of a Polish *obbedienza* embassy to the new Pope had been under consideration since the beginning of 1667, for there had been no Polish envoy in Rome for about fifty years.¹ Innocent XI. himself cared but little for formalities of this kind, and his remarks on the Polish embassies of 1679 in particular, namely that they would be of little use, would cost much money and would only delay the Turkish affair,² were fully justified by events. According to Sobieski's reckoning, the total cost of the embassies amounted to over a million.³ Radziwill in particular, to whom had been entrusted the embassy to the South, was well known, and disliked, in Poland and Vienna by reason of his love of display and titles.⁴ He only reached Vienna by mid-July.⁵ His mission which, as a matter of fact, did not empower him to conclude a treaty,⁶ would probably have come to grief from the first owing to his claim to being styled "Highness", a title which the court of Vienna denied him, had not nuncio Buonvisi found a way out of the impasse: this consisted in that

offensivo quam defensivo bello deesse nolit, huc usque tamen (licet integrum annum magnificus Legatus noster ibi transegerit) eam non habemus declarationem, qua certum quantum et quando adferet."

¹ Cf. the nunciature reports in BOJANI, I., 415-19.

² Cibo to Martelli, May 13, 1679, *ibid.*, 527 *seq.*

³ Letter to Martelli of September 29, 1679, *ibid.*, 587.

⁴ Martelli to Cibo, June 14, 1679, *ibid.*, 546 *seq.*

⁵ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 16, 1679, *ibid.*, 557. On the delay, cf. Martelli to Cibo, May 17, 1679, *ibid.*, 528-530. Martelli cannot say for certain when Radziwill would set out, "perchè in questo paese le cose appena si possono dar per sicure quando son fatte." John III.'s letter of recommendation for Radziwill in TRENTA, I., 374.

⁶ Buonvisi to Cibo, August 6, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 565.

conversation was carried on in the third person.¹ In a solemn address Radziwill reminded the Emperor of his duty to protect Christendom; that was why the King of Poland requested him to enter into an alliance against the traditional enemy of Christendom.² The negotiations themselves were overshadowed by the court of Vienna's fear of France.³ The Emperor, Radziwill observed to Jacobelli, the nuncio at Venice, did not trust the Peace of Nymegen; all his thoughts run in the direction of Cologne, Strassburg, Casale, Milan and Genoa. He was for an offensive league, provided the Pope granted subsidies and Moscow joined in, otherwise only for a defensive one.⁴

If Radziwill really summed up in this way the result of his negotiations at Vienna, we may surmise that he put too favourable a construction on what he had been told there. In that city fear of a Turkish war was far too great, in view of Louis XIV.'s uncertain and threatening attitude, for the Government to risk anything beyond a defensive league.⁵ The mere thought that information on the negotiation for a league of offence might reach Constantinople and rouse the haughty Kara Mustafa, caused Leopold no small anxiety.⁶ For the rest Radziwill's mission was obviously looked upon, to a large extent, as a mere demonstration; nuncio Buonvisi

¹ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 23, 1679, *ibid.*, 559-561.

² The speeches of Radziwill during his embassy in LÜNIG, *Orationes procerum*, II., 443-466; the two speeches to the Emperor Leopold, *ibid.*, 443-452.

³ Cf. Béthune to Pomponne, September 6, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 284. The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV. from Rome (MICHAUD, II., 80): the Pope said that the Emperor seemed to be full of goodwill but that he was afraid of the mighty power of France. Cf. KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 73 *seq.*

⁴ Jacobelli to Cibo, December 16, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 604 *seq.*; DU HAMEL, VIII., 58 *seq.*

⁵ According to WAGNER (*Hist. Leopoldi*, I., 499) the reply of Vienna was: "de Turcico bello ne cogitare quidem posse."

⁶ Cf. Buonvisi to Cibo, May 28, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 540 *seq.*

compared it to a stage play in which the public saw a picture of war and then went home in peace.¹

From Vienna Radziwill went to Italy where, in consequence of the risk of the plague, he found the frontiers of Venice and the Papal States closed against him,² so that the nuncio in Venice, Jacobelli, had to treat with the Polish embassy at the frontiers whilst observing all the prescribed sanitary precautions.³ Jacobelli and Radziwill met on December 14th at Pontebba. The Polish envoy's chief request to the Pope was for financial assistance. Poland, he urged, had resolved to go to war with 50,000 men, but 30,000 of these must be maintained with the contributions of other princes. The Pope should set a good example before the next Polish Diet which was due to open in the following year, otherwise there remained nothing for Poland but to carry out the peace of Zurawna.⁴

As soon as the frontiers were opened the Polish embassy continued its journey. On August 8th, 1680 it was solemnly received at the Quirinal when Radziwill did homage to the Pope in the name of Poland and its King, praying him at the same time to grant a subsidy for the holy war to his country which had at no time incurred the reproach of schism. The Pope replied that he would spare no effort to further any work that was for the well-being of Christendom.⁵ But Radziwill's further negotiations with the ambassadors of the various European courts were wrecked in the end by questions of etiquette: the ambassadors in Rome refused to address

¹ Buonvisi to Conte Lorenzo Magalotti in Florence, August 3, 1679, in TRENTA, II., 317.

² Cibo to Martelli, October 28 and November 11, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 594 *seq.*

³ Cibo to Iacobelli, November 29, 1679, *ibid.*, 597 *seq.*

⁴ Iacobelli to Cibo, December 16, 1679, *ibid.*, 603-6; Cibo to all the nuncios, January 7, 1680, *ibid.*, 609 *seq.*

⁵ LÜNIG, *loc. cit.*, 458. The reply of Innocent XI. to Radziwill's speech is in BERTHIER, I., 361. *Ibid.*, 382, the corresponding Brief of October 14, 1680, to King John III. Cf. KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 73.

each other even in the third person. Radziwill died at Bologna, on his return journey, burdened with debts contracted with the Apostolic Camera, so that what he left scarcely sufficed to meet them.¹ The only result of the embassies was a protest by the Porte on the ground that they were at variance with existing peace treaties.²

If the imperial court received the Polish envoys with considerable reserve in the summer of 1679, the reason, quite apart from its distrust of Poland and France, lay in the negotiations which the imperial Residents in Constantinople were conducting just then for the prolongation of the armistice of 1664 between the Emperor and Turkey. However, the negotiations proved abortive,³ as did Moscow's attempts to end the Russo-Turkish war.⁴ The result was that towards the close of the year a marked readiness for a league with Poland showed itself both at Vienna and at Moscow, in fact this disposition was so strong at Vienna that the Emperor empowered his ambassador at Warsaw to conclude one.⁵ Vienna nevertheless sought to keep out of an offensive league whilst there was reason to fear for the safety of the west of the Empire from Louis XIV.'s policy and so long as the attitude of Bavaria and Brunswick remained doubtful. On the other hand Leopold desired his Resident and the papal

¹ Cibo to Martelli, September 4, 1680; to Pallavicini, November 23, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 404, n. 1 *seq.*, 418.

² Pallavicino to Cibo, December 11, 1680, *ibid.*, 419.

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, October 22, 1679; Cibo to Buonvisi, November 11 and 25; Cibo to Martelli, November 11, *ibid.*, I., 593 *seq.*, 595 *seq.*; KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 71 *seq.*

⁴ Sobieski to Martelli, October 9, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 590-2. Cf. Béthune to Louis XIV., November 17, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 316 *seq.*

⁵ Martelli to Cibo, January 3, February 14 and March 27, 1680; Buonvisi to Martelli, March 3, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 346, 360, 373, 357, n. 2. The fact that they made much better proposals than was expected speaks for the sincerity of the Muscovite negotiators; cf. Béthune to Louis XIV., April 28, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 417 *seq.*

nuncio to promote with the utmost energy the creation of a league of defence.¹ Innocent XI. seconded the Emperor's efforts in a fashion which impressed Poland and which was calculated to prepare the ground for the Diet about to open at Warsaw. On December 30th, 1679, whilst Prince Radziwill was still waiting at the Austro-Venetian frontier for leave to enter Italy, he dispatched 500,000 florins to nuncio Martelli, to be consigned to Poland as soon as that Kingdom should have begun war against the Crescent.²

Almost at the same time Louis XIV., at whose court Morstein was still negotiating with a view to getting help against the Turks, issued instructions to his ambassador in Poland in regard to the discussions at the forthcoming Diet concerning the league. They were to the effect that Béthune should do all in his power to defeat every effort of the papal nuncio and the imperial Resident in favour of the league.³ Béthune eagerly applied himself to this task in which he had the collaboration of the Grand Elector.⁴ Poland's domestic troubles, of which nuncio Martelli complained bitterly,⁵ and the deliberately spread rumour that the King of France would not fail adequately to support Poland against the Turks,⁶ made the Frenchman's task easy, all the more so as he still wielded a preponderant influence.

¹ Cf. above, p. 111, n. 3; Béthune to Louis XIV., December 7, 1679, *Acta Pol.*, V., 486; Martelli to Cibo, October 11, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 592; Buonvisi to Cibo, January 7, 1680, *ibid.*, III., 346, n. 1 (Vienna is afraid of a matrimonial alliance between Max Emanuel and the second daughter of the Duke of Orleans); Buonvisi to Martelli, February 18, 1680, *ibid.*, 361. Cf. the nunciature reports, *ibid.*, 379-386.

² Cibo to Martelli, December 30, 1679, *ibid.*, I., 608 *seq.*

³ Louis XIV. to Béthune, January 5, May 30 and June 20, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 371, 374, 444.

⁴ Béthune to Vitry, February 20, 1680, *ibid.*, 377.

⁵ Martelli to Cibo, December 6, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 598-601.

⁶ Cf. for this and for what follows the *Mémoire de M. de Béthune* on the Polish Diet from January 11 to February 3, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 349-357.

The Diet opened on January 11th, 1680. The result of the first four sessions was a commission charged to discuss the question of the league with the imperial Resident. However, Béthune had secretly so worked upon the feelings of the members of the Diet that of the seven Bishops who were the first to vote and who, at the last Diet, had been unanimously in favour of the league, all now expressed themselves definitely against it, with the sole exception of Queen Casimira's Chancellor, the Bishop of Przemysl. The sharpest opposition to the league came from Bishop Wierzbowski of Posen, until then a decided adherent of the Austrian party, who seasoned his objections with the most extravagant encomiums of Louis XIV. and Béthune. Eight out of the ten Palatines and two-thirds of the senators were against a defensive league. In the last few weeks King John, in his confidential communications to nuncio Martelli, had expressed himself in favour of the league,¹ and he voted accordingly at the Diet. However, when he asked the senators and deputies for their opinion, the Bishop of Posen, perhaps out of spite because he had not been given the See of Cracow, indulged in a violent attack on the King, reproaching him with treading the freedom of Poland under foot and of selling the interests of the State for private profit. Sobieski called God to witness that he was being falsely accused, whereupon the Bishop left the room in tears. But he was not without supporters, though his accusations were so enormous that the King felt compelled to suspend the sitting. Queen Casimira complained bitterly of Béthune whom the court suspected of having instigated so painful a scene. The papal nuncio called the otherwise zealous but indiscreet Bishop to order, took him into the King's presence and pleaded for forgiveness for him, whereupon Sobieski embraced the prelate.² But all this could not make good the mischief

¹ Martelli to Cibo, January 24, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 348-350. Also the nunciature reports, *ibid.*, 590-610.

² Besides the *Mémoire* of Béthune, see Martelli to Cibo, February 7 and 21 and April 10, 1680; Cibo to Martelli, March 9,

done. The King yielded all the more readily to the excited passions, which were unfavourable to him, as his own hostility towards Leopold continued to sway him. He promised Béthune to bring the Diet to a close on his own initiative, before it had concluded anything.

On the other hand nuncio Martelli and the imperial Resident did not yet give up all hope. They laid before a special commission, which had been formed at their request, a proposal for an immediate defensive league, to be altered into an offensive one as soon as a guarantee would have been obtained from the King of France that for the duration of the league he would in no way attack either the hereditary States or the Empire. As at this very time a pasha, at the head of a considerable army, had arrived at Kamieniec to carry out a regulation of frontiers, the proposal was not unwelcome to the court of Warsaw and it also won many supporters among the senators; Béthune, however, forced the Grand Chancellor to withdraw from the commission and to protest against the league negotiations. This told. Instead of a league, a decision was arrived at to dispatch a courier to Paris to communicate to Louis XIV. the Emperor's proposal and to induce him to comply with the request both of the Pope and the Poles and to leave the Emperor free to join an offensive league, or at least to allow Poland to conclude a defensive one. Béthune was anxious to prevent this embassy to Paris. He urged that it was injurious to the peace of Nymeguen; it was necessary, on the contrary, to await the return of Morstein who would surely be the bearer of a favourable answer. But the court no longer trusted Morstein for the latter had not availed himself of the last six postal facilities between Paris and Warsaw. Béthune was obliged to give way; he thereupon dispatched to Paris a Frenchman of the Queen's court.¹ As a matter of fact, he had every

1680, in BOJANI, III., 353, n. 1, 356, n. 2, 362, n. 1, as also the two letters of admonition to Bishop Wierzbowski of March 9 and October 11, 1680, in BERTHIER, I., 327 *seq.*, 378.

¹ Béthune to Louis XIV., April 28, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 416 *seq.*

reason to be satisfied with the result : the whole plan of the league had been adjourned once more, in fact it had actually got into the hands of French diplomacy.

Louis XIV. at first avoided giving the desired declaration. The demand, he said, betrayed a want of confidence and was quite superfluous ; so long as the Emperor gave no cause for him to act otherwise, he would remain friendly.¹ To Sobieski himself, however, he spoke more clearly and this at Béthune's instance who feared that otherwise events would of themselves lead to the formation of a league.² By his orders Béthune had to warn the King of Poland against a war with Turkey, as well as against any kind of league, whether offensive or defensive,³ with the Emperor ; in its form this warning was not unlike a threat. Even if the league took shape, Béthune explained, his sovereign was sufficiently strong and resourceful to defeat its purpose. On the other hand he gave reassuring promises in the event of Poland being attacked by Turkey : were this to happen Louis would not leave Poland in the lurch.⁴ At the same time French anti-Austrian machinations in Hungary and Transilvania were taken up with renewed vigour.⁵ Evidently in these circumstances the fresh negotiations for a league between Moscow and Poland, which as a matter of fact caused grave misgivings in the latter country, were bound to come to nothing, notwithstanding the wide powers of the Russian negotiators.⁶ Reassured as against the Porte by

¹ Lauri to Cibo, July 19, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 402. Cf. Martelli to Cibo, February 7, April 3 and 7, 1680 ; Cibo to Martelli, March 2, 1680, *ibid.*, 356, 374, n. 2, 378, 363.

² Béthune to Louis XIV., May 17, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 427 *seq.*

³ Cf. paragraphs 3 and 4 in *Projet de traité entre Sa Majesté T. C. et le Roi de Pologne*, *ibid.*, VII., 81 *seq.* The document was sent from Paris to the French embassy in Warsaw.

⁴ Cf. Béthune to Louis XIV., July 20, 1680, *ibid.*, V., 446-450.

⁵ Martelli to Cibo, March 13, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 368 ; paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned *Projet de traité*.

⁶ Martelli to Cibo, March 27, 1680 ; Cibo to Martelli, April 20, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 373, 369, n. 2. The account of the

Louis XIV.'s declarations, Sobieski entered, with the Grand Vizier, upon the stipulated regulation of frontiers on the basis of the Peace of Zurawna.¹

Rome had left nothing undone in order to pave the way for a league, though not an offensive one, in the first instance, for it was realized that in view of Louis XIV.'s equivocal attitude such a league would be dangerous to the Emperor²; on the other hand the Pope had all the more eagerly promoted a defensive league for which he offered fresh subsidies. His nuncio at Warsaw was equally active. On one occasion, after a three hours' conference with Martelli on the subject of the league, Sobieski observed to Béthune that never had he met so partial a man. The French ambassador himself remarked that Martelli seemed to conduct himself as an ambassador of the Emperor rather than as a representative of His Holiness.³ All the greater were Rome's annoyance and disappointment at the failure of the plans for a league, as well as its distrust of Poland, which was accused, with some bitterness, of having acted dishonestly. "Deeds are sadly in disagreement with big promises," wrote the Cardinal Secretary of State: "in the question of the Turkish war, Poland is not acting straightforwardly and feeds us with fairy-tales, but by so doing she only serves the covetousness of others, not her own security."⁴

conferences with the Russians is in Martelli's report of June 19, 1680, *ibid.*, 396-9. Béthune to Louis XIV., April 28, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 417 *seq.* The oral reply of Béthune to the proposals of the Russian embassy and his reports to Louis XIV. of June 11 and 18, 1680, are in *Acta Pol.*, V., 431 *seq.*, 492 (67), Nr. 27 and 29.

¹ Béthune to Louis XIV., July 20, 1680, *ibid.*, 449 *seq.*

² Cf. Cibo to Martelli, March 2 and October 12, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 363, 406, n. 2.

³ Cf. two letters of Béthune to Louis XIV., of April 2 and 8, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 406-412, 490 (66), Nr. 51 and 53.

⁴ Martelli to Cibo, March 27 and April 24, 1680; Cibo to Martelli, March 30 and May 11, to Martelli and Buonvisi on July 8, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 374, 384 *seq.*, 374, n. 1, 388 *seq.*, 393, n. 1.

(3.)

Such was the situation with regard to the anti-Turkish alliance in the latter half of the year 1680 and thus it substantially remained until the middle of 1682. When he realized that an offensive league was unattainable, Innocent XI. strove consistently for the creation of a defensive league between the Emperor and Poland. Louis XIV., whose superior diplomacy repeatedly turned the scales at the decisive moment both at the Polish Diets and at the court of John III., worked just as deliberately against every kind of anti-Turkish alliance and strove to direct Kara Mustafa's lust of aggression against Austria. The Polish Diet waxed keen on the league but it lacked unity and perseverance whilst the King vacillated between his feelings for Louis XIV.—though these cooled in course of time—and his aversion for Austria and Leopold; between the influence of the arrogant French ambassador and the exhortations of the papal nuncio who was very strongly supported by the King's French consort; between the alluring and reassuring promises of Louis XIV. and the disquieting anxiety of compelling the Emperor, by rejecting the league, to come to terms with the Sultan and thus to draw the massed Turkish forces against his country, knowing that in the hour of need France would give him no assistance.¹

The end of the year 1680 and the beginning of 1681 brought with it a change in the nunciature at the Polish court. Martelli resigned his post owing to sickness; he was replaced by Pallavicini who promoted the affair of the league with the same ardour as his predecessor.² Louis XIV. also recalled his ambassador from Poland, apparently because in the

¹ The reports of the French ambassadors, Vitry and Forbin. Janson to Louis XIV. of March 21, May 27, July 18 and 26, September 8 and 19 and October 24, 1681 (*Acta Pol.*, VII., 120-3, 143 *seq.*, 398, Nr. 104, 155-7, 399, Nr. 114, 157-9, 399, Nr. 115, 167, 399, Nr. 122, 171 *seq.*, 399, Nr. 126 *seq.*, 175, 399, Nr. 130) show up the King's inconsistency.

² Vitry and Forbin to Louis XIV., January 1 and February 25, 1680, *ibid.*, 78, 101 *seq.*

King's judgment, Béthune underestimated France's opportunities at the court of Sobieski.¹ Béthune was succeeded by Louis Nicolas de l'Hospital, Marquis de Vitry, to whom Louis adjoined, for the purpose of recovering Casimira's friendship, the Bishop of Beauvais, Forbin Janson, who was popular at the court of Warsaw whilst Rome, not without cause, viewed him with suspicion.² That Béthune had seen more clearly than his sovereign when he stressed the growing difficulties encountered by French policy in Poland,³ appears from his last conversation with John III. He himself, the

¹ DU HAMEL, VII., 525 *seq.* According to the nunciature reports defalcations by Béthune seem to have been contributory causes.

² GÉRIN, 1683, p. 97 *seq.*; Cibo to Pallavicino, February 8, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 484 *seq.* The first of the repeated petitions of Sobieski and Casimira for a Cardinal's hat for Forbin Janson came to Rome already on October 21, 1676. Sobieski says: " *Consuetudini insuper, et iuri, quod Serenissimis Praedecessoribus meis regnoque Poloniae cum ceteris semper commune fuit coronis innixus Reverendissimum Tuscanum de Forbin Janson . . . Stî Vrae pro cardinalatu denuo proponendum nominandumque duxi, veluti reverenter propono et nomino." In Rome the words "consuetudini" to "innixus", "proponendum nominandumque duxi", "propono et nomino" were underlined, and at the bottom of the letter the following observation was written: "Avvertasi che questa lettera fu abietta per rispetto delle parole lineate in essa: non competendo nè al Re di Polonia nè ad alcun altro principe, per grande che egli sia, dritto alcuno di nominare alla sacra porpora, la cui dispensatione dipende dal libero arbitrio del Sommo Pontefice, sì per ragione, come per uso, e l'ultimo esempio di questa libertà fu la promotione ultima di Clemente X. Oltre questa lettera in pergamena, ne scrisse il Re di Polonia un'altra in carta ordinaria, in idioma Italiano e sotto la med^{ma} Data. Alla quale, perchè era scritta in ogni più reverente riguardo e senza alcuna delle frasi qui lineate, S. St^a si degnò di rispondere benignamente, ma senza impegno alcuno." Pap. Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*, 103 f., 204.

³ Cf. especially Béthune's *Mémoire sur les affaires de la Pologne* of March 24, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, V., 358-369.

King observed in a bitter tone, had served Louis XIV. regardless of his own interest, nay even at some risk to himself and his family, whereas England and Bavaria were in receipt of gigantic sums from France, not for the purpose of securing her help, but merely to prevent them from opposing her. He himself had been badly treated whilst the Elector of Brandenburg and other declared enemies of France had favours showered upon them day by day. Sobieski openly threatened the departing ambassador with a change of policy.¹ Vitry and Forbin Janson were confronted by no easy task if, in accordance with the express instructions of their sovereign, they were to prevent every kind of defensive or offensive league between Poland and Austria and, on the other hand, to obtain Polish troops not only for Hungary but likewise for France's designs on the western frontier of the German Empire.²

The opponents of France's policy at the court of Warsaw—the papal nuncios—did all in their power to secure a decision in favour of a defensive league with the Emperor at the Polish Diet which opened at the beginning of 1681.³ Their efforts upset French plans to such an extent that in consequence of a letter from Forbin Janson, the Duke D'Estrées protested to the Pope and asked whether it was permissible for the envoys of a neutral sovereign, nay those of a common father, to show so much partisanship as did the nuncios Martelli and Pallavicini. Innocent XI. replied that the best thing would have been if all the princes had united in an offensive league against the Turks, but since this had not been realized, it was all the more necessary

¹ DU HAMEL, VII., 527. Cf. KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 75.

² GÉRIN, 1683, p. 97 *seq.* Cf. *Projet de traité* quoted on p. 116, n. 3, and Louis XIV. to Vitry and Forbin, December 18, 1680, *Acta Pol.*, VII., 319 (68), Nr. 142; Pallavicini to Cibo, February 26, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 487, n. 1.; KÖHLER, 44–50.

³ Cibo to Pallavicini, January 25, 1681; Pallavicini to Cibo, January 8 and 22 and February 26, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 480, n. 1, 481 *seq.*, 482, n. 3, 487, n. 1. Nuncio Martelli remained for some time with Pallavicini at the court of John III.

to promote this defensive alliance.¹ He himself appealed once more to all the Christian princes to go to Poland's assistance.²

After some grievous disputes, in the course of which even blood flowed, the cause of the league at the Polish Diet was in so favourable a situation that it was possible to count on a treaty being concluded. This result was due in no small measure to Pallavicini's activity as a mediator and to the hope of papal subsidies held out by him.³ But the cunning Forbin Janson, with the secret aid of the Palatine Jablonowski of Reussen, who was in receipt of a fat pension from Louis XIV., and that of the Berlin agents, successfully persuaded the Palatine of Posen, at the price of a thousand ducats, to bring about the dissolution of the Diet by means of his *veto* before any decision was arrived at.⁴ In this way the new negotiations with the Muscovite envoys for an offensive alliance were once more broken off. Though the Muscovites would not grant to the Pope more than the title "Doctor", Pallavicini had successfully intervened in the negotiations with them, in fact the Polish Senate had already agreed to the formation of a league. For the rest on this occasion the Grand Duke did not act with absolute straightforwardness in the question of the league. His aim was, by means of discussions with Poland, to bring pressure to bear on the Porte with which he was just then engaged in secret negotiations and with which he shortly afterwards concluded peace.⁵ This peace, the failure of the negotiations for a league at the Polish

¹ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., March 29, 1681, in MICHAUD, II., 81 *seq.*

² Cibo to Pallavicini, April 12, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 505.

³ SALVANDY, II., 116-19; Pallavicini to Cibo, March 26, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 501 *seq.*, 502, n. 1.

⁴ Pallavicini to Cibo, May 27 and 28 and June 11, 1681, July 29, August 5 and 19 and September 9, 1682, *ibid.*, 513-524, 566-9, 572; Vitry to Louis XIV., April 4, 1681 and August 21, 1682, in GÉRIN, III *seq.*, 117. GÉRIN says (121, n. 2) that the Berlin agents had again a hand in the affair.

⁵ Pallavicini to Cibo, February 12, March 5 and 19, April 2 and 23, May 7, 9, 14 and 28, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 490 *seq.*

Diet and the false report spread in Poland that the Emperor had prolonged the armistice with the Turks for a further twenty-five years, made Sobieski more amenable to France's demands. Vitry felt sure of his affair in Poland and the French ambassador continued to support the Hungarian rebels with men and money on a larger scale than ever, whilst the Polish King looked on half willing, half unwilling.¹

Louis XIV. was well pleased. It was surely better for the common good of Christendom, he wrote a little later to his ambassador Vitry, that the House of Austria should be occupied in Hungary and prevented by the troubles in that country from fanning anew the flames of war in Europe, than that Poland should be invaded by the Turks without a single Christian prince being able to come to her rescue. For the rest the Emperor had a simple means by which to put an end to everything: let him but make peace with France.² Peace, however, in Louis' mind, implied the recognition of the "reunions" which were in full progress since 1679 and by which Strassburg was torn from the Empire on October 1, 1681, on the day, that is, on which Casale, the strongest place in upper Italy, was surrendered to the French, for money, by the Duke of Mantua.

Innocent XI.'s disappointment and displeasure were in inverse ratio to the satisfaction of the King of France. The Pope now gave up all hope of a defensive league between the Emperor and Poland,³ though he would never agree to the

494-500, also 506, 524, n. 1, 504, 506-510, 519 *seqq.*; Vitry and Forbin to Louis XIV., March 7, 14, 21 and 28, April 18, May 6 and 27, June 13 and July 26, 1681, *Acta Pol.*, VII., 113-18, 397, Nr. 88 and 96, 124 *seq.*, 142 *seq.*, 398, Nr. 104 and 109, 157, 399, Nr. 115, 242, 246.

¹ See above, p. 118, n. 1, and Pallavicini to Cibo, August 27 and November 19, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 542, 549 *seq.*

² Louis XIV. to Vitry, May 21, 1682, *Acta Pol.*, VII., 226 *seq.*; KÖHLER, 88, n. 2.

³ Cibo to Pallavicini, January 3, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 553. Cf. the Briefs of May 31, July 12 and November 8, 1681 to Poland, in BERTHIER, I., 420, II., 6.

surrender by King John III. of the Ukraine to the Turks, for in the event of the latter attacking imperial Hungary, Poland would be in a position, even without a league, to advance into the territory which had recently passed into the hands of the Turks and so divide their forces. The Pope was prepared to grant subsidies to this end.¹ Innocent XI.'s pre-occupation and anxiety were further increased by reason of the enormous excitement called forth in Italy since about the middle of 1681 by the anticipation of an imminent Turkish attack on Sicily.² The Generals of Orders were instructed to have prayers offered up in all their houses, to the end that God would avert the peril.³ On September 11, 1681, the Pope published a plenary indulgence similar to that of the jubilee, in order to obtain, through the prayers of the faithful, the unity of Christian princes in the Turkish question, a unity so lamentably lacking yet so eagerly longed for.⁴

The Pope's anxiety as well as his hopes centred on Louis XIV. and France. On July 9 of the following year, 1682, in a conversation with Cardinal César D'Estrées, brother of the French ambassador at the papal court, François Annibal D'Estrées, he expounded his view of the situation as well as his plans. He observed ⁵ that Louis XIV.'s extensive acquisitions since the Peace of Nymeguen and the abundant means for their exploitation, were viewed with considerable misgiving by the Emperor, the King of Spain and the other princes, his

¹ Cibo to Pallavicini, June 21, July 2 and 12 and September 26, 1681; Pallavicini to Cibo, July 2, 1681, in BOJANI, III., 529 *seq.*, 531 *seq.*, 534, n. 1, 573.

² Already in 1679 Louis XIV. instructed Guilleragues to inquire what truth there was in the rumours that the Turks were about to invade Italy; see KÖHLER, 118.

³ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., August 12, 1681, in GÉRIN, 110 *seq.*

⁴ The Bull "Onerosam"; see *Bull.*, XIX., 417-420.

⁵ Cardinal D'Estrées to Louis XIV., July 12, 1682, in GÉRIN, *Le Pape Innocent et le Siège de Vienne en 1683*, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXXIX. (1886), 123-5; MICHAUD, II., 78 *seqq.* Cf. IMMICH, *Innozenz*, XI., 22.

neighbours. They felt that they could not be sure that the King of France would put a limit to his exigencies and that he had no further surprises in store for them. They would be less disinclined to come to terms with Louis XIV., even at the price of some sacrifices, if only they could feel assured that the treaty would be exactly and peacefully executed. But in view of the pressure under which they laboured, fear and distrust prevented them from acquiescing in any cession of territory whatever which would not guarantee to them the possession of the remainder. The only way in which the King of France could give them such a guarantee would be by allying himself with them against the infidels and by binding himself to go to war against the Crescent. If the other sovereigns were to see the King of France engaged in such a task, so greatly in keeping with his power and his glory, they would have better hopes of a lasting peace with him. Even as he, the Pope, could not think of any other means of preserving peace and concord among the Christian princes, so was there nothing on earth that could render so vast a plan difficult of execution. The Pope gave it as his opinion that the league planned by him could beat to the ground the Ottoman power in less than three campaigns. The Emperor and the King of Poland would attack the Sultan by land, whilst the King of France would simultaneously press him by sea. As it was the French fleet was far superior to the Turkish one; moreover it would receive reinforcements from Italy, the Knights of Malta and perhaps also from Spain. This imposing force would advance against Greece and even as far as Constantinople which would not be in a position to defend itself. After that it would be open to the King to make what conquests he chose on the soil of Asia Minor, and not only to acquire provinces but to distribute Kingdoms among the princes of the blood; he would likewise have an opportunity of gratifying his zeal for the spread of religion, of acquiring earthly crowns and of preparing for himself far more beautiful ones in heaven. The Pope was so carried away by his enthusiasm for his plan, Cardinal D'Estrées relates, that he already pictured to himself

Louis as a crowned Emperor of Constantinople. At this audience, as well as at the next, he got so excited that the Cardinal himself was nearly swept off his feet by the torrent of his eloquence.¹

Cardinal D'Estrées, however, told the Pope that the age of the crusades was over.² As a matter of fact, Innocent XI.'s vast plan may seem somewhat "fantastic",³ but as a criterion of papal policy it is invaluable. To Innocent XI.'s thinking there was but one political question, namely that of averting the Ottoman peril, and this could be brought about by means of concord among the Christian princes and by as wide a league as possible against the hereditary enemy. Other political aims the Pope knew none; from the political conquests of Europe, in so far as they did not trench on the Turkish question, he held himself utterly aloof.⁴ This was his attitude previous to the peace of Nymeguen, when he sought to mediate between Spain and Venice.⁵ When at a later date the Marquis de Louvigny, a Spanish agent, submitted to the Pontiff a plan for a secret alliance of all princes having possessions in Italy, the Pope interrupted him with a declaration that he would neither conclude such a league nor have anything whatever to do with it. Should his neighbours be drawn into war, he would be sorry for their misfortune and gladly act as a mediator with the King of France on their behalf, if it were in his power to extricate them from the peril of war. But he would not do anything against the King; even if Louis attacked the Pontifical States, all he would do would be to go out to meet him, cross in hand, as far as Viterbo.⁶

¹ Cardinal D'Estrées to Louis XIV., July 15, 1682, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 125, n. 1.

² Cardinal D'Estrées in the report of July 12, 1682 (*cf.* p. 123, n. 3).

³ IMMICH, *loc. cit.*

⁴ IMMICH rightly called special attention to this fact (*loc. cit.*, 14, n. 4).

⁵ *Cf.* above, p. 57.

⁶ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., March 18, 1682, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 99 *seq.*

In like manner Louis XIV.'s contests with the German Empire only interested Innocent XI. in so far as they delayed the formation of the anti-Turkish league or, in later years, jeopardized the prosecution of the war against the Turks. He used all his influence with the two D'Estrées with a view to an end being put to the "reunions", because they made it extremely difficult for the Emperor to decide on war against Turkey; none the less he told the Duke D'Estrées on September 11, 1682, that he definitely wished Strassburg to remain in the hands of Louis XIV. and he added with a smile that if Cardinal Pio knew how he had spoken about Strassburg, he would be none too pleased.¹

Pio was the Emperor's Cardinal Protector. The above remark of the Pope sufficiently shows that it would be a great mistake to stamp him as an opponent of France.² Louis XIV.'s ambassador at the papal court, the above-mentioned Duke D'Estrées, pays homage to the Pope's impartiality.³ In his report of the year 1684, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, Sebastiano Foscari, even goes so far as to assert that the Pope's reserve in political affairs had been in reality of very great advantage to France.⁴ Innocent XI.'s Secretary of State, Cardinal Cibo, a secret pensioner of Louis XIV.,⁵ may have encouraged his master's reserve because of that circumstance. On their part the French agents at the papal court naturally did all in their power to inspire the Pope with distrust of Austria; to this end they even sought to exploit his zeal for religion and his political inexperience. The Duke D'Estrées' answer to the Pope when

¹ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., September 12, 1682, in MICHAUD, II., 52.

² As does MICHAUD. IMMICH (7 *seq.*) remarks, referring to the latter's work in 3 vols.: "The writer's lack of judgment is at times comical."

³ To Louis XIV., March 16, 1683 (GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 130). Cf. IMMICH, *Innozenz XI.*, 21, n. 3.

⁴ BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Relazioni, Francia*, III., 428. Cf. IMMICH, 40, n. 2.

⁵ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 100.

the latter, at the beginning of December 1679, lamented with tears the injury done to the anti-Turkish cause by the plague in Austria, is characteristic of this attitude. The plague must be attributed to the anger of God, D'Estrées said: it was a divine chastisement for the Emperor's alliance with heretical Powers by which that monarch had hampered the French successes in heretical countries, when, for instance, France had secured liberty of conscience in Holland.¹ For the rest Innocent XI., who was by nature inclined to be suspicious, allowed himself to be but little influenced by the people around him.²

The sphere in which serious conflicts arose between Innocent XI. and Louis XIV. was that of Church policy; the Pope knew quite well how to draw the line between ecclesiastical policy and his other relations with the King of France. The above conversation with Cardinal D'Estrées, in which it is assuredly not possible to detect any trace of prevention against France, took place shortly after the proclamation and the condemnation of the Gallican articles.³ It may even be said that the Pope's esteem for Louis XIV. gave him a considerable advantage over all the other princes, even over the Emperor Leopold. Even as late as 1685 Innocent XI. is reported to have said to the Abbé Servient that Louis was the only sovereign in Christendom for whom he felt any regard. If it were lawful to give to Christendom a single secular head, and if he had power to do this and could in conscience depose the other princes, he would not hesitate for one moment. Louis alone was able to lay low the Ottoman power.⁴ To Louis the Pope had assigned in his own mind the decisive rôle in the struggle against the traditional foe of Christendom and to him too, despite his keen disappointment in the question of the league, he long continued

¹ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., December 5, 1679, in MICHAUD, II., 80.

² This opinion is confirmed by the nunciature reports.

³ Cf. GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 123.

⁴ Report of February 17, 1685, in GÉRIN, XXIV., 415; IMMICH, 41, n. 1.

to look for the fulfilment of his hopes. On occasion we indeed hear the Pope complaining to Cardinal Pio that the court of Paris misled and deceived him.¹ After 1682 political events in south-eastern Europe required an immediate decision ; it was then that the force of circumstances led to a close co-operation between Innocent XI. and Emperor Leopold.²

The imminence of the Turkish peril even induced Innocent XI. to give way, to some extent, in his ecclesiastico-political conflict with France, though as a rule the Pope would not hear of a compromise in this sphere. This became apparent in the conflicts which occurred in 1678 in connexion with the funeral of the Paris nuncio Varese.³ Innocent XI. left the nunciature vacant though in 1683 he once more adopted a more conciliatory attitude, as soon as an occasion presented itself. There can be no doubt that anxiety with regard to the Turkish question alone inspired this spirit of accommodation in a Pope otherwise inflexible in Church matters. His most important instruction to Ranuzzi, the new nuncio, was that he should recall to the King's mind the duty of protecting the threatened Catholic faith.⁴ But the nuncio's mission yielded no result. Ranuzzi was only received by the King in August 1683, when the Turks had been besieging Vienna for some time already,⁵ and it was precisely Louis XIV.'s policy which had caused the long cherished plan of attack on the hereditary territories of the Habsburgs to mature at Constantinople.

As early as July, 1681, when it was generally believed that the Sultan was bent on moving towards the northern frontier of the Empire, Louis' ambassador at Constantinople, Guilleragues, caused the report to circulate that the French were

¹ Cf. Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, May 15, 1683 ("accertando la M. V., havermi detto Sua Santità più volte, non volere li Francesi la pace, benchè dimostrino il contrario"), in KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 161, n. 4 ; IMMICH, 28, n. 1.

² On the whole one must agree with what IMMICH says (110 *seq.*).

³ See below, Ch. IV.

⁴ IMMICH, *loc. cit.*, 25, 27.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 27 *seq.*

about to carry out great works of fortification in Alsace and to concentrate there considerable bodies of troops. When asked whether his King was at peace with the Emperor Leopold, he replied that this was indeed the case at the moment ; on the other hand his sovereign was not in the habit of leaving his army of 300,000 men unoccupied for any length of time.¹ In the second half of 1682 relations between Louis XIV. and the Sultan became indeed somewhat strained in consequence of the so-called sofa dispute and the bombardment of Chios by the French admiral Duquesne. This may have been due to the fact that the King of France, in view of the great power he had attained by then, hoped to be able to carry out his plans in Europe without the help of the Turks. But it was not long before his attitude underwent yet another change. He who, as a rule, was most unyielding, even on the slightest point of etiquette, allowed his ambassador to the Porte to be arrested without protest. Duquesne who, to avenge Guilleragues, had sailed up the Dardanelles, was recalled and Louis even consented to offer very humble apologies to the Sultan for the happenings at Chios.² On April 8, 1682, he instructed Guilleragues to contradict all rumours to the effect that in the event of a Turkish attack Leopold might hope for French assistance, and to declare that any such help was out of the question.³ This amounted to an invitation to invade the Austrian hereditary States. The Pope was therefore being deceived when, towards the end of 1681, Louis XIV. assured him through his Roman ambassador that he would undertake nothing against the German Empire whilst the war between the Emperor and the Sultan lasted,⁴ and when, at the beginning of 1682, he took everybody by surprise with the announcement that the blockade of Luxemburg had been raised in consideration of the peril threatening from the

¹ KÖHLER, 81.

² Cf. for the affair of Chios, FLASSAN, IV., 33 *seqq.* ; KLOPP, 102 *seq.* ; KÖHLER, 25 *seq.*, 89 *seq.*, 97.

³ KÖHLER, 121 *seq.* ; cf. 87 *seq.*

⁴ Louis XIV. to the Duke D'Estrées, November 28, 1681, in MICHAUD, II., 83.

Turks. Public opinion allowed itself to be deluded and the deception was not without effect even in Rome.¹

About the middle of 1682, at a time when a division of opinion was still observable in the Sultan's council with regard to the invasion of the imperial territories, at the time also of Innocent XI.'s long conversations with Cardinal D'Estrées on the subject of Louis' part in the war against the Crescent, Guilleragues produced the instructions of April 8th, which made it clear that Leopold could not count on French help in the event of a Turkish attack. He added, however, that his sovereign would not withhold assistance from Poland and Venice if they were attacked by Turkey. This information, as Guilleragues reported to Paris, produced its effect on the Seraglio²; in fact it proved decisive in Constantinople. In view of the superior strength of the French King, the Porte could not have risked an advance on Vienna without an assurance of France's benevolent neutrality.³

To-day all this is quite clear, whereas at the time precisely those most concerned, that is Innocent XI. and the court of Vienna, could not discern it at all, or only very inadequately. Even Civrano, the Venetian ambassador at the Porte during that period, on returning to his native city in the summer of 1682, was unable to state with certainty whether Kara Mustafa's plan of campaign was directed against the Emperor or, perhaps, after all, against Venice.⁴ Now though the court of Vienna was in favour of a league and of war against Turkey, its readiness was dependent on the safety of the western frontier being assured, and up to the last it was thought that

¹ Cf. the report of the Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., April 16 1682, *ibid.*, 84.

² KÖHLER, 97 *seq.* Cf. Louis XIV.'s instruction to Vitry, October 29, 1682, *Acta Pol.*, VII., 284, and PLATZHOFF, 404.

³ Cf. KÖHLER, 72-100, especially 99 *seq.* RANKE (*Französ. Gesch.*, III., 463-5) judges the policy of Louis XIV. too favourably when he says: it cannot be maintained that Louis exercised a real influence on the march against Vienna.

⁴ Cf. his final report of 1682 in KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 107-9.

such a guarantee might be obtained independently of the Hungarian and the Turkish question, in fact that the latter might be put on one side for the time being, or settled by peaceful means.¹

In 1678 and 1679 four agents were successively dispatched to Constantinople for the purpose of prolonging the peace of Vasvar of 1664, which was due to expire in 1684. Everyone of these envoys died even before the opening of the negotiations. When at the conclusion of the Russo-Turkish war and as a result of the peace of Radzin in 1681, the threat from the south-east increased and Thököly, at a time when the armistice which he had concluded with the Emperor at the beginning of 1679 was still in force, dispatched an embassy to the Grand Vizier openly asking the Porte's assistance for the Hungarian rebels, the imperial court sought to meet the difficulty by convoking a Hungarian Diet. That assembly met on April 28th at Ödenburg.² Politically this meant a return to constitutional conditions. The Diet also secured for Hungary a considerable easing of taxation and a greater financial autonomy. This settlement was due in no small measure to the influence of nuncio Buonvisi, who personally attended the Diet in June. Already in 1678, both on his own initiative and by order of Rome, he had sought to influence the court of Vienna and the Hungarian magnates with a view to a milder treatment of the rebels, an amnesty and an equitable compromise.³ On his own admission,⁴ that which facilitated his task as against Hungarian obstinacy and the unyielding temper of the imperial minister, was the never failing mildness of the Emperor.

Meanwhile it was not so much the constitutional problem

¹ Cf. for what follows, KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, ch. 2-4; REDLICH, VI., 299-310.

² The nunciature reports on the Diet of Ödenburg in BOJANI, III., 429-479.

³ Buonvisi to Cibo, November 8 and December 27, 1676, March 7 and September 9, 1677, May 5 and June 19, 1678, in LEVINSON, III., 586-8, 709; BOJANI, I., 45-8; FRACKNÓI-JEKEL, 29-32, 34.

⁴ On May 5, 1678 (*cf. n. 3*).

as the religious question that constituted the most difficult task of the Diet of Ödenburg, a task all the more arduous as Thököly, who refused to come to Ödenburg, broke the armistice whilst the Diet was in full progress, and allied himself with Transilvanian troops and the Turkish pashas of Temesvár and Grosswardein. The very peril compelled the Emperor Leopold to accept a compromise. Basing itself on the terms of the peace of Vienna of 1606, the Diet granted general freedom of religion, though with reservation of the rights of the lords of Catholic estates and territories. In places where freedom of religion was in force, or where the landed owners belonged to a different confession, the churches were to remain the property of the present owners; elsewhere they were to belong to those who had held them since 1670.¹ The religious compromise of Ödenburg was in accordance with nuncio Buonvisi's advice to the Emperor. Already in 1677 and 1678, when Rome felt anxious because of the concessions granted to the Protestants, in answer to inquiries on the point, Buonvisi had made the following statement: "The Emperor has been accused of having unduly oppressed consciences. Excessive demands have made the people obstinate; hence it was necessary to show a more accommodating spirit. The Emperor's firmness, reverence and loyalty in all that concerns the Catholic religion are very great, but it was equally necessary to settle the confusion provoked by the Turks and kept up by them. Nothing should be left undone to win over the Hungarians by meeting some of their demands, by allowing the exercise of the Protestant religion and by granting them churches."² Though on December 27th, 1681, by order of Innocent XI., Buonvisi protested against the concessions which the Ödenburg articles

¹ WAGNER, I., 564-570; KATONA, vol. 34, *ad ann.*, 1681. The religious decision, the royal decree of November 9, 1681, passed as articles 25 and 26 into the resolutions of the Diet of December 30. The decree is in KATONA, 669 *seqq.*, and in JOH. GRAF MAILÁTH, *Gesch. des Österreich. Kaiserstaates*, IV., Hamburg, 1848, 149-152.

² Cibo to Buonvisi, August 2, 1677; Buonvisi to Cibo, August 29, 1677, and November 6, 1678 in BOJANI, I., 379, 440 *seq.*

of religion granted to the heretics, this was done solely for the purpose of emphasizing, as at Münster and Nymeguen, the principles that inspired the attitude of the Holy See. When handing in his declaration, the nuncio added that there was no intention thereby to embitter either the Hungarians or the court, or to call forth fresh troubles.¹ Unfortunately the religious decisions of Ödenburg failed to fulfil their purpose. They satisfied neither Catholics nor Protestants. The latter lodged a formal protest against them because they considered that all their demands were not fully complied with, but the Catholics also were very dissatisfied as they considered that the suggested sacrifice of churches was excessive and in opposition to the will of the founders.

Notwithstanding the unsatisfactory issue of the Diet of Ödenburg, despite Thököly's traitorous duplicity, despite also the warnings of George Christoph von Kunitz, the imperial Resident on the Golden Horn, Vienna continued to hope that

¹ FRAKNÓI-JEKEL, 59. Rome took up the same position with regard to the negotiations with Thököly in the following year (THEIN, 32 *seq.*). When towards the end of 1683 the general amnesty and the concession of freedom of religion for the Protestants in Hungary were again discussed, nuncio Buonvisi communicated to the court the assent of the Pope to both propositions. The Venetian ambassador, Contarini, mentions this in his report of December 26, 1683 (in KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 374): "[Il cardinale Buonvisi] allega che il Papa capo della chiesa non solamente aderisce al perdono et alla permissione della loro religione per valersi, quietati che fossero, contro gl'infedeli, conoscendo molto bene, che non possono essere forzate le conscienze." If this statement about the liberty of conscience is not merely a sentiment put by Contarini in the mouth of the Pope, but an explicit declaration of Innocent XI., it is indeed for that time and in the mouth of a Pope, a most remarkable statement (*cf.* IMMICH, *loc. cit.*, 36, n. 1), especially as even at the beginning of 1680, Innocent XI. expressed himself with extraordinary severity against an agreement which Morstein, the Polish ambassador to France and England, is said to have made in England with the heretics (*cf.* Cibo to Martelli, March 2, 1680, in BOJANI, III., 351, n. 1).

the troubles in Hungary and the Turkish peril could be mastered by means of compromise and negotiations. In December, 1681, a fresh armistice was concluded with Thököly. On February 16th, 1682, Albert Caprara went to Constantinople as imperial internuncio, with mission to save the peace with the Porte. Meanwhile the chief anxiety of the court of Vienna lay in the West. In the course of the year 1681 it was decided to maintain a standing imperial army. In the autumn the Emperor joined the Treaty of Association between the Netherlands and Sweden, and in the so-called alliance of Laxenburg of June 10th, 1682, the Union of the Circles of the Empire and the lesser princes which had been called into being by the energetic George Frederick von Waldeck. In their disgust with Louis XIV.'s policy of "reunion", John George III. of Saxony and Max Emmanuel of Bavaria were turning increasingly away from the King of France to side with the Emperor. On January 26th, 1683, a defensive alliance was arrived at with the Elector of Bavaria. Shortly before, Duke Ernest Augustus of Hanover had guaranteed to the Emperor a corps of 10,000 men. All these alliances and warlike preparations were for the protection of the Empire against its western neighbour, but in point of fact they were destined to be first tested in the struggle with the Turks before Vienna and in Hungary.

The attempt to master the eastern situation by peaceful means turned out a failure. Thököly's envoys arrived in Constantinople before Caprara, not indeed for the purpose of working on behalf of peace between the Emperor and the Sultan, as their master gave the court of Vienna to understand, but in order to make sure of the help of Turkey against the Emperor's forces in Hungary. Thököly was successful. The Porte recognized him as Prince of Hungary. On June 24th, 1682, he denounced the armistice with Vienna: open war began in Upper Hungary and with it, in effect, the Porte's war against the Emperor.¹ When at last, in October, money and an imperial letter reached Caprara from Vienna—which

¹ REDLICH, 306.

was even now unwilling to understand the gravity of the situation—it was too late. Guilleragues' declaration in August of that year finally silenced all objections in Constantinople to Kara Mustafa's war plan. In the first days of October the Sultan and his Grand Vizier set out from Constantinople for Adrianople. Caprara could only inform Vienna that nothing remained now but to take up the sword.

(4.)

Meanwhile the over-astute policy by which Louis XIV. and the Porte sought to overwhelm the Emperor, led to an event, at another point, namely in Poland, and at the court of John III., which was bound greatly to annoy these two. Up to the middle of 1682 Sobieski's attitude remained ill-defined and hesitating and French influence was still supreme at his court.¹ Innocent XI. felt it incumbent on him to represent to Sobieski, through the nuncio, how strange he thought it that the King should continue to help France in her assistance of heretics who had risen against their sovereign and invited a Turkish attack against Christendom.² However, the old friendship between Warsaw and Paris was rapidly cooling, and from the second half of 1682 onwards, Sobieski's attitude underwent a rapid and decisive change. The powerful Turkish armaments and the report of the Sultan's departure for Adrianople worked powerfully on his mind. Henceforth he was dominated by a great fear that, after conquering Hungary, the Turkish hosts would, as a matter of course, overrun Poland. If, as the

¹ The correspondence between Louis XIV. and Vitry at this time in *Acta Pol.*, VII., 183, 187, 191, 415, Nr. 17, 197 *seq.*, 416-18, 258, 249.

² Vitry to Louis XIV., April 7, 1682 (GÉRIN, 115). Pallavicini's reports to Rome on the assistance which France gave to Thököly at this time and the gradual alienation of Sobieski from the French policy in Hungary on April 1 and 29, June 17, August 5 and September 16, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 560, 562, 564, n. 2, 567 *seq.*, 573.

French asserted, the Emperor intended to ally himself with Mohammed IV. against Poland, in order to avert the peril to his own territory, the best way of preventing such a thing from happening was to conclude an alliance with Leopold, thereby forcing him, willingly or unwillingly, to make war on the Turks.¹ All assurances on the part of France that Louis would defend Poland against a Turkish attack were now useless, as was the offer at last of the dignity of a Duke, or even that of a *Pair*, for Marquis D'Arquien. Sobieski told the French envoys that it was against his conscience further to support King Louis' policy and to the imperial Resident Zierowski he expressed his willingness to enter into a league.² In September, 1682, Warsaw forwarded to Vienna a plan for a league though for the time being neither nuncio Pallavicini nor the Pope felt that they could really rely on it.³

That which decided John III. to alter his policy was a correspondence which had come into the hands of the imperial Resident at Warsaw. It contained grave accusations against France's agent in Poland and Hungary, the Abbé Duvernay, and established the fact of his relations with Thököly and the Turks in opposition to Sobieski's express prohibition.⁴ It

¹ KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 162-4, 167, 379; DU HAMEL, VII., 218; Vitry to Louis XIV., October 24, 1681 (GÉRIN, 113), and August 7, 1682 (*Acta Pol.*, VII., 249), and October 1, 1682 (GÉRIN, 116 *seq.*). Cf. also the reports of Vitry in *Acta Pol.*, VII., 275, 284, 419, and the instruction of John III. for the Polish local Diets in 1682, *ibid.*, VI., 6.

² Pallavicini to Cibo, July 18 and August 5 and 26, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 566-8, 570; Louis XIV. to Vitry, May 21, June 11, July 9 and 16 and August 27, 1682, in GÉRIN, 115 *seq.* Cf. THEIN, 13 *seq.*; KÖHLER, 55 *seq.*

³ Pallavicini to Cibo, September 16, 1682 (the letter is remarkable for the judgment Pallavicini passes on Sobieski: "the King, he says, does not want any more wars, so he tries to add to his glory by magnificent projects"), on September 23 and October 7, 1682; Cibo to Pallavicini, October 24, in BOJANI, III., 574, 577 *seq.*, 581.

⁴ Exact report in Vitry's letter to Louis XIV., October 8, 1682, in GÉRIN, 117 *seq.* Cf. DU HAMEL, VIII., 61-4.

was in vain that De Vitry now offered the sum of 100,000 francs. The King rejected them, an act by which he earned great praise from the nuncio.¹ On December 15th, 1682, the King of Poland informed Innocent XI. through his envoy at the papal court, the priest Casimir Dönhoff, that he was prepared to enter into an alliance with the Emperor Leopold, to be negotiated in the course of that winter.² On his part, when accrediting Count Charles Ferdinand Waldstein as ambassador extraordinary to Warsaw, the Emperor formally proposed an Austro-Polish defensive and offensive alliance. In order to remove all misgivings he bound himself at the same time not to enter into any negotiations with the Turks until the conclusion of the Polish Diet.³ The Pope replied to Sobieski's letter on February 20th, 1683, granted to Poland a tenth of all ecclesiastical revenues in the event of an alliance being realized and held out the prospect of considerable subsidies from Rome.⁴

A month earlier the Pope had made yet another attempt at mediation between the Emperor Leopold and Louis XIV. in the interest of the anti-Turkish cause.⁵ On January 20th, 1683, he prayed and exhorted King Louis in a pressing letter, to help in warding off the threatening Turkish peril or at least to refrain from exercising political pressure on the Emperor and his allies during the forthcoming Turkish war.⁶ Louis XIV. replied on February 12th, that he had long ago anticipated the Pope's wishes and that he had remained far below his just demands from the German Empire; he would be content if no more than the conditions presented by him to the Diet of Ratisbon through his envoy Verjus, were accepted; instead of this the Emperor treated with the Turks with a view to directing the latter's lust of conquest against his eastern

¹ TRENTA, II., 178 *seqq.*; THEIN, 18.

² THEINER, *Monuments*, 244; THEIN, 12 *seq.*

³ Pallavicini to Cibo, January 13, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 31 *seq.*; BOJANI, III., 634.

⁴ BERTHIER, II., 74; KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 167.

⁵ For what follows, *cf.* KLOPP, 150-160.

⁶ BERTHIER, II., 64 *seq.*

neighbour to the end that he himself might resume undisturbed his war against the Christian princes and peoples.¹ The two D'Estrées made even stronger efforts to influence the Pope in the sense of their King. It would seem that at this time the French even thought of suggesting a congress in Rome for the purpose of settling their conflict with the German Empire. If the German Protestant princes refused to send representatives, the fact would lead to tension between them and the Catholic princes, to France's advantage. If the Catholic princes refused to attend the congress without their Protestant colleagues, it was to be expected, in view of Innocent XI.'s character, that the refusal would lead him to distrust the Emperor and the German princes and draw him closer to France.² However, no congress took place in Rome, but the Pope sent Briefs to the Emperor and to the King of Spain, urging them to come to terms with King Louis from whose letter one could gather that he had at all times been willing to settle peaceably the disputes within the Christian community.³ At Vienna the Brief called forth no small annoyance for it seemed to show that in the controversies between the Empire and Louis XIV., Innocent XI. only lent ear to the French statements of them. However, Vienna was too cautious. But it is probably true to say that the Pope would have been pleased if, in view of the Turkish question, the Emperor and the King of Spain had given way to the King of France of their own accord.⁴ The whole action of the Pope was as barren of result as was the dispatch, immediately afterwards, of Ranuzzi as nuncio extraordinary to the court of Louis XIV. In the course of the next few months Louis repeated his assurance to the Porte

¹ KLOPP, 151 *seq.*

² Report of Cardinal Pio of March 13, 1683, to the Emperor Leopold, *ibid.*, 153.

³ BERTHIER, II., 79 *seq.*

⁴ KLOPP, 154-160. *Cf.* Cardinal Pio's report of August 14, 1683, to the Emperor Leopold, *ibid.*, 339, and IMMICH, 38, n. 2. For the whole affair, *cf.* Cibo to Buonvisi, January 16 and March 13, 1683, Buonvisi to Cibo, April 4, 11 and 18, in BOJANI, III., 608, n. 2, 621 *seq.*, 629 *seq.*, 631 *seq.*; GÉRIN, 127-132.

that it could count on his lending help neither to the Emperor nor to Poland in the forthcoming struggle.¹

More fruitful were the exhortations which Innocent XI., together with his reply to Sobieski's letter, addressed to the Polish senators and knights on the projected league with the Emperor,² for on their attitude depended the fate of the negotiations for an alliance with the latter at the Diet which opened on January 27th. The uncertainty of the issue of these negotiations was due to the fact that the French party at the Diet still numbered many members and that Louis XIV.'s agents did their utmost to wreck both Diet and league. The only purpose of the league, so they proclaimed all over Poland, was to provide Polish troops for the Emperor for his struggle in Hungary. As for Poland herself, she was sufficiently protected against the Crescent by the King of France, whereas the league would expose her to attack from two sides, viz.—from the Tartars whom the Turks would mobilize against the country, and from the Elector of Brandenburg who disposed of French help, whilst in the meantime the Emperor might have come to terms with the Porte.³ At Rome Cardinal D'Estrées sought to use the Polish envoy Dönhoff for the purposes of French policy, in fact he induced the very man who should have advocated, at the pontifical court, an alliance with the Emperor, to speak about it to the Pope in the opposite sense. Dönhoff, the Cardinal reported to Louis XIV., has represented to the Pope that at bottom Sobieski wished for peace with the Porte. Moreover the latter's corpulence, age, health and whole way of life seemed to render him incapable of undertaking anything. On hearing this the Pope sighed and remarked that this was a great misfortune for Christendom. The result of all this will be, the Cardinal told his sovereign,⁴

¹ His instructions to GUILLERAGUES of April 30, May 21 and June 9, 1683, in GÉRIN, 121-3.

² BERTHIER, II., 74 *seq.*; THEIN, 12 *seq.*, 16.

³ Pallavicini to Cibo, December 8, 1682 and January 27, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 587 *seq.*, 637.

⁴ December 24, 1682, in GÉRIN, 125 *seq.*

that the Pope will not hope for much from the negotiations for a league about which the court of Vienna makes such an ado at present, on the contrary he will base his hopes for Christianity exclusively on the might and power of the King of France. On January 8th, information reached the Vatican from the papal *chargé d'affaires* in Paris, that a few days previously a courier had left for Poland with instructions for the French ambassador to bring about the dissolution of the Diet at any price, regardless of the cost ; the ministers believed that they would achieve their purpose ; their only fear was the nuncio at Warsaw and the possible dispatch of papal Briefs to the Diet.¹ As a matter of fact, as mentioned above, Innocent XI. did address hortatory Briefs to the members of that assembly.

The most valuable help for France's underground activities against the league came from the agents of Brandenburg. Already in the summer of 1682 the Grand Elector had sent his emissaries to Poland for the purpose of creating discontent in view of the coming Diet and securing adherents for himself. Nuncio Pallavicini saw quite well that if Brandenburg could be detached from France, French action would be paralysed, for in this way that country would be deprived of an appropriate tool for its Polish policy seeing that it was precisely the Elector's partisans who displayed most resolution, courage and even recklessness. Quite apart from Frederick William's secret pact with Louis XIV., excitement in Berlin, as Pallavicini wrote to Rome, was in large measure due to the report that Sweden was about to send a delegate to Poland for the purpose of forming an alliance with that country. As a matter of fact, so Pallavicini wrote, King John had actually solicited the dispatch of a Swedish agent. On the other hand the Elector would in any case look on a Polish-Swedish alliance as aimed against himself, hence he would endeavour to get the Diet dissolved. He, that is, the nuncio, had drawn Sobieski's attention to that danger and the King had accordingly arranged

¹ BOJANI, III., 635.

that the Swedish envoy should arrive neither before nor during the Diet.¹

The head of the French party in Poland was Morstein, the Grand Treasurer.² It was unfortunate for him and his friends that in consequence of the capture, in the neighbourhood of Warsaw, of three Brandenburg couriers, at the beginning of February, correspondence had come into the hands of Sobieski which grievously compromised Morstein and Vitry. Among other things these letters charged Morstein with having undertaken, for a sum of money, to wreck the Diet. There was even a plan to make a French prince, or Jablonowski, King of Poland in Sobieski's place, and Morstein had had a hand in these designs. More dead than alive the latter was confronted with the captured documents. Sobieski wished to inflict on him at once the severest penalty. Happily the nuncio succeeded, though only after repeated prayers, in preventing such a step and in getting all judicial proceedings in the matter indefinitely postponed. At Vienna also Buonvisi, to whom Morstein appealed in his distress, did not answer him with a refusal. Let him lend a hand in the formation of a league, he told him, and do what lay in his power to prevent the dissolution of the Diet; he would then give him the desired recommendations. In his report to Rome Buonvisi added that it was a good thing that he and Pallavicini had lent help to Morstein, for if driven to despair, a man of his wealth and ability might do grievous harm.³ The progress and issue of

¹ Pallavicini to Cibo, November 11, December 9 and 23, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 582, 588 *seq.*, 590 *seq.*, and February 24, 1683, in HILTEBRANDT, *Preussen und die römische Kurie*, I., 71. Cf. also Contarini's report of April 20, 1683, in DU HAMEL, VIII., 69, n. 2; THEIN, 18.

² Pallavicini to Cibo, December 8, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 587 *seq.*

³ KLOPP, 170, and DU HAMEL, VIII., 67-9, according to Contarini's report of April 3, 1683. Cf. Pallavicini to Cibo, March 24, 1683 (to the report is added an extract of the confiscated letters of the French ambassador in Warsaw; see *Acta Pol.*, VI., 62 *seq.*); Buonvisi to Cibo, March 7 and 21, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 619 *seq.*, 625.

the Diet were to show how right had been the nuncio's judgment.

Under the impression of the revelations contained in the intercepted correspondence of Vitry and Morstein, the Diet unanimously agreed to the suggested alliance with the Emperor. A deputation consisting of thirty-eight members, viz. five Bishops, five senators, and twenty-eight nuncios of the provincial Diet was appointed for the purpose of negotiating with the imperial ambassador. The first session, February 26th–March 10th,¹ brought to light the intentions of the court of Vienna. Leopold wished to bargain in his capacity as King of Bohemia and as Archduke of his hereditary States, and to furnish an army of 60,000 men. Though the accession of the Empire to the league and a previous settlement of political disputes with France were desirable, they must not be allowed to delay the conclusion of the alliance, for time pressed. By means of the alliance Poland should recover what she had forfeited to the Turks. The question of joint warlike action would only arise if the whole of the hostile power were to be exclusively directed against any one of the two States. The protection and guarantee of the College of Cardinals and the Pope were to be solicited for the alliance. Nuncio Pallavicini, however, observed that the consideration which, as common father of Christendom, the Pope owed to other nations, would make it difficult to comply with this request, unless some precedents could be found. The imperial envoy, Count Waldstein, allowed himself to be persuaded by Pallavicini to agree to the restoration of the instrument which the Poles had been made to hand over to the Emperor during the Swedish war, by the terms of which they were bound to pay a sum of more than two million florins, and at no time to elect a King who was not agreeable to the Emperor. Moreover the Emperor was to advance 200,000 imperial thalers for Polish armaments, a sum which was to be in part covered by one half of the subsidies which the Pope

¹ According to the nunciature reports in *Acta Pol.*, VI., 46–56, and in BOJANI, III., 641–8; THEIN, 21–3. The third session took place on March 3.

had forwarded to Vienna up to that time. Whilst these discussions were in progress, news arrived that Moscow's envoys were on the way. It was to be foreseen that the opponents of the league would insist on Moscow being admitted as a member, in the hope of thereby drawing out the negotiations and even of wrecking them. Pallavicini forestalled this danger by proposing the insertion in the instrument of the league of a clause whereby new members might join the alliance, with the consent of the contracting parties. In this way, he said, the door would be left open for negotiations with Moscow without delaying the settlement with the Emperor. Under the pressure of disquieting reports from Turkey the proposal was accepted, and in the following year it found a practical application when Venice and Moscow joined the alliance.

However, the negotiations ran the risk of being wrecked on another point. The Polish deputies insisted on the rulers of the contracting Powers taking a personal oath to guarantee security and loyal observance of the alliance. After lengthy discussions, in this sense and in that, Waldstein and Zierowski (the latter had been adjoined to the former for the purpose of the negotiations), as decisively rejected the demand, as offensive to the Emperor, as the Poles insisted on its acceptance. The extraordinary danger for the alliance which this incident brought to light, lay in the fact that the anti-Turkish league had to reckon with influential opponents not only in Poland but even at the court of Vienna. Count Quintin Jörger, Hermann of Baden and above all Borgomainero, the Spanish ambassador, worked against it and were in favour of negotiations with Thököly and the Turks. Their most vigorous opponent was nuncio Buonvisi who advocated an agreement with Thököly, but in the sense of an anti-Turkish league in which he would have been glad even then to include Moldavia and Walachia.¹ On hearing, through Pallavicini, of the difficulties of the negotiations at the Polish Diet, Buonvisi did all he could to dispose the Emperor favourably and he

¹ THEIN, 31-4.

succeeded at least in preventing a negative decision. Those concerned gained the impression that the Emperor would not disavow his ambassador at Warsaw if he went beyond his instructions and agreed to the oath.¹

However, things did not go so far. As soon as the crisis had arisen, King John had informed the nuncio at Warsaw that he desired his mediation. Pallavicini accepted but at once met with opposition by both parties, though they ended by accepting to negotiate on the same spot under his mediation. Accordingly the parties took their places on either side of the hall of the sessions, separated from each other, so that neither side could hear the other. Nuncio Pallavicini acted as a go-between, crossing from one side of the hall to the other, offering suggestions and receiving answers. This led to a result acceptable to both parties. It was decided that the oath should be made in the hands of the Pope ; consequently it was to be taken by persons other than the rulers. The two Cardinals Protector, Pio and Barberini, were subsequently chosen for this duty, the former for Austria, the latter for Poland. The formula of the oath was to remain secret, nor was it to be inserted in the instrument of the treaty. The King and the ministers having given their approval, a start was made with the drafting of the treaty.²

The negotiations between the imperial and the Polish deputies continued their course, though with tiresome delays on account of utterly irrelevant matters. There was an enormous amount of talk. The nuncio's loud remonstrances and protests were countered by the King with the remark that the senators made such long speeches to show off their talent as orators rather than in the interest of the affair in question. Comfort, luxury, humanistic studies and the consequent neglect of the profession of arms did great harm

¹ KLOPP, 168, according to Contarini's reports of March 20 and 27, 1683.

² *Acta Pol.*, VI., 55 *seq.* ; BOJANI, III., 647 ; THEIN, 23-6. Barberini was Cardinal Protector of Poland since the spring of 1681 ; *cf.* the letter of King John to Innocent XI., dated April 30, 1681, THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, III., 678.

to the realm. He, the King, feared that the Polish libraries would one day become the stables of the Turks' horses, just as the Tartars stabled horses in the libraries of China. The fall of Vienna would be far more disastrous than that of Cracow. Before Cracow the Turks would be caught in the Austrian and Polish pincers; hence Cracow would be reconquered. But if Vienna were lost, Poland would be severed from the rest of Christendom. For the rest, the delay in the negotiations was also due to the opponents of the league who sought to gain time and were waiting for the money with which France bribed them. However, the unwearied efforts of the papal nuncio and the imperial plenipotentiaries, with the help of the King and Queen, who now gave their unstinted support to the league, ended by overcoming every obstacle.¹

A final difficulty for the league, which was precisely due to Queen Casimira, was likewise removed. Since 1678 there had been question of the betrothal of the Archduchess Maria Antonia to James, the son of Sobieski and Casimira. The marriage, so the parents calculated, might possibly prove the foundation of a hereditary kingship for the Sobieskis, especially if the people were roused to enthusiasm by the father's brilliant victories over the Turks. It was even said in Poland that the Emperor would consent to the match for the sake of the league and assign Hungary to the Archduchess for her dowry. As a matter of fact the court of Vienna seems to have held out for a time some such hope.² Rome, however, would not hear of the

¹ Cf. Pallavicini's reports to Rome, March 21, 24 and 31, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 58-62; BOJANI, III., 652, 656, 659. An embassy of Thököly to the Polish Diet was one of the obstacles to the negotiations (report of Pallavicini, March 31, 1683). The nuncio and the imperial ambassador opposed its reception at court. However, it must not be forgotten that the court of Vienna was still negotiating with Thököly; cf. THEIN, 25 *seq.*, 31-4.

² So says Vitry in his report to Louis XIV., March 14, 1682 (*Acta Pol.*, VII., 198). This would be in accordance with the fact that Buonvisi did not at first report unfavourably to nuncio Martelli in Warsaw; cf. Martelli to Cibo, May 3, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 423, n. 1.

plan because the Archduchess was at first destined for Charles II. of Spain, and, later on, when Charles II. became engaged to Marie Louise of Orléans, because it was desired to marry her to the young Elector of Bavaria. By this means it was hoped to forestall the plan of a marriage of Max Emmanuel with Eleonore Erdmuth of Sachsen-Eisenach, for Innocent XI. was strongly opposed to such a match on religious grounds, even in the event of the conversion of the Saxon princess,¹ and it was likewise necessary to bring about closer relations between Max Emmanuel and the Emperor. This plan had already been agreed upon by Vienna and Munich at the time of the league negotiations and to nuncio Pallavicini fell the no light task to reconcile Casimira to her disappointment. He represented to her that James' union with Maria Antonia would precisely constitute a great obstacle to his election as King of Poland for they would have to reckon with French, Spanish and Polish opposition. This argument proved effective and when the imperial ambassador informed her that the Archduchess already belonged to another, the King and Queen of Poland insisted no longer.²

The question now was to get the Diet to approve the treaty of alliance. It had become clear that Morstein's partisans in that assembly were much more numerous than could have been foreseen. Moreover a great many of them were so heavily compromised by the intercepted correspondence with Paris

¹ The dispensation for a mixed marriage, even in view of a probable conversion later on, would not have been granted by the Pope.—Brief of Innocent XI. of August 16, 1681, to Max Emmanuel (BERTHIER, I., 435-7): "in the marriages of princes the beauty of the bride is of secondary importance." Cf. K. TH. HEIGEL, *Quellen u. Abhandl. zur neueren Geschichte Bayerns*, new series, Munich, 1890, 78-88; DUHR, III., 639, 851 seq.

² Cf. Cibo's instructions to Martelli, May 28 and July 9, 1678, in BOJANI, I., 423, n. 1; Buonvisi to Cibo, February 19, 1682, Cibo to Buonvisi, July 25, 1682, Pallavicini to Cibo, March 10, 1683, *ibid.*, III., 593, n. 2, 645, n. 1; DU HAMEL, VIII., 57, according to Contarini's report of November 26, 1682.

that, were it only out of fear for their personal safety, they were unwilling, by approving the league, to put into the King's hands the power and the weapons for their own destruction. The intrigues of Vitry, who still remained at Warsaw, did the rest. Some very violent scenes took place at the Diet and a bloody scuffle among the senators was only narrowly avoided.¹ Furious and dangerous was the storm, nuncio Pallavicini reported to Rome on Sunday, March 21st,² which convulsed the Diet from Tuesday to Saturday. That had unfortunately happened which he, the nuncio, had so often foretold, when he had earnestly pleaded and prayed that the affair of the intercepted letters should be dropped. The nuncio proposed various solutions but they were rejected.³ The storm abated at length and on the evening of March 31st the Chancellor was able to read to the Diet the draft of the treaty of alliance that had been agreed upon. In addition to the clauses already mentioned, the draft contained the following additions and alterations. The alliance was to be aimed exclusively against the Turks and have for its further object defence from their attacks and the recovery of lost territory. It was to be personally subscribed to by the rulers. Peace could only be concluded by mutual agreement. Further dispositions were the mobilization of an imperial army of 60,000 men and of a Polish one of 40,000, but a joint advance was to be made only in the event of Vienna or Cracow being besieged and, lastly, the addition of further allies acceptable to both parties, especially that of Moscow. The Emperor was to pay Poland the sum of 200,000 imperial thalers for which he was to be

¹ KLOPP, according to Contarini's report of April 17, 1683.

² *Acta Pol.*, VI., 57 *seq.*; BOJANI, III., 648-651.

³ A law was passed instead which considerably restricted the stay of the ambassadors of foreign Powers in Poland; this was done to protect the country against their intrigues. The attention of the Diet was drawn to the fact that the papal nuncio should be expressly exempted from such laws, "but the King said—with profound respect for the Holy See and the honour of the nuncio—that the Apostolic nuncio was never included in any laws of this kind," BOJANI, III., 651.

indemnified with the subsidies he received from the Pope ; Poland was not to be asked at any future time to refund the above mentioned sum. An ecclesiastical tenth which the Pope was to impose on Milan and Naples, was likewise to fall exclusively to Poland.¹

Contrary to all expectation, the Diet approved the draft and on the morning of April 1st, previous to the session of the Diet, the deputies of the Polish Republic put their signature to it. That same morning, without warning and without giving them time to consider the matter, the imperial plenipotentiaries were likewise requested to sign. The reason of this proceeding became clear to them as they hastily examined the document submitted to them. Some points, especially the financial stipulations, were differently stated in the instrument of the treaty and were more unfavourable to the Emperor than had been agreed upon in the course of the negotiations. Violent disputes with the Polish ministers ensued, but to all the representations of Waldstein and Zierowski the Poles made the one reply ; either you sign, or the negotiations are at an end. After resisting for the space of six hours the imperial envoys, against their will, ended by putting their names at the bottom of the document. Nuncio Pallavicini calmed them and praised their conduct. It was better, he assured them, to have yielded than to have jeopardized the whole work ; the Emperor would approve their conduct. As for himself, he did not like the freedom with which the Diet had disposed of papal subsidies and ecclesiastical tenths. With a view to forestalling possible difficulties at Vienna, the nuncio suggested that for the ratification by the Emperor Leopold and King Sobieski, a text should be submitted which agreed in substance with the treaty instrument of April 1st, whilst it departed from it in the unacceptable clauses : only this text, bearing the rulers' signature, should be published. However, the nuncio's proposal was rejected.²

¹ THEIN, 26 *seq.*

² Pallavicini to Cibo, April 7, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 70 *seq.* ; BOJANI, III., 656-660 ; THEIN, 27-9.

Thus the Diet had happily accepted the league, but that assembly itself was not yet concluded and the whole work of the treaty would be in jeopardy if the meeting were to be dissolved before its normal termination. Towards this end the opponents of the league now directed their efforts, by putting every imaginable obstacle in the way of a solution of the questions not yet settled. To avoid a complete failure the King was repeatedly compelled to extend the duration of the session. Nuncio Pallavicini, who had fallen ill as a result of all his exertions and excitement, urged the Bishops who were taking part in the Diet to protect themselves against violence with a guard of a hundred or more armed men. On Wednesday in Holy Week, April 14th, grave disorders occurred once more, especially on the part of the Lithuanians. During the night of Good Friday to Holy Saturday the Grand Treasurer Morstein, the French ambassador and the two brothers Noblet, who had been especially sent from Paris to assist Vitry, rushed through the whole city for the purpose of recruiting adherents. To their underground activities must be ascribed the violent scenes which took place at the sittings of the following day, and in the night of Easter, April 17th–18th. Three times in the course of that night the Diet was on the point of breaking down. But when the King appeared in person at dawn on Easter Sunday, to urge approval of a treaty already concluded, as well as the termination of the Diet, no one dared to interpose his veto. The battle was won.¹

“Last night,” nuncio Pallavicini reported to Rome on Easter Sunday, “the Diet came to an end, and thus the league and war against the Turks are accomplished facts. This is an extraordinary favour granted by God to Christendom in answer to your Holiness’ prayers and supplications. It must be openly acknowledged that this is not the work of men, for no exertion, no eloquence and no diplomatic skill could have brought it about.” This conviction, he wrote, forced

¹ KLOPP, 171, according to Contarini’s report of April 17, 1683; Pallavicini to Cibo, April 14 and 18, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 79, 87; BOJANI, III., 658–661 (*cf.* 660, n. 1); THEIN, 29 *seq.*

itself upon him when he considered Poland's poverty and the discord, the fury and the hatred which had sprung up amongst the members of the Diet in consequence of the affair of the letters.¹ The Marquis de Vitry was obliged to leave Warsaw for Berlin; from there he wrote to Paris that, in accordance with the instructions of his Sovereign, he had done his best to create difficulties for the Diet and even to wreck it. He had hoped to find someone who would bring about its dissolution in return for 1,000 ducats; but no matter how much money he offered, no one would lend himself for the task. The papal nuncio had been one of his bitterest opponents and it was he who had succeeded in reconciling the Grand Marshal of Lithuania with the King.² For purposes of bribery, Vitry had ended by sacrificing his own table silver.³ This time, however, the other side had outdone him, even on this point. For the purpose of obtaining votes the French had only spent 50,000 florins, whereas the imperial party had expended 66,000. Pallavicini had encouraged Waldstein and Zierowski to make use of gold and he himself contributed at least 14,700 florins of the Pope's money. Jablonowski, Jerome Lubomirski, who had entered the Emperor's service in the meantime,⁴ and the Lithuanian Sapiehas, saw their opportunity and allowed themselves to be paid by both sides, by the French and by the Imperialists.⁵

¹ Pallavicini to Cibo, April 18, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 87 *seq.*; BOJANI, III., 660 *seq.* On the sentiments of the Polish King and the nuncio, *cf.* TRENTA, II., 180, and THEINER, *Monuments*, 245 *seq.* On the financial conditions of Poland *cf.* the very interesting statements of Pallavicini given in BOJANI, III., 379-386 (a tax on alcohol that would scarcely be felt would bring in 20 million florins!), 583 *seq.*

² Reports of April 17 and 22, 1683, in GÉRIN, 120.

³ KLOPP, 171, according to Contarini's report of May 1, 1683,

⁴ *Cf.* the Emperor Leopold to Count Schaffgotsch, on February 14, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 40-3.

⁵ THEIN, 20, according to Zierowski's accounts in *Acta Pol.*, VI. (to the numbers given by THEIN must be added No. 12); report of Pallavicini, February 10, 1683 (SAUER, 168), and No. 58 in *Acta Pol.*, I.; REDLICH, 309, n. 1.

On April 23rd news of the conclusion of the league reached Vienna. "The joy of the public is indescribable," Buonvisi said in a letter to Rome in which he bestowed the highest encomiums on the Warsaw nuncio. He at once dispatched a courier to Venice in order to acquaint the Pope as speedily as possible with the joyful event.¹ Innocent XI. had accompanied the Warsaw negotiations with his prayers. In the course of Lent, he went more than once from the Quirinal to St. Peter's for the Stations. For the Fridays of March he published Indulgences and general Jubilees for the purpose of obtaining concord among Christian princes. He ordered the prayer against the infidels to be said at Mass and prescribed other public prayers for the pressing needs of the Church. The carnival was prohibited; in its place the faithful were exhorted to pray for the preservation of Christendom from the danger that threatened it.² In Rome there was now great jubilation and in his joy at the successful conclusion of the alliance the Pope at once forwarded to the Emperor the sum of 100,000 crowns.³

The Emperor signed the treaty on May 2nd at Laxenburg. The oath in the Pope's hands by Cardinal Pio and Barberini, which by the terms of the secret article should have been taken within two months, was only taken on August 16th when Vienna was already invested by the Turks and the Polish army of relief was on the march. After the ceremony the Pope, greatly moved and full of joy, drew the two Cardinals into his arms.⁴ In 1682 the Venetian ambassador, Civrano,

¹ Letter to Cibo of April 24, 1683, in BOJANI, 662; Letter of Buonvisi to Sobieski in TRENTA, II., 23 *seq.*

² LIPPI, 141 *seq.*

³ KLOPP, 173. The Briefs of congratulation to King John and the Emperor Leopold, dated May 8 and 12, 1683, in BERTHIER, II., 94 *seq.*; SAUER, 3.

⁴ KLOPP, 173. The Pope's answer to the taking of the oath, *ibid.*, 539; THEIN, 26, n. 5 and 6. The text of the treaty of alliance in DU MONT, VII., 2, 62-4 (literal German translation in KLOPP, 173), in *Codex dipl. regni Poloniae*, I., Vilna, 1758, 337-342 (an extract in *Acta Pol.*, VI., 63-70), and in ANDREAS

wrote as follows in his final report to the Senate, after his return from Constantinople: "The Pope is held in particular respect by the Turks. They feel that he has power to unite the Christian princes in a league against them, in fact he is the only bulwark against their power they are afraid of."¹ In point of fact the concentric attack on the Crescent by the whole Christian world was a bold inspiration of Innocent XI. Though he had not been able to realize this conception, there existed at least a league capable of warding off the immediate Turkish peril. The alliance was in an outstanding degree the work of the Pope, in which his nuncios had co-operated with decision, untiringly and with extraordinary prudence, namely Buonvisi at Vienna and above all, as the Polish Senate unreservedly acknowledged in a letter to Innocent XI. immediately after the happy conclusion of the Diet, by Pallavicini at Warsaw.²

(5.)

In the reports of the nuncios of Vienna and Warsaw previous to 1683 we frequently meet with the remark that a definite guarantee of papal subsidies would greatly promote the chances of the alliance.³ About the middle of March, 1683, when the projected league was about to become a reality, nuncio Buonvisi found the Emperor almost in despair because he could not see how he was going to meet the financial

CHR. ZALUSKI, *Epistolarum historico-familiarium*, I., 2, 803-9. ZALUSKI gives the treaty in the formula of Poland, the others give it in the formula of the Emperor.

¹ In KLOPP, 147.

² On April 19, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., 89.

³ Cf., *inter alia*, the reports of the nunciatures of Vienna and Warsaw in BOJANI, I., 452, 503, 535 *seq.*, 538 *seq.*; also the Briefs to the Emperor, dated August 23, 1681 and August 22, 1682, in BERTHIER, I., 441; II., 46 *seq.* On the Pope's subsidies against the Turks, cf. MAURER, in *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, XCVIII. (1886), 569 *seqq.*

conditions to which Waldstein had agreed at Warsaw.¹ However, for the time being Innocent was unable to go beyond general promises. The Pope was most willing to give, the Secretary of State wrote on June 3rd, 1679, to the nuncios at Vienna and Warsaw, but since the coffers of the Apostolic Camera were empty, no one could complain if His Holiness failed to give what he did not possess.² Innocent XI. had taken over the Papal States with a burden of debt which must have considerably exceeded fifty million scudi.³ Added to this was the fact that, according to a report of the Venetian ambassador Mocenigo in the year 1675, the population of the country had diminished by a third within less than forty years, and the number of homesteads by over 40 per cent, whilst annual taxation had been doubled.⁴ For all that the public income continued to show a yearly deficit of about 200,000 scudi.⁵ Some time after his accession Innocent XI. lamented the fact that as a Cardinal he had been wealthy, but that now that he was Pope, he was reduced to misery.⁶ The aim of his financial policy was an administration which, without fresh taxation, would yield a surplus to cover the public debt and to

¹ Buonvisi to Cibo, March 21, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 622-4.

² Cibo to Buonvisi and Martelli, June 3, 1679, *ibid.*, I., 541-3.

³ The *Diarium Europaeum* (XXXIV., 150) puts the debt at 65 millions, Servient gives 30 million thalers (MICHAUD, I., 305), the Venetians Querini and Grimani (in BROSCHE, I., 469) give for the years 1667 and 1671, 50 million scudi. Information on the value of money about 1680 is given in the *Diar. Europ.*, XXXV., 7-28, and in the reports of the nunciatures of Vienna and Warsaw, BOJANI, I., 485 *seq.*, III., 397, 629, n. 1. According to these accounts 2 thalers = 3 Austrian florins, 1 Austrian florin = 2 (or up to 4) Polish florins (the indications of Redlich [309] agree with this), 1 ducat = 3 florins and 12 kreuzer, 1 scudo = 3 Austrian florins and 20 kreuzer.

⁴ From Mocenigo's report of 1675, in BROSCHE, I., 458 *seq.*

⁵ *Cardinal Pio to Leopold, October 3, 1676. State Archives, Vienna. RANKE (Päpste, III., 112) therefore, when speaking of 170,000 scudi, gives too low a figure. Cf. IMMICH, 19, n. 2.

⁶ *Cardinal Pio, *loc. cit.*

subsidize the Turkish war ; the means for its realization was a wide system of saving and strict watchfulness over the finances.

The Roman people had early proof of the economic views of the new Pope. He would not hear of any expenditure to celebrate his elevation, nor were there any clothes and new coins for the domestic staff of the papal court, as was customary at the accession of a new Pope. In like manner the five score gold and silver coins which were annually distributed among the personnel of the court on the feast of SS. Peter and Paul went henceforth to the Apostolic Camera. Foreign Powers, more particularly the Catholic Swiss and Venice, were requested to refrain from sending *obbedienza* embassies and instead to spend the money for the benefit of the Catholic cause. The presents which the Popes were wont to bestow on their relatives out of the funds of the Apostolic Camera were abolished under Innocent XI.¹ The money from the sale of his furniture which he ordered after his elevation to the papacy, was given to the poor.² Don Livio, the Pope's nephew, only received a slender allowance.³

The office of a general superintendent of the Papal States and the legation of Avignon, two posts that used to fall to the nephews, Innocent XI. bestowed on his Secretary of State, Cardinal Cibo, but without salary. The posts of a General of the Church, of commander of the navy and governor of Castel St. Angelo were left vacant by him. By this measure alone he saved 70,000 scudi a year.⁴ The Pope relieved Cardinal Chigi of the office of Librarian of the Church and conferred it on a cleric of lower degree to whom he was able to pay a

¹ *Proc. summ.*, 136 seq., 153, §§ 48-50.

² *Diar. Europ.*, XXIV., 152.

³ *Proc. summ.*, 136.

⁴ *Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, September 25 and October 3, 1676, *loc. cit.* ; *Proc. summ.*, *loc. cit.* The statement of *Diar. Europ.*, XXXIV., 153, namely, that the Princes Pamfili, Borghese and Savelli had received the two above-mentioned posts of generals and also the post of governor of the castle of S. Angelo, is evidently based on a premature report.

lower salary.¹ The Secretariates for Briefs,² the posts of inspectors general in the Papal States³ and other offices the only purpose of which was to make provision for certain families,⁴ he allowed to lapse. In December, 1677, another twenty-four secretarial posts were abolished.⁵ Those who held two or three posts at the palace had to be content with the salary of one. Extraordinary expenses for the benefit of palace officials were abolished.⁶

The Vatican gardens, those of the Quirinal, the *Vigna* of Pope Julius and other parks which used to be put at the disposal of high papal officials, were let by Innocent XI., the rent going to the Apostolic Camera.⁷ The Pope was even credited with the idea of selling the water of the public fountains.⁸ The papal guard was reduced and expenditure on the army curtailed, whilst the police force was increased.⁹ The income of every papal official, from the Cardinals down to the lowest employee, was curtailed.¹⁰ It was said that in September 1687, Cardinal Ottoboni had freely remonstrated with the Pope for allowing several members of the Sacred College to suffer from hunger.¹¹ Heavy taxes were laid on Bulls of confirmation.¹² Instead of the papal medals of gold and silver, he introduced medals made of wax from the very

¹ *Diar. Europ.*, XXXVI., 111 seq.; **Avviso* of August 14, 1677, *Cod. Barb.* 6417, Vatican Library.

² **Avviso* of January 22, 1678, *ibid.*

³ *Diar. Europ.*, XXXV., 274.

⁴ *Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, January 21, 1679, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Diar. Europ.*, XXXVI., 497 (dated December, 1677).

⁶ *Proc. summ.*, 136 seq.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ **Avviso* of August 18, 1677, *loc. cit.*

⁹ *Diar. Europ.*, XXXIV., 153; **Avviso* of January 23, 1677, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰ *Diar. Europ.*, *loc. cit.*

¹¹ MICHAUD, I., 308.

¹² *Ibid.*, 309-311.

beginning of his pontificate ; in this way, it was said, an economy of 6,000 crowns was effected annually.¹

Innocent XI. put a stop to the squandering of the funds of the Apostolic Camera, from which, so it was said, 80,000 to 100,000 thalers were missing.² In October 1676, the Secretary of State told Cardinal D'Estrées that when the expenditure for Civitavecchia was submitted to examination, a defalcation of 20,000 thalers was discovered and that this sum had gone to Cardinal Altieri and Don Angelo.³ Cardinal Cibo maintained that the taxes could be made to yield a third as much again as they actually produced ; that even so, the tax-gatherers were willing to pay for the privilege of collecting them, because in consequence of the elimination of secret contributions they would make the same profit as before.⁴ The Pope abolished the exemption from customs dues both for himself and his court.⁵ The heavily indebted communes of the Papal States, which had to pay as much as 7 per cent and 8 per cent interest, so that they never were in a position to create a sinking fund, he assisted by the following means : he advanced the money they required to pay off the capital debt out of a newly founded State finance department which replaced the former *Monti* and only demanded 3 per cent interest. This was to the advantage of the communes, as well as that of the Apostolic Camera which, thanks to the low rate of interest, gradually recovered the capital it had advanced.⁶

The corn chamber of Rome was taken over by Innocent XI. with the burden of a deficit said to have exceeded 300,000 scudi. Moreover there was a scarcity of bread at the beginning of his

¹ *Diar. Europ.*, XXXVI., 8.

² Thus the Abbé Louis de Bourlemont to Pomponne on October 27, 1676, in MICHAUD, I., 307 *seq.*

³ MICHAUD, I., 307.

⁴ *Cf.* the report quoted in note 3.

⁵ *Diar. Europ.*, XXXVI., 9.

⁶ *Proc. summ.*, 137, § 49. The new bank was called " *Comunità a' trè scudi di frutto per luogo di Monte* " ; *cf.* MICHAUD, I., 319-323.

pontificate ; this the Pope remedied by imports of grain from Holland.¹ In the autumn of 1677, he ordered the sequestration of the private grain stores of Count Falconieri and others, because they sought to sell corn at usurious prices. They were made to sell the sack of corn for seven crowns.² At the beginning of 1679 Cardinal Pio informed the Emperor that a list had been put into the Pope's hands of the names of those who enriched themselves by means of the corn chambers ; they were removed from their posts. The affair was bound to create a great sensation, for a number of people were implicated.³ For the requirements of the bakers of Rome, the papal corn chamber bought each month a fixed quantity of corn from private owners. On their part, the bakers could only buy flour from the corn chamber and they had to furnish bread of a standard weight. The result was that the city always had good, moderately priced bread, whilst the corn chamber was able to meet its liabilities and to cover the higher cost of the Dutch grain. When someone told the Pope that the Dutch flour was bad, he sent for bread from various bakeries, tasted it and declared that the flour was good but the baking bad.⁴ In Cardinal D'Estrées' estimation, the meat tax yielded 70,000 thalers annually. On the other hand, the soap tax brought in very little. Towards the end of his pontificate, Innocent XI. did away with the meat tax.⁵ He

¹ *Proc. summ.*, 132, § 7, 137, § 47 *seq.*

² *Diar. Europ.*, XXXVI., 353. *Cf. ibid.*, 422, on the fraud of the French ambassador in the exportation of biscuits to Sicily.

³ *Report to the Emperor Leopold of January 27, 1679, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ *Proc. summ.*, 137, § 47 *seq.*, 140, § 70 *seq.* Abbot Carlo Antonio de Prosperis says, *inter alia*, that the Pope always kept the weight of the bread unit at eight ounces ; in the years of the poorest crop he asked 12 scudi for a quarter of corn. This must be compared with what MICHAUD (I., 317-19) says. Quite possibly there was only question of a passing necessity in 1688.

⁵ Cardinal D'Estrées in MICHAUD, I., 325 ; GUARNACCI, 110 CD.

would not hear of new taxes ; he was even prepared to lower existing ones and would have done so had not the Turkish war and the conflict over the question of the quarters rendered even fresh taxation necessary.¹ The Pope also put a stop to the usurious interest which the Jews were in the habit of demanding.²

The ordering of the Apostolic Camera caused the Pope a good deal of anxiety. " Day by day Innocent XI. reckons up, in detail the income of the Camera," Cardinal D'Estrées wrote to Louis XIV.³ In February, 1679, the Pope observed to Cardinal Barberini that when he took over the Camera it was burdened with a debt of five millions, but that by now he had balanced income and expenditure.⁴ Yet when not long after his wish to assist the Duke of York out of the funds of Propaganda was opposed by that body, on the ground that its work was exclusively for the conversion of heretics and infidels, and that the present case concerned the Apostolic Camera, the Pope answered in an excited and loud tone that could be heard at a distance, that Cardinal Barberini knew quite well how great was the deficit of the Apostolic Camera whilst, on the other hand, in his opinion, Propaganda annually wasted 20,000 scudi.⁵ Where money was concerned the Pope was strict and suspicious. One day he made a gift of fifty gold scudi to the establishment of the catechumens and neophytes of S. Maria dei Monti ; he, however, ordered the money to be cast into the alms box. Later on he had special inquiries made to ascertain how much money had come out of the box when it was emptied. The fifty gold scudi had really been found in it.⁶ On another occasion Fr. Marracci begged the Pope to remit the taxes of which an exalted house had defrauded the State. Innocent replied that he was not the

¹ *Proc. summ.*, 137. Cf. **Avviso* of July 1, 1679. *Cod. Barb.* 6420, Vatican Library.

² *Proc. summ.*, 148, § 9.

³ MICHAUD, I., 314.

⁴ **Avviso* of February 18, 1679, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, May 20, 1679, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Proc. summ.*, 117, § 17.

master of the money of the Apostolic Camera. When Marracci objected that it was a very probable opinion that one guilty of fraud in the payment of taxes was not obliged to restitution, the Pope's curt reply was that: "others may think what they like; we have *our own* opinion."¹ He was anxious that the poor should not suffer in consequence of his policy of economy. The process for the beatification of Innocent XI. has much to say of the Pontiff's liberality.² His personal alms amounted to 70-80 scudi a month.³ When there was question of any work of mercy, the usually rigid Pontiff could be liberal, even in the bestowal of benefices. Thus he conferred the vacant archdeaconry of Cefalù on Don Giacomo Spinola, a deserving priest originating from a poor and numerous family, to enable him to provide for his five sisters.⁴

The Pope's large-heartedness was particularly marked when there was question of the Turkish problem. When bishoprics or abbeys or other rich prebends became vacant in Dalmatia, benefices which, as a rule, had hitherto fallen to the Cardinals and the prelates of the court, Innocent XI. bestowed them on members of the native clergy, without burdening them with yearly payments, in order to enable those who enjoyed them to undertake works of charity and to contribute to the upkeep of the churches which had been so often plundered by the Turks.⁵ When Ragusa was compelled, in 1678, to raise the sum of 80,000 scudi as a ransom for its envoys whom Kara Mustafa held captives, Innocent XI. made a contribution of 10,000 ducats.⁶

The Pope refused to follow the advice of certain overzealous persons who advised him to suppress the Camaldolese, the Silvestrines and the Alexians for the purpose of obtaining money for the Turkish war, without fresh taxation, by

¹ *Ibid.*, 147, § 4 *seq.*

² In the *Informatio*, 29-34, in the *Summarium*, 104-131.

³ *Proc. summ.*, 126, § 82.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 130, § 105 *seq.*

⁵ LIPPI, 135.

⁶ BERNINO, 7-9.

confiscating their property.¹ But he taxed ecclesiastical property all the more heavily in view of the war. On December 27th, 1679, Cardinal Vidoni, the then Protector of Poland, reported to Warsaw that the Pope had instructed all the nuncios to devote the revenues of vacant sees to the furtherance of Poland's war against the Turks.²

On January 7th, 1680, all the nuncios were ordered to collect the *spolia* and other ecclesiastical revenues for the Turkish war.³ In June 1679, at the suggestion of the Viennese nuncio, the Pope put at the Emperor's disposal, for war purposes, the 100,000 florins of the Bohemian salt chamber which had been set apart for the erection of a new episcopal residence in Prague.⁴ Great expectations were set in Rome on a tenth laid on ecclesiastical possessions in the Spanish dominions in Italy. However, to the Pope's grievous disappointment, the court of Madrid only consented to impose it on condition that the royal *placet* should precede it and that one half of the sum raised should go to Spain as royal dues.⁵ On top of everything Louis XIV. taxed the measure with partiality.⁶

In the autumn of 1682, when the Turkish peril became imminent, the Emperor Leopold laid on all property, ecclesiastical possessions not excluded, a tax of 1 per cent. At the same time he sent Count Martinitz to Italy with mission to obtain money and allies. Nuncio Buonvisi, and not least Innocent XI. were at first indignant at the Emperor's action which, they said, injured ecclesiastical immunity, but in view of the pressing need, and on the advice of a special Congregation of ten Cardinals, the Pope gave his consent,

¹ **Avviso* of June 24, 1679, *loc. cit.*

² Martelli to Cibo, December 27, 1679, in BOJANI, I., 608 *seq.*

³ Circular letter of Cibo of January 7, 1680, *ibid.*, 609 *seq.*

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, May 14, 1679, Cibo to Buonvisi, June 3, 1679, *ibid.*, 535 *seq.*, 539.

⁵ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 29, 1679, Cibo to Mellini, October 29, 1679, *ibid.*, 594 *seq.* Cf. the report of the French ambassador D'Estrées on his audience of August 16, 1682, in MICHAUD, II., 67.

⁶ Louis XIV. to D'Estrées, November 12, 1681, *ibid.*, 50 *seq.*

provided there were precedents; he also gave leave for a special imposition of 500,000 florins on the Austrian clergy and himself at once contributed 200,000 crowns and 50,000 florins.¹ He also consented to the sale of the property of Janowitz in Bohemia which was part of the endowment of the archiepiscopal See of Prague: this transaction yielded 48,000 florins.² Cardinal Ludovisi even urged the Pope, in view of the lack of money, to take the treasures of the Jesuit sacristies for the war.³ As a matter of fact, Buonvisi was given full power, with the utmost secrecy, to touch the treasures of the churches and in view of the extreme necessity the letter proposed to the Emperor to mint the silver of the churches and the treasure of Maria-Zell, and to pawn the jewels at Venice, seeing that the millions of souls were of greater value than the treasures of the churches. He also urged the Holy Father to empower the Elector of Bavaria to raise large subsidies from the clergy of that country, a step that was actually taken. Buonvisi even suggested to lay hands on the treasure deposited in Castel S. Angelo, since the fall of Vienna would mean that of Rome.⁴ A little later, in November 1683, the Pope himself

¹ Buonvisi to Cibo, October 18 and 25, 1682, April 25 and May 2, 1683; Cibo to Buonvisi, November 21, 1682, January 2, 9 and 16 (particulars are there given on the papal subsidies; among them are the 112,000 florins which Radziwill still owed to the Apostolic Camera), February 13 and 20 and April 17, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 601 *seq.*, 662, n. 1, 664 *seq.*, 603, n. 1, 608, 606, n. 1, 609, 612 *seq.*, 631; the Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., December 23, 1682, in MICHAUD, I., 53. Cf. KLOPP, 148.

² *Theatr. Europ.*, XII., 608 *seq.*; Buonvisi to Cibo, April 25, 1683 (see n. 1, and SAUER, 124); THEIN, 55 *seq.* Rome desired that the sale of ecclesiastical property should be avoided as much as possible; cf. Cibo to Buonvisi, March 27, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 625.

³ *Report of Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, October 3, 1682. State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ Cibo to Buonvisi, April 17, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 631; Buonvisi to Cibo, May 16 (SAUER, 128), July 12, 21 and 28, 1683 (BOJANI, III., 692-6, 700); Brief to Max Emanuel, August 7, 1683, in BERTHIER, II., 115, SAUER, 30; cf. THEIN, 56.

studied the possibility of using the silver of the Spanish churches and sanctuaries in the struggle against the Turks.¹ Whilst the Diet was still in progress Pallavicini exhorted the Polish Bishops to make voluntary contributions for the purpose of raising troops.² The Polish army, he wrote to Rome on April 7th, usually suffers from the lack of two things, provisions and field hospitals, in consequence of which a great number of soldiers die without the Sacraments. Consequently the Pope should assign to this object the money destined for the beatification of a Monk of Andreovia, adding to it the revenues of the non-resident Abbot of that place, of which the Pontiff had the disposal for a period of five years: these amounted to 120,000 florins.³ The Diet then demanded from the Polish clergy a war contribution of 500,000 florins in return for which it would be exempted from all other war charges.⁴ In September 1683, Innocent imposed a contribution of 6 per cent, for a period of ten years, on all church property in Italy, not excepting the possessions of the Cardinals.⁵ To this he added in 1685, at the request of the Emperor, the third part of all property acquired by the wealthy Abbeys and by the Jesuits in the course of the last sixty years,⁶ and in the same year he raised a tenth from the clergy of Spain.⁷ The first of these two financial measures yielded, up to the end of 1687, the sum of 1,600,000 florins⁸ ;

¹ Cibo to Mellini, November 7 and 21, 1683; Mellini to Cibo, December 16, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 848 *seq.*

² Pallavicini, April 7, 1683, *ibid.*, 659 *seq.*

³ *Acta Pol.*, VI., 74 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁵ *Gazette de Paris* of September 9, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 712, n. 1 *seq.*

⁶ *Cibo to Buonvisi, January 13 and 27, 1685; *Nunziat. di Germania*, 28, Pap. Sec. Arch.; *Buonvisi to Cibo, February 4 and 25, March 18 and August 12, 1685, *ibid.*, 210 f., 75^b, 161, 238, CCXI., f. 121.

⁷ *Cibo to Buonvisi, November 17 and December 1, 1685, *ibid.*, 28 f., 620, 626.

⁸ REDLICH, VI., 374 *seq.*; particulars in MAURER, 194; KÁROLYI, 105 *seq.*; FRAKNÓI, 186, 209 *seq.*

on the other hand the various tenths laid on ecclesiastical property for the war against the Turks brought in very little.¹

In the spring of 1683 Innocent XI. also appealed for help to the Archbishop of Gran, the Archbishops and Bishops of Germany, the Bishop of Bâsle and the Benedictine Abbeys of Switzerland.² The result, however, was inconsiderable. Fear of France or friendship for her tied the hands of the Electors of Mayence, Cologne and Trèves.³ Some of the other Bishops no doubt felt that they were already sufficiently burdened by the regular war contributions of troops, munitions and money.⁴ The most unsatisfactory contribution, in Buonvisi's opinion, was that of the Archbishop of Salzburg, Max von Kuenburg; the latter only sent 5,000 thalers' worth of powder to Vienna when, in view of his wealth, he could have given more. Subsequently also the nuncio blamed the Archbishop somewhat unjustly, reproaching him for doing no more than what he was strictly bound to do.⁵ At a later date, namely in 1685, the Bishop of Trent with his clergy contributed 200,000 Austrian florins.⁶ The Swiss Abbeys excused themselves or gave fair promises; the most generous was the poorest of them all, namely the Cistercian Abbey of Altaripa (Hauterive).⁷

¹ *Cibo to Pallavicini, February 23, 1686 and January 18, 1687, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 185 f., 294^b, 186 f. 6, Pap. Sec. Archives.

² The Briefs in BERTHIER, II., 76 *seq.*, 82-4, 99.

³ KLOPP, 155; THEIN, 51 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. Cherofini's report to Cibo, July 9, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 687.

⁵ *Buonvisi to Cibo, April 15 and May 27, 1685; *Cibo to Buonvisi, May 5 and June 16, 1685, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 210 f., 323^a, 423, 38 f., 528, 550^b *seq.* Papal Secret Archives.

⁶ *Cibo to Buonvisi, March 24, 1685, *ibid.*, 38 f., 497^b and 500^a.

⁷ Cherofini to Cibo, July 9, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 687-9. The later contributions from Switzerland were also very small: *Cibo to Buonvisi, July 7, 1685, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 38 f., 584, *loc. cit.*

From Portugal, for whose help Innocent XI. prayed on April 11th, 1683,¹ he received 100,000 thalers. As soon as he was informed of the fact he at once assigned the same amount to the Emperor from the funds of the Apostolic Camera. It was his intention to refund the Camera with Portugal's contribution but in the end the money was immediately assigned to Poland.² From Spain, to whose clergy Innocent XI. made another appeal about the middle of August,³ the Emperor received 200,000 florins.⁴ If we may believe French reports, the Pope was annoyed at the smallness of the sum which, it would seem, had at first been put at an even lower figure in reports to Rome; "it was a contribution of a couple of pence," he said, "and a shame, and the Emperor had been undignified enough to accept it."⁵

After the conclusion of the Austro-Polish alliance Innocent XI. appealed to the Italian States for subsidies, viz. to Grand Duke Cosimo of Tuscany, to the Dukes of Parma-Piacenza, Mantua, Modena, Massa and Mirandola, to Lucca, Genoa, Venice and to the Duchess-Mother Maria of Savoy. To the three last named he also appealed through Count Martinitz who was on his way home.⁶ Tuscany offered its galleys and promised subsidies, promises which Vienna interpreted as evasive answers⁷; however, people there were to be pleasantly undeceived for the Grand Duke eventually gave to the Emperor 100,000 pounds of powder⁸ and to Poland the sum

¹ BERTHIER, II., 84.

² Cibo to Pallavicini, October 9, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 770, n. 1.

³ By Briefs of August 15, 1683, in BERTHIER, II., 119-122.

⁴ Buonvisi to Cibo, October 5, Cibo to Buonvisi, October 16, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 767, n. 1, 773, n. 2.

⁵ The Duke D'Estrées to Louis XIV., December 7, 1683, in MICHAUD, II., 55 *seq.*

⁶ The Briefs in BERTHIER, II., 95-8; THEIN, 53.

⁷ Buonvisi to Cibo, July 9, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 687.

⁸ THEIN, 54.

of 100,000 florins.¹ Genoa contributed 30,000 thalers, Lucca 20,000 florins, the Duke of Massa 1,000 gold doubloons, Savoy 50,000 ducats, the Prince of Castiglione 30,000 florins and various other princes and States smaller sums.² In Upper Italy it was very necessary to take into consideration the proximity of the King of France,³ but Venice nevertheless ended by taking the side of the Pope and the Emperor.⁴

At this moment the Pope looked once more towards Persia. When the Archbishop of Naxivan returned to his mission, he was the bearer not only of the instructions of Buonvisi and Pallavicini, but of a Brief of Innocent XI. in which the Pope urged the Shah of Persia to march into the territory of the Turks from the east now that the bulk of their forces were concentrated in Hungary.⁵ But little could be hoped for from Persia as the Porte had meanwhile cooled the warlike ardour of her eastern neighbour by means of money and various facilities for the Persian pilgrims to Mecca.⁶

Considerable sums were given for the war by the Cardinals in Rome. According to a report from Paris, nine of them contributed together 41,700 thalers of which 15,000 came from Cardinal Borghese and 2,500 from the Cardinal Secretary of State.⁷ Cardinal Ludovisi sold his silver plate for the sum of 4,000 thalers for the common cause of Christendom⁸ whilst Cardinals Pio and Barberini sacrificed the best pieces

¹ According to Pucci's report of August 24, 1683, *Acta Pol.*, VI., Nr. 183; THIEN, 55.

² Cibo to Pallavicini, June 12, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 679 *seq.*; THEIN, 53 *seq.* A gold doubloon is a little over 6 florins.

³ Cf. GÉRIN, 132 *seq.*

⁴ Iacobelli to Cibo, July 31 and August 21, 1683, in BOJANI, 837; *cf.* 834-6.

⁵ Brief of June 19, 1683, in BERTHIER, II., 105 *seq.* Pallavicini to Cibo, August 19, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 720.

⁶ Pallavicini to Cibo, June 3, 1682, *ibid.*, 564, n. 1, according to the report of the Polish ambassador in Persia.

⁷ *Gazette de Paris* of August 14 and 31, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 712, n. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*

in their galleries and wardrobes.¹ Don Livio gave 10,000 thalers.² The Pope informed Queen Christine through Cardinal Azzolini that he had assigned to Hungary the 12,000 scudi which the Holy See had until then annually paid to her. The Queen was at no loss for a sharp answer to this sharp measure. The Pope had done her a favour, she informed Cardinal Cibo, when he applied the money to Hungary in her place; she herself had thought of doing so on her own account but had refrained for fear of hurting the Pope's magnanimity.³ By August 1683, the Apostolic Camera had provided Poland with 500,000 florins⁴ and the Emperor with one million by September.⁵ The 500,000 florins previously promised to Poland had in the meantime been employed by the Pope, beginning in 1683, in assisting Hungary. In acting thus, he explained, he was not alienating the money from its original destination, for what was done for Hungary would also benefit Poland.⁶ A number of smaller contributions, which happened to be due to the Apostolic Camera in this place or that, and which Innocent XI. devoted to the struggle against the Turks, may have to be added to the above sums. At any rate, by unanimous consent, it would have been impossible to provide the army with food and munitions without the Pope's help.⁷ When at a moment of supreme

¹ LIPPI, 147.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Report of Cardinal Pio to the Emperor Leopold, January 11, 1683, State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ This is quite clear from Cibo's report to Pallavicini, October 9, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 770, n. 1.

⁵ According to Buonvisi's exact statement in his report to Cibo of September 14, 1683. Accordingly other statements, e.g. the figures given by Bernino (5, 9, 65, 66, 92), by the French reporters (MICHAUD, II., 54-8; GÉRIN, 136), by Pucci (in *Acta Pol.*, VI., 325) and REDLICH (VI., 300 *seq.*, according to Fraknói and Newald), must be supplemented or corrected.

⁶ Cibo to Pallavicini, January 2 and 16 and February 20, 1683; Pallavicini to Cibo, March 31, in BOJANI, III., 633, 636 *seq.*, 639, 653 *seq.*

⁷ *Cf.*, *inter alia*, Buonvisi's report quoted above, n. 5.

need, in August 1683, the Pope dispatched to the Emperor the sum of 500,000 florins by the most rapid means, nuncio Buonvisi wrote to Rome that he had taken the good news to the Emperor during the night, immediately after the arrival of the money and that such had been the Emperor's emotion that tears streamed from his eyes.¹

By the end of the pontificate of Innocent XI. the sums received by the Emperor from the Apostolic Camera for the Turkish war amounted to over five million florins.² According to a report of Lando, the Venetian ambassador, in the year 1691,³ the Apostolic Camera was at that time burdened with a debt of forty-two millions on which it paid interest at the rate of 3 per cent. Of that sum fifteen millions had been spent for the common good of Christendom whilst two million Roman scudi, that is six to seven million florins, had been expended on the Turkish war. What was above five millions in this sum went to Poland and Venice.

¹ Brief to the Emperor Leopold, August 7, 1683, in BERTHIER, II., 114; SAUER, 29 *seq.*; Cibo to Buonvisi on the same day, Buonvisi to Cibo, August 18, in BOJANI, III., 706, 719.

² TRENTA, II., 104. On page 104, Nr. 101, Trenta writes: "Da un libro in cui teneva il Buonvisi registrate tutte le partite del danaro, che gli venivano rimesse d'ordine del Pontefice, apparisce il quantitativo del contante, che oltrepassa i 5 milioni di fiorini." Cf. IMMICH, 98, n. 1.

³ BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Roma*, I., 414.

CHAPTER III.

THE RELIEF OF VIENNA, THE HOLY LEAGUE AND THE WAR AGAINST THE TURKS IN HUNGARY.

(1.)

ON the very day on which the long sought alliance between the Emperor and Poland was effected, the Turkish army set out from Adrianople in the direction of Belgrade, headed by the Janissaries who were followed by Sultan Mohammed IV. and the Grand Vizier Kara Mustâfa, the real originator of the expedition. The troops marched to the accompaniment of rousing music. Their path was marked by small mounds of earth. At sunset prayer was said in common, ending with a petition for the welfare of the Sultan and shouts of Allah ! Belgrade was reached in the first days of May. Here the army paused to wait for the troops from Asia, Moldavia and Walachia. The Sultan, who was accompanied by his entire harem, remained at Belgrade where he handed to Kara Mustafa the green banner of the prophet in token of his appointment as commander-in-chief.¹ Another pause was made at Esseg. The imperial ambassador, Count Caprara, was told that his sovereign had broken the peace by erecting fortifications on the territory of the Sultan, the most powerful of all the Kings of the earth, whose sword, by the will of God, cast its shadow across the whole world.² Caprara was first taken to Ofen, whilst the imperial Resident Kunitz was detained as a prisoner with the army ; he nevertheless managed to forward valuable information to the imperialists.³

¹ HAMMER, III., 730 *seq.*

² RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, I., *Urk.*, 6 ; KLOPP, *Das Jahr 1683*, p. 191.

³ REDLICH, 214 *seq.*

Caprara reckoned the total strength of the Turks at 160,000 men, not counting the immense train.¹

To this enormous force the Emperor could only oppose at first 30,000 men,² under the command of his brother-in-law, Duke Charles of Lorraine.³ In view of the Turks' superior strength it became necessary to abandon the offensive which had been planned at first, but soon even the defensive became impossible. When Thököly, whose duplicity the imperial party had failed to discover up to the very last moment,⁴ openly went over to the enemy, all hope of cover by means of the Hungarian strong places vanished. When the Turkish hordes, after pushing forward through Stuhlweissenburg, appeared before Raab in the first days of July, the imperial army was in danger of being cut off. Charles of Lorraine decided to retreat: the slow moving infantry and artillery was ordered to cross over to the left bank of the Danube whilst he himself, with his cavalry, made for Vienna in order to cover the capital against a *coup de main*. However, the Turks, who did not stop to invest Raab, followed hot on his heels. On July 7th his rearguard was attacked by the Tartar bands which accompanied the main army near Petronell, not far from the ruins of ancient Carnuntum. Rumour exaggerated the

¹ Rumour enormously exaggerated the strength of the Turkish army when it spoke of a million. Sobieski estimated it at 300,000 but Kara Mustafa gave it as 160,000 (*cf.* VACHON, 751); so also KLOPP, *loc. cit.*, 187, whilst ZINKEISEN still put it at 200,000. REDLICH makes the cautious statement that the Turkish army ended by attaining a strength of 100,000 men. VANCSA (*Gesch. des Stadt Wien*, IV., 137) states that Kara Mustafa set out from Adrianople with 200,000 men but on p. 141 he adopts the estimate of the Imperial Resident Kunitz who stated that the able-bodied troops employed against Vienna cannot have exceeded 90,000.

² REDLICH, 313, 315.

³ On Charles of Lorraine, Governor of Tyrol since 1678, see *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, XV., 302-8; EGGER, *Gesch. Tirols*, II., 460 *seq.*

⁴ REDLICH, 313-14.

misfortune of this encounter with the result that a dreadful panic succeeded to the confidence which had hitherto obtained in Vienna. All who were able to do so took to flight; the Emperor also, who could not run the risk of capture, left the capital together with the court and the ambassadors.¹

On July 8th Kara Mustafa crossed the Raab, stormed Altenburg and Hainburg, whose garrisons he massacred, and set the greater part of the grain stores on fire. Columns of fire illumined the sky far and wide; on every side there was nothing but incendiarism, murder and outrage.²

It was necessary for Kara Mustafa to await the arrival of his siege guns and ammunition, hence the defenders of Vienna were given six precious days which the energetic and intelligent commander-in-chief, Count Ernest Rüdiger von Starhemberg, used to excellent purpose. Only on July 12th did the Turkish vanguard appear in the neighbourhood of Vienna, destroying everything with fire and flame, whereupon Starhemberg decided to sacrifice the suburbs; a sea of flames, which endangered even the city itself, reduced them to ashes on July 13th. On the following day the Turks completed the investment of the ancient imperial city. Starting from the bank of the Danube near St. Max, the line of encirclement extended through Gumpendorf, Ottakring, Hernals, Währing and Döbling as far again as the Danube, near Nussdorf. A forest of 25,000 tents marked the camp from which there now daily rose at sunset the Moslems' terrifying shouts of Allah! On July 16th the imperial cavalry abandoned the untenable position in the Leopoldstadt after setting it on fire, and withdrew to the left bank of the Danube; after that the encirclement of Vienna extended itself to that side also.³ Thus began one of the most memorable sieges of all

¹ VANCSA, 137 *seq.*

² HAMMER, III., 735.

³ VANCSA, 141. *Cf.* Leander Anguissola's plan in KLOPP, 219, and that of Daniel Suttinger, in CAMESINA, in *Berichte des Wiener Allertumvereins*, VIII. (1865), 102.

time.¹ It was a great good fortune for Vienna that the Emperor had just the right men in the right places. The energetic Starhemberg was admirably supplemented by the aged yet youthfully vigorous general of artillery Count Kaspar Zdenko von Kaplirs, who was also a skilled administrator, and the excellent burgomaster John Andrew von Liebenberg. At their side stood the Bishop of Wiener-Neustadt, Leopold Count Kollonitsch who had at one time fought the Turks in Candia as a Knight of Malta. Kollonitsch came to Vienna of his own accord, where by his charity towards the wounded and the orphans, by which he fanned the spirit of the defenders, he won a fame no less lasting than that of the two above-named.²

The 10,000 men whom the Duke of Lorraine had thrown into the town were inadequate for its defence; accordingly Starhemberg called the citizens to arms for the preservation of their lives and liberty. His appeal met with a tremendous response. Burghers, artisans, students, even the domestics of the court, took their share in defending the city by standing on guard and by labouring on the works of defence. All were animated by the one thought: to hold the city at all cost until relief came. The worst mistake in war is to underestimate the opponent. Kara Mustafa committed it, hence the siege was not at once conducted with vigour and only on July 20th did he start mining operations, a work in which the

¹ VANCSA (*Gesch. der Stadt Wien*, IV., 40 seq., 136, n. 1) gives the fullest information on sources and the literature on the subject. For the literature on the jubilee of 1883, cf. also UHLIRZ, in *Mitteil. des Instituts für österr. Geschichtschreibung*, V., 326 seqq., and HELFERT, in *Abhandl. der böhm. Gesellschaft der Wissensch.* 1884. The most recent account of the special literature published since then in REDLICH, 319 seqq. A Turkish source, the little known diary of Alex. Maurokordatos, Grand Dragoman of the Porte, has been recently discussed by O. BRUNNER in *Mitteil. des Vereins für Gesch. des Stadt Wien*, V. (1925).

² For Starhemberg see the monograph by Count THÜRHEIM, Wien, 1882; for Kaplirs, REDLICH, 318; for Liebenberg, VACSA, IV., 139, and the special writings quoted there; for Kollonitsch, the biography by MAURER, Innsbruck, 1888.

Turks excelled.¹ To this mistake the Grand Vizier added another and one no less fatal. Misled by an engineer whom he held in high esteem, one Ahmed Bey, an apostate Capuchin² who, by order of Thököly, had made a plan of the fortifications of Vienna in 1682, he directed his main attack against the Burg bastion and that of Löwel and the ravelin between them, which constituted the strongest point of the fortifications. Hence the first assaults failed completely.³ With incomprehensible blindness Kara Mustafa nevertheless obstinately persevered in this strategic blunder. After a series of bloody combats, in the course of which the Turks discharged a hurricane of projectiles and poisoned arrows against the besieged, they at length succeeded, on August 3rd, in penetrating into the counterscarp in front of the Burg ravelin and on August 12th they established themselves in the city moat in front of the ravelin. The situation of the garrison was rendered still more critical by the intervention of yet another foe when the summer heat caused an outbreak of dysentery. However, Starhemberg, though wounded as early as July 15th, did not lose heart. On August 3rd, through a cunning native of Raiz of the name of Kolttschitzky, who managed to slip through the Turkish lines in disguise, he sent the following message to the Duke of Lorraine: "Up till now we have disputed the ground to the enemy foot by foot and he has not won an inch of it without leaving his skin there, and however often he came up to the assault, he was thrown back by our troops with such losses that he no longer dare put his head out of his den. My men have no fear of the Turks; thirty or forty of them are always prepared to take on a hundred Moslems."⁴ However, as time went on, the situation changed to the disadvantage of the besieged. On August 27th Starhemberg was obliged to send this message

¹ KLOPP, 230.

² *Ibid.*, 221, 540, 542.

³ The Burg ravelin was on the spot now occupied by the *Volksgarten*.

⁴ KLOPP, 233 *seq.*

to the Duke of Lorraine by another daring messenger: "It is time to come to our aid; we lose many officers and men, more by dysentery than by the fire of the enemy; sixty persons die daily. We have no more grenades which were our best means of defence; our guns have either been rendered useless by the enemy or their tubes are worn out." In a postscript Starhemberg added: "This very moment my miners tell me that they can hear the enemy working underneath them, that is, under the Burg bastion. Consequently, my lord, there is no time to lose."¹ Kaplirs made a similar report at this same moment, and he concluded: "The danger is greater than may be said on paper."² Rockets were now fired nightly from the tower of St. Stephen's as signals of extreme distress. In the night of September 2nd to 3rd the blood-soaked ravelin—"the rock defended by all the sorceries of the Christians," as Kara Mustafa described it, had at length to be evacuated. On September 4th the explosion of a formidable mine made a breach of 10 metres in the flank of the Burg bastion. Once again the defenders succeeded both here and at the Löwel bastion in repelling the furious onslaughts of the Turks. Nevertheless the city could not hold out much longer. One half of the garrison and a third of the armed citizens had fallen in the bitter struggle or succumbed to disease, and munitions and provisions were almost exhausted.³ At last, in the night of September 10th to 11th, five rockets went up from the summit of the Kahlenberg—a signal that the army of relief was at hand.

After beating back Thököly's troops on July 29th and August 7th, Duke Charles of Lorraine had marched up the Danube for the purpose of effecting a junction with the relief forces which were expected from the Empire and from Poland. These, however, advanced but slowly. The first to arrive were 11,000 Bavarians under the command of Freiherr von Degenfeld who reached Krems about the middle

¹ *Ibid.*, 240.

² *Ibid.*, 241.

³ On the ravages of dysentery cf. BOJANI, III., 747.

of August, but the arrival of the troops from the Circle of Franconia and the Upper Rhine, of the Saxons under John George III., and that of the Poles had still to be waited for. The Duke was nevertheless resolved, even if this help did not come, to deliver Vienna single-handed "or to perish in the attempt".¹ Both the Duke and the Emperor sought to hasten the march of the Poles by every possible means.² The latter, only 26,000 strong instead of 40,000, as had been stipulated in the treaty,³ only crossed the Silesian frontier on August 22nd.

Sobieski hastened ahead of his troops and on August 31st he and Charles of Lorraine met at Oberhollabrunn. The meeting of the two men, who had at one time disputed each other the crown of Poland, was a painful one, but the Duke succeeded in compelling the respect, nay even the admiration of his former rival and in inducing him to approve his plan of attacking the Turks through the Wiener Wald. Another problem was less easily settled: the ambitious Sobieski claimed for himself the supreme command of the combined Christian army. Leopold I. had at first intended to be present at the decisive battle, but he eventually gave up the idea, partly at the instigation of the Capuchin Marco d'Aviano who had been sent to him by Innocent XI. The further difficulty, that of the subordination of all the German auxiliary troops to the Polish King, an arrangement particularly desired by the vanity of Maria Casimira, Sobieski's consort,⁴ was solved by the prudence of Charles of Lorraine who divided the whole of the army into a series of independent commands.⁵ Thus on September 9th the army of relief,

¹ See General Taaffe's letter of August 17, 1683, in V. U. RENNER, *Wien im Jahre 1683*, Vienna, 1883, 409.

² THEIN, 91; DU HAMEL, VIII., 219.

³ DU HAMEL, VIII., 231.

⁴ THEIN, 92 *seq.*

⁵ VANCSA, IV., 150; KLOPP, 292 *seq.*, 295 *seq.*; REDLICH, 326; DU HAMEL, VIII., 224 *seqq.*

70,000 strong¹ and nominally under the supreme command of Sobieski, was able to begin its forward march towards Vienna. The nature of the ground and the bad weather greatly impeded its progress. However, on the evening of September 11th the Christian army occupied the heights of Kahlenberg which the blinded and badly informed Kara Mustafa² had failed to fortify. The firing of guns announced to the hard pressed imperial city that its salvation was at hand. "From the mountain in view of Vienna," Marco d'Aviano headed a letter to Leopold I. in which he comforted him by assuring him that the greatest concord reigned among the Christian generals and princes. This harmony would in all probability have been destroyed should the Emperor have arrived without a previous ordering of the ceremonial. "The Duke of Lorraine neither eats nor sleeps; he visits the outposts in person and carries out to perfection the duties of a good general. The army is in excellent condition. To-morrow, God willing, we attack."³

On September 12th, a Sunday, Marco d'Aviano said Mass before sunrise in the Camaldolese monastery on the Josephsberg,⁴ Sobieski acting as acolyte. Afterwards the famous preacher took his stand at a point from where he could be seen from a great distance. There, in the sight of all, holding a crucifix in his hands, he prayed for victory over the Crescent.⁵

¹ RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, I., 31, and particularly *Das Kriegsjahr 1683 nach Akten dargestellt*, in *Abteil. für Kriegsgesch. des K. K. Kriegsarchivs*, Wien 1883, 232 seqq.

² DU HAMEL, VIII., 233 seq.; G. GUILLOT, in *Rev. d'hist. dipl.*, XXV. (1911), 528.

³ Text in KLOPP, 532, and again in his edition of *Corrisp. epist. tra Leopoldo I. e P. Marco d'Aviano*, 29; facsimile in RENNER, 420.

⁴ RENNER, 428 note; VANCSA, IV., 151 note.

⁵ See the report in KLOPP, 308, n. 2. For Marco d'Aviano (*ob.* 1699 at Vienna), who displayed a most extensive activity as a popular preacher in Italy, Germany, France and the Low Countries, and who was in close touch with Leopold I., especially where the Turkish question was concerned, *cf.* in addition to his

The day before the weather had been rainy, but now a bright, sunny autumn day broke upon the world; this greatly favoured the attack by the Christian host. An even greater advantage lay in the fact that Kara Mustafa had left the greater part of his picked troops, the Janissaries, before Vienna. He himself assumed the supreme command. His right wing was based on the Nussberg whilst the left was pushed forward as far as Dornbach.¹

The imperialists under the Duke of Lorraine together with the Saxons, who formed the left wing of the army of relief, were the first to establish contact with the enemy who offered an obstinate resistance, so that the Nussberg was only stormed towards midday. About this time the centre of the army of relief, consisting of troops from the Empire and of Bavarians, had also made a victorious advance. But in consequence of the right wing, consisting of the Poles, who had to go over the longest and most difficult road, not having arrived by then, the battle came to a standstill. At 2 o'clock the Poles attacked at Dornbach; they were, however, unable to break through the dense Turkish masses and had to be supported by German troops. The struggle entered a decisive phase when Charles of Lorraine rolled up the right wing of the Turks towards their centre. After a great cavalry attack by Kara Mustafa at Breitensee and Hernals had broken down before the stout resistance of the Poles, the enemy began, at 4 o'clock, a retreat which soon became a general stampede, in the

correspondence published by KLOPP (see p. 175, n. 3), the monographs of FEDELE DA ZARA (2 vols., Venezia, 1798), and REMBRY (Bruxelles, 1884); also HEYRET, *M. d'Aviano* (Munich, 1900); STOCK (Brixen, 1899), *Hist. polit. Blätter*, CII., 176 seqq., 287 seqq., 553 seqq. Cf. *Allg. Literaturblatt der Leo-Gesellschaft*, 1899, 452.

¹ Among recent writers VANCSA (IV., 152 seq.) and REDLICH (329 seq.) give the best and most comprehensive accounts of the battle. For the Bavarians' part see RIEZLER, VII., 278 seq. Cf. JOCHNER, for the part taken by the Circle of Franconia in the liberation of Vienna in 1683, in *Hist. Verein für Bamberg*, XLVII.

direction of the Hungarian frontier. Kara Mustafa as well as the Janissaries in the trenches joined the fugitives.

The field of battle was strewn with the corpses of 10,000 Turks whilst the losses of the Christian army amounted to nearly 2,000 men.¹ The victors' booty, of which the Poles appropriated the greater part, was enormous: 117 pieces of cannon, 15,000 tents, including the sumptuous tent of the Grand Vizier, 10,000 oxen, buffaloes and camels and as many sheep, 600 bags of piastres, many banners and an extraordinary amount of war material. "I have not yet seen the whole of the booty," Sobieski wrote to his consort, "but there is no comparison with what we saw at Chocim. It is impossible to describe the luxury of the tents of the Grand Vizier: there were baths, gardens, fountains, rabbit hutches and even a parrot. The best pieces of my booty are a diamond girdle, two diamond-studded clocks, five quivers adorned with sapphires, rubies and pearls, carpets and the most magnificent sables in the world."² The fairest booty was, however, 500 Christian children left behind by the Turks—the prisoners fit to bear arms had been massacred before the battle by Kara Mustafa's orders—of whom Bishop Kollonitsch undertook the care, thereby earning for himself the glorious surname of "Guardian in chief of the orphans". The Bishop likewise provided for destitute old men and women.³

For the rest the relief had come in the nick of time. "The town could not have held out for another five days," Sobieski wrote; "the imperial castle is riddled with bullets, the undermined and partly ruined bastions present an appalling

¹ HAMMER, IV., 746, and REDLICH, 331. The numbers given by Contarini (KLOPP, 312): 8,000 Turks and 500 Christians are surely too low. According to Sébeville's account in VACHON, 765 *seq.*, only 6,000 Turks fell.

² A writing table inlaid with ivory which Innocent XI. sent to Sobieski after the relief of Vienna, is now in the castle of Willanow, where Sobieski's death chamber has been turned into a chapel. A portable altar which Sobieski had with him at the deliverance of Vienna is preserved in the treasure of Czenstochau.

³ KLOPP, 236, 314-15.

sight; they are no better than huge heaps of stones. All the troops have done their duty in spirited fashion. All ascribe the victory to God and to me.”¹

As a matter of fact Sobieski was eager to gather all the laurels of victory for himself. Accordingly, on September 13th, even before the Emperor, he made his solemn entry into Vienna, an act to which the noble Leopold I. submitted in silence.² But however highly one must needs rate Sobieski's merit, it was not he alone who preserved from oriental barbarism the city of Vienna, the bulwark and the eastern corner stone of Europe's Christian civilization. The honour of having won this splendid victory over the Crescent belongs not only to the Poles, but likewise to the Austrians, Saxons, Bavarians, Swabians and to their leaders.³ But that which

¹ See KLUCZYCKI, *Acta Joannis*, III., n. 236. In his *letter to Cardinal Cibo, dated Vienna, September 14, 1683, Sobieski also speaks as if the victory were exclusively due to himself whereas in a subsequent letter, dated November 30, 1683, he attributes everything to Innocent XI.'s money (both letters are in the State Archives at Massa; see L. MUSSI, in *Corriere d'Italia*, June 14, 1924). In his letter of November 16, 1683, to Cibo, Buonvisi observes that Sobieski's claim for all the credit of the victory was contradicted by the fact that his troops began to give ground so that the Germans had to go to their support (BOJANI, III., 787).

² See Buonvisi's report of November 16, 1683, in SAUER, *Rom und Wien in Jahre 1683*, Vienna, 1883, 160.

³ Thus KLOPP, 323 *seq.*; NEWALD, *Beiträge zur Gesch. der Belagerung von Wien*, II., Vienna, 1883, 114 *seq.*; WEISS, *Weltgesch.*, X., 562; REDLICH, 333. DU HAMEL (VIII., 244 *seqq.*) points out that not only the imperial generals, but the Venetian ambassador and even Sobieski's chamberlains were of opinion that the Poles' intervention in the battle had been neither definite nor important. HANISCH (*Gesch. Polens*, 236), nevertheless, describes Sobieski's intervention as decisive. ZIVIER (*Gesch. Polens*, 207) says that Sobieski did not obtain the victory single-handed, but that it was unlikely that it would have been won without him. Whilst the merits of the Polish king are thus diversely appreciated, the historians of all parties and nations

alone rendered possible so momentous an event in the history of the world was the magnanimous co-operation of the Pope.

(2.)

Whilst doing all that was humanly possible, Innocent XI. did not neglect to commend the weighty cause to the Ruler of all destinies. In his extreme anxiety he besought God day and night, and ordered public prayers¹ and asked for the prayers of all the monasteries.² Since July Rome had been in a state of the greatest excitement, which was further increased by the conflicting nature of the rumours of the progress of the Turks.³ "Vienna," Queen Christine wrote, "can only be saved by a miracle like that of the Red Sea. If it is lost, who will be able to withstand the conqueror?"⁴ On August 11th, 1683, the Pope proclaimed a universal jubilee in order that God might bless the combined arms of the Emperor, the King of Poland and the other Christian princes as well as his own exertions, and grant courage and strength to the brave defenders of Vienna and concord to the Christian rulers.⁵ At a consistory of August 16th the alliance between Leopold I. and Sobieski was proclaimed and sworn to by Cardinal Pio in the name of the Emperor,

are unanimous as to the great part played by Innocent XI. in the turn of the world's history which the relief of Vienna implies. "Without the Pope's help," IMMICH writes (*Innocenz XI.*, 33), "the relief of Vienna is almost unthinkable." Historians of the most diverse tendencies are of the same opinion, thus recently G. GUILLOT, in *Rev. d'hist. dipl.*, XXV. (1911), 423.

¹ See BERNINO, 63 *seq.*; LANCELOTTI, 56.

² **Avviso* of October 9, 1683, Vat. Lib.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of July 24 ("Confusa resta questa corte e la città tutta delle nuove circa li progressi de' Turchi"), and at the beginning of August, 1683 ("confusa resta questa città per l'assedio di Vienna, non meno per la diversità delle nuove"), Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome.

⁴ GRAUERT, II., 277.

⁵ *Bull.*, XIX., 501 *seq.* Cf. BOJANI, III., 731.

and by Cardinal Barberini in the name of the King of Poland.¹ On August 18th a great jubilee procession, in which many Cardinals and crowds of Romans took part, went from the Minerva to the German national church of the Anima where Cardinal Ludovisi, in lieu of the Pope who was suffering from gout, carried out the sacred functions usual on such occasions in presence of the Blessed Sacrament exposed.² As reports of the investment of Vienna grew in gravity, the Pope ordered, on September 3rd, that the Blessed Sacrament should be exposed for three days at St. Peter's, St. Mary Major, the Lateran, the Anima and the German College, in order that the faithful might pray for the deliverance of the imperial city. Many people flocked to these devout exercises.³ On September 11th Cardinal Pio wrote to the Emperor Leopold that he had nothing new to report from Rome for attention was wholly concentrated on the siege of Vienna.⁴ It was during this time of anxious tension that the Pope observed in a tone of absolute confidence, whilst pointing to the crucifix: "This Lord will protect us."⁵ On September 11th he wrote to Sobieski that he prayed day and night for the triumph of the Christian arms.⁶

A premature report of the relief of Vienna, which came

¹ **Acta consist.*, Barb. 2896, Vat. Lib. Cf. Cardinal Barberini's letter in SAUER, 41, and above, p. 151.

² See *Diarium Balduini*, in SAUER, 35 seq.; *ibid.*, 42, Card. Barberini's letter; also the **Avvisi Marescotti* of August 14 and 21, 1683 (*loc. cit.*), used by SCHMIDLIN (*Anima*, 466), and the accounts in LANCELOTTI, 58.

³ SAUER, 55; LANCELOTTI, 58 seq.; cf. **Avviso Marescotti* of September 4, 1683, *loc. cit.*

⁴ " *Nuove di Roma non possono di qui sperarsi mentre tutti stanno attenti al grand'affare di Vienna, standosi o nelle chiese per un felice successo o alle poste per saper se sian giunte nuove buone. Il pontefice più di tutti è fervido e nell'orare e nel promuovere le divotioni e nel bramare le buone nuove." State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ BERNINO, *loc. cit.*

⁶ SAUER, 57.

from Ragusa by way of Venice as early as September 17th,¹ caused a veritable explosion of joy.² Complete certainty, however, was only obtained a week later on the evening of the 22nd with the arrival of a courier from the nuncio in Vienna and another from the Cardinal legate of Ferrara who sent identical reports of the deliverance of Vienna and the flight of the Turkish hosts. Further reports confirmed the event on the 23rd,³ when delight no longer knew any bounds ; not within memory of man had such an explosion of joy been witnessed.⁴ Such had been the Pope's anxiety that he hardly slept during the nights immediately preceding. On the arrival of the courier he fell on his knees to give thanks to God, and exhorted his entourage to do in like manner.⁵ On September 24th the Cardinal Vicar published a decree ordering all the bells to be rung for one hour after the evening *Angelus* on the two days following and services of thanksgiving to be held in all the churches of the city.⁶ At nightfall all Rome was illuminated and the people raised enthusiastic cries of : " Long live the Pope, the Emperor and the King of Poland ! " whilst it made play with dummy figures representing the Grand Vizier.⁷ The Pope ordered the façade

¹ *Ibid.*, 56.

² BOJANI, III., 755.

³ LANCELOTTI, 63.

⁴ See *Theatr. Europ.*, XII., 609 ; LIPPI, 157.

⁵ **Avviso Marescotti* of September 25, 1683, *loc. cit.*

⁶ LANCELOTTI, 63 *seq.*

⁷ " *Per Roma non si vidde altro tutta la notte [of Saturday] che varie truppe di diversi quarti, che conducevano in trionfo il Gran Visir, chi sopra l'asinello, chi entro una gabbia, e chi in una foggia, e chi in un'altra, tirando seco tutto il popolo. In Campo Vaccino havendo quella gente di Campagna, che colà dimora, fatto una simil assemblea, nella quale giustitiavano il Gran Visir, li sbirri di Campidoglio vedendo il grandissimo fracasso et baccano, che si faceva, accorsivi per reprimer la troppa licenza, furon da quei villani bastonati, il che diede motivo a questo cardinale governatore di prohibir in avvenire simil radunanze e spettacoli." *Avviso Marescotti*, October 2, 1683, *loc. cit.*

and the dome of St. Peter's to be illuminated and salvoes to be fired from St. Angelo.¹ On the 25th, in presence of the entire Sacred College, a solemn *Te Deum* was sung at St. Mary Major and on the 26th he ordered Requiem Masses to be said in all the churches of Rome for the souls of the fallen²; on the 27th he commented on the historic event at a secret consistory. He ascribed the triumph to God alone, and on this occasion he imposed a tenth on the Italian clergy for a period of six years.³ On the 29th, during Mass at the Quirinal

¹ LANCELOTTI, 64.

² *Ibid.*, 65 seq.

³ The text of the address was as follows: “*Quantas misericordias his diebus proxime elapsis fecerit nobiscum Deus exercituum, Vobis iam notum esse non dubitamus, eas tamen assidue commemorare memores gratique debemus; par siquidem est, ut scribantur haec in generatione altera, et ut narrent populi mirabilia virtutis atque potentiae, quam Dominus ostendit nobis. Arcta obsidione liberata est Vienna, sedes imperii, post fustum fugatumque exercitum ac disiectas copias illas immanissimorum hostium, quae rabido furore florentissimas provincias antea vastaverant; et redemptionem misit populo suo. Agnoscamus itaque et confiteamur opus dexteræ Excelsi, qui fecit virtutem magnam in Israel et exaudivit voces clamantium ad se; etenim carissimum in Christo filium Leopoldum imperatorem electum totumque Romanum imperium ac urbem Viennam trepidantem erexit carissimus itidem in Christo filius noster Iohannes Poloniae rex, quem bellica virtute inclytum aliosque praeclarissimos principes tantae victoriae comparticipes meritisimis laudibus in dies magis cumulare non cessabimus. Maxime vero Patri misericordiarum ac totius consolationis, qui suscitavit in nos auxilium de sancto, intimo cordis animique sensu sacrificandum est hostiam laudis. Unus enim Ioannes Poloniae rex pro mirifica sua in catholicam religionem universamque christianam rempublicam pietate zeloque occurrit, et ad suam gloriam propagandam etiam primum vexillum, quod ipse manu sua e tabernaculo supremi hostium ductoris abstraxit, ad Nos misit. Iam vero tantam tamque feliciter oblatam conficiendi belli opportunitatem ipsi ne dimittamus, instandum victoriae est, ut quos hostis obstrinxit, captivitatis vinculis eximamus.

in presence of all the ambassadors, Innocent XI. received from the hands of Sobieski's representative, the priest Dönhoff, who had arrived on the 25th, the large banner of the Turks which was afterwards taken to St. Peter's where it was hung up, as a token of triumph, over the main portal.¹ A copious distribution of alms to the poor and an amnesty for

Profecto principes urgere non dimittemus eosque prosequi gratiis non defuerimus, quamvis angustiae sint maximae. Verum tam praeclara gesta animarunt Nos ad decimarum impositionem, Vos ab eis eximentes cum paucis aliquibus aliis, iuxta Bullam quam promulgabimus. Quod reliquum est, omnis spes et fiducia nostra in Deo est; ipse enim, non manus nostra, fecit haec omnia; proinde sincero cordis affectu convertamus nos ad Dominum Deum nostrum, ut mereamur eius semper protectione defendi ab inimicis nostris in angustiis et tribulationibus (Acta consist., *Barb.* 2896, Vat. Lib.). The Bull on the tenth is in *Bull.*, XIX., 508 *seq.* It met with opposition in Naples, Sicily and Milan; *cf.* MICHAUD, II., 92. Spain refused to allow the tenth to be levied in its Italian possessions; see *ibid.*

¹ BERNINO, 91; LANCELOTTI, 69, 70 *seq.*, with *picture and explanation of the banner after a contemporary engraving; also in SAUER, 90 *seqq.* The Brief of thanks to Sobieski in BERTHIER, II., 134 *seq.* In Rome it was thought that the banner was that of the prophet which had been handed to Kara Mustafa (*cf.* *a letter of Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I., dated October 2, 1683, State Archives, Vienna; *cf.* Buonvisi's letter in SAUER, 93 *seq.* *Ibid.*, 212, Sobieski's letter); however, that precious object was saved by the bravery of the Tartar Hadji of Geroj; *cf.* ÜBERSBERGER, I., 36 *seq.* Sébeville promptly reported the fact to Louis XIV.; *cf.* VACHON, 768. The sensation caused by the arrival of the banner in Rome is attested by the rich contemporary literature, for which see VANCSA, IV., 44 *seq.* The first interpretations of the Arab inscriptions on the banner were published by the Pope's confessor, Marracci; *cf.* **Avviso Marescotti* of October 16, 1683, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome. Subsequently this valuable booty was unfortunately carried away by the French and is now lost. Three banners presented by Sobieski's wife to the church of S. Maria della Vittoria are still preserved; see LANCELOTTI, 73 *seq.*

minor civil offences,¹ a further ringing of bells and firing of guns and the celebration of special services on October 1st at the Quirinal, on the 10th at the Anima and on the 17th at S. Stanislao dei Polacchi,² concluded the festivities which were likewise celebrated in most of the Italian cities.³

The universal recognition of the great, nay the decisive, share of Innocent XI. in the deliverance of Vienna was painful to that most humble Pontiff. If someone alluded to his great work he would turn the conversation to the achievements of others and ascribe all the honour to Almighty God.⁴ "Thy right hand, O Lord, hath slain the enemy" is the legend of the medals he ordered to be struck for a perpetual remembrance of the event,⁵ and in thanksgiving for the help of the Mother of God he subsequently established for the whole Church the feast of the Name of Mary on the Sunday within the Octave of her Nativity.⁶ Like Pius V., he looked on the powerful advocate of Christians as the author of the great victory and, now as then, the historic event was celebrated in verse and prose. Among the poems the outstanding one is the popular epic *Meo Patacca* by the Roman Giuseppe Berneri and among the panegyrics, that of the great popular preacher of Vienna, Abraham a Sancta Clara, beginning with the words: "Up, up, Christians!"⁷

¹ See LANCELOTTI'S *letter to Card. Carlo Pio, October 2, 1683, State Archives, Vienna.

² LANCELOTTI, 74; SCHMIDLIN, 467.

³ Besides LANCELOTTI, 64 *seq.*, *cf.* SAUER, 83, 85 *seq.*; CONTI, *Firenze*, 74 *seq.*

⁴ LIPPI, 157 *seq.*

⁵ "Dextera tua, Domine, percussit inimicum" (*Exod.*, XV., 6). See LANCELOTTI, 81, where, however, it is erroneously stated that Pius V. had had the same text engraved on his commemorative medals; *cf.* our data, XVIII., 443.

⁶ LANCELOTTI, 88; *cf.* below, pp. 209, 227.

⁷ The number of poems dedicated to the Pope, so we read in an **Avviso Marescotti* of October 30, 1683 (*loc. cit.*), was so great that the Pope wearied of them and passed them all on to his nephew Livio. Italian *sonnets in honour of Innocent XI.,

To what extent Innocent XI. had been the real soul of the enterprise against the hereditary enemy, the Turks, appears from the letters of congratulation which reached him from the most diverse quarters.¹ In eloquent Briefs of September 25th he acknowledged the reports of Sobieski and Leopold I. on their splendid triumph and to generous praise he added an exhortation to exploit it until the enemy should be utterly destroyed.² Charles of Lorraine, Rüdiger von Starhemberg and the Elector of Bavaria also received Briefs, dated September 25th, urging them on to fresh warlike undertakings.³ To the Banus of Croatia, Count Nicolas Erdödy, he sent 25,000 florins on the same day in order to induce him to attack Kanizsa.⁴

The vastness of the plans cherished by the Pope in the first days of October may be gathered from a report of the Duc D'Estrées to Louis XIV. of an audience granted to him about this time. The Pope, who still believed in the Catholic sentiments of the Most Christian King, said that "Poland should continue the fight in its own territory, the Emperor in Hungary, Venice in Crete whilst Louis XIV. fought at sea, with a view to adorning his head with the imperial crown of

Sobieski and Charles of Lorraine on the occasion of the relief of Vienna are in *Cod.* 10427 of the British Museum. On the printed sheets, poems and sermons in the most diverse languages, cf. besides H. KABDEBO, *Bibliographie zur Gesch. der beiden Türkenbelagerungen Wiens*, Vienna, 1876, also VANCSA, IV., 42 seq.; LANCELOTI, 91 seq.; BERNHARDY, 74. For a "celebre canzone", by Filicaja, see PALMIERI, in *Spicilegio Vaticano*, I., 579. Much is yet unpublished, *ex. gr.*, the collection of Italian poems in *Cod. C.*, CCVIII., II., 27 and C., CCLX., of the *Bibl. Marucelliana* at Florence. One curiosity is preserved in the Azzolini Archives, Rome.

¹ SAUER, 74, 87; BERTHIER, II., 135-8, 139.

² SAUER, 74 seq., 84 seq. For the date of Sobieski's letter to Innocent XI., which was only added later on, see STEMPFLE, in *Miscell. di storia eccl.*, V. (1907), n. 5-6.

³ SAUER, 77-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 80. Cf. THEIN, III seq.

the East after the conquest of Constantinople". To this aim he had already alluded in a conversation with Cardinal D'Estrées in July 1682.¹

The desire of winning over the ambitious King of France for a crusade against the Mohammedans appears also in the plan for the partition of the Turkish Empire which Innocent XI. unfolded towards the end of November: the Emperor was to have the whole of Hungary, the Poles Moldavia and Walachia, Venice Slavonia, Turkish Croatia, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Albania and Epirus; France's share was to be Thrace, with Constantinople and Adrianople, Bulgaria, Serbia, Macedonia, Morea, Achaia and the Archipelago. Transilvania and the Banat were conceived as buffer States between Austria and France which would only be contiguous through Serbia, the passage of which was difficult owing to the mountains and forests. France might also subject Egypt and Syria, when the Duke of Anjou (the future Philip V.) might be made Emperor of the East.² This shows how much the struggle with the traditional enemy of the Christian name was more than ever the centre of all the Pope's thoughts and plans.³

The realization of these ambitious schemes was, of course, a very distant eventuality, but the confident expectation of further successes to which Innocent XI. refers in a second Brief to the Emperor,⁴ dated October 2nd, was not falsified. Though the Saxons had started for home already on September 15th and the troops from the Empire had followed soon after, the imperialists under Charles of Lorraine and the Poles under Sobieski, had gone in pursuit of the enemy. However,

¹ See the report of the Duke D'Estrées, October 5, 1683, in GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXXIX. (1886), 190, and that of Card. D'Estrées of July 12, 1683, *ibid.*, 123 seq.

² Report of November 28, 1683, in MICHAUD, II., 92.

³ " *S. Stà, che non medita altro che la destruttione de' Turchi e la dilatione della fede cattolica, pensa d'armare 12^m huomini italiani. Armerà anco sei galere." Meanwhile he urges prayer for an important decision. *Avviso Marescotti* of October 30, 1683, *loc. cit.*

⁴ SAUER, 84.

on October 7th, Sobieski, who recklessly hurried ahead with his horsemen, suffered a defeat near Párkány in which he only escaped death as by a miracle. However, this set back was made good two days later by the brilliant victory of the imperialists and the Poles over the Pasha of Ofen, on the same field. It was now possible to begin the siege of Gran which had been in the hands of the Turks since 1605. The lower town was stormed on October 25th and the citadel capitulated on the 27th.¹ Great was the Pope's joy now that the cathedral church of Hungary's primate was again restored to Catholic worship after having served so long as a mosque. When the Pope heard the news, we read, he spent two whole hours in thanksgiving, after which he said Mass with a devotion that profoundly affected all the assistants.² "There is nothing he desires more ardently than fresh Turkish defeats," we read in a report from Rome under date of November 20th, 1683.³ The Morlacs and the Albanians of Dalmatia and Herzegovina also rose at this time in order to shake off the Turkish yoke, whilst the dethroned Gospodar of Moldavia and Walachia, Stephen Petriceicu, made preparations for the reconquest of his kingdom, towards which Innocent XI. granted him pecuniary help.⁴

However, Innocent XI.'s joy at these successes was not without alloy because of the ever present anxiety for the permanence of the alliance between the Emperor and Poland. Immediately after the relief of Vienna certain petty susceptibilities on the part of the Emperor and Sobieski had given rise to misunderstandings and bickerings which the nuncio in Vienna, Buonvisi, strove zealously and successfully

¹ RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, I., 66 *seq.* ; HAMMER, III., 752 *seq.* ; ZINKEISEN, V., 110 *seq.* Cf. the Briefs in SAUER, 86, 89, 92, 96, 97, 100, 103, and BERTHIER, II., 147 *seq.*

² **Avviso Marescotti* of November 13, 1683, *loc. cit.* ; *ibid.*, for the congratulations of Queen Christine who was served with a "lautissima collatione".

³ **Avviso Marescotti* of November 20, 1683, *loc. cit.*

⁴ SAUER, 101 ; THEIN, 112 *seq.*

to appease.¹ But both he and his colleague, Pallavicini, found it far more difficult to ease the tension at Warsaw, caused by the ambitious Queen of Poland who cherished the fantastic plan of obtaining the royal crown of Hungary for her son James, with the help of Thököly. Pallavicini succeeded in dissuading the Queen from the pursuit of such a project.² On the other hand, Buonvisi and Pallavicini were faced with an even more arduous and thorny task when they undertook to appease the mutual resentment of the King of Poland and Leopold, due to the former's *rapprochement* with Thököly. Anxiety in Rome was all the greater as Poland favoured a compromise with Thököly which was to include religious concessions, and these were advocated even by Buonvisi.³ With regard to Thököly, Innocent XI. was, on the whole, on the Emperor's side. Since the rebels were not only allied with the Moslems, but had been responsible, in the first instance, for the latter's attack on Vienna, the Pope took the standpoint that war against the Turks also meant war against Thököly.⁴

The danger to which the preservation of the Polish-Imperial alliance was exposed was substantially increased by the plans of Louis XIV. who sought to harness Poland to his own political chariot whilst he persisted in his opposition to the Emperor. Deaf to every exhortation on the part of the Pope,⁵ Louis had watched Vienna's peril with satisfaction for he now hoped to secure the Emperor's renunciation to the "reunited possessions" as well as to Strasburg.⁶ At the very moment when the Turks drew near to the imperial city, he ordered his troops to advance into the Spanish Netherlands. When joy over the defeat of the traditional enemy filled all Europe

¹ FRAKNÓI, *Innocenz*, XI., 79.

² THEIN, 119 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 122 *seq.*, 127 *seq.*

⁴ SAUER, 164.

⁵ On Ranuzzi's mission in August, see Ch. V.

⁶ THEIN, 80 *seq.*, who agrees with the opinion of IMMICH (p. 28) and the researches of KÖHLER (p. 99) that this was the real aim of the hypocritical policy of Louis XIV.

he could not escape the duty of congratulating the Paris nuncio.¹ It was, however, a mere formality for the truth was that the Emperor's victory annoyed him greatly, for not only were his plans for the surrender of the "reunions" defeated, but faith in his own Christian sentiments was likewise greatly shaken beyond the French boundaries.² The extent to which public opinion considered him an ally of the Turks was shown by the anti-French manifestations which occurred at Venice and in Rome³; a biting satire described him as "the Most Christian Turk of Versailles".⁴ But what did the *Roi Soleil* care for public opinion! When the Paris nuncio expatiated with the minister, Croissy, on the unfavourable impression which the military proceedings in the Spanish Netherlands were bound to call forth in the rest of the world, Croissy replied: "Let the world say what it likes; the King knows what he is about and he has given the Spaniards plenty of time in which to give him satisfaction."⁵ Fresh remonstrances by the nuncio in the last days of September, to the effect that

¹ See Ranuzzi's report of September 20, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 759 *seq.*

² ROUSSET, *Louvois*, III., 233; GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 143 *seq.*; IMMICH, *Innocenz*, XI., 32. Louis XIV.'s small satisfaction at the relief of Vienna is attested by the Venetian ambassador Girolamo Venier, in BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Francia*, III., 444.

³ On Venice, see GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXXIX., 146; THEIN, 91, 110; for Rome, see RINKH, *Leopold der Grosse*, I., 857 *seq.* Rome's dissatisfaction with France's attitude greatly increased in the sequel. On July 13, 1684, Card. Carlo Pio wrote to Leopold I.: *Fr. Calvo, S.J., France's procurator at the Curia, refuses to hear confessions as before "perchè non si sentivano che bestemmie contro il suo Re, tanto è sdegnato questo popolo per l'impedimento danno le armi francesi alla guerra contro il comun nemico". On August 12, 1684: *The French avoid to appear in public in order not to expose themselves to interference. The Governor fears he can give them no guarantees. State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ Printed by STRAGANZ, *Weltgeschichte*, 392.

⁵ See Ranuzzi's report of 10th [September], 1683, in BOJANI, III., 839.

it ill became so illustrious a King to disturb the peace of the world by war, seeing that he was well able to realize his purpose by peaceful means, were equally barren. Croissy persisted in maintaining that the Emperor was opposed to a compromise of any kind; after the defeat of the Turks he would turn upon France which must accordingly think of her own defence.¹ The Pope nevertheless continued to work for peace,² though in vain. In December Spain decided to meet force with force and declared war against France. The Paris nuncio, Ranuzzi, was now instructed to work at least for an armistice. More insistently than ever he was to represent to Croissy, to Père La Chaise and to the King himself, that so favourable a chance to crush the Turks finally must not be neglected; God Himself wanted the war against the Turks and He would surely inflict the heaviest punishment on those who hindered it. Ranuzzi was to speak with all the force at his command for, as common father, it was the Pope's duty to speak with the utmost freedom to the conscience of rulers in a matter of such importance.³

When, towards the end of December, and notwithstanding the declaration of war, Ranuzzi advocated a compromise,

¹ See Ranuzzi's report of 27th [September], 1683, *ibid.*, 842 *seq.*

² Cibo to Ranuzzi on October 10 and November 2, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 845, 847. See also SAUER, 155 *seq.*

³ “ *La prosperità dell'armi christiane e la depressione di quelle del Turco obliga non meno l'una che l'altra parte a non perdere una così bella congiuntura. Vuole però N. S., che ella dica in nome suo con ogni libertà al Padre La Chaise al sig. di Croissy et al Re medesimo che Dio vuol la guerra contro il Turco, e che manderà gravissimi castighi a tutti quelli che in qualsivoglia modo vi apportheranno impedimento. E S. Stà incarica a lei di parlare in questi precisi termini, perchè sa molto bene, che non si trova il più delle volte chi parli a i principi con la dovuta libertà, la quale conviene principalmente al debito et alla qualità di Padre comune, ch'ella sostiene nella chiesa, massime in un affare di tanta importanza, et in cui si ha dalla Stà sua una così giusta premura ” (Cifra di Cibo a Ranuzzi 1683, December 21, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, p. 18^b, Papal Sec. Arch.).

Croissy told him that the Emperor intended to make peace with the Turks so as to have a free hand against France.¹ There was no question of such a thing, though it is true that, at the instigation of the Spanish ambassador, a certain party in Vienna had counselled such action, but Buonvisi strenuously opposed every attempt of the kind, regardless of the risk of being accused of cherishing French sympathies; he even threatened that the Pope would suspend his subsidies if, for the purpose of assisting Spain, the Emperor were to turn his arms against France.² Innocent unreservedly approved this action, declaring that as the common father of Christendom he could not allow such money to be expended on a war against a Christian ruler.³

At the end of November Buonvisi, to whom the Pope had forwarded 100,000 thalers for armaments, was able to report that Leopold was firmly resolved to continue the war against the Turks.⁴ From Poland also came favourable reports. Though Sobieski had led his troops home in December, he did not think of peace. The struggle against the Turks, he wrote to the Pope from Cracow on January 15th, 1684, was only beginning; with the help of his Holiness he meant to go on with it.⁵ In view of the fact that he now definitely broke

¹ See Ranuzzi's report of December 20, 1683, BOJANI, III., 861.

² Buonvisi's report of October 10, 1683, in FRAKNOÍ, *Innocenz*, XI., 89. Cf. Contarini's reports in KLOPP, 362, n. 2.

³ See D'Estrées' reports of November 21 and December 21, 1683, in MICHAUD, II., 92 *seq.* For the same reason Innocent XI. had already before this declined to participate in an anti-French league of the Italian States proposed by Spain; see IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 22. On the papal subsidies against the Turks, see *Hist. polit. Blätter*, XCVIII., 569 *seqq.*, 673 *seqq.*, 774 *seqq.*

⁴ See Buonvisi's report of November 21, 1683, in KLOPP, 364. According to REDLICH (p. 337) the action of Louis XIV., when at the beginning of November he showed himself not averse to a twenty years' truce with the Emperor and the Empire on the basis of the *status quo*, proved decisive.

⁵ SAUER, 112 *seq.*

with Thököly, the nuncio disbursed for his benefit at the end of January, for equipment for the forthcoming campaign, in addition to various contributions for the Cossacks, the sum of 200,000 florins for the infantry and 100,000 for the cavalry.¹ Accordingly, on February 27th, the King of Poland assured the Pope that he was bent on resuming the war with the Turks as soon as possible. But to enable him to take the field with the newly levied troops already at the beginning of May, he asked for leave to take at least 200,000 imperial thalers out of the tenths as a first war contribution.² Innocent XI. also gave satisfaction to the lively desire of the Polish royal couple for some special mark of honour, a wish that had Pallavicini's support. On March 25th Sobieski received a hat and sword blessed by the Pope, whilst his consort was given the Golden Rose. The same honour was also bestowed on the Empress at this time.³

This extraordinary distinction bestowed on Sobieski was closely connected with the circumstance that just then the Imperial-Polish alliance was reinforced by the accession of Venice and thus expanded into a Holy League.

(3.)

The formidable struggle which the Republic of St. Mark had waged with the Porte for the space of twenty-four years, had swallowed the gigantic sum of 150 million gold ducats.⁴ Small wonder if there was at first but little inclination in the City of the Lagoons to embark once more on so risky an undertaking, in spite of constant friction with the Turks.

¹ See Contarini's report in KLOPP, 337. On the repulse of Thököly, see THEIN, 134, and DU HAMEL, VIII., 263 *seq.*

² THEINER, *Monuments*, 260.

³ SAUER, 114 *seq.*, 187, 188 (*cf.* 151, 156 *seq.*); BERTHIER, II., 167 *seq.* The **Avviso Marescotti* of February 26, 1684 (Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele) estimates the value of the sword at 1,000 scudi; pictures of the decorations in LANCELOTTI, 76.

⁴ This was the sum quoted to the Pope by G. Lando; *cf.* BERNHARDY, 68.

The Pope's exhortations of May 12th and 22nd, 1683, that he should go to the assistance of the Emperor, elicited from the Doge no more than polite assurances of friendly dispositions and the best good wishes.¹ However, when news arrived of the great defeat of the Turks before Vienna, enthusiasm for war against the infidels broke out with such elemental force that a change of feeling could be hoped for.² The further successes in Hungary in the course of the autumn of 1683 also made a deep impression in Venice, though nothing definite was decided.³ Three parties were in opposition: the first, whose chief spokesman was the Senator Valiero, was in favour of joining the Polish-Imperial League; the second, which included the Doge, was willing to assist the Emperor but without coming out into the open; the third, headed by Senator Foscarini, felt that it was necessary to wait for further successes and in particular for a rising of the Christians still groaning under the Turkish yoke.⁴ The Morlacs of Dalmatia, who were still in part under Venice's domination, had already risen; so had the Albanians,⁵ and it was hoped that, with some assistance, the two peoples together would be able to put 30,000 men in the field by the spring.⁶ Reports that reached Venice on this point made the question of a Turkish war a burning one. But it was feared that the Porte might avenge itself and that Venice might forfeit Dalmatia also, in which eventuality the City of the Lagoons would be directly threatened by the Crescent.

¹ See the Briefs in SAUER, 6, 7 *seq.*, and the Doge's reply in THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, III., 686.

² See above, p. 181, and BOJANI, III., 837.

³ *Ibid.*, 851.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 846. The speeches of Foscarini and Valiero in the Senate in CONTARINI, I., 255 *seq.*, which KLOPP (p. 381) considers to have been really delivered, can hardly be authentic as they appear there.

⁵ *Cf.* above, p. 187.

⁶ *Cf.* the letter of Archbp. John Parzagli of Zara, in SAUER, 101 *seq.*

In view of the financial exhaustion of the Republic of St. Mark,¹ it was clearly realized from the first that a naval campaign against the Turks was only possible with the Pope's assistance.² A guarantee from that quarter appeared all the more necessary as the Republic did not entirely trust either the Emperor or the King of Poland. But there was one big obstacle to an alliance with the Holy See, namely the state of acute tension which had long obtained between the Republic and the Papacy.

From the first day of his reign Innocent XI. gave proof of the utmost goodwill towards Venice, but the Republic's representative in Rome, Antonio Barbaro, adopted an extremely arrogant attitude as early as November, 1676. He grossly abused the privileges enjoyed by ambassadors; thus, among other things, he allowed his equerry to open a tobacco shop near the Palazzo di Venezia where the latter did so extensive a trade in smuggled goods as to injure the papal fisc to a considerable extent.³ Barbaro's conduct led to further incidents in another matter to which Innocent XI. attached the greatest importance.

In course of time intolerable abuses had crept in at Rome in the conduct of the ambassadors, inasmuch as they were no longer content with their personal immunity and that of the embassy buildings, but sought to extend their prerogatives (*franchigie*) ever further. Foreign nationals in Rome, as a rule, lived in proximity to the ambassadors under whose protection they were. Thus it came about that the jurisdiction which the ambassadors enjoyed over their palaces and their immediate dependents, was by degrees extended to the neighbouring houses and even to entire streets. For that quarter of the city they claimed the most extravagant privileges, and in particular, exemption from papal jurisdiction. No papal police officer was allowed to enter their quarter in which all manner of disreputable people, even undoubted

¹ BOJANI, III., 758.

² *Ibid.*, 835, 855, 863.

³ *Ibid.*, 425, 433, 477, 479.

criminals, sought an asylum from the arm of justice. To this were added other abuses, especially with regard to customs. Innocent XI. resolved from the outset of his pontificate to put an end to this state of things by circumscribing the franchise of the quarters to the ambassador's palace and the persons actually in his service.¹ Barbaro, however, offered the most obstinate resistance to the papal ordinances,² but his position soon became untenable in consequence of his having repeatedly sent false reports to Venice.³ He was recalled in April 1678, and replaced by Girolamo Zeno. The latter, however, walked in the footsteps of his predecessor in everything; in fact on the plea of the franchise of quarters he arrogated to himself rights that properly belonged to the Pope. Complaints met with no response from Venice.⁴ In the night of July 1st, 1678, whilst Zeno's suite were patrolling the quarter, a scuffle occurred with some papal police officials not far from the church of the Gésu, in which two policemen were hurt.⁵ Though the ambassador expressed his regrets for the incident he nevertheless prevented the punishment of the culprits.⁶ The Pope's protests to Venice were once more ignored and thus things worked up for a rupture. The nuncio took his departure from Venice, leaving his auditor, Luigi Giacobelli, behind. Accordingly, Zeno and the whole personnel of the embassy also left Rome at the beginning of January, 1679.⁷ Repeated attempts at a compromise proved in vain, all the more so as further causes of disagreement arose; the Turkish peril alone led to a *rapprochement*.

Whilst still a Cardinal, Innocent XI. had clearly perceived that without Venice nothing could be done against the Turks⁸; the Queen of the Sea, amid her lagoons, was the only power

¹ *Ibid.*, II., 414 *seq.*, 419 *seq.*, 431 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 454 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 435, 444, 448.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 462, 467.

⁵ DENGEL, *Palazzo di Venezia*, 123; BOJANI, II., 462.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 462.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 474 *seq.*; DENGEL, *loc. cit.*

⁸ BOJANI, III., 435, n. 1.

that could successfully supplement at sea the war on land. However, as until then he had only had fair words and evil deeds from the senate,¹ he left it to Venice to take the first step towards a *rapprochement*. As a matter of fact a change did occur there, and Girolamo Lando, a man who enjoyed the esteem of the Curia, was proposed for the post of ambassador.²

Even before Lando came to Rome the Venetian ambassador at the Emperor's court had ascertained at Linz, at the beginning of December, 1683, through nuncio Buonvisi, that Leopold was prepared to enter into an alliance with Venice against the Turks.³ Lando set out for Rome at the beginning of 1684, but without ambassadorial rank; hence he did not take up residence in the Palazzo di Venezia. This greatly facilitated the settlement of the dispute about the franchise of the quarters which the Pope was determined to abolish.⁴ After the indefatigable Marco d'Aviano had removed the last objections, a majority of votes was cast at Venice on January 22nd, 1684, in favour of an anti-Turkish league. This was soon finally concluded with the Pope's co-operation.⁵ The letter of February 12th, accrediting the Venetian ambassador, Contarini, states that just as the holy zeal of Christ's Vicar on earth had called into being and powerfully promoted the Polish-Imperial alliance of 1683, so would the same zeal also prove the basis of this new alliance.⁶

In his burning zeal against the traditional enemy of Christendom,⁷ Innocent XI. was ready for extreme financial sacrifices; if necessary, he was prepared to suppress several small convents and even a whole Order.⁸ Venice was preparing

¹ *Ibid.*, 850.

² *Ibid.*, 849 *seq.*, 855, 856, 861.

³ KLOPP, 371 *seq.*

⁴ BERNHARDY, 75.

⁵ KLOPP, 381.

⁶ BOJANI, III., 927.

⁷ His programme is outlined in the Brief of December 11, 1683, to Sobieski, BERTHIER, II., 151. Cf. IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 33 *seq.*

⁸ KLOPP, 386.

powerful armaments and in the negotiations at Linz, Contarini showed the greatest keenness as well as full confidence in Buonvisi¹ who exerted himself in every direction on behalf of the great cause. A certain party at court was unwilling to grant to Venice the same conditions as to Poland, namely, that peace would not be concluded without Venice; but Buonvisi obtained that the offer to join the league of offence and defence should be made to the Republic of St. Mark without reservation of any kind.² Buonvisi also energetically assisted the nuncio of Warsaw. Both men did their utmost to prevent any misunderstanding between the Emperor and Sobieski, and to keep the King of Poland in the league notwithstanding fresh underground work on the part of Louis XIV.³

Great was the Pope's satisfaction at the mutual confidence between Buonvisi and Contarini, as well as with Buonvisi's conciliating and pacifying influence on Leopold and Sobieski.⁴ He hoped that these efforts would be crowned with success.⁵ Though the text of the treaty did not commit the Poles to war in Hungary, he was nevertheless of opinion that they would be induced to take part in it if they were met in friendly fashion.⁶ On his part, Buonvisi pointed out that the Pope must not be chary of financial contributions, and he likewise sought to induce the Emperor to flatter Sobieski by means of presents and distinctions.⁷ It was regrettable that the imperial ministers put all sorts of petty obstacles in Buonvisi's way. Leopold removed this difficulty by appointing Buonvisi

¹ See Buonvisi's report in cypher from Linz, January 4, 1684 ("decifrato a 21 Gennaio"), *Nunziat. di Germania*, 209, Papal Sec. Arch.

² *Ibid.*

³ See *Buonvisi's reports in code, dated January 4, 17, 18, 25 and February 1, 11, 15, 1683, *ibid.*

⁴ Cf. *Instructions to Buonvisi of January 22 and February 19, 1684, *ibid.*

⁵ Cf. *Instruction to Buonvisi of January 29, 1684, *ibid.*

⁶ Cf. *Instruction to Buonvisi of February 12, 1684, *ibid.*

⁷ Cf. Buonvisi's *reports of January 18 and 25, 1684, *ibid.*

chairman of the league commission ¹ ; after that the deliberations proceeded more rapidly.

On March 6th, 1684, Buonvisi was able to report to Rome as follows ² : “ Yesterday the articles of the league with Venice were agreed upon at my house. At a five hours’ sitting on March 2nd, Chancellor Stratmann, contrary to a proposal previously approved by the Emperor, desired to insert a further paragraph concerning frontiers and the navigation of the Adriatic. From Contarini’s instructions I knew that he had been ordered to leave this altogether on one side, but the Chancellor nevertheless flattered himself with the hope of securing his point. I told him that such an attempt would jeopardize the entire negotiations, and Contarini confirmed my fears on the following day.” At that critical moment it was once more Buonvisi who conjured the peril : he appealed to the Emperor who, on March 4th, ordered the omission of the clause. Further complications might also have arisen owing to the conflicting demands of the Polish ambassador and Venice concerning the conduct of the military operations. On this point also Buonvisi found a satisfactory solution.³ As soon as these difficulties were removed others

¹ Cf. Buonvisi’s *report in cypher, March 14, 1684, *ibid.*

² This *report of Buonvisi (*Nunziat. di Germania*, 208, *loc. cit.*) forms the basis of the following one ; it is more accurate than the data of TRENTA, II., 50 *seq.*

³ “ *Vi era l’altra gran difficoltà, che faceva l’ambasciatore di Polonia, il quale secondo la sua istruzione voleva, che la Republica esplicasse con quante forze haverebbe operato, conforme si dichiarano nel trattato cesareo-polonico, e che di più la Republica si obbligasse di non portare le sue armi in Candia, ma operasse in parte più vicina, atta a cagionare diversione, e che mandasse la sua armata marittima a i Dardanelli ; ma perchè l’ambasciatore di Venezia non haveva istruzione di dichiarare le forze nè l’operazioni, proposi che si obbligassero d’impiegare tutti i loro sforzi per mare e per terra, e che l’esercito terrestre operasse in Dalmazia, che estensivamente comprende le provincie vicine, come l’Albania et altre, e fu da tutti approvato con l’aggiunta, che doppo ratificata la Lega si concertassero l’operazioni, e così si facesse ogn’anno, e che nelli eserciti si trovasse sempre un ministro de’ collegati

arose in connexion with the ratification of the league. In the end Buonvisi's proposal was accepted. This was to the effect that the nuncio should sign the protocol of all the points agreed upon and append his seal to it. The document would then remain in the hands of the Emperor, but copies as well as the deed of ratification would be sent by courier to Venice and Poland together with the formulas of the oaths to be taken before the Pope and the plenipotentiaries.

The Imperialists demanded that Buonvisi should be the first to subscribe the deed because in it the Pope was referred to as the patron, guarantee and representative of the alliance. To this the representatives of Venice and Poland were willing to agree, but nuncio Buonvisi was not empowered to do so. Accordingly, he proposed the following formula: "I, Cardinal Buonvisi, Apostolic nuncio with the Emperor, being requested to participate in and to subscribe to the treaty, attest that I have been present at the discussion of all the articles concluded and subscribed to by the plenipotentiaries." This met with universal approval.¹

The treaty of the Holy League, as Innocent XI. styled the alliance, is largely based on the model of the alliance of 1683 between Leopold I. and Sobieski. By its terms the Emperor and the King of Poland bound themselves to employ their land forces exclusively against the Turks and in no way against any Christian Powers; the Republic of Venice undertook to act in like manner with its fleet. The members of the League were to settle together the plan of campaign for each year; they undertook to assist each other reciprocally and not to enter into negotiations, still less to make peace with the enemy, without the consent of the other allies. Each of the allies was to conduct his own military operations independently and to retain his conquests. All Christian princes, in particular the Tsar of Moscow, were invited to join the league. "But in

pratico della milizia per andare di concerto, e col patto di soccorrersi l'un l'altro in caso di urgente necessità; e così fu stabilito." *Nunziat. di Germania*, 208, Papal Sec. Arch.

¹ Cf. Buonvisi's *report of March 6, 1684, *loc. cit.*

order to impart greater strength to the holy undertaking and to knit together the alliance with indissoluble bonds, the allied Powers choose the Pope and his successors, as the common father of Christendom, for the protector, guarantor and representative of the alliance.¹

A number of difficulties had to be cleared out of the way before the league could come into force, for Venice demanded a declaration from the Emperor that the Republic would be empowered to retain as its lawful possession whatever she would win from the Turks in Dalmatia. Against this the imperial Chancellor objected that Dalmatia belonged to the Hungarian crown. Once again Buonvisi effected a compromise. Separate articles laid down that any part of its former possessions in Dalmatia reconquered by Venice should remain its property, whilst conquest made in the various territories adjacent to Hungary should be once more incorporated in the Hungarian crown.² Other difficulties which arose later on were also successfully overcome.³ At length, on May 24th, at a special Congregation attended by most of the Cardinals, observance of the treaty was sworn to in presence of the Pope. Cardinal Pio, the Protector of Germany, acted as the Emperor's representative, the Protector of Poland, Cardinal Barberini, did so on behalf of Sobieski, whilst Cardinal Ottoboni swore as the representative of Venice. The Pope, for his part, gave a solemn undertaking that he would support the allies with his prayers and by every means in his power.⁴

On the commemorative medal which a German, the

¹ DUMONT, VII., 2, 71 *seq.* Cf. LIPPI, 161 *seq.*; BITTNER, *Chronol. Verzeichniss der österr. Staatsverträge*, I., 92.

² FRAKNÓI, *Innocenz XI.*, 91 *seq.*

³ BOJANI, III., 952 *seq.*, 969 *seq.*, 1026 *seq.*

⁴ **Acta consist.*, Barb. 2897-8, Vat. Lib.; letter of Cibo to Buonvisi, in BOJANI, III., 967 (with wrong date); *letter of Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I. of May 27, 1684, State Archives, Vienna; *letter of Card. Barberini to Sobieski of May 25, 1684, *Lett. di princip.*, Papal Sec. Arch. Faculties for taking the oath in THEINER, *Monuments*, 267 *seq.* Cf. also BERTHIER, II., 175.

celebrated medallist Hameran, struck for the occasion, we see the various members of the League headed by Innocent XI.¹ The Pope deserves this place of honour, not only by reason of his dignity, but because he was the real author of the League.² He undertook at once to expand it still further. Not only his own galleys, but those also of the Knights of Malta and the Grand Duke of Tuscany were to join the Venetian fleet.³ The papal nuncios at Warsaw and Vienna were instructed to give energetic support to the efforts made by Sobieski and the Emperor to induce the Russian Grand Duke and the Shah of Persia to join the triple alliance.⁴

Whilst excellent prospects for an attack on the Turks were thus unfolding, everything was once more put in jeopardy by Louis XIV.'s policy. At the beginning of 1684, Innocent XI. had most earnestly remonstrated with the Kings of France and Spain because of their war, and sought to initiate a settlement, or at least an armistice,⁵ and he had never ceased to work in this direction. However, Spain saw herself threatened by the King of France not only in the Netherlands, but in Italy also. As early as 1678 the Cabinet of Madrid had sought to secure its possessions in the Apennine peninsula by means of a league of the Italian States. But the plan could not be realized. Venice felt so weak that her one desire was to

¹ Reproduction in KLOPP, 387. On Hameran, see vol. XXX., n., and NOACK, *Deutsche in Rom.*, 28 seq. Another medal is described by RÖDER VON DIERSBURG (I., 77, n. 1).

² REDLICH's opinion (342). Cf. KLOPP, 388 seq.

³ Cf. the Brief to the Grand Master of the Knights of St. John, Gregory Carafa, dated April 22, 1684, and that to Leopold I. of May 27, 1684, in BERTHIER, II., 171, 178. The **Avviso Marecottii* of June 10, 1684 (Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome) reports that in the consistory of Monday Innocent XI. had complained to Card. D'Estrées of the action against Genoa (cf. below, p. 202).

⁴ On the efforts, continued during the following year, which were all in vain, cf. THEINER, *Monuments*, 266 seq., 271 seq., 295 seq., 299 seq., 301 seq.; BOJANI, III., 963, 997 seq.; UBERSBERGER, I., 35 seq.; PIERLING, IV., 77-95.

⁵ See the Briefs of January 2 and 4, 1684, in BERTHIER, II., 154 seq.

remain neutral; Grand Duke Cosimo of Tuscany was dependent on Louis XIV. on account of his deplorable matrimonial situation whilst Victor Amadeus, of Savoy, was too young. Innocent XI. felt that as head of Christendom he could not be a member of a separate league; he maintained this standpoint all the more firmly as he was afraid of sharpening still further his ecclesiastico-political disputes with France by entering into political combinations.¹ In these circumstances it was a most opportune thing for Louis XIV. that the degenerate Duke of Mantua, Ferdinand Charles, needed money, and yet more money, for his dissipated mode of life. By a secret pact concluded at Versailles on December 8th, 1678, the Duke had promised to open the fortress of Casale to the French, in exchange for which he was to be given the command of the French troops in the event of war in Italy together with a sum of 100,000 scudi. The execution of the pact was, however, prevented by the Mantuan Secretary of State, Mattioli, who had negotiated the treaty, and who betrayed the secret to the courts of Madrid and Turin.² In the autumn of 1681, Louis XIV. nevertheless realized his ambition; for the sum of 500,000 livres Ferdinand Charles surrendered the citadel to the French. Thus the French King held Italy's strongest fortress and threatened the Spaniards in Milan.³ After Savoy had been drawn into the French sphere by the marriage of Duke Victor Amadeus with Anne, daughter of Duke Philip of Orleans, Genoa, which sided with Spain, was also to be compelled to submit to France. But as the Genoese proved unwilling a French fleet appeared before their city in May, 1684, and reduced it to ruins by a fearful bombardment. "So stern a

¹ REUMONT, *Toskana*, I., 449. Cf. IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 22, and above, p. 127.

² Mattioli, who was arrested after having been induced to enter French territory, is probably "the man with the iron mask"; cf. FUNCK-BRENTANO, *L'homme au masque de velours noir dit le masque de fer*, Paris, 1894; BRÖCKING, *Das Rätsel der eisernen Maske und seine Lösung*, Wiesbaden, 1898.

³ IMMICH, *Staatensystem*, 106.

chastisement," Louvois exultantly wrote to Créqui, "will bring the Genoese to reason and strike terror into the hearts of all princes who have towns on the sea-coast." ¹

When the French ambassador sought to justify to the Pope the reasons for Genoa's treatment, Innocent refused to listen to him; with tears in his eyes he exclaimed: "Lord, do thou defend Thy cause!" ² On May 24th the Pope wrote a pressing letter to Louis XIV. conjuring him not to interfere by a fresh war in Italy with the war against the Turks which was willed by God Himself. ³ Even before this he had made earnest representations to the French ambassador in Rome on account of the cruel war in Flanders; in fact, he told him quite frankly that the great conflagration started in Europe by Louis was bound to jeopardize the Christians' crusade against the Turks. ⁴ All was in vain. Louis continued the siege of Luxemburg, which fell to him on June 4th. News

¹ ROUSSET, *Louvois*, III., 274.

² RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, III., 479. On the Pope's grief, cf. also CLARETTA, in *Giorn. Ligust.*, 1887, 20 seq., 23.

³ Brief in BERTHIER, II., 177. Cf. Cibo to Ranuzzi on May 24, 1684, in BOJANI, III., 1044 seq., and Card. Carlo Pio's *letter to Leopold I. of May 27, 1684, State Archives, Vienna. Innocent XI., who had already once before (1678) mediated between Genoa and Louis XIV. (see BERTHIER, I., 197, 208; CLARETTA, *loc. cit.*, 12), undertook the work of conciliation on this occasion also, in spite of the difficulty created by the extraordinarily hard conditions of the King of France; see BERTHIER, II., 196, 199, 210; CLARETTA, *loc. cit.*, 23. In the main he insisted on all of them; see the *reports of Card. Carlo Pio, February 10 and March 3, 1684, *loc. cit.* The reconciliation took place at length on May 15, 1685; see FLASSAN, *Dipl. franç.*, IV., 86 seq.

⁴ *Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I. on May 6, 1684 (*loc. cit.*): "Il Pontefice parlò al ambasciatore di Francia con gran sentimento per le crudeltà (che) usano le armi del suo re in Fiandra, per le usurpazioni fatte dopo la pace di Nimega e per haver eccitato il gran fuoco che va ad ardere l'Europa solo per impedire li progressi dell'armi cristiane contro il Turco." The envoy endeavoured to refute these accusations, but when he perceived that he was making no impression he withdrew in confusion.

of this event strengthened the hands of the party which desired peace with the Turks and war against France. As a matter of fact the Emperor dispatched seven regiments to the Rhine, induced the Elector of Bavaria to put his army on a war footing, and himself mobilized the troops of the Circles of Franconia and the Upper Rhine.¹

This turn of events roused Buonvisi to the utmost—nay, it almost drove him to despair. He demanded his recall, for now, he wrote, the edifice which we had so laboriously raised collapses completely.² However, the Pope kept this experienced servant of the Holy See at his post. The wisdom of his action was seen soon enough. Vienna came to realize that it was impossible to wage war on two fronts. Accordingly, a hand was held out for a compromise which safeguarded, at least formally, the rights of the Empire, and secured the West against invasion, so that the Emperor's whole strength could be employed against the Turks. On August 15th, 1684, a twenty years' armistice was signed at Ratisbon for the Empire and for Spain, by the terms of which Strasburg and Kehl and all the territories "reunited" up to August 1st, 1681, were to remain in the possession of France for the same period. Courtrai and Dixmuiden were restored to Spain; on the other hand she had to cede Luxemburg to Louis XIV. Both Innocent XI. and Buonvisi hailed this turn of events with immense satisfaction, for they viewed everything from the standpoint of the fight against the hereditary enemy of Christendom.³

¹ FESTER, *Die Augsburgener Allianz*, Munich, 1893, 2 seq., 146; REDLICH, 344.

² See Buonvisi's reports of June 20 and 27, 1684, *Nunziat. di Germania*, Papal Sec. Arch., used by FRAKNÓI in his *Innocenz XI.*, 104 seq.

³ IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 37 seq. What hopes eager Buonvisi cherished is shown by his memorial to Louis XIV. "the Great", dated August 24, 1684 (TRENTA, II., 209 seq.), in which, as Leibnitz (see XXXI., p. 490) and Innocent XI. himself had done at an earlier period (above, p. 185), he lays before him a plan for the conquest of Syria, Palestine and Egypt, but which

This time also the Pope gave as much as he was able to bestow. In addition to the command of the papal fleet, Venice was given leave to raise the sum of 100,000 gold florins from the clergy of its territory.¹ In May the Pope acquired 10,000 *rubbi* of wheat in the Marches and Romagna and gave them to the Republic for ships' biscuits.² The largest subsidies went to the Emperor who, by a wide amnesty of January 12th, 1684, sought to liberate the fighting forces of Hungary. According to the data of the Venetian ambassador, the papal subsidies reached a total of 1,300,000 florins.³ In addition to all this Innocent established, at his own expense, a field hospital complete with surgeons and physicians for the sick and wounded of the imperial army.⁴ To defray the cost of his armaments the Elector of Bavaria was allowed to lay a tax of 300,000 florins on the property of the Church in his territory,⁵

met with a cool reception by the French King (*cf.* FRAKNOI, 105 *seq.*; SAYOUS, 259). Buonvisi's and Innocent XI.'s crusading ardour showed itself also in 1685 in the impossible plan of compensating Charles of Lorraine for the loss of his duchy by giving him Transilvania; *cf.* FRAKNOI, 164 *seq.* The Pope's crusading ardour is taken into account in the *letter of the Elector of Bavaria dated Munich, August 18, 1684 (Papal Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*), in which he informs the Pope of the armistice with he remark that now the "infensissimus inimicus christiani nominis" could be successfully attacked.

¹ See the *Brief of April 22, 1684, in *Miscell. di Clemente XI.*, 213, p. 232 *seq.*, Papal Sec. Arch. The internuncio and the Patriarch of Venice were to see to the raising of the money. *Cf.* also BOJANI, III., 1031 *seq.* For the contributions which Venice drew from the islands of the Archipelago in 1684-1695, see *MS. Glauburg*, 34, n. 17, of the City Library, Frankfurt.

² See the *report of Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I., May 20, 1684, *loc. cit.*; GUARNACCI, 110.

³ CONTARINI, in *Fontes rer. Austr.*, XXVII., 253.

⁴ Contarini in KLOPP, 389.

⁵ BOJANI, III., 958. *Cf.* the *letter of the Elector Max Emmanuel to Innocent XI., dated Munich, 1685, Papal Sec. A ch., *Lett. di princ.*, 118.

and the King of Poland was permitted to raise 500,000 florins in the same way.¹

Unfortunately the results of the campaign were in no way commensurate with these sacrifices. The campaign, which began very late in the season in consequence of the threatening attitude of Louis XIV., opened favourably enough. The main army of more than 30,000 men, commanded by Duke Charles of Lorraine, who had prayed for a special blessing from the Pope before setting out,² and who was accompanied by the Capuchin Marco d'Aviano, took the field on June 13th, 1684. On 17th it captured the fortress of Visegrád, a small place but one that commanded the narrows of the Danube. On 27th it pushed back the Turks at Waitzen, and on the 30th it occupied Pest which the enemy had abandoned. When the imperial army, now 40,000 strong, mustered in full force before Ofen, siege was laid to that city, exactly one year after the investment of Vienna by the Turks. Unfortunately the Christians now made exactly the same mistake as that made by Kara Mustafa on that occasion: they underestimated their opponent who, with 10,000 picked men, was resolved to defend to the last the strongly fortified Schlossberg. The storming of the lower town on July 19th, the so-called Wasserstadt, and the defeat of a relieving force at Hamzsabég on the 22nd, raised the most sanguine expectations on the imperial side, where it was hoped to subdue Ofen within five days. But the siege, which had been begun without adequate preparation, led to no result in the face of the desperate resistance of the Turks. To this was added a scandalous quarrel between the leaders, especially between Charles of Lorraine and Starhemberg. Profoundly disgusted, Marco d'Aviano, sensing disaster, left the army. The arrival of the gallant Bavarians under Max Emmanuel and that of

¹ SYLVIVS, II., boek, 22, p. 144; KLOPP, 390. The Brief of April 29, 1684, to Sobieski shows that he received at that time the sum of 300,000 fl. "decimarum nomine" (BERTHIER, II., 173).

² See Charles of Lorraine's *letter to Innocent XI., dated Linz, May 17, 1684, Papal Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.* Cf. the Brief of June 17, 1684, in BERTHIER, II., 181 *seq.*

troops from the Circle of Swabia, together with that of imperial regiments from Bohemia in September, raised fresh hopes which were, however, not to be fulfilled. Towards the end of October it became necessary to raise the siege: it had lasted 109 days and as sickness had also broken out, the cost had been 23,000 men of the best troops. Better fortune had favoured Field Marshal Leslie in Slavonia and General Schulz who fought against Thököly in Lower Hungary.¹

The Venetians, who had solemnly declared war against Constantinople on July 15th, 1684—until then it had always been the Turks who did so—were bent on first attacking Bosnia. But when the court of Vienna, which had the support of Buonvisi, asserted the old claims of the Kings of Hungary to Bosnia, the plan was dropped. Reinforced by the galleys of the Pope, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Knights of St. John, the Venetian fleet, under Francesco Morosini, sailed for the coast of Dalmatia, took Santa Maura on the isle of Leukas on August 8th, and in September, Prevesa, at the entrance of the Gulf of Arta.² A further success was the fact that the Republic of Ragusa denounced its vassalage to Turkey and on August 20th, 1684, put itself under the protection of the Emperor in exchange for arms and subsidies against the Turks.³ The one man who came least up to expectations was Sobieski. As was his wont he had drawn up grandiose plans but was extremely slow in marching into Podolia; he laid siege to the fortress of Chocim but failed

¹ On the campaign of 1684, cf. WAGNER, *Hist. Leopoldi*, I., 633; HAMMER, III., 760 seq.; RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, I., 77 seq.; *Mitteil. des K. K. Kriegsarchivs*, 1884, 377 seq.; KLOPP, 391 seq.; A. VERESS, *Gróf Marsigli*, Budapest, 1907; REDLICH, 345 seq.

² Cf. LOCATELLI, *Racconto stor. d. Veneta guerra in Levante*, Colonia, 1691; GARZONI, *Istoria di Venezia in tempo della s. Lega contro Maometto IV.*, Venezia, 1705, 64 seq.; HAMMER, III., 766 seq.; GUGLIELMOTTI, *Squadra ausiliaria*, 378 seq. In the letter of August 29, 1684, in which Doge Marcantonio Giustiniani informs the Pope of the conquest of Santa Maura, the assistance of the papal troops is particularly singled out (Papal Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*).

³ BITTNER, *Österr. Staatsverträge*, I., 93.

to take it and his attempt to cross the Dnjestr was also thwarted by the Turks.¹

Innocent XI., who in May 1684, had ordered a procession of supplication to obtain the blessing of heaven for the Christian arms,² was kept accurately informed of the progress of the military operations, by word of mouth through Cardinal Pio and by letter through Charles of Lorraine, Leopold I., the Doge and Sobieski. On July 20th he congratulated the Emperor and the Duke of Lorraine on the capture of Visegrád and the victory of Waitzen³; on the 29th he replied to Queen Maria Casimira of Poland, who had laid before him the obstacles which had prevented her husband from taking the field.⁴ In thanksgiving for the victories in Hungary the Pope had a *Te Deum* sung at the Quirinal. When Queen Christine congratulated him he observed he would grant further subsidies for the war against the Turk.⁵ On August 5th Innocent XI. issued an invitation to Tsars Ivan and Peter, the Grand Dukes

¹ GARZONI, 74 *seq.*; HAMMER, III., 772. Sobieski sent the Pope on several occasions lengthy accounts of his warlike enterprises, thus on July 15, August 11 and 25, November 13, 1684 (see THEINER, *Monuments*, 284 *seq.*), but in his letter to Cibo on November 13, 1684 (Papal Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princip.*, 118) he was obliged to avow the "disastri che hanno saputo in gran parte attraversare i nostri disegni" (*cf.* THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 288 *seq.*; BERTHIER, II., 201.

² **Avviso Marescotti* of May 27, 1684, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome.

³ BERTHIER, II., 184. Charles of Lorraine's *letter to the Pope "du camp de Vatz" on the conquest of Visegrad "dans trente heures d'attaque", and the battle of Waitzen ("taillée une partie de l'infanterie en pièce, pris les canons qu'ils avoient et mis leur cavallerie dans une deroutte entiere"), in *Lett. di princ.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ BERTHIER, II., 186. The *letter of the King of Poland, dated Zavoro, June 14, 1684, in *Lett. di princ.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ **Avviso Marescotti*, July 22, 1684, *loc. cit.* In a *letter dated Linz, July 2, 1684, Leopold I. begged the Pope for further subsidies, basing his demand on his successes in Hungary (*Lett. di princ.*, 118, *loc. cit.*).

and other noblemen of Russia, to join the Holy League.¹ In August Sobieski, who had no successes to report, sent to Rome a banner taken from the Turks near Párkány the year before ; this banner was destined by him for the Holy House of Loreto. This action was so much in keeping with the Pope's trust in the protection of the Most Holy Virgin that he had a special medal struck to commemorate the gift.² At this time Innocent XI. looked all the more hopefully towards Hungary as news arrived just then of the victory of Hamzsabég on which he congratulated the Emperor and the Duke of Lorraine on August 12th.³ Cardinal Pio now had audiences which often lasted as much as four hours, when the Pope eagerly listened for news of the siege of Ofen.⁴ On August 19th a report from Rome stated that Innocent XI. had had a service of thanksgiving celebrated for the victory of Hamzsabég and that such was his keenness to hear of the fall of Ofen that someone had to remain up all night in order that there should be no delay in the receipt of news.⁵

On July 27th, 1684, Leopold informed the Pope that he hoped for the speedy fall of Ofen.⁶ However, reports from

¹ BERTHIER, II., 187.

² FRANCESCO DAL MONTE CASONI, *Il santuario di Loreto e le sue difese militari*, Recanati, 1919, 125 seq.; BONANNI, II., 772, n. 37 seq.; *Riv. stor.*, 1921, 174. At the time of the French invasion in 1798 the banner was taken to Warsaw by a Polish general and has now disappeared.

³ BERTHIER, II., 189. *Ibid.*, 192, Congratulations to Venice on August 26, 1684, on the naval victory of Leukadia.

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti* of August 12, 1684, *loc. cit.* The Pope, Cardinal Carlo Pio *reports on August 12, 1684 (State Archives, Vienna), could think of nothing but the Turkish war and of averting war between the Christian princes.

⁵ **Avviso Marescotti* of August 19, 1684, *loc. cit.*

⁶ " *Adeo sub auspiciis Stis V. eiusdemque piarum orationum suffragiis bellum contra infideles feliciter administratur hucusque, ut occupandi Budam proxima spes affulgeat." Papal Sec. Arch., *Lett. di princ.*, 118. *Ibid.*, an undated *letter of Charles of Lorraine (probably of June 23, 1684), in which he gives a full account of the siege and the seizure of the " grand stendart de l'empire othoman ".

Hungary became, on the contrary, increasingly unfavourable, so much so that Innocent urged the Elector Maximilian Henry of Cologne to dispatch reinforcements thither.¹ He hoped for great things from the arrival of the Bavarians.² On October 14th he requested Sobieski to abandon the siege of Kamieniec and to invade the interior of Turkey with a view to facilitating the conquest of Ofen.³ But the siege dragged on and the Pope's anxiety grew steadily⁴; hence it was with great joy that he heard on October 28th that the Bavarians under Max Emmanuel were nearing Ofen.⁵ On September 26th, the Elector of Bavaria had written to the Pope from his camp before Ofen, telling him of his hopes of taking a place made strong by the hand of man and even more so by nature herself.⁶ Great was the Holy Father's disappointment when news arrived that the siege had been raised. From Roman reports we learn that the Pope fell into a profound depression,⁷ to which the Emperor's report of December 14th of the heavy loss of material and money which the futile siege had occasioned, contributed in no small measure. At the same time

¹ Brief of September 9, 1684, BERTHIER, II., 193. Innocent XI. maintained 6,000 of the men; see MICHAUD, II., 56. On October 7, 1684, he wrote to the Elector of Cologne that the troops sent against Liège would have been better employed for the Christian cause in Hungary; he hoped, however, that the Elector would fulfil the Pope's expectations (BERTHIER, II., 197).

² BOJANI, III., 995.

³ BERTHIER, II., 198.

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti*, October 14, 1684, *loc. cit.*

⁵ BERTHIER, II., 198.

⁶ " *Speramus proinde, adhuc non obstante brevitare temporis aut intemperie aëris, per gratiam Dei et Apost. Sits V^{ae} benedictionem, loci huius, arte quidem, sed natura et situ magis muniti ditionem, qua obtenta luna ottomanica magnam patietur eclipsin, Ecclesia vero Dei, electa ut sol, in immensum poterit suos diffundere radios, pro qua maiorum meorum vestigiis inhaerens non solum vires a Deo mihi concessas, sed et sanguinem cum vita impendere paratus sum."

⁷ **Avviso Marescotti*. November 25, 1684, *loc. cit.*

Leopold spoke of the fresh and extensive preparations of the Turks which gave ground for fearing another siege of Vienna ; he accordingly prayed for speedy assistance for next year's campaign.¹ This the Pope was prepared to grant, notwithstanding the slender successes of 1684. On February 3rd, 1685, he allowed the sale of one-third of all ecclesiastical goods of every description which the clergy, both secular and regular, had acquired in the Austrian hereditary States during the last sixty years, the money to be applied to meet the cost of the war.² The German Bishops and Abbots were likewise urged to contribute men and money for the Turkish war³ : so also were the Benedictine Abbots of Switzerland⁴ ; and at a later date, the Chapters of Liège, Cologne, Hildesheim and Münster.⁵ Marco d'Aviano and Buonvisi displayed no less zeal than the Pope. The former was of opinion that the next campaign should definitely open on May 20th : he even felt moved to draw up a formal plan for it. At the same time he pressed for an urgently needed reform of the Austrian financial system.⁶ Cardinal Buonvisi worked for the same purpose. He succeeded in getting the Commissary General for war, Count Siegfried Breuner, a man unequal to his task, replaced by the able Count Rabatta.⁷ Buonvisi was likewise untiring in his efforts to find the requisite money. It was due to him that the great wealth left by the Archbishop of Gran,

¹ Letter of December 14, 1684, in THEINER, *Monuments*, 290,

² BERTHIER, II., 212, 218 ; FRAKNÓI, 126, 137 *seq.* ; REDLICH, 355. In three *Bulls : viz. to the Papal Legates at Vienna, dated February 9, 1685, to the Bishop of Gurk, of March 24, to the Bishop of Wiener-Neustadt of June 9, the Pope demands accurate information on the possessions of ecclesiastical persons and colleges with a view to the Turkish tax. Copies in Stadtarchiv, Bregenz, No. 640.

³ BERTHIER, II., 203 *seq.*, 213 *seq.* For the results, see FRAKNÓI, 127.

⁴ BERTHIER, II., 211 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 223 *seq.*

⁶ Cf *Corrispondenza*, ed. KLOPP, 32 *seq.*

⁷ FRAKNÓI, 128 *seq.*

Szelepcsényi, and that of the Bishop of Vienna, Emmerich Sinelli, was spent on armaments in return for a promise of future repayment.¹

As a result of Buonvisi's activities Innocent XI. forwarded 100,000 florins at the beginning of April, and another 50,000 a few months later. The Banus of Croatia received 15,000 florins, and the Pope spent a further 10,000 florins on field hospitals and a vast quantity of balsam.² Thus the manifold and energetic solicitude of the Head of the Church and his nuncio were once more paramount factors in the prosecution of the war.³

Despite Marco d'Aviano's pressure the campaign of 1685 only opened in July. The plan was the same as that of the preceding year: Leslie was to operate in Slavonia, Schulz in Upper Hungary and Charles of Lorraine along the line of the Danube. A beginning was made with an attack on Neuhäusel. But when news arrived that Ibrahim Pasha was besieging Gran, the bulk of the army, viz. 40,000 men, commanded by Charles of Lorraine, the Elector Max Emmanuel and Prince George of Waldeck, set out to relieve that town. On August 16th battle was joined before Gran. It ended in the utter defeat of the Turks. Three days later Neuhäusel, a "corner stone" of the Turkish power in Hungary, was taken by storm. In Slavonia also, the imperial army achieved a success when Leslie conquered Esseg, after which Ibrahim Pasha withdrew to Belgrad.⁴

After the victories of Gran and Neuhäusel, Leopold I. dispatched to Rome young Count Rosenberg, the son of the president of the Chamber, with an autograph letter in which the Emperor repeated his request for subsidies.⁵ Rosenberg

¹ *Ibid.*, 125 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 127.

³ REDLICH's opinion (355).

⁴ WAGNER, *Hist. Leopoldi I.*, 652 seq. ; RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, I., 125 seq. ; FRAKNÓI, 141 seq. ; REDLICH, 355 seq.

⁵ *Original in *Lett. di princ.*, 118, Papal Sec. Arch. Previous requests of February 22 and June 24, 1685, in THEINER, *Monuments*, 293, 296. News of the victory of Gran reached Rome on

reached Rome on August 29th, when Cardinal Pio presented him at once to the Pope; the latter, however, showed a good deal of reserve. The reason for this conduct lay not only in the adverse state of the finances, but in the fact also that precisely Rosenberg's father was greatly to blame for bad financial administration and the use made of the papal subsidies.¹ But when the notion arose in Vienna that Innocent XI. was against the continuation of the Turkish war, Buonvisi was in a position to furnish a striking proof to the contrary.² The Pope celebrated the Emperor's victories with a service of thanksgiving at which he himself intoned the *Te Deum*.³ The thought of giving up the struggle was very far from the Pontiff's mind, especially as prospects were favourable at the moment. Under the command of Francesco Morosoni, the Venetian fleet, which again included the galleys of the Pope, of Tuscany, and of the Knights of Malta, had won a brilliant victory by the conquest, on

the morning of August 25 (*Cibo to Buonvisi, August 25, 1685 Papal Sec. Arch., *Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 587^b *seq. ibid.*, CCXI., p. 159 *seq.* " *Breve relatione di ciò che è seguito appresso Strigonia alli 16 d'Agosto "). The conquest of Neuhäusel was only learnt in Rome on September 1 (*Cibo to Buonvisi, September 1, 1685, *ibid.*, XXXVIII., p. 590).

¹ See the detailed account of FRAKNÓI (149 *seq.*), who was the first to make use of Card. Carlo Pio's *report of September 9, 1685 (State Arch., Vienna). On the adverse financial situation, see the Briefs in BERTHIER, II., 220 *seq.*, 241 *seq.*, and Jacobelli's *report to Cibo from Venice (which also wanted subsidies) of April 7, 1685. Cibo wrote to him on July 7, 1685: " *Trovan-dosi N. S. esausto et angustiato per i largi soccorsi dati sinora per la guerra contro il Turco, non può supplire in tutte le parti nè far quello che per altro avrebbe potuto fare," *Nunziat. di Venezia*, 126, p. 285 s. (*cf.* 22^a), Papal Sec. Arch.

² FRAKNÓI, 153 *seq.*

³ Besides Card. Carlo Pio's *reports of September 9 and 21, 1685 (*loc. cit.*), see **Avviso Mareseotti* of September 8, 1685, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome. The Brief of congratulations to Leopold I. of September 6, 1685, in BERTHIER, II., 247.

August 12th, of Koron,¹ news of which reached Rome at the same time as that of the capture of Neuhausel.² It was equally important that the arms of the Emperor were

¹ SCHWENKE, *Gesch. der hannov. Truppen in Griechenland, 1685-1699*, Hannover, 1854, 27 *seqq.*, according to whom the part played by the 2,400 Hannoverian auxiliaries was a very important one. Cf. also GUGLIEMOTTI, *Squadra*, 390 *seq.*, 402 *seq.* On the impression in Rome, see BERLOTTI, in GORI'S *Archivio*, V., 56. In his *letter to the Pope, dated Venice, August 29, 1685 (reply to it in BERTHIER, II., 248), the Doge acknowledges in warm terms the help of Innocent XI. He says: " Il Dio degl'esserciti e delle vittorie, gradendo la purità della religiosa intentione con cui sotto gl'auspicii felici di V. B^{ne} la Republica nostra prontamente unendosi alla sacra Lega, ha con tutto il vigore impugnate l'armi contro l'ottomana barbarie, s'è degnato con la sua infinita misericordia permettere che il nostro capitano general, assistito dal valido e vigoroso corpo delle truppe e forze di santa Chiesa, e dell'altre Maltesi e Toscane aussiliari, postosi all'assedio della importante piazza di Coron delle principali del regno della Morea, doppo quaranta sette giorni possa trionfare d'un essercito d'oltre dieci mille combattenti, che con la maggiore risoluzione si portava all' soccorso dell'oppugnato barbaro recinto, e con horride straggi e morti di considerabile numero di quegl'infedeli, tra quali il Bassà che lo dirigeva con altro principal comandante, impadronirsi del campo con l'acquisto di tutto il bagaglio, di più pezzi di cannone e di molte bandiere lasciate in abbandono dalle reliquie dell'essercito medesimo, dandosi a precipitosa ignomeniosissima fuga. Lo stesso capo supremo con la sua consumata esperienza, valendosi della congiuntura propitia, senza perder momenti, con le vittoriose milizie accintosi al generale assalto della piazza, coll'impiego di tutte le militari industrie ha anche potuto godere la seconda successiva benedittione d'impadronirsene a forza d'armi, e di piantarvi il glorioso vessillo della croce e del nostro santo protettore, mandando a fil di spada tutto il numeroso presidio in pena dell'ostinata costantissima resistenza." *Lett. di princ.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

² *Cibo to Buonvisi, September 1, 1685, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 591, Papal Sec. Arch. Charles of Lorraine's *letter is dated Gomoria, August 12, 1685, *Lett. di princ.*, 118, *ibid.* The Pope's reply in BERTHIER, II., 248.

no less favoured by fortune in the fight against Thököly. When General Schulz had victoriously penetrated into Upper Hungary, Thököly, "the author of the rebellion and of all evil,"¹ was forced to seek refuge with the Turks who, however, took him to Belgrad in chains. The extent of the depression on the Golden Horn may be gauged by the fact that the Sultan let it be known that he was willing to surrender Thököly as he was anxious to make peace with the Emperor. Vienna, where Buonvisi and the Venetian ambassador, Cornaro, worked vigorously for the prosecution of the war, rejected the offer.²

Thököly's imprisonment, which Buonvisi described as a greater blessing than the reconquest of Neuhäusel³ led to the complete collapse of his power in Upper Hungary.⁴ The Pope's hopes now revived for he saw in these events an omen and a guarantee of the complete decline of Turkish domination in Hungary. As he listened to Cardinal Pio's account of this important turn of events his eyes filled with tears. Falling on his knees he gave thanks to God and ordered a service of thanksgiving to be held in the German national church of the Anima.⁵ The taxation of the Spanish clergy,

¹ In his *letter to the Pope, dated Vienna, November 1, 1685 (*Lett. di princ.*, 118, Papal Sec. Arch.), Leopold I. describes him as "rebellionis omniumque malorum auctor". On October 20, 1685, by means of a letter of Cibo to Buonvisi, Innocent XI. had thus defined the Curia's standpoint: no negotiations with the Turks, a view insisted upon by the Emperor also and by Buonvisi as against some of the ministers, nor with Thököly, "questo perfido mostro di ribellione" (*Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 608, *loc. cit.*)

² REDLICH, 359 *seq.*

³ See Buonvisi's *letter of November 1, 1685, Papal Sec. Arch., *Nunziat. di Germania*, and the account in FRAKNÓI, 157 *seq.*

⁴ REDLICH, 360 *seq.*

⁵ See Card. Carlo Pio's *reports of November 18 and 24, 1685, State Arch., Vienna, and the account in FRAKNÓI, 158. Cf. also SCHMIDLIN, 468. *Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I. on November 1, 1685 (*loc. cit.*): "The Pope is overjoyed at the

which he had long refused to sanction on account of the heavy burden that it already had to bear, was now decided upon, but in view of his own financial situation he announced that he could make no statement concerning further subsidies by himself.¹ The Pope had cause for grave preoccupation in the lack of concord between ministers at Vienna and in Leopold's dependence on his advisers.² The King of Poland, the third member of the League, though he had submitted vast plans for 1685 also, had carried out no military operation of any kind. This was not to be wondered at, seeing that Béthune, the French ambassador and the Queen's brother-in-law, successfully sowed the seeds of distrust of the Emperor in Sobieski's mind. The latter's conduct was so equivocal that the Pope had reason to fear lest Poland should withdraw

Emperor's fresh victory over the Turks. Sentite a leggere le lettere del card. Nunzio principiò a piangere e si pose in ginocchi a render gratia a Dio . . . e pareva come fuori di se per il giubilo e per la tenerezza." Under the impression of this news the Pope granted to Card. Pio a tenth from the Spanish clergy which he had refused until then; the Spanish nuncio was, however, instructed to dispense, wholly or in part, those really unable to pay, 1687, March 22 (*ibid.*): "The King of Spain will only allow the tenth for the Turkish war if the excommunication pronounced by the nuncio against the authorities of Naples is first raised. The Congregation, more especially Cibo and Carpegna, were against the excommunication; so was the nuncio himself! the Congregation must now extricate him from his difficulties. Cf. below, Ch. VI.

¹ FRAKNÓI, 159. On the burdening of the Spanish clergy, cf. the Brief in BERTHIER, II., 218. However, on December 1, 1685, *Cibo was able to write to Buonvisi that though many Spanish Bishops had complained to Rome of the burden laid on them, the Pope had signed the Briefs imposing the tenth on Spain, and that it was his will that all should pay in the measure in which it was at all possible, *Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 626, Papal Sec. Arch.

² Cf. *Cibo to Buonvisi, October 20, 1685, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 209, *loc. cit.*; *Buonvisi's reply on November 11, and *Cibo's answer to that letter, December 1, 1685, *ibid.*

from the League.¹ This fact explains the dispatch to Poland of the huge sums of money to which Rome consented. In the last days of December 1684, Innocent XI. had sent 100,000 florins to Poland via Amsterdam. In February 1685, he forwarded another 100,000 florins and yet again another 100,000 at the end of March.² But Sobieski demanded a great deal more. Through a courier he informed the Pope that he would begin war in May and that he would prosecute the campaign with such intensity that he did not even intend to go into winter quarters; however, he would not be able to carry out his plan unless he received a full million florins.³ Innocent yielded; on May 16th, 1685, he instructed the treasurer to forward 100,000 florins to nuncio Pallavicini; by other autograph letters he had dispatched 900,000 florins.⁴ To calm Vienna the Pope let it be known that by this action he meant to render service to the Emperor also, for Sobieski's campaign would greatly benefit the war in Hungary.⁵ For all that the imperial court was greatly annoyed, as may be easily understood.⁶ However, the Pope's action seems sufficiently justified if we bear in mind that this liberality

¹ FRAKNÓI, 171, 173.

² See the *letters to Pallavicini, February 17 and March 31, 1685, *Nunziat di Polonia*, 185, p. 222^b, 229^b, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ FRAKNOI, 186 *seq.*

⁴ *Sommario del chirografo segnato li 16 maggio 1685, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 185, p. 238 (*cf.* 242^b), *loc. cit.*

⁵ FRAKNÓI, 187.

⁶ In his *letter of May 20, 1685, to Cibo, Buonvisi complained of Sobieski's conduct of the war: "E se il Re di Polonia non coopererà con tutti gli sforzi, e se non userà maggior efficacia di quella che usò l'anno passato, ne doverà rendere stretto conto a Dio, e non occorrerà ch'il suo regno sperì mai più di far leghe, nè di haver aiuti, mentre toltone quel primo hallore del soccorso di Vienna, non si è mai più veduta azione generosa nè profittevole, e viddemo l'anno passato, che i Turchi non fecero caso delle loro simulate diversioni, e quest'anno sappiamo da i sopradetti precipi, che niente le curano, se pure è vero tutto quello, che mi ha referito, chi è ritornato dalle loro corti." *Nunziat. di Germania*, 210, p. 408, Papal Sec. Arch.

was the only means of keeping Poland in the League, and that in this way an accommodation was eventually reached between Russia and Poland.¹

The Warsaw nuncio, Pallavicini, had been working since the beginning of 1684 for a reconciliation between Poland and Russia in the hope that both States would go to war against the Turks.² The Archbishop of Naxivan had been sent to Persia by the Pope, the Emperor and Sobieski in connexion with the struggle against the Porte. In April 1684, the Archbishop sent a report on his Moscow negotiations with a view to the establishment of friendly relations between Russia and Rome. Pallavicini had repeatedly exerted himself in the same sense. Circumstances seemed more favourable at this time as the Tsarine Sophia, who had been acting since 1682 as regent for her brothers Ivan and Peter, who were minors, showed signs of a friendly disposition towards Catholics.³ In June 1684, together with the imperial ambassador, Baron Blumberg, the able Jesuit Vota, a native of Savoy, was dispatched to Moscow where he began negotiations in July, with a view to the easing of the condition of Catholics in that city.⁴ On his part Innocent XI. had made a present of money to the Cossacks in the preceding May, and in July he promised them further help against the Turks.⁵ On August 5th, 1684, he invited the Tsarine to join the Holy League.⁶ On September 16th the Pope was able to thank Blumberg and Vota for having secured admission for two Jesuits who would be allowed to look after the spiritual welfare of Catholic foreigners in Moscow. In May 1685, Pallavicini sent further favourable reports on this subject.⁷

It was a grievous disappointment to him when it became

¹ REDLICH, 365.

² THEINER, *Monuments*, 271 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 278 *seq.* Cf. PIERLING, IV., 77-95; ÜBERSBERGER, I., 36.

⁴ THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 281 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 280, 283.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 284.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 281, 286, 295.

evident that Poland was doing nothing for the war against the Turks in 1685. Rome now regretted having sent such vast sums to that country,¹ though in answer to fresh demands and promises Innocent XI. forwarded another 100,000 florins in January, and a like sum in February, though this time he instructed Pallavicini not to disburse the money until there was a firm resolve to do something.² To these sums a further 100,000 florins were added during each of the next three months, viz. February, March³ and April.⁴ These huge subsidies were granted in view also of the circumstance that the peace negotiations between Poland and Russia, on the progress of which Pallavicini kept the Pope informed,⁵ gave promise of a favourable result.

Innocent XI. was overjoyed when he was at last informed on April 26th [May 6th], 1686, that an offensive and defensive alliance against the Turks had been concluded. The conditions of this "everlasting peace" were as follows: Russia was to retain the territories acquired in 1667, including the important town of Kiew, in exchange for which she was to pay 1,500,000 Polish florins, and to undertake to begin warlike operations against the Turks in the course of the current year, and subsequently to attack the Crimea. Thus was the mighty northern empire included in the Holy League, "to the boundless joy of Christendom" and the terror of the Porte.⁶

¹ On January 19, 1686, Cibo wrote to Pallavicini that had these sums been used elsewhere, they would have been a great help, whereas in Poland nothing was done (*Nunziat. di Polonia*, 185, p. 285, Papal Sec. Arch.). On December 15, 1685, Cibo had written to Buonvisi: "Sarebbe hormai tempo che il Re di Polonia mutasse i suoi progetti in operationi" (*Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 630, *ibid.*).

² *Cibo to Pallavicini, January 19 and February 2, 1686, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 185, p. 285-8^b *loc. cit.*

³ *Cibo to Pallavicini, February 23 and March 16, 1686, *ibid.*, 294, 300^b.

⁴ *Cibo to Pallavicini, April 13, 1686, *ibid.*, 308^b.

⁵ THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 295, 297, 302.

⁶ DUMONT, VII., 2, 125 *seqq.*; ÜBERSBERGER, II., 278 *seq.* The Brief on the peace addressed to Sobieski, July 6, 1686, in

Finally, on July 20th, 1686, Innocent XI. wrote to the Shah of Persia exhorting him to join the great alliance against the Turks.¹

BERTHIER, II., 278 *seq.* Cf. *ibid.*, 282, the Brief to Oginski thanking him for his efforts for the conclusion of the alliance. Oginski's reports to Pallavicino in THEINER, *loc. cit.*, 303 *seq.*

¹ See *ibid.*, 307. Together with his *report of January 29, 1686, nuncio Pallavicini forwarded copies of three *letters dated July 30 and August 3, 1685, these two sent by Bogdan (= Deodatus) Gurdziecki (*Nunziat. di Polonia*, 105, p. 26, 27, *loc. cit.*), and January 23, 1686, this last from the Bishop of Luceoria to the nuncio (*ibid.*, 28). Their content is as follows, viz. that of July 30, 1685: "The King of Persia has received the account of the victory of Vienna with admiration and obvious pleasure. Fr. Raphael de Latina, O.M.C., has given him a written Persian translation. Thereupon the King dispatched one Szachalichanus to Turkey, to ascertain whether the situation was really as described. The latter confirmed the news from Europe. When during the period of the fast the Shah received the letters of the Pope, the Emperor and the King of Poland, he personally discussed the enterprise against the Turks with the bearer of the letters. The Swedish envoy at the court of Persia encouraged the Shah's inclination to participate. The envoy's name is Fabrizio. I myself, Bogdan Gurdziecki, was instructed by the King to send a courier to the King of Poland to inform him that 30,000 Arabs of the Persian army were ready to march against the Turks. Disturbances in the district of Babylon are reported; these the King of Persia naturally encourages.—Letter of August 3: Gurdziecki is able to report on good authority that the Persians have set out and are now in the neighbourhood of Naxivan. It is said they are advancing towards Babylon.—Letter of the Bishop of Luceoria: The royal internuncio at the court of Persia has returned with this joyful information: He left Ispahan in August 1685. He is the bearer of very friendly letters for our (the Polish) King, expressing his joy at the relief of Vienna and all that followed it. He would take advantage of so favourable an opportunity. The internuncio saw the departure of the army with his own eyes. He also says that the remnants of the Parthians, who up till now sided in part with the Persians and partly with the Turks, had now completely gone over to the Persian side as a result of the Porte having planned to send 20,000 of their number

Meanwhile the indefatigable Buonvisi had worked with all his might in preparing the campaign in Hungary.¹ He exerted himself in every direction, his first object being that the campaign should open in May, before the Turkish armies were ready to strike. He furthermore sought to influence the course of the operations themselves; but his chief concern was to procure the necessary resources, the lack of which was constantly being urged as an argument by the peace parties at Vienna and Madrid. Hence great was his disappointment when Rome remained deaf to his demands. A decisive factor in Rome's conduct was its dissatisfaction with the bad financial management of the court of Vienna as well as the actual impossibility of raising the required ready money. Week after week Buonvisi renewed his request for help, only to be told that the exhaustion of the Apostolic Camera made it impossible to give assistance. Finally, in view of the wishes of the peace parties whom Buonvisi had very properly opposed, Cibo coolly observed in a note in code of February 16th, 1686, that the Emperor was free either to make peace with the Turks or not, as he deemed best; but let him remember, that if peace was given them, the Turks would gather strength, and therefore it would be quite possible that they might attempt another siege of Vienna.² Leopold was much hurt by this answer, as also was Buonvisi. When, at the beginning of April, he was once again told by Rome that it was impossible to send any money, his excitement was such that he demanded his recall, but the Secretary of State replied that he did not deem it opportune to lay before the Pope the motives on which he based his request.³ Rome set too high a value on so extraordinarily diligent a nuncio to forgo

as reinforcements to Europe. In Moscow the internuncio met with an extraordinarily friendly reception and credence was given to his reports at the court of Tsarina Sophia. Cf. LIPPI, 168.

¹ For what follows, cf. ΦΡΑΚΝÓΙ, 175 seq. Part of Buonvisi's reports used by him are printed in *Relat. card. Buonvisi*, 3 seqq.

² *Ibid.*, 34.

³ Cf. Buonvisi's reports and Cibo's replies, *ibid.*, 67 seq., 79, 81.

the services of such a man, especially as his conduct was in full agreement with the Pope's intentions.¹

For the rest, Buonvisi, who was easily roused, took too gloomy a view of the situation,² since the indirect subsidies, through the grant of ecclesiastical revenues, yielded fairly considerable sums. The result of the Spanish ecclesiastical tenth, for which both Buonvisi and the Pope greatly exerted themselves, proved indeed disappointing, but the renewal, in 1685,³ of the Bull of the Crusade of Pius V. yielded excellent results. Spontaneous and important contributions for the Holy War reached Buonvisi from the most varied parts; thus from Switzerland the Bishop of Bâsle sent 12,000 florins, and the Abbot of St. Gall 6,000. The lesser Benedictine and Cistercian Abbeys contributed 2,200 florins; 3,000 florins came from Canton Fribourg; a similar sum from Hennegau, 10,500 thalers from Toledo, the archdiocese of Cardinal Portocarrero and 1,000 doubloons were contributed by the Archbishop of Saragossa.⁴ Immense sums were contributed by the Austrian clergy. By permission of the Pope under date February 3rd, 1685, the clergy were authorized to alienate a third of whatever they had acquired within the last sixty years. On February 17th, 1686, Buonvisi was able to report to Rome that from this source he had put at the disposal of the imperial court, including advances paid in the previous summer, the sum of 826,000 florins and that he would presently hand in a further sum of 50,000 florins.⁵ Buonvisi

¹ REDLICH, 374-5.

² FRAKNÓI, 205.

³ *Relat. card. Buonvisi, Proleg.*, XLVIII.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 31, 109, 136; FRAKNÓI, 186, 209; REDLICH, 375. On the contributions of the Swiss Abbots, *cf.* also Cibo's *letters to Buonvisi of June 9 and July 7, 1685, according to which 467 "scudi di moneta Romana" came from Canton Lucerne, *Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 545, 584, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁵ *Relat. card. Buonvisi*, 35. *Buonvisi, who was no friend of the Jesuits, had complained to Cibo on February 25, 1685, that the Fathers created difficulties for him with regard to the contributions (*Nunziat. di Germania*, 210, p. 161, *loc. cit.*). *Cibo replied

and Kollonitsch strictly enforced the levy ; at the conclusion in 1687 the total amounted to 1,600,000 florins.¹

It was with the utmost satisfaction that Buonvisi and the Pope saw that the Emperor succeeded not only in retaining the princely allies in Germany who had so far sided with him, but in winning fresh adhesions to the League. Most important of all was the fact that the negotiations with the Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg, whose military power was great, led to a favourable issue. The Brandenburger broke at last with France and on January 4th, 1686, undertook to put 7,000 men in the field against the payment of 150,000 imperial thalers : this was followed on March 22nd by a treaty of alliance with the Emperor.² Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, who had married the Emperor's daughter, Maria Antonia, on July 15th, promised 8,000 men and the Elector of Saxony likewise promised 4,700. The Elector of Cologne provided 2,900 men, the Circle of Franconia 3,000, that of Swabia 4,000, that of the Upper Rhine 1,500, and Sweden as a State of Empire 1,000. As in previous years the Austrian and Bohemian hereditary territories granted 3,623,000 florins and Hungary two millions.³ Enthusiasm for the Holy War spread far and wide at this time. Nobles and commoners flocked to arms. As in the glorious days of the Crusades the youth of all nations, eager as they were for

on March 17, 1685, that the Jesuits might appeal to Rome if they found the imposts too onerous (*ibid.*, XXXVIII., p. 494). In his reports of April 15 and May 27, 1685, Buonvisi complains of a lack of generosity on the part of several Abbots and the Archbishop of Salzburg (*ibid.*, 210, p. 323, 423).

¹ MAURER, *Kollonitsch*, 194. Cf. KAROLYI, 105 *seq.* According to a letter of Cibo to Buonvisi of March 24, 1685, the following contributions were made : the Archbishop of Salzburg, 100,000 florins, viz. 75,000 *in denaro*, 25,000 in powder and ammunition ; the Bishop of Trent 20,000, the Bishop of Brixen 16,000 florins ; Mayence, Würzburg and Paderborn furnished troops. *Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 497^b, 500, *loc. cit.*

² REDLICH, 367 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 373. Cf. RIETZLER, VII., 292 ; KAROLYI, 72 *seq.*

battle, hearkened to the Pope's call to arms against the Crescent. The number of volunteers was reckoned at 7,000.¹

The total strength of the imperial army amounted to 56,000 men; it was once more commanded by Charles of Lorraine. In June 1686, it made a direct advance against Ofen.² The fortress, naturally very strong and abundantly provided with food and war material, was only defended by 7,000 Turks, but they were heroes and the aged Abdurrhman Pasha was resolved to hold the important place at all costs.

The investment began on June 18th: the Elector of Bavaria took up a position to the south near the Gerhardsberg, or Blocksberg, whilst the Duke of Lorraine stood on the opposite side near Altofen, in a westerly direction towards Leopoldsfeld; then came the camp of the Brandenburgers towards the north-west and once more imperial troops and troops from the German Empire in the west and south-west. To this day the names of the great and the little Schwabenberg recall the memory of the Germans.

The attack began on June 20th, on the north side, against the Wasserstadt, which was abandoned by the Turks. They withdrew into the upper town, the citadel properly so-called, where they offered the most obstinate resistance. A bold attack on July 13th failed, even the explosion of a big powder magazine in the castle, which shook the earth within a wide radius, did not shake the courage of the Turks. A general assault on July 27th, at which the Franciscan Gabrieli

¹ KLOPP, 402.

² Besides the accounts of HAMMER (III., 784 seq.), RÖDER VON DIERSBURG (I., 169 seq.), KLOPP (401 seq.), REDLICH (376 seq.), cf. especially the extensively documented work of KAROLYI: *Buda és Pest visszavivása 1686-ban* (*The reconquest of Ofen and Pest in the year 1686*), Budapest, 1886, and VON ZIEGLAUER, *Die Befreiung Ofens von der Türkenherrschaft 1686*, Innsbruck, 1886. Cf. also the privately published *édition de luxe*, printed as a MS., of the following work: FED. CORNARO, *ambasciatore Veneto. Avvisi circa l'assedio e la presa della fortezza di Buda nell'a, 1686*. Con traduz. ungher. ed introduz. stor. da S. BUBICS, Budapest, 1891.

of Nizza, subsequently surnamed the "fiery Gabriel", made use of a kind of Greek fire, was frustrated of its object notwithstanding the utmost valour. The losses were very heavy on both sides. Abdurrhaman believed that a fresh assault would surely be driven off by the miraculous power of the prophet. His hopes rose even higher when he heard of the approach of a relief force under the leadership of Suleiman, the new Grand Vizier. When a second general assault on August 3rd also failed, the Duke of Lorraine, leaving a besieging force before Ofen, went to meet the Grand Vizier with an army of 40,000 men. In a series of bloody battles the army of relief was successfully driven back in the second half of August. This decided the fate of Ofen. A general assault in the afternoon of September 2nd led to the fall of the fortress within the space of a few hours. The greater part of the garrison died the death of heroes, including Abdurrhaman. Thus the latter met with a worthier end than Kara Mustafa who had been strangled on December 25th, 1683, by order of the Sultan.

At the decisive moment Marco d'Aviano wrote a brief account to the Emperor with a hand shaking with emotion : " Praised be God and Mary ! Buda has been taken by storm. Your Majesty will be told particulars. It is a real miracle of the hand of God." ¹ After 145 years of Moslem slavery the capital of Hungary, " Islam's frontier bulwark in Europe, the lock and key of the Ottoman Empire," ² was once more in Christian hands. Nearly every nation and class in Europe had a share in the work : Germans of every tribe, Hungarians, Croats, Spanish Grandees, French Marquises, English Lords, Italian noblemen,³ but likewise many commoners, among them sixty Catalans from Barcelona, had participated in a fight

¹ KLOPP, 405.

² HAMMER, III., 788.

³ Among them the Roman Michele d'Aste who was the first to enter through the breach at the storming, but who soon succumbed to his wounds. For further details on this brave man, see LANCELOTTI in the work referred to below, p. 226, n. 2, p. 2 *seq.*, 10 *seq.*, 13 *seq.*, 28 *seq.*

the issue of which called forth a storm of enthusiasm similar to that caused by the relief of Vienna.

Innocent XI, who was kept informed of every stage of the siege of Ofen by Buonvisi, had followed events with anxious expectation. He prayed unceasingly for a happy issue of the arduous undertaking.¹ His anxiety grew as the fall of the fortress was delayed. The Romans were scarcely less excited: the divergent reports caused a feverish commotion among the people.² At last, on September 8th, several couriers brought the good news so ardently longed for, though full certainty only came with the arrival of an eye-witness of the siege, Count De Saufre, whom Max Emmanuel had dispatched to the Pope with a short letter. Innocent detained the messenger for a full three hours. Salvoes from Castel S. Angelo and the clangour of all the bells announced the great victory to the Romans. During the night a messenger of Leopold I., Count Thun, also arrived; he was the bearer of an autograph letter from the Emperor.³

The great event was magnificently celebrated in Rome, The festivities opened with the ringing of all the bells of Rome for the space of one hour. Two days later the façade of St. Peter's was illuminated and a girandole was lighted on Castel S. Angelo. Thanksgiving services were held in all the churches. In the chapel of the Quirinal Mass was said by Cardinal Pio and at its conclusion the Pope himself intoned the *Te Deum*. Nobles and plebeians displayed equal enthusiasm in the celebrations. Joy was still further increased when news arrived that the Venetians had taken Nauplia.⁴ The populace amused itself with caricatures of the Grand Vizier. Giacomo de' Rossi produced a firework which showed a

¹ BERNINO, 148; FRAKNÓI, 216.

² For details, see the rare work written for the occasion by Prince FILIPPO LANCELOTTI, *Pel secondo centenario della cacciata dei Turchi da Buda*, Roma, 1886, 20 seq.

³ *Avviso* of September 14, 1686, in LANCELOTTI, 22 seq.

⁴ LANCELOTTI, 24, 25. The Brief of congratulation to Venice on the conquest of Nauplia, dated October 12, 1686, in BERTHIER, II., 312 seq.

dying Turk whose heart was being torn by an eagle on whose head an angel was placing a crown.¹ The illumination of the palaces provided a magnificent spectacle, especially those of the envoys of Max Emmanuel and James II. A fairylike spectacle was presented by the so-called Towers of Nero, near the Convent of the Dominican nuns of S. Caterina a Magnanapoli, which the sisters had artistically illuminated.² Innocent XI. also had Requiem Masses said for the fallen and he distributed 4,000 scudi to the poor.³ Count Thun received the Grand Cross of the Order of Malta and on the Duke of Lorraine and the Elector of Bavaria the Pope bestowed two crosses adorned with precious stones.⁴ To the highly deserving Bishop Kollonitsch, the nuncio at Warsaw, Pallavicini, and to Sobieski's Roman agent, the priest Dönhoff, the purple had been granted already on September 2nd. In the words spoken by the Pope on that occasion: "Rejoice not in this elevation, but rejoice in the increase of the honour of Christendom," people saw a prophecy of the great event which occurred on that very day.⁵ However, the Pope did not rely on such things, but rather on the intercession of the Mother of God. September 1683, had witnessed the deliverance of Vienna, and three years later, in the same month, took place the conquest of Ofen. Even before this, on hearing of the fall of Neuhäusel, certain devout Romans had founded a sodality of the Holy Name of Mary in the church of S. Stefano del Cacco. This gave Innocent XI. occasion to institute the September feast of the Holy Name of Mary on the Sunday after the feast of her nativity, in

¹ LANCELOTTI, 22 *seq.*; ΦΡΑΚΝÓΙ, 222, n. 3.

² Avviso of September 31, 1686, in LANCELOTTI, 23 *seq.*

³ BERNINO, 150.

⁴ LANCELOTTI, 27. Congratulatory Briefs to Leopold I. and Max Emmanuel, September 22 and 27, 1686, in BERTHIER, II., 307 *seq.*; to Charles of Lorraine, *ibid.*, 315. The latter's letter, dated Buda, September 14, 1686, in LANCELOTTI, 26.

⁵ LIPPI, 169 *seq.*; Lancelotti, 25 *seq.* For the creations of Cardinals, see also below, Ch. VI.

memory of the great victories of 1683 and 1686,¹ whilst the feast of St. Stephen, King of Hungary, was transferred by him to September 2nd, the day on which Ofen was reconquered for Christendom.²

The Bishops of Italy were instructed by the Pope to celebrate the conquest of Ofen with a *Te Deum* and Masses for the souls of the fallen.³ The event called forth immense joy even beyond the boundaries of Italy, and there was an explosion of enthusiasm for the crusade. Innumerable pamphlets and more than 70 commemorative medals bear witness to the fact. It was felt that this new blow to Islam was a much heavier one than even the catastrophe of three years earlier. The boundaries of the Turkish power, which had been so near but a short while ago, were now for ever pushed very far back.⁴

The congratulations which came to the Pope from all sides⁵ were well deserved. Even as late as the end of August,

¹ *Brief of August 4, 1688, Papal Sec. Arch. By a *Brief of May 16, 1689, he raised the confraternity into an archconfraternity; cf. *Archivio dell' Arciconfraternità del SS. Nome di Maria* attached to the church of S. Nome di Maria, erected in 1738 on the site of a church of St. Bernard. Cf. BIAGIO DELLA PURIFICAZIONE, Carmelitano scalzo della provincia Romana: *Narrazioni delle più insigni vittorie riportate dai fedeli per intercessione della SS. Madre di Dio dagl'anni di Christo 534 fino al 1683*, Roma, 1687. The Acts of the Archives show that Leopold I. became a member of the Archconfraternity. In 1697 he sent it a large Turkish banner and "alcune insegne". To this day the church is under the patronage of the Austrian ambassador to the Holy See and as such I was able to be of service to it at the end of the World War. Every year a *Requiem* is held there for the Austrian dead in the Turkish war.

² See the Brief to Leopold I. of November 27, 1686, in THEINER, *Monuments*, 314 seq.; LIPPI, 170; LANCELOTTI, 27.

³ Cf. Card. Carlo Pio's *letter of September 21, 1686, to Leopold I., State Archives, Vienna.

⁴ REDLICH, 386. On the commemorative medals, see GOHL, in *Numizmatiki Közlöny*, IV., 34 seq.; VI, 96; LANCELOTTI, 32.

⁵ Many such *letters in *Lett. di princ.*, Papal Sec. Arch., among them *one from the King of Spain, dated Madrid, November 14,

he had sought, as Buonvisi puts it, to make sure that he had a part in the deliverance of Hungary's most important city and fortress by sending a subsidy of 100,000 florins.¹ There was, therefore, every reason for the remark of the new King of England, James II., when he said to nuncio Adda in accents of joyful emotion: "It is the Holy Father who has conquered Ofen, just as he relieved Vienna. Not for centuries has such a Pope sat on the chair of Peter."² To the campaign of 1687, Innocent XI. also made most liberal contributions. About mid-April the tireless Buonvisi had the joy of receiving a bill of exchange for 100,000 florins, which was followed by another for 200,000 florins at a later date. Part of this money the Pope desired to be expended on fortifying Ofen, part on the payment of the garrison in the frontier posts; the remainder was to be spent on mobilization.³

In a letter of November 8th, 1686, the Elector of Bavaria felt confident enough to express to the Pope the hope that the next campaign, that of 1687, would lead to a victorious termination of the Turkish war.⁴ However, the military

1686, which ascribes the capture of Ofen to the "continuados paternas auxilios de V.S."

¹ See Cibo's letter of August 24 and 31, 1686, in *Relat. card. Buonvisi*.

² See Adda's report of September 15, 1686, in CAMPANA DE CAVELLI, *Les derniers Stuarts*, II., 118. Innocent XI.'s large part in the liberation of Hungary from the domination of the Turks has recently been put in a clearer light by FRAKNÓI's publication to which I have frequently alluded, as well as the following works of J. J. ACSADY: *Der Entsatz Wiens 1683 und die Befreiung Ungarns vom Türkenjoch bis zum Frieden von Karlowitz*, Budapest, 1909, and *Ungarns Befreiung von der Türkenherrschaft 1683-1669*, *ibid.*, 1909.

³ FRAKNÓI, 245 seq.

⁴ "Io spero che la campagna prossima debba esser l'ultima di questa guerra e che la christianità trionfante giungendo palme a palme habbia ad assicurarsi li acquisti con sempre più rilevanti vittorie, benchè non si sappia quali aiuti siano per avere le armi imperiali da' principi protestanti." *Lett. di princ.*, 120. The original, entirely in the Elector's own hand, is in *Lett. di princ.*, 120, Papal Sec. Arch.

operations which, once more, were not resumed till June, led to a set-back in July, though this defeat was more than compensated for on August 12th by the splendid victory on Mount Harsan over the vast army of Grand Vizier Suleiman. Disappointment at this defeat led to a mutiny of the Janissaries and the Spahis. The rebels demanded the head of the Grand Vizier. When their request had been complied with on October 8th, they also extorted the deposition of Sultan Mohammed IV., and on November 9th, 1687, the latter's brother ascended the shaky throne under the name of Suleiman II. The Janissaries and Spahis were determined to retain uncontrolled power, and in this way it came about that the Turkish capital was subject for a time to all the horrors of a military insurrection. These upheavals came most opportunely for the imperialists. Erlau fell on December 7th, 1687, and Munkács, Thököly's last position, on January 19th, 1688, whilst Charles of Lorraine was making preparations for the conquest of Transilvania.¹

The Venetians, who had taken Nauplia (Napoli di Romania) at the end of August 1686, went from victory to victory in the course of the year 1687, aided as they were with tents by Innocent XI.² Morosini, who earned for himself the title of "The Peloponnesian", took Corinth in August. At the end of the following month the Count of Königsmarck occupied Athens, though not before that marvel of ancient Greek art, the Parthenon, which the Turks had turned into a powder magazine, had suffered grievous injury as the result of an explosion. At the same time Girolamo Cornaro seized the

¹ HAMMER, III., 798 *seq.*, 806 *seq.*; RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, II., 9 *seq.*; KLOPP, 408 *seq.*; REDLICH, 389 *seq.*

² *Tre altri sussidii [for the first sussidio, 1684, see above, p. 205] per la stessa guerra furono successivamente accordati a detta Repubblica dal medesimo Pontefice parimente di 100.000 scudi d'oro li 14 Aprile 1687, li 19 Febraro 1688 da pagare ambedue in quelli anni rispettivamente et il terzo li 24 Dicembre del detto anno 1688 da pagarsi il susseguente anno. *Miscell. di Clemente XI.*, 213, p. 233, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. the Brief of May 10, 1687, in BERTHIER, II., 347.

important fortress of Castelnuovo on the Dalmatian coast and 1688 saw the fall of the frontier fortress of Knin.¹

The Pope followed these decisive battles with interest and satisfaction²; hence his disappointment was all the keener when in 1687 Sobieski had to show merely the same failures as in 1686.³ In July 1687, the Secretary of State, Cibo, wrote

¹ HAMMER, III., 793 seq.; ZINKEISEN, V., 132 seq., 137; LABORDE, *Athènes*, II., 98 seq.; KLOPP, 406 seq.; cf. also GUGLIELMOTTI, *Squadra ausiliaria*, 409 seq., 421 seq., 434 seq.; F. PFISTER, *Der Krieg von Morea in den Jahren 1687 und 1688, eine Erinnerung an deutsche Taten, besonders als Beitrag zur hessischen Kriegsgeschichte*, Kassel, 1845; F. VOLPATO, *Dispaccio di Morosini, capitano generale da mar, intorno al bombardamento ed alla presa di Atene l'anno 1687*, Venezia, 1862 (pubblicazione per nozze).

² See the congratulations to Venice, August 16; to Leopold I., September 13; to Charles of Lorraine, September 20, and again to Venice because of Castelnuovo, October 19, 1687, in BERTHIER, II., 359-361, 364 seq. For the celebrations in Rome, cf. GUGLIELMOTTI, *Squadra*, 441 seq.

³ On November 19, 1686, Cibo writes as follows on the results of the campaign of 1686: " *Reca particolare amarezza all'animo zelantissimo di N. S. il sentir, che colla speranza delle scritte vittorie che svaniscono, manchi pur quella, ch'erasi già concepita della ritenzione di Jassi, e degl'altri forti, che si presupponevano acquistati dall'armi Polacche. Quello che più rilieva e duole a S. B^{ne} è il considerarsi, che colla riflessione di non essersi fatto dalle armi medesime alcun acquisto con perdita di tempo e con profusione di tanto denaro somministrato dalla generosa beneficenza pontificia, si venisse dalla Dieta generale, alla risoluzione di far la pace col Turco per distaccarsi dalla Lega, o pur la Dieta medesima si disciogliesse senza conclusione, con che si verrebbe a mancare non meno de' mezzi, fin qui nè pur somministrati dal regno per la continuazione della guerra, che non si è fatta, che dell'autorità di poterla fare nella futura campagna " (*Nunziat. di Polonia*, 185, p. 346, Papal Sec. Arch.). At this time Innocent XI. strove to prevent a Polish separate peace; cf. Cibo's *letter of November 23, 1686, *ibid.*, 347^b. Pallavicini wrote as follows on the Poles when discussing the failure of the campaign: " *Questa nazione è buona ne primi impeti et ove non bisogna

to the nuncio at Warsaw that the Poles had no ground for complaint against the Muscovites, for the latter had loyally carried out their obligations in accordance with article 10 of the treaty, whereas one did not see a like readiness on the part of the Poles.¹ On August 16th Cibo complained that the fear was unhappily being realized that the Poles would not take the field at all, or would only do so, so late and so slowly that nothing would be achieved; the Turks had been able to fortify Kamieniec without molestation, and it was only too true that the Hungarian rebels and the people of Transilvania were negotiating with Poland.² Sobieski ascribed the total failure of the campaign to the withdrawal of the Muscovites.³ To this the Secretary of State very properly replied that instead of laying all the blame on others, the King should for once attack on his own account.⁴ The Pope was particularly annoyed by the circumstance that the generals were unable to undertake anything because Sobieski kept announcing that he would himself take the field, but never did so.⁵

Whilst in 1688 also no deeds followed Sobieski's plans,⁶

operare con providentia et attendere con pazienza le congiunture, e se ha tempo di riflettere al pericolo, rimette molto del suo fervore et vale assai meno." Letter to Cibo of November 10, 1686, *ibid.*, 102, p. 293 *seq.*

¹ Cf. Cibo's **Cifra* to Pallavicini, dated July 12, 1687, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 186, p. 22 *seq.*, *ibid.*

² Cibo's **Cifra* to Pallavicini, August 16, 1687, *ibid.*, p. 26^b.

³ Cibo's **Cifra* to Pallavicini, October 18, 1687, *ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴ Cibo's **Cifra* to Pallavicini, October 25, 1687, *ibid.*

⁵ Cibo's **Cifra* to Pallavicini, November 17, 1687, *ibid.* On Jacopo Cantelmi, who had been sent to Poland as nuncio extraordinary in connection with the Turkish war, see the Brief of November 8, 1687, BERTHIER, II., 367. In the **Vita critica de' cardinali* the purpose of his mission is said to be: " esplorare la vera causa per la quale il re Giovanni s'asteneva dal proseguire contro il Turco, benchè pur troppo si fosse persuaso (Innocent XI.) che ciò succedeva per opera de' Francesi," Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

⁶ Cibo's **Cifra* to Cantelmi, October 31, November 7, December 11, 1688, *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 186, p. 128^b *sec.*, *loc. cit.*

the imperialists were once more able to show magnificent successes. On May 19th, 1688, Caprara took Stuhlweissenburg. On June 17th Leopold I., whose eldest son Joseph had been crowned King of Hungary on December 9th, 1687,¹ obtained the protectorate of Transilvania where he guaranteed freedom of religion.² A month later the imperial army, led by the Elector of Bavaria, stood before Belgrad, and on September 6th this important fortress, the "key to the Balkans", was wrested from the Turks, notwithstanding their desperate resistance. Almost at the same time Margrave Louis of Baden, who had penetrated into Bosnia, defeated the Turks at Derbent.³ Small wonder if bold plans of conquest, fanned by the fiery Marco d'Aviano, were entertained at the imperial court.⁴ However, at this point Louis XIV. stepped in.

The King of France had hoped that the Emperor would waste his energy in the gigantic struggle with the Turks; hence he did his best to prevent the conclusion of peace between Leopold and the Sultan, whilst at the same time he ever kept in mind his plan of definitively consolidating his conquests on the Rhine.⁵

The danger that threatened from Louis XIV. did not escape Innocent XI. But was there no possibility, by meeting the wishes of the King of France half-way, of preventing a

¹ TURBA, I., 78 *seq.*; REDLICH, 533.

² KRONES, *Zur Gesch. Ungarns* (1667-1683), Vienna, 1894, 35 *seq.*

³ Cf. RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, II., 66 *seq.*; KLOPP, 418 *seq.*; REDLICH, 405 *seq.*, 407 *seq.* Congratulatory Brief to Max Emmanuel who had announced the capture of Belgrad by special couriers, in BERTHIER, II., 405. *Ibid.*, 412, congratulations to Leopold I. on his success in Hungary, dated September 25, 1688. On December 27, 1688, Innocent XI. thanked the Elector of Bavaria for the gift of some of the banners captured at Belgrad (*ibid.*, 422). Cf. also BERNINO, 189.

⁴ RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, II., 87 *seq.*; *Corrisp. di Marco d'Aviano*, 177; REDLICH, 409.

⁵ Besides FRAKNÓI, 163 *seq.*, cf. KAROLYI'S account in Ch. I. of the work mentioned above, p. 224, n. 2.

conflict with the Emperor, and of thus assuring the continuation of the Turkish war much better than had been done by the armistice of Ratisbon, which in point of fact, contained numerous germs of future complications? Among the disputes then left in suspense, one of the most weighty was the question of Lorraine. Duke Charles continued to insist on compensation being made to him for his hereditary territory of which the French had robbed him. Not alone concern for the prosecution of the Turkish war, but a feeling of gratitude also for that most deserving Duke, strengthened Innocent's determination to take up his claim. Linked with these efforts was also a plan previously cherished by Innocent XI.,¹ namely that of mobilizing the strongest military power in Europe against the traditional enemy of the Christian faith and thereby to set a worthy goal for the warlike ambition of the *Roi Soleil*. Innocent XI. thought highly both of Louis' personal qualities and of his financial and military resources.² If he succeeded in getting such a monarch to join the Holy League, the destruction of Turkey's power would no longer seem impossible. The ill successes of the imperial arms in 1684 strengthened the Pope in his view that without the help of France, a decisive blow against the Turks was scarcely to be thought of. That is why he sought a solution of the question of Lorraine. Towards the end of January 1685, the Paris nuncio, Ranuzzi, reported that it would be difficult to obtain anything in this matter,³ and at the close of the same year certain remarks

¹ Cf. above, p. 185.

² Cf. the account of Abbé Servient, February 17, 1685, of his conversations with the Pope, in GÉRIN, *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXIV., 415.

³ *Ranuzzi to Cibo on January 24, 1685. Ranuzzi is doubtful of success, "essendo troppo fissa la mira, che qui si ha di ritenerla per le conseguenze che porta seco, in riguardo alle cose del Reno, il cui acquisto è forse il fine delle applicazioni presenti di questa corona. Il Ministro dell'Imperatore ultimamente venuto, mi ha detto di haver ordine di fare istanza per l'accennata restituzione; onde io starò sull'avviso per coadiuvare in quanto sarà possibile le di lui premure, le quali per il bene di quel Duca

by Croissy only confirmed him in this opinion. For all that he made yet another attempt with Louis XIV., but no sooner had he alluded, with the utmost caution, to the question of Lorraine, than the King told him decisively to drop the subject. Ranuzzi replied that he had only referred to the matter because its solution would redound to the King's honour. But Louis abruptly cut short all further discussion.¹ Rome, however, continued to look for a solution. In July 1685, the Pope sounded the court of Vienna on the possibility of a definite cession of Lorraine, since Duke Charles would be compensated out of the conquests to be made elsewhere with the help of the French King.² Buonvisi suggested that instead of future conquests the Duke be compensated with Transilvania. However, the Emperor's ministers, above all, Charles himself, emphatically declined these plans for an exchange. None the less Innocent XI. returned to them more than once in the ensuing years.³

In the first days of September 1686, Croissy told the Paris nuncio that the restoration of the Duchy of Lorraine was not

è più da desiderare che da sperare, che siano per haver buona riuscita." *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, p. 222, Papal Sec. Arch.

¹ According to Ranuzzi Louis had said: " *che senza quello stato non havrebbe lasciato di essere quel gran re, ch'egli è; senza lasciarmi passare più avanti, mi replicò con atto quasi di sdegno: non non, ne parlez pas de cela, e aggiunse: oh il faut prendre d'autre moyen: volendo tal volta inferire a ciò che già mi disse il sig. di Croissy, cioè che S. A. era sempre stata unita co i nemici di S. M^{tà}, e che haveva prestato le armi contro di essa. Letter of Cibo, November 26, 1685, *ibid.*, p. 373.

² See *Cibo's instructions to Buonvisi, July 14, August 25, October 12, 1685, used by FRAKNÓI, 164 *seq.*; also *Cibo to Buonvisi, September 1, 1685, *Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 590^b *seq.*, Papal Sec. Arch. *Ibid.*, 209, p. 212 *seq.* Buonvisi's *letter to Cibo, November 4, 1685: " The members of the League are afraid of an alliance with France; Venice does not wish to see the French fleet in the Gulf as she fears for her sovereignty there. Vienna does not want any French troops, but France will not give money alone."

³ FRAKNÓI, 165 *seq.*; IMMICH, 40 *seq.*

to be thought of, as such a step would be against the security of France and the welfare of the State. Ranuzzi replied that Charles would probably be willing to give up this place or that, though not the whole Duchy.¹ Despite the uncertain outlook Ranuzzi was instructed in February and March, 1686, to work for a solution of the question.² Thereupon a confidant of La Chaize proposed to indemnify Duke Charles with Mecklenburg, but both Ranuzzi and Cardinal Cibo very properly refused to fall in with such a suggestion.³ Innocent XI. was not discouraged by these failures. In June, 1686, the nuncio was once more commanded to attempt a settlement.⁴

Whilst these efforts for a solution of the problem of Lorraine were still in progress, symptoms appeared of a fresh dispute between France and the Emperor which gave rise to grave fears for the preservation of peace and, consequently, for the continuation of the Turkish war.⁵

By the death, on May 26th, 1685, of the Palatine Charles, the Simmern branch of the Electors Palatine, which adhered to Calvinism, became extinct in the male line. On the basis of the Peace of Westphalia, both the electoral dignity and the territory fell to Philip Wilhelm, the Catholic Count Palatine of Neuburg. The allodial possessions of the deceased

¹ *Ranuzzi to Cibo, February 4, 1686, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, p. 402, Papal Sec. Arch.

² *Cibo to Ranuzzi, February 26 and March 5, 1686, *ibid.*, p. 59 and 61.

³ *Ranuzzi to Cibo, March 25, 1686, and *Cibo to Ranuzzi, April 16, 1686, *ibid.*, p. 427 and 63.

⁴ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, July 9, 1686, *ibid.*, p. 76.

⁵ How ill-timed this dispute—the Palatine question—seemed to the Pope, on account of the Turkish war, was emphasized by him in a Brief of June 30, 1685, to the Elector of Cologne, Maximilian Henry, whom the Pontiff requests to lend support to the efforts made with Louis XIV. for a settlement; see BERTHIER, II., 241; *Ibid.*, 243, in similar strain to James II. Cf. also Cibo's *instructions to Buonvisi (not referred to by IMMICH, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Orleansschen Krieges*) of June 30, 1685, *Nunziat. di Germania*, XXXVIII., p. 558^b, Papal Sec. Arch.

were inherited by his sister Elizabeth Charlotte, known under the name of Liselotte, who was married to Duke Philip of Orléans, Louis XIV.'s brother. As was to be foreseen, Louis XIV. promptly interpreted the claims of his sister-in-law in so wide a sense that, had they been satisfied, the best parts of the Palatinate, the Duchy of Simmern and the Counties of Sponheim and Lautern, would have become French possessions. The Pope judged the dispute exclusively from the standpoint which he invariably maintained, that is, the possibility for the Emperor to prosecute energetically the war against the Turks through the preservation of peace between France and the Empire. From the first he did everything in his power for a peaceful settlement and he rejoiced greatly when in October 1685, Louis XIV. announced his willingness to leave the decision to papal arbitration.¹ In order to remove the objection which the Emperor and the Elector raised against it, he proposed, instead of arbitration, the more harmless process of mediation. But even this displeased both the Elector and the Emperor. Leopold I. would have been glad to thwart the mediation, without offending his ally in the struggle against the Turks. Thus the situation became equivocal. At Rome it was taken for granted that the Emperor and the Duke had agreed to mediation, whereas in fact neither was willing to accept it, or they were only prepared to submit to it in a very limited measure. It was not till the beginning of 1687 that they were prevailed upon to make somewhat wider concessions.² For the rest Innocent XI. confined himself strictly within the limits of his powers. When the Duke of Orléans requested the Pope to put him provisionally in possession of the Palatine territory to which he aspired,³ the latter answered him briefly but decisively in the negative.⁴

¹ IMMICH, *Zur Vorgeschichte*, 21 seq., 26.

² IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 45 seq.

³ See in IMMICH, *Zur Vorgeschichte*, 94, the anonymous letter forwarded by the Paris nuncio Ranuzzi, on July 22, 1686.

⁴ See the Brief of August 20, 1686, in BERTHIER, II., 287. Cf. IMMICH, *Zur Vorgesch.*, 100, 105.

In the sequel the Pope's action as a mediator was rendered much more difficult by the change in Louis XIV.'s policy after the conquest of Ofen. The laurels which Leopold's armies had won for themselves in Hungary would not let the King of France sleep. The man who wanted to be first in Europe, was forced to look on whilst the Emperor became the leader in the great struggle against the traditional enemy of Christendom, and the Turk, who was to have crushed the power of the Habsburgs, became the unwilling instrument of their unexpected rise.¹ Within the Empire also Louis could no longer count on Brandenburg, nor even on Bavaria. That a revulsion of feeling had arisen in that quarter was clearly shown by the league which the Emperor concluded in the summer of 1686 with a number of Princes of Empire as well as with Spain.² Even though the "League of Augsburg" was condemned to inaction in consequence of the disunion and egoism of individual States of the Empire, it nevertheless provided the King of France with a welcome pretext for carrying out certain works of fortification on the right bank of the Rhine in defiance of every treaty, in order to meet an alleged threat to his borders.³

¹ REDLICH, 410 *seq.* •

² FESTER, *Die Augsburger Allianz*, Munich, 1893.

³ *Ranuzzi to Cibo, September 9, 1686: "It is said at court and in the city that the King of France has obtained from the King of England a copy of a treaty which the Protestant princes are said to have agreed to at Augsburg. Its object is said to be the maintenance of the Catholic religion where it exists and its restoration where it had been suppressed. This is interpreted as a fresh effort to induce the King to confirm anew the Edict of Nantes. The Austrians deny that anything of the kind was concluded at Augsburg; that the whole thing has been invented in order to give a semblance of justice to a war against Germany (*Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, p. 530, *loc. cit.*). Cibo's *reply of October 1: Card. Pio and the Spanish agent openly declare that nothing of the kind stood in the treaty of Augsburg—that its sole purpose was to secure the peace of Nymeguen (*ibid.*, 84). *Ranuzzi to Cibo, October 7, 1686: The French have built a fortress opposite Hüningen, on the territory of the Margrave of

Innocent XI.'s attitude in regard to these proceedings clearly shows that the corner stone of his policy was the prosecution of the Turkish war. Accordingly he strove to prevent at all costs a rupture between France and the Emperor. In Paris, through Ranuzzi, he sought to dispel the fear of aggression by the Emperor on the conclusion of the Turkish war, and prayed for a stop to be put to military preparations, whilst at Vienna, through Buonvisi, he endeavoured to induce the Emperor to make a peaceful gesture. At the same

Baden. To Count Lobkowitz' protest Croissy replied that they must provide against that which had been done at Augsburg, lest they be taken by surprise (*ibid.*, 536). *October 14 : The French are said to demand an oath of loyalty from divers German lords in the neighbourhood of the occupied territories (*ibid.*, 547). *October 21 : The court of Paris is loud against the alliance of Augsburg. The King was too generous when he agreed to the armistice of Ratisbon. To his kindness and restraint was due the conquest of Buda. They talk as if the Alliance had already dispatched 60,000 men to the Rhine. Soon the King, too, would have so many troops there as to enable him to resist any attack. If the war against the Turks suffered thereby, the fault was not his (*ibid.*, 548 *seq.*). *November 25 : Brandenburg, too, has protested against the occupation of German territory (*ibid.*, 570 *seq.*). *December 2 : The King said it was a good thing for him that his opponents had betrayed their intentions betimes. They would find him ready. Places near the Rhine were filling with soldiers. Yet another fort is being constructed on an island near Philippsburg (p. 572). *December 9 : Troops are being sent into the district of Coblenz and Trèves (578). December 30 : *The fortresses at Hünigen and Geisenheim are being enlarged, though hostile intentions against Germany are denied and the whole is said to be solely for security. The garrison towns in Alsace are full of soldiers. It is thought that the fort of Geisenheim is meant to facilitate the throwing of a bridge over the Rhine, though such bridges are forbidden by the peace treaties of Münster and Nymeguen. People think that all this was done in order that the King might derive the greatest possible advantage from the situation. It may be that the intention also is to restrain the Huguenots who are waiting for a foreign attack (*ibid.*, 582).

time he condemned the "useless, nay dangerous" League of Augsburg.¹ That treaty, however, remained in force, despite the Pope's representations. On the other hand he succeeded at last in crossing the plans of those people at Vienna who urged the conclusion of peace with the Turks and in strengthening the Emperor in his determination to prosecute the war against them. Innocent XI. pursued neither a French nor an Austrian policy; his one concern was the preservation of peace and the prosecution of the Turkish war which was so closely connected with it.²

It was precisely at this point that France intervened. A remark by Buonvisi, misunderstood and inadvisedly exploited by the Paris nuncio Ranuzzi,³ provided the desired opportunity, in December 1686, for requesting the Pope to mediate for a peace which would guarantee to France the permanent possession of all "reunions".⁴ Innocent XI. realized full well what a feeble guarantee of peace the armistice of Ratisbon was, hence he was at first full of enthusiasm for the project of a definitive peace, especially as Cardinal D'Estrées held out the hope of a considerable money subsidy for the Turkish war in the event of the plan succeeding. But when Cardinal Pio had enlightened the Pope on the exceedingly slender chance of success, he laid the affair before a Congregation of Cardinals. That body also pointed out the far greater danger to the peace of Europe, and to the prosecution of the Turkish war, if the mediation were begun but failed to yield a favourable result. Thereupon Innocent

¹ See the accounts in IMMICH, *Zur Vorgesch.*, 126, 132 seq., 134 seq., 140 seq., 153 seq., 161, 166; *Id.*, *Innocenz XI.*, 43 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 56.

³ TRENTA, II., 80 seq.

⁴ IMMICH, *Zur Vorgesch.*, 161 seq.; *Id.*, *Innocenz XI.*, 58. Here convincing proof is adduced to show that neither the Pope nor the nuncios had instigated the transformation of the armistice of Ratisbon in the manner suggested by Louis XIV. This disposes of DROYSEN'S figment (*Preussische Politik*, III.², 550 seq.) of a vast Catholic plot.

XI. declined.¹ Out of the grave embarrassment in which the French Government was thereby involved, it nevertheless managed to save two small gains. The first was Leopold's solemn declaration that he would strictly observe the armistice of Ratisbon on the termination of the Turkish war; the other was that he would refrain from protesting against France's latest encroachments. Both these gains were due to the mediation of Innocent XI., whose one concern it was to insure the prosecution of the Turkish war.²

Though in the course of these latest negotiations the Pope came to realize increasingly that his repeated representations and earnest exhortations would not restrain Louis XIV.'s lust of conquest, he was nevertheless resolved to avoid whatever might give the King a solid reason for complaint.³ Not so the King of France. Since the Pope was not prepared to allow himself to be used as a willing tool in political questions any more than in ecclesiastical ones, he resolved to obtain his ends by violent measures. He was, however, destined to experience one grievous disappointment. In the dispute of the quarters⁴ Innocent firmly insisted on his rights as a sovereign; and in the question of filling the archiepiscopal see of Cologne, for which Louis had in view one of his own partisans, he strictly defended the independence of the Church. Even the occupation of Avignon and Venaissin did not break his spirit.⁵ But perhaps an even severer blow to the aged Pontiff than this act of violence, was the final failure of his efforts on behalf of peace between France and the Emperor. An energetic prosecution of the Turkish war was now no longer to be thought of. Belgrad had fallen on September 6th, 1688. Within that same month Louis XIV.

¹ *Ibid.*, 173 seq., 177 seq.; *Id.*, *Innocenz XI.*, 59. Cf. KLOPP, III., 293, 540. That the Pope could not refuse from the first is admitted by ERDMANNSDÖRFER also (I., 719).

² *Id.*, *Innocenz XI.*, 61 seqq.

³ *Id.*, *Zur Vorgesch.*, 185 seq., 196 seq., 203 seq., 227 seq., 251 seq., 254.

⁴ See above, p. 194, and below, Ch. V.

⁵ Below, Ch. IV.

came to the rescue of the Turks by ordering his soldiers to advance into the Palatinate, Mayence and Trèves. The Turks, who were already negotiating for peace at Vienna, and who were prepared to make extensive concessions in order to secure it, now demanded, at the instigation of France, the renunciation by the Emperor, of Belgrad and Transilvania.¹

To complete the misfortune this was also the moment when Innocent felt compelled to limit his support of the Turkish war which he had hitherto given on so magnificent a scale. Up to this time he had given five millions to the Emperor, whilst he had also sent large sums to Poland and lent assistance to Venice. The impossibility of continuing his liberality on such a scale was all the greater as an earthquake in the Pontifical States, more particularly at Benevento, had caused great misery, which demanded immediate relief.² To this was added the fact that in view of Louis XIV.'s threats, the Pope had to think of his own security and to guard against a sudden attack.³ For all that, with the magnanimous trust in God so characteristic of the Habsburgs,⁴ Leopold I. came to the heroic decision to take up the struggle on both fronts, though that against the Turks would be only a defensive one. Whilst Sobieski was preparing fresh disappointments for the Pope,⁵ it was a supreme satisfaction

¹ REDLICH, 549 *seq.* On the irritation of the French, see GÉRIN, *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXXIII., 121 *seq.*; IOS. WEISS, *Berichte* [Archives Wallerstein] *über die Eroberung Belgrads vom Jahre 1688*, in *Ungarische Revue*, XV. (1895), 73-97.

² *Theatrum Europ.*, XIII., 607. According to GUARNACCI (110), the Pope gave 150,000 ducats on this occasion.

³ *Ibid.*, XIII., 602 *seq.*, 962; KLOPP, *Stuart*, IV., 412. Cf. below, Ch. IV.

⁴ REDLICH, 421.

⁵ In the summer of 1688 Innocent XI. was busy preventing a rupture between Poland and the Emperor. Sobieski looked on Walachia as an old dependence of his kingdom; hence the threat of a rupture with the Emperor was imminent (*Cibo to Buonvisi, August 7, 1688, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 209, Papal Sec. Arch.). Buonvisi *replied on August 29 that the imperial army would have to be quartered along the Danube as far as Nikopolis, which would

for Innocent XI. that notwithstanding the French attack on the Rhineland, the Emperor persevered in the war against

be impossible without including Walachia ; Poland might extend in Moldavia (*ibid.*). On September 11 Cibo told Buonvisi to warn against further irritation of Sobieski : " a cui alla presente amarezza dell'improvviso matrimonio della margravia di Razvil col principe Carlo Palatino ogni prudenza vuole, che non si diano giusti pretesti di separarsi dalla Lega." On October 3 Buonvisi tells Cibo : It is surmised that the King of Poland, in agreement with the Tartars and with a view to subjecting the nobility of Walachia, accepted gifts from the Walachian, in return for which he was to preserve him from an invasion by the imperialists. The people of Walachia would like to be under the Emperor so as to be freed from the tyranny of the nobles. Buonvisi works against the garrisoning of Walachia. That marriage has blinded the Polish King with passion. For the rest, after what he has done for Vienna, he never showed the same zeal. He supported Thököly, as is shown by his letters, and has intentions on Transilvania. Cibo replied on November 6 : The Pope would be glad if the Emperor would write to Sobieski and his wife so as to remove all suspicion that he had anything to do in the affair of the Radziwill-Neuburg marriage. To this Buonvisi replied on November 29 : The imperial envoy in Berlin has promoted the marriage, thinking that he was thereby doing service to the Empress (the sister of Charles of Neuburg). For that reason one does not wish to blame him. For the rest the Emperor says that John III. had no reason to be angry with him for John had never hinted that he wanted the Radziwill princess for his son ; that he himself had only discussed the affair, in the utmost secrecy, with the French ambassador ; that in fact, he allowed himself to be guided by the latter. Cibo replied to Buonvisi : Mgr. Cantelmi has conceived the plan, which must be known to Buonvisi, of a marriage between James of Poland and a daughter of the Elector Palatine. The Pope supports the affair in the accompanying Brief to the Emperor (dated November 20, in BERTHIER, II., 419). Aim : a close alliance between the courts of Vienna and Warsaw. To this Buonvisi answered on December 5 : Cantelmi's plan has been repeatedly proposed but met with obstacles : however, he had handed over the Brief to the Emperor. On December 12 he communicates the latter's

the traditional enemy. News of the brilliant victory over the Turks won by Margrave Louis of Baden at Batudjina in

reply : The Emperor, since there is question of a " fatto alieno ", has passed on the affair to the Elector Palatine, but he is aware that the elder daughter is promised to the Duke of Parma, the second to the Duke of Saxe-Lauenburg, whilst the third is not yet marriageable. On December 11 Cibo writes to Buonvisi : The King of Poland has sent a letter to the Pope in which he expresses his resentment of the Radziwill-Neuburg marriage. The Pope replied in a Brief of which he sends a copy, the contents of which Buonvisi should communicate to the Emperor by word of mouth. Aim : the Emperor should inform the King of Poland that he had had nothing to do with the marriage and that the envoy had acted on his own authority. On January 2, 1689, Buonvisi informs the Secretary of State that he read the Brief addressed to Sobieski to the Emperor. The latter is now willing to write to Sobieski but says that he was acquainted with the latter's letters to the Pope and the Palatine, and that these were so sharp that little could be hoped for. James' election as King of Poland would be made not easier but more difficult by such a marriage. The Princess Palatine, the Emperor's sister, would remain a simple Polish noble lady. On April 17, 1689, Buonvisi reports that Sobieski wanted not only Moldavia, which the Emperor readily yielded up to him, but likewise Walachia, which obviously lay in the latter's sphere of interests. Innocent XI. found it hard to give up the hope that Sobieski would comply with his exhortation of November 20, 1688, to prosecute the war against the Turks (BERTHIER, II., 420). The Italian tenth was extended on November 25, 1688 (*Bull.*, XIX., 926 *seq.*). In his *letter of December 11, 1688, to Cantelmi, Cibo complains bitterly of Sobieski's " vasti disegni " for the forthcoming campaign ; up till then deeds had never corresponded to plans (*Nunziat. di Polonia*, 186, Papal Sec. Arch.). Further developments are made clear in the following *letters of Cibo to Cantelmi : 1689, April 2 : The Poles want to carry on the war against the Turks single-handed should the Emperor make peace. The nuncio had spoken strongly against this. They had not achieved much whilst the Turks were being attacked by the League ; what could they do alone ? (*ibid.*, p. 141). May 14 : The *consilium postcomitiale* is resolved on an early campaign (p. 147). May 21 :

Serbia, on August 30th, 1689, only reached Rome on September 13th, when the Pope was no longer among the living.¹

The Pope is glad to hear Sobieski is lending 200,000 florins to the Republic. The Diet has asked the nuncio for papal subsidies. The Holy Father approves (1) that the nuncio gives no subsidies *anticipatamente*; (2) that when the army sets out he pays 7 florins monthly for every infantryman. Since the 50,000 florins recently handed to the nuncio by Rezzonico are inadequate, the Pope grants another 50,000 (p. 148^{a-b}). June 4: Further subsidies from the papal exchequer are impossible (p. 151^b). June 11: The nuncio must not hand over the sums he has received if the army marches into Moldavia with a view to the invasion of Walachia from there, as this would break up the League (p. 152^b). June 18: The same. This seems to show that Sobieski had already made up his mind to invade Walachia. The Pope suggests an advance on Budziak. This would be in keeping with the League treaty and would support Moscow's action (p. 153^b *seq.*). August 6 (Cibo's last note to Poland during Innocent XI.'s pontificate): The Polish army is gathering and is strong; the king, however, has not yet rejoined it and unless he does so soon, it will be too late for this year (p. 160^b *seq.*).

¹ See SCHMIDLIN, 468, on the *Te Deum* at the Anima, September 18, 1689. On the battle of Batudjina, *cf.* RÖDER VON DIERSBURG, II., 97 *seq.*, and *Mitteil. des K. K. Kriegsarchivs*, II. (1877).

CHAPTER IV.

INNOCENT XI.'S STRUGGLE AGAINST LOUIS XIV.'S ABSOLUTISM AND GALLICANISM—THE ASSEMBLY OF THE FRENCH CLERGY, AND THE FOUR GALLICAN ARTICLES OF 1682.

(1.)

BY the concordat with Francis I., Leo X., in 1516, had decided in favour of the Holy See the long fight against the schismatical tendencies of the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges [1438] and opposed a powerful barrier to the separatist tendencies of the French Church. True, this result had been bought at the cost of heavy sacrifices, for by that treaty the French crown secured an almost unlimited disposal of all the higher ecclesiastical offices. On the other hand it was now to the advantage of the Government to preserve existing conditions in the Church, so much so that it saw itself compelled to take up a decided position against the Huguenots, and at a later date, against the Jansenists.¹ Thus the papacy and the monarchy seemed to be closely allied, though the alliance was threatened by political Gallicanism, which survived the concordat. Most of the jurists, and not a few theologians, endeavoured to safeguard certain alleged privileges and national interests by defending the so-called Gallican liberties. In so doing, they based themselves chiefly upon the Pragmatic Sanction. The Parliaments, which were almost wholly independent of the court, continued to make the dispositions of 1438 the standard of their decisions. This parliamentary Gallicanism, which must be clearly distinguished from the episcopal variety, was reduced to a system in 1594 by Pierre Pithou in a book dedicated to Henry IV.² Richelieu

¹ Cf. our data, Vol. VIII., 414 *seqq.* For Ch. IV. and V. the author had before him a careful study by Dr. Castelmur of Chur.

² Cf. our data, Vol. XXVIII., 430 *seq.*

showed himself an adherent of these views ; his ideal was to grant to the Pope only a minimum of prerogatives but to attribute to the State whatever the national tradition claimed for it. Pierre Pithou's work on Gallican liberties was written under his patronage, and this book, like that of Pierre de Marca on the relations between Church and State, substantially advocated the standpoint of Pithou and the Parliaments.¹ Mazarin felt like Richelieu. Although the Congregation of the Index had condemned the works of Pithou and de Marca, the work by which Du Puy sought to justify Pithou's theses appeared in a second edition in 1651, with a royal privilege praising both writer and publisher, inasmuch as in this book the rights of the crown and the precious liberties of the Church of France were put in their true light and raised above all doubt.²

With Louis XIV.'s accession to the throne the situation grew worse. The men round the youthful King were set on instilling into his mind wrong notions about the papal power. They put before him a greatly distorted picture of the relations between Philip the Fair and Boniface VIII. whom they credited with the intention of depriving the King of his crown and deposing him. Of the Bull *Unam sanctam* they made such a bogey that Louis might well see in the action of the Popes a real attempt on his sovereign prerogatives which it was his duty to defend before God and the nation.³

In view of the absolutist principles cherished by Louis XIV. such teaching fell on all too favourable ground. It became the policy of the King completely to dominate the Church, and to extend indefinitely the privileges conceded by the concordat, even in the purely spiritual sphere. To this end he could count on the Parliaments as surely as on a section of the theological Faculty of Paris which still cherished the old anti-Roman traditions.⁴ The decisive influence of the Government in the appointment to bishoprics meant

¹ *Ibid.*

² HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, III.⁵, 728 *seqq.*

³ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 16, 20.

⁴ LAVISSE, *Hist. de France*, VII., 2, 16.

that even from the Bishops no serious opposition need be feared.

In his youthful arrogance Louis XIV. inflicted a profound humiliation on defenceless Alexander VII. in the dispute over the Corsican Guard, and secured the right of nomination to the sees of Metz, Toul and Verdun.¹ This dispute showed that though the "Most Christian King" did not deny the primacy of the Pope, and even acknowledged that it was necessary for the preservation of the unity of the Church, he nevertheless professed the same sort of practical Gallicanism as Richelieu. Hence a struggle might arise quite easily. Seemingly insignificant incidents were the spark which set fire to inflammable material that had accumulated for a long time. When on December 12th, 1661, in the Jesuit College of Clermont, the thesis of papal infallibility was defended, and especially as against the Jansenists, the doctrine that there was a supreme judge in the Church who could decide infallibly in questions of right and fact even outside a Council, the Jansenists and Gallicans represented the occurrence as an attempt against the Crown. Scarcely had this incident been disposed of by the Jesuit Annat, Louis' confessor, and the Archbishop of Toulouse, Pierre de Marca,² when the dispute over the Corsican Guard broke out. On January 22nd, 1663, the Bachelor Gabriel Drouet of Villeneuve maintained the following theses at the Sorbonne: the special privileges of certain Churches, such as those, for instance, of the French Church, were based on a papal concession; Christ gave the supreme authority in the Church to the Prince of the Apostles and to his successors; General Councils were useful, but not indispensable, for the extirpation of heresies. These theses remained within the boundaries of theology and at any other time they would have been left to the specialists for discussion. But in its anti-Roman feeling the Government was determined to humble the Pope by every possible means,³ and Parliament lent a willing hand to this

¹ Vol. XXXI., p. 106 *seqq.*

² PUYOL, *Richer*, II., 466; MOURRET, *L'Ancien Régime*, 310.

³ V. MARTIN, in *Rev. des sciences relig.*, VIII. (1928), 175 *seqq.*

end. The Attorney General Denis Talon denounced the theses to Parliament and demanded a decree forbidding the theological Faculty to allow such propositions to be maintained.¹ The decree was to be read at the Faculty and afterwards embodied in its registers. The youthful Procurator General, Achille de Harlay, particularly distinguished himself in this affair. However, the Faculty rejected the proposal on the ground that Parliament had no jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters ; all it agreed to was that it should be discussed within its own circle.² Thereupon the Government began to bring pressure to bear on individual Doctors. It ordered lists to be printed giving the names of those members of the Faculty who were loyal to Rome ; of those who were for the King ; and of the neutral ones.³ The result was that eighty-nine Doctors were described as papal, fifty-five as anti-papal, and thirty-four as undecided. The most outstanding figure among them, Bossuet, belonged to the papal party.⁴ Notwithstanding the fact that the Doctors in favour of Rome were in a majority, the Faculty took it upon itself, on April 4th, 1663, to register the anti-Roman decree of Parliament.

Now on that very same April 4th a thesis was defended at the Bernardines, with the approval of Syndic Grandin, which roused anew the anger of Parliament. The Lateran Council of 1215 had made it a duty for all Catholics to confess once a year to " their own priest ". This " proper priest ", so the thesis stated, was, besides the parish priest and the Bishop, the Pope also who possessed the fulness of jurisdiction over the whole Church both in the external and the internal forum. The assertion was harmless enough for here there was no question of any interference by the Pope with the secular Government. But in its present state of excitement

¹ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 19 ; FERET, III., 266 ; RAPIN, *Mém.*, III., 195 *seqq.* ; V. MARTIN, *loc. cit.*, 173 *seqq.*

² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 23.

³ *Ibid.*, 23, 28. Lists, *ibid.*, in Appendix, p. 481 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 28, 481 ; HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, IV.⁵, 19 *seqq.*

Parliament gladly seized every opportunity to vent its hatred of Rome. Grandin was summoned before Parliament and suspended from his functions for a period of six months. By this means he was no longer able to take part in the meetings of the Faculty in his capacity as Syndic. But he remained a Doctor as much as the rest, and as such he proposed to the Faculty to set down its view on papal authority in brief statements as by this means it would be able to counteract the distrust of the Government.¹ Thus were drawn up the six propositions of 1663 which were signed by sixty-two Doctors and submitted to the King.² They stated that it was not the teaching of the Faculty that the Pope had any authority in the King's temporal affairs ; that he was above the General Council and infallible without the consent of the Church. On the other hand the Faculty taught that in temporal matters the King was subject to God alone and that under no pretext whatever could his subjects be absolved from the obedience they owed to him ; that the Faculty approved no proposition which was in any way derogatory to the authority of the King, the true liberties of the Gallican Church, or the canons which had been accepted in the realm.³

However, this manifesto did not wholly satisfy the Government. Though it stated that the Faculty did not maintain the dogma of papal infallibility, it did not say that that doctrine was false ; nor were the King's prerogatives as against the Pope defined with sufficient clearness ; hence the Government felt cheated of its expectation that the theologians would provide it with a solid basis for action against Rome.⁴ For all that the declaration of the Faculty was not without weighty consequences. It was the first time that the Sorbonne made open profession of Gallicanism⁵ ; in fact the Assembly of 1682 appealed to this act. The six

¹ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 32.

² Text, *ibid.*, 17.

³ *Coll. Lac.*, I., 811 ; HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, IV.⁵, 21.

⁴ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 34.

⁵ " la première proclamation officielle du Gallicanisme," says V. MARTIN (*loc. cit.*, 175).

articles gave the impulse to the fresh Gallican movement in France by which the Pope's influence in ecclesiastical affairs was almost completely paralysed and Pope and King became involved in the most violent disputes. Moreover the court had openly approved the Gallican views of Parliament, so that Government and Parliament presented a united front against Rome. This violent action of Parliament also constituted a further attack on the liberties and prerogatives of the University of Paris; in fact it even suppressed them in part, whilst the clergy were split into two camps, the one loyal to Rome, the other the champion of the King. These facts must be borne in mind if we wish to understand the further development of events and in particular the dispute over the so-called *droit de régale*.

By *régale* was meant in France the right claimed by the King to administer and to appropriate the revenues of a number of dioceses on the death of the Bishop, as well as to confer certain benefices.¹ The second Council of Lyons in 1274 had contented itself with forbidding, under pain of excommunication, any extension of this right or its application to dioceses where it did not yet obtain. This was by no means a formal sanction of the right of *régale*, but it nevertheless implied a measure of toleration. In the great struggle between Boniface VIII. and Philip the Fair the question of *régale* played an important part. Subsequently also disputes as to whether the right of *régale* was in force in this diocese or that were not wanting. These controversies were decided by the Parliament of Paris. That body increasingly adopted

¹ J. G. PHILLIPS, *Das Regalienrecht in Frankreich*, Halle, 1893; E. MICHELET, *Du droit de régale* (Thèse), Ligugé, 1900; C. CONSTANTIN in *Dictionnaire de théol. cath.*, IV., 186-206; *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, III.², 893; *Recueil des Instruct.*, Rome, II., introd., IV.-XIII.; LESNE, *Les origines du droit de régale*, in *Nouv. Rev. hist. de droit français et étranger*, XLV. (1921), 5-52; A. PÖSCHL, *Die regalien der mittelalterlichen Kirchen*, Graz, 1928. Cf. our data, Vol. XXVI., 3. The *régale* seems to have been originally based on the right of private patronage; cf. STUTZ in HERZOG-HAUCK'S *Realenzyklop.*, XVI.³, 536 seqq.

a standpoint favouring the State and unfavourable to the Church. It took the view that in doubtful cases it was not the business of the State to prove the existence of the right, but that, on the contrary, it was for the diocese to prove its exemption from such a rule. Since the 16th century the jurists had been representing the *régale* as a right of the crown, in force throughout the realm, inalienable and imprescriptible; the *jus regaliae* became a *jus regale* from which even the King might not dispense; should he attempt to do so, the royal dispensation would be invalid. Parliament affirmed the universal validity of the right of *régale* in 1608, but its point of view did not triumph at once. Since the reign of Charles VII. the revenues of vacant sees had been assigned to the Sainte-Chapelle in Paris. In 1641 Louis XIII. took them from the Canons of that Chapel. From that time onwards such revenues were carefully kept and handed to the next occupant of the see. One-third was spent by the Government for the support of needy converts from Protestantism,¹ so that it did not itself derive any benefit from the money thus put aside. It is by no means unlikely that the Canons of the Sainte-Chapelle hoped for a change in their own favour from an alteration of the dispositions of 1641 by Louis XIV.'s absolutism, when they counselled him to extend the right of *régale* to the whole of France.²

Louis XIV. seems to have honestly believed that the right of *régale* was an ancient prerogative of the crown. By a decree of 1673 and its explanation of 1675, he took an important step which was to sow the seeds of a lengthy dispute: he extended the right to all the territories subject to the French crown.³ The aged Clement X. did not at first pay any great attention to the matter, though the nuncio had reported on it. On June 6th, 1673, Francesco Nerli, Archbishop of Florence, nuncio in Paris since 1672, wrote from Tournai to Cardinal Altieri, Secretary of State, that the

¹ DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 103.

² *Id.* in *Bullet. de litt. ecclés.*, 1911, 373.

³ Text in DUBRUEL, *Querelle*, 264.

decree was in print, but his letter was not even acknowledged. Rome remained equally silent when on May 31st, 1675, nuncio Spada drew attention to the new royal decree.¹

There were many Bishops and other clergy in France who sensed danger for the liberty of the Church in these royal decrees; hence they were surprised that the Holy See did not interfere; if it had protested, so they argued, the decrees would have been withdrawn.²

As a matter of fact the Pope's restraint had a fatal influence on the course of events. On the one hand the King might interpret it as tacit consent which strengthened his good faith in his rights, and on the other, the French clergy lacked the strong backing which it needed so much against Louis XIV. Consequently Bishop after Bishop submitted to the new decree and took the prescribed oath. There is little cause for surprise that almost the entire episcopate tacitly accepted the royal decree. That document put an end to the juridical uncertainty which had arisen more than a century ago from the endless disputes about the universal validity of the right of *régale*. The Bishops had themselves submitted these controversies to the judgment of the secular courts, so that it was now difficult for them to plead that the second Council of Lyons had taken the question of *régale* out of the hands of the secular power, nor was there any prospect that the jurists would ever give up their view that the right of *régale* was a prerogative of the crown. Moreover the free appointment to ecclesiastical positions was made so difficult for the Bishops by all sorts of rights of patronage, that the introduction of the right of *régale* deprived them of the disposal of but a very small number of benefices. But the royal decree could only be described as an injustice and the Pope, as the guardian of the canons of the Church, was right in opposing it. The French Bishops, however, resigned themselves to it as the lesser evil.³

¹ DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 105.

² *Id.*, *Quevelle*, 262 seq.

³ On August 21, 1679, Bishop Le Camus wrote to Caulet on the right of *régale* and the dispute it entailed: "Le droit même . . .

Thus it came about that at first only two Bishops protested against the universal application of the *régale*, viz. Jean du Ferrier of Albi, and Louis du Vaucel of Albi.¹ They declared the royal decrees to be invalid because they offended against the second Council of Lyons which had punished every extension of the right of *régale* with excommunication. By their earnest endeavours they succeeded in winning over to their side the Bishop of Alet, Nicolas Pavillon. Once persuaded, Pavillon became an inflexible opponent of the royal decree. In vain was it pointed out to him that the decrees of the second Council of Lyons were only known through the *Liber Sextus* of Boniface VIII., which had not been accepted in France.² The aged prelate, who was also a friend of the Jansenists, stuck to his opinion and sought to win over to his side his colleague, François Caulet, Bishop of Pamiers, like himself a supporter of the Jansenists.³ Caulet rather favoured a compromise but Pavillon succeeded in obtaining his adhesion to a joint memorial (dated July 8th, 1675) to the Assembly of the Clergy which was then sitting at Saint-Germain-en-Laye. In it the two Bishops strongly stressed the fact that the prerogatives of the Church were at stake, and for these the clergy had always stood up.

However, the two prelates had to reckon with a dangerous

n'est presque rien au fond, puisque le roi donne l'économat aux évêques qu'il nomme et que cela ne peut aller au plus qu'à la nomination de quelque prébende pendant la vacance du siège, que d'ailleurs le plus difficile et à quoi l'on aurait plus de droit de former de la difficulté est fait, puisque vous avez prêté le serment de fidélité au roi, en quoi consiste proprement le prétendu droit de régale. . ." He then speaks of the grave injury Caulet's resistance did to his diocese: "Enfin tous les autres ayant toléré ce qu'ils ne pouvaient empêcher, et votre successeur le devant faire un jour, s'il y a des matières où l'on puisse avoir de la condescendance et entrer dans des tempéraments, c'est celle-là,"
 DUBRUEL, *Bullet. de litt. ecclés.*, 1911, 424.

¹ DUBRUEL, *Querelle*, 261.

² *Id.*, *Extension*, 106.

³ See XXXI., p. 209 for the two Jansenist Bishops.

opponent in the person of the Archbishop of Paris, François de Harlay, a courtier Bishop, to whom the King's favour meant more than anything else. Harlay affected to see in the expostulations of the two Bishops no more than a trick prompted by the Bishop of Alet's embarrassment, for that prelate had got into serious difficulties in consequence of his opposition on the question of the *régale*. By the terms of the ordinance of 1673 the right of *régale* only expired in a given diocese when, at the conclusion of a vacancy, the new Bishop had registered his oath of loyalty to the King in the Chamber of Accounts in Paris; this ruling was also extended to those Bishops who had long since taken the oath of loyalty.¹ Pavillon and Caulet omitted this registration because they saw in it a recognition of the universal validity of the right of *régale* and an infringement of the decrees of the Council of Lyons. The consequence was that, on the plea of the right of *régale*, the Government claimed for itself the disposal of all benefices which had at any time become vacant since the entry upon office of the two Bishops. This was bound to lead to the gravest disorders since the Government was making fresh appointments to posts occupied long since.²

At the request of the two Bishops the Assembly of the Clergy promised to take up the matter.³ For a time Caulet hesitated. In all probability, on the occasion of a visit to Paris in July 1675, he had made concessions to La Chaize, the King's confessor, in connexion with the *régale*, concessions which he subsequently withdrew. It was only by degrees that he identified himself more and more, on the question of the *régale* also, with the views of his friend Pavillon⁴ who took stern measures in the matter. In two ordinances, dated May 30th, 1675, and March 5th, 1676, he declared that all clerics of his diocese who had obtained a benefice from the King in virtue of the right of *régale*, had incurred

¹ DUBRUEL, *Bullet. de litt. ecclés.*, 1911, 370; 1917, 226.

² *Ibid.*, 1911, 370; V. MARTIN in *Rev. des sciences rel.*, 1928, 367 *seqq.*

³ DUBRUEL, *Querelle*, 278.

⁴ *Id.* in *Bullet. de litt. ecclés.*, 1911, 373 *seqq.*

the penalty of excommunication.¹ In a letter to Louis XIV. he sought to justify his standpoint² but failed. A decree of June 23rd, 1676, declared the Bishop's ordinances null and void,³ so that his step was barren of result. Bishops who, like Le Camus, had until then sympathized with Pavillon, now dropped him, for fear of the royal displeasure. Pavillon would have been completely isolated had not Caulet of Pamiers, to his great joy, at last definitely thrown in his lot with him.⁴ On October 20th, 1676, Pavillon again wrote to Louis XIV. but once more in vain. When the Bishop of Pamiers had also published decrees similar to those of his friend of Alet, and these had likewise been declared null and void, both prelates appealed to their metropolitans, the Archbishops of Narbonne and Toulouse, who had acknowledged the royal decision and disavowed the Bishops of Alet and Pamiers, though without naming them. Thereupon Pavillon and Caulet appealed for protection to the Holy See.⁵

Such was the situation at the accession of Innocent XI. The Pope received the appeal of the two Jansenist Bishops since a question of principle was at stake.⁶ The schismatical tendencies which, quite apart from the matter of *régale*, were steadily gaining ground in France, could not but fill him with anxiety. If France was not to slip further down this inclined plane intervention by the Holy See was

¹ *Id.*, *Querelle*, 272 seq., 295.

² *Ibid.*, 300.

³ *Ibid.*, 301.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 301.

⁵ HERGENRÖTHER-KIRSCH, IV.⁵, 25.

⁶ IMMICH (*Innocenz*, XI., 23) justly emphasizes the fact that Innocent XI. intervened solely from considerations of principle, not from personal antipathy, political hostility or exaggerated pretensions: "To-day there is no doubt that the dispute was not caused by an anti-French attitude on the part of the Pope: its cause was much deeper, namely France's aim at national isolation, unity and independence of every foreign influence and the consequent opposition based on the very nature of the hierarchy and the Pope's universal authority. Louis XIV.'s action was the outcome of a new conception of the State and an exaggerated idea of sovereignty."

imperative. In France the matter was seen in a different light. No one there had anticipated that precisely the question of the *régale* would lead to this outbreak since the last Popes had not taken any action in the matter. The extension of the right of *régale* meant an increase of power for the King of France, consequently the principle involved was overlooked and people failed to understand why, for the sake of two Jansenist Bishops, Innocent X. should reopen the great controversy between the ecclesiastical and the secular authority which had led to an open struggle under Philip the Fair.¹

As a result of his attitude Innocent XI. was even suspected, though most unjustifiably, of favouring Jansenism and of disapproving the Bulls of Urban VIII., Innocent X., and Alexander VII.² Yet he was bound to intervene since, at bottom, the stake was the independence of the Church which Louis XIV.'s absolutism sought to crush. The action of Innocent XI. implied no blame or condemnation of his predecessors in Peter's Chair; for him it was simply a duty of conscience.³ The Bishop of Alet did not live to see the further developments of the affair, but before his death (December 8th, 1677) he had at least the profound satisfaction of seeing his appeal admitted by Innocent XI.⁴

¹ DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 103 seq., 106.

² MICHAEL, *Döllinger*, 439 seqq.

³ " *S. S^ta non approva nè disapprova le novità tollerate dai suoi predecessori in pregiudicio della libertà e degli diritti de la Chiesa, ma non crede di poter tollerare la presente." Cibo to the French nuncio, August 24, 1683, Papal Sec. Arch., *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170.

⁴ DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 109. The Jansenists gladly seized the opportunity to take the Pope's part against Louis XIV. Richelieu's nephew, the Abbé de Pontchâteau, was living in Rome under the pseudonym of Du Mené. He represented the interests of Port-Royal and now began to play a rôle in the question of the *régale*. He got in touch with those Cardinals who were keen on the reform, such as Ottoboni, Azzolini, Ludovisi, Casanata, etc. He found a valuable supporter in Agostino Favoriti (cf. DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 108 seq.).

That same year (1677) the Pope appointed a special Congregation to deal with the question of the *régale*. It consisted of Cardinals Ottoboni, Carpegna and Albizzi, together with several Bishops. Agostino Favoriti was named secretary.¹ The Congregation studied the question and drew up the papers which Innocent XI. used as the basis of his Briefs. From the first there was a desire to tear out the evil by the root and simply to condemn the royal decree by a Constitution. Favoriti relates that a declaration of the kind had been elaborated by the Congregation.² However, matters did not go so far; the more moderate among the Cardinals dissuaded the Pope from too drastic a step; they hoped to secure an acceptable solution by means of friendly discussion. In this they were well served by the circumstance that Innocent XI. had a high opinion of the person of the King who, so he thought, was only badly advised. Two sets of advisers at the papal court sought to influence the final decision. The moderate Cardinals were opposed by the *Zelanti*, among whom Favoriti played an important rôle. These insisted on energetic intervention because they only considered the question of principle and would not heed considerations of opportunity and prudence. Innocent XI. did his best to act in accordance with his conscience without allowing himself to be influenced by either party. But he did not altogether succeed in preserving his independence. At first he showed unmistakable signs of hesitation; but the force of circumstances drove him ever more and more toward the

¹ Favoriti (see below, p. 261 *seqq.*) has left an interesting survey of the labours of the Congregation of the *régale*, dated May 8, 1682. To the above named three Cardinals he added between the lines that of Card. Cibo. Dubruel published a French translation of the survey: *Congrégation particulière de la Régale*, in *Revue des quest. hist.*, LXXXVII. (1910), 143 *seq.*, where he examines (131 *seq.*) Favoriti's *literary remains in the Papal Secret Archives and the Collegium Germanicum.

² " Sans ces conditions furent faits la minute de la constitution qui annullait les arrêts de 1673 et 1675 et les deux premiers brefs " (DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 143).

Zelanti. It is this circumstance that created an impression of apparent hostility towards France on the part of the Pope.

Innocent XI. was firmly convinced that the very duty of taking a fatherly interest in the welfare of Louis XIV.'s soul did not allow him to look on idly at the march of events in France. In a Brief of March 12th, 1678,¹ he spoke to the King of his grief that evil counsellors should have succeeded in persuading him to extend the right of *régale* to Churches where it had never obtained.² He then examined the origin of this right, at the same time drawing the King's attention to the Council of Lyons which had decided the question. He pressed the King to abide by these canons, as his predecessors on the throne of France had done during four hundred years. At the same time the Pope also requested the French Cardinals, the Archbishop of Paris and the King's confessor, to influence Louis in this sense.³

In France the question had been too exclusively considered as the private affair of the Bishop of Pamiers, with the result that it did not at first receive adequate attention. It was thought that with the death of that aged prelate everything would settle itself of its own accord. In order to gain time only a non-committal reply was given to the papal Brief. However, this time French diplomacy, usually so subtle, had made a miscalculation, for Innocent would not leave the matter alone. On September 21st, 1678, another Brief to the King in connexion with the *régale* was drawn up.⁴ From Louis' answer of April 5th, 1678, to the first Brief, the Pope had only been able to gather that his intervention had been unwelcome to the King. For all that he felt it his duty to

¹ BERTHIER, I., 159.

² "Iampridem inaudivimus non deesse M^{ti} tuae consiliarios et administros, qui tibi persuadere nituntur, ut usum illum antiquum custodiae fructuum vacantium ecclesiarum, quem Regaliam vocant, ad eas quoque regni tui ecclesias extenderes, quas illi iuri obnoxias numquam fuisse vel ex ipsis fisci regii tabulariis liquido constet" (BERTHIER, I., 159).

³ *Ibid.*, 165-170.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 255.

warn him against the influence of the royal counsellors.¹ He firmly condemned all interference with the prerogatives of the Church,² and earnestly pleaded with the King not to allow himself to be influenced by bad advisers in a matter of such importance. In his Brief Innocent speaks of an "absurd mistake" [*error tam absurdus*] into which Louis and his advisers had fallen, and he observes that, misled by the example of the King, other Christian rulers might be tempted to take similar steps. Hence he conjures Louis to think of the salvation of his soul and to abandon the wrong path which he had taken.

The Brief was couched in somewhat strong terms. It was easy to foresee its effect on Louis, accustomed as he was to adulation, and on the clergy who idolized him. As a matter of fact the Brief was objected to by some members of the Sacred College. It was deemed imprudent, especially by the Secretary of State, Cardinal Cibo, who it must be remembered, was personally tied to France as with golden threads. Unknown to the Pope he was the recipient of a considerable French pension, in return for which he betrayed confidential matters to the French agent, in view of the next conclave.³ However, Cibo was taken so seriously ill on January 5th, 1679, that his recovery seemed doubtful.⁴ Thereupon the *Zelanti* judged that the moment had come to dispatch the Brief of September 21st, 1678. On January 4th, 1679, it was prepared for dispatch. This explains why January 4th is given in the Brief as the date of completion and dispatch.⁵ It may be that January 4th, that is the day

¹ "te male consulentium" (*ibid.*).

² Non enim sanæ mentis et doctrinæ ausit in dubium revocare nullum sæculari potestati in res sacras ius esse, nisi quatenus ecclesiæ indulsit auctoritas" (*ibid.*).

³ GÉRIN, *Revue des quest. hist.*, XX. (1876), 439 seq., XXXIII. (1878), 402, n. 3.

⁴ DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 112.

⁵ "datum die 21 Sept. 1678, missum vero die 4 Januarii 1679" (BERTHIER, I., 225).

before Cibo's illness, was purposely chosen in order to lay responsibility on him. What is certain is that in French circles he was long suspected of being the instigator of every one of Innocent XI.'s measures against France, since all business, at least nominally, passed through his hands in his capacity as Secretary of State. But even now the Brief was not dispatched at once; it was only handed to the courier on January 18th.¹ On January 4th Innocent also addressed a Brief to the Bishop of Pamiers, in which he promised to defend the rights of his Church.² The Congregation for the *régale* was reinforced at this time by the addition of Cardinals Barberini and Azzolini.³

Fresh encroachments in France led to increased tension. The Poor Clares of Toulouse complained to the Pope that, by order of the King, an Abbess had been forced on them who had made her entry with a large suite and a military escort. The nuns had been compelled to yield to force and to allow the Abbess, against every law of justice, to take possession of the Abbey, to the great scandal of the whole town. In a Brief of January 18th, 1679, explaining the situation, Innocent XI. appealed to the Archbishop of Toulouse. He referred once more to what had taken place at Pamiers and exhorted the Archbishop to show himself worthy of his position by intervening with the King on behalf of the nuns.⁴ This case too was submitted to the Congregation of the *régale*.⁵

Meanwhile Cardinal Cibo made a slow recovery. However, the real management of affairs remained in the hands of Favoriti. The latter now only submitted for the signature of the Secretary of State one single document for each nunciature, in which were included, on loose sheets, the decisions concerning all other current business: hence Cibo hardly

¹ DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 113.

² BERTHIER, I., 223.

³ DUBRUEL, *Congrégation*, 143.

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 227.

⁵ DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*

knew what it was that he signed.¹ When the Cardinal reappeared at the papal palace, Innocent received him with his old friendliness and cordiality; his influence, however, was at an end for the *zelanti* among the Cardinals, together with Favoriti, now had the management of affairs.²

Meanwhile the papal nuncio Varese had died in Paris. He had left instructions for his funeral of which no notice was taken in France. The Archbishop of Paris, François de Harlay, explained that the nuncio had no power of jurisdiction in France so that he could give no instructions of this kind and that the burial was the business of the parish priest in whose district death had occurred.³ The funeral was accordingly carried out by the Curé of St. Sulpice.⁴

By way of reply to this insult the Pope decided to send no nuncio to Paris until satisfaction should have been made for what had happened. The business of the nunciature was transacted by Varese's secretary, the Auditor of the Rota Lauri who, however, was not officially recognized by France. Whilst Pomponne remained in office as Foreign Secretary, relations were tolerable, for he was a man of great experience and knowledge of the world and though he stated his views in council without fear, he was at all times guided by great considerateness and kindness, so that he enjoyed the esteem of all.⁵ However, the peaceable and moderate disposition of the minister was out of keeping with the manner which Paris had begun to adopt towards Rome. In November 1679, Pomponne, who was also the object of

¹ Card. Pio to Leopold I., January 18 and February 28, 1679 (DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 114; *En plein conflit*, 28). Cf. GÉRIN in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX. (1876), 439; DUBRUEL, *ibid.*, LXXV. (1904), 602-8.

² DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 114.

³ *Ibid.*, cf. IMMICH, *Innocenz*, XI., 24.

⁴ " *Cifra a Lauri " of May 18, 1683, Papal Sec. Arch., *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170; DUBRUEL, *A propos des obsèques du nonce Varese*, in *Bullet. de litt. ecclés.*, 1926, 63-73.

⁵ For Pomponne, cf. Pietro Venier in BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Francia*, III., 513.

the intrigues of Colbert, fell into disgrace,¹ his place being taken by Croissy, brother to the celebrated minister Colbert. Croissy, who knew no higher ideal than the glory of his sovereign, sought to obtain his end by intimidation and threats and was not at all particular in his choice of means. In addition to this he was also a man of passionate and violent character: even the slightest contradiction on the part of foreign ambassadors would rouse his ire so that relations with him were exceedingly difficult. In the course of negotiations he was ever ready for intrigues and his answers were so vague that the ambassadors never quite knew what to make of anything he said.² The change of personnel in the ministry soon made itself painfully felt in the relations with the Holy See. Croissy would not shake hands with Lauri when greeting the ambassadors, on the plea that this was only due to the accredited representatives of crowned heads,³ nor did he alter his conduct after Lauri had been formally accredited as internuncio.⁴ For quite a long period Lauri's letters were full of this question of the handshake, so much so that on July 12th, 1680, he was instructed by Rome to drop the matter and to give his attention to the far more important question of the *régale*.⁵

Roman circles were aware of a growing estrangement between Innocent XI. and Louis XIV., though the real cause remained a mystery. When Cardinal Pio questioned Cardinal Cibo on the subject, he was given a whole string of reasons which, however, did not touch the core of the dispute.⁶

¹ Cf. GÉRIN, *La disgrâce de M. de Pomponne 18 nov. 1679*, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXIII. (1878), 1-71; BAROZZI-BERCHET, *loc. cit.*

² Pietro Venier, *loc. cit.*, 514 *seq.*

³ BOJANI, III., 108 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁵ "Car on voit que c'est une affaire finie... V. S. doit tourner son attention vers les projets de la cour touchant la *régale*" (*ibid.*, 121 *seq.*).

⁶ Card. Pio to the Emperor Leopold I., September 2, 1679, DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 115.

Innocent had enjoined the strictest silence on the Congregation of the *régale* and he was being strictly obeyed, nor was much information to be drawn from the Duc D'Estrées, the French ambassador. In a letter of September 2nd, 1679, Cardinal Pio wrote that the French ambassador had observed that the hostility of the Curia would in the end compel him to make public the threats about which he had hitherto been silent.¹ On May 19th, 1679, Cardinal Pio wrote to the Emperor that Cibo feared a rupture with France.²

Meanwhile, on December 29th, 1679, the Congregation completed a third Brief to Louis XIV. which was intended as a final statement of the Pope's point of view. But this time also Innocent deferred its dispatch. It may be that he still hoped for a change of feeling in France where it was no doubt difficult to grasp the full gravity of the situation. To the second Brief not even a reply had been made. It looked as if the King of France were firmly convinced of his right, and that he could not understand that for the sake of two Jansenist Bishops, the Pope should oppose him, the Most Christian King. Moreover there was a desire in France to draw out the affair and to wait for the death of the aged Bishop of Pamiers.³ On the other hand the Pope was anxious to have the situation cleared up and as no reply came from France, the Brief of December 29th, 1679, was dispatched on March 13th, 1680.⁴ By a letter of March 20th, the Pope informed Cardinals D'Estrées, Bouillon, Bonsi and Grimaldi of the dispatch of the third Brief to the King.⁵ In these letters Innocent explained that twice already he had drawn the King's attention to the grievous injury which his conduct inflicted on the Church's immunity, that it offended against divine and human justice and was in marked contrast to the

¹ *Ibid.*, 116.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 328.

⁵ The letters are dated February 28, 1679, hence the third Brief to Louis XIV. was already about to be dispatched; BERTHIER, *loc. cit.*

conduct of his predecessors. Twice he had urged him to withdraw his decrees. It grieved him that after waiting for months, he had not as yet received a reply to his last Brief and that not only had there appeared no sign of improvement but, on the contrary, things were growing worse daily, and that with the full knowledge and consent of the King.¹ For the sake of the King's eternal salvation the Pope felt he could no longer countenance such a wrong. "He who heareth you, heareth me," Christ had said. Hence he prayed the King no longer to lend ear to counsels that appeared quite beautiful when considered superficially, though in reality they endangered the very foundations of the French State.² After that the Pope pointed to the example of the various Kings of France who had defended the prerogatives of the Church instead of seeking to curtail them. He fully understood, he continued, how much the King did for religion by crushing heresy in France, but let him see to it that he did not destroy with his left hand what he built up with his right.³ There were many Bishops and priests in France who could advise the King far better, did not fear restrain them. Let the King beware of the anger of heaven. Nothing would induce the Pope to swerve from his principles; on the contrary, he would gladly endure every kind of tribulation for justice' sake.⁴

¹ "Pro comperto affertur omnia deteriore in dies loco esse; . . . institutioni contrariam invehi a saeculari potestate; neque eam clam aut timide fieri, sed palam et manu regia," *ibid.*

² "Nos potius, qui tibi parentis, et quidem amantissimi loco sumus, audire velis vera salutaria suadentes, quam filios diffidentiae, qui terrena tantum sapiunt, quique consiliis in speciem utilibus, sed re vera perniciosis inclyti istius regni fundamenta, in rerum sacrarum reverentia et in ecclesiae autoritate iuribusque tuendis posita, convellunt," *ibid.*

³ "Cavendum tamen diligenter est, ne quod dextera, hoc est ingenita pietas tua aedificat, destruat sinistra, hoc est callida et iniqua consilia dicentium tenebras lucem et lucem tenebras," *ibid.*, 329.

⁴ "Neque tamen ullum inde incommodum aut periculum, nullam, quantumvis saevam atque horribilem tempestatem

Up to this time no one had dared to address such words to the most powerful monarch in Europe, the object of universal adulation. Louis was amazed. He felt particularly hit by the hint that he might die without progeny unless he altered his conduct.¹ We know something of the discussions which took place in the royal council at that period through an interesting account which has only recently been made public.² Three main possibilities were examined. At first it was proposed to submit the question of the *régale* to a Provincial Council for consideration. This suggestion was, however, not acted upon, because recourse to a Council would only be resorted to under extreme pressure,³ and the councillors feared opposition on the part of the Bishops if they were consulted on the question of the *régale*. As it was, two Bishops had offered open resistance, and no doubt many secretly shared their sentiments and would be glad of an opportunity to state them openly. Another suggestion was to ignore this Brief also. However, the King could not deny the fact of its arrival. Moreover Louis was afraid that in that event the Pope would proceed against him with the censures of the Church.⁴ Hence a third view prevailed. It was decided to send a "most courteous" reply, but without touching on any one point of the question of *régale*. All the rest the bearer of the letter was to explain to the Pope by word of

pertimescemus. Ad hoc enim vocati sumus, neque facimus animam Nostram pretiosiore quam Nos, probe intelligentes, non forti solum, sed etiam laeto animo subeundas tribulationes propter iustitiam, in quibus et in cruce Domini Nos unice gloriari oportet. Causam Dei agimus, quaerentes non quae Nostra sunt, sed quae Iesu Christi," *ibid.*, 330.

¹ "observatum fuisse nunquam regias in Gallia stirpes defecisse, nisi ubi reges indebitas ad beneficia nominationes arrogare sibi coepissent," *ibid.*, 329.

² GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 51 *seq.*

³ "qu'on dit qu'un concile était le dernier remède auquel il fallait avoir recours, et qu'il ne fallait s'en servir que dans les conjonctures les plus pressantes," *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 52.

mouth. In this way the French Government hoped to delay the affair ; for meanwhile it was quite possible that the aged Pontiff might die and a solution be found.¹ There can be no doubt that this plan originated with the King himself who, from motives of prudence, was anxious to avoid a rupture with Rome.

At this time the real cause of the tension between Rome and Paris became known in Roman circles also. Cardinal Pio mentions it in his letter of May 18th, 1680, to Leopold I. In accordance with instructions from the Emperor he had requested the Pope to intervene with Louis on behalf of the Duke of Lorraine. Innocent XI. told him that he was most willing to do all he could, but that he must wait for France's answer in the affair of the *régale*, for the relations of the Holy See with that country would depend on the nature of that reply.²

French circles continued to lay all the blame for the Briefs on Cardinal Cibo. It would seem that it was not yet generally known that Favoriti was the real driving power. The French ambassador in Rome took Cardinal Cibo severely to task ; yet when describing the latter's attitude to Leopold I. in a letter of May 18th, 1680, Cardinal Pio states that Cibo had opposed the Briefs and that by his advice Innocent XI. had at first been in favour of oral discussions. Only after other counsellors had gained influence was the Brief dispatched, a fact of which Cibo only became aware later on, at the moment when the Briefs were being dispatched.³

Of the members of the Congregation of the *régale* death carried off about this time Cardinals Barberini and Albizzi. For a whole year the sittings were no longer held at the Pope's palace but at the residence of the senior Cardinal, the Venetian Ottoboni. Gradually the fear took shape that out of consideration for France Venice might forbid the Cardinal to hold

¹ *Ibid.*

² DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 117.

³ " mais depuis sa S^{té} aurait été persuadée par d'autres, et le cardinal n'aurait eu connaissance du bref qu'au moment même où il fut remis pour être expédié," *ibid.*

these meetings at his own house ; as a matter of fact on a previous occasion the Signoria had forbidden him to participate in a Congregation of fourteen Cardinals created by Clement X. for the purpose of dealing with the question of the exemption [franchises] of the ambassadors' quarters, and Ottoboni had submitted on that occasion. It was accordingly suggested that the meetings should be held at the papal palace as before ; however, this would have proved too trying for the aged Ottoboni who resided at the palace of S. Marco, whereas during eight months the Pope resided at the distant Vatican. Moreover—and this is very characteristic—it was desired to provide the Cardinal Secretary of State, Cibo, with a pretext for staying away from discussions which were but little to his liking. So the meetings were held at Cardinal Ludovisi's house, greatly to Ottoboni's satisfaction. Cibo was now able to plead the excessive distance as an excuse for holding aloof.¹ Meanwhile Lauri had not yet been recognized as internuncio because the French Government were determined to force the Pope to accredit a nuncio to Paris. The Pope's feelings were not improved by the fact that about this time the Parliament of Paris condemned a book by the Bishop of Pamiers in which the latter defended the prerogatives of his Church.²

The Pope's annoyance could only be intensified when news reached Rome that the Assembly of the French Clergy had actually been convened at Saint-Germain on May 25th, 1681. Innocent was of opinion that now was the time for action, for nothing was achieved by exhortations and threats, in fact the evil was on the increase, for was not the decree against the Bishop of Pamiers issued after the last peremptory Brief ?³ It was seriously intended to publish a papal Constitution in condemnation of the extension, by the King of France, of the right of the *régale*.⁴

¹ Favoriti in DUBRUEL, *Congregation*, 144.

² *Traité de la régale, imprimé par ordre de M. L'ÉVÊQUE DE PAMIERS pour la défense des droits de son église*, 1680 ; Card. Pio to Leopold I., June 16, 1680, in DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 119. (Pio's letters hereafter quoted are all addressed to Leopold I.)

³ Pio, June 16, 1680, *ibid.*

⁴ Pio, June 30, 1680, *ibid.*

But there were other voices advocating gentler methods: there was reason to fear the consequences of an open rupture with the powerful King of France. This line of conduct was once again championed by Cibo, though people in France continued to hold him responsible for every step taken by the Pope.¹ On July 7th, 1680, no decision had as yet been arrived at. It was said that the Pope would deal with the matter at the next Consistory though no one could tell how—whether he would ask for the Cardinals' opinion, or whether he would content himself with explaining the situation to them.² Most of the members of the Congregation urged action. The French ambassador, the Duc D'Estrées, complained of the Cardinals of Altieri's party who were for ever egging on the Pope to stern measures against France. On the other hand Cardinal Pio affirmed that, on the contrary, several Cardinals of that party advised the Pope in the opposite sense, against Altieri's wishes.³ Innocent still temporized. On July 12th he instructed internuncio Lauri in Paris to try to win over the Archbishop of Rheims for the Roman Curia and to grant to him the Abbey of St. Remi. He also inquired whether the Archbishop still stood in the same high favour with the King.⁴

Louis XIV. had accurate information on the state of mind prevailing at the Curia. Despite his power and his arrogant attitude he feared a solemn condemnation by the Pope of the right of *régale* which he had so vastly extended. He accordingly welcomed Cardinal Rospigliosi's suggestion that for the time being both sides should refrain from further steps and enter upon the sphere of negotiations.⁵ Through his ambassador in Rome, the Duc D'Estrées, Louis XIV. sent a reply to the

¹ Pio, June 30, 1680, *ibid.*

² Pio, July 6, 1680, *ibid.*, 121.

³ Pio, July 13, 1680, *ibid.*, 122.

⁴ BOJANI, III., 121 *seq.* (Letter of Cibo to Lauri.) The Abbey was given to the Archbishop of Rheims by Brief of August 28, 1680 (BERTHIER, I., 364).

⁵ *Cibo to the nuncio, April 24, 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, Papal Sec. Arch. The letter describes the events of 1680.

third Brief in which he expressed, in terms of the utmost respect, his sentiments towards the Holy See. In addition to this the letter announced that Cardinal D'Estrées was coming to Rome as ambassador extraordinary. The King also spoke of his conviction that his undertakings would not prosper if the estrangement between himself and the Pope continued.¹

Cardinal Pio suspected some *arrière-pensée* behind the King's action. He felt that France wished to gain time and to have Cardinal D'Estrées, as well as his brother, as ambassador in Rome, in order to establish a precedent of a French ambassador being received without renouncing the exemption of his quarters. The Duc D'Estrées' conduct was distinguished for its moderation, Cardinal Pio went on, whereas that of the Cardinal was violent. The Vatican was not prepared to look upon the Cardinal as a real ambassador whilst the latter's brother remained in Rome in that capacity.² When the Duc D'Estrées presented Louis XIV.'s letter, the Pope expressed his thanks for the Cardinal's mission and these he repeated in a Brief of July 12th, 1680, to the King of France.³ In his account to the Emperor of the French ambassador's audience with the Pope, Cardinal Pio wrote on July 20th, 1680, that the Duc D'Estrées had complained of the sharp language of the Brief; particular offence had been given by the Pope's remark that in punishment for his conduct the King might die without issue. To this Innocent was said to have replied that Louis had not acknowledged the first two Briefs, and that he himself had the welfare of the King's soul so much at heart that he could not omit another and more earnest warning. If the King failed to see his mistake in this life, he would realize it all the more clearly in the next. The King must extirpate the evil root of the *régale* if he did not wish to bring about his own ruin and the ruin of those who would come after him. Let him adopt

¹ Pio, July, 13, 1680, in DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 122.

² Pio, July 13, 1680, *ibid.*, 121.

³ BERTHIER, I., 357.

another policy lest punishment should fall upon his race, even in his lifetime.¹ It is doubtful whether the Duc D'Estrées communicated this grave warning to his sovereign. If he did, the aging monarch must have recalled it to mind at a later date when death snatched away the princes of his own blood, leaving him with one sickly child of tender years.

At Rome the chief instigators of the anti-papal feeling in France were believed to be the Archbishop of Paris, François de Harlay, and the King's confessor, the Jesuit François d'Aix de La Chaize. Cardinal Cibo sought to combat this impression by representing the King's submissive letter as precisely the work of the Archbishop and the confessor. But the Pope's entourage would not be convinced. Cardinal Pio reports that Innocent XI. had requested the General of the Jesuits to warn Père La Chaize and to proceed against Père Maimbourg whose writings were detrimental to the Church on the question of the *régale* also.²

In France, the Bishop of Pamiers continued to be the soul of the opposition to the King. On July 17th, 1680, the Pope had encouraged him to remain steadfast, had cordially praised his unwavering attitude and informed him of his intention to proceed energetically against the Archbishop of Toulouse because of his contempt for the decrees of the Council of Lyons. Meanwhile, however, a letter had come from the King in which Louis informed the Pontiff, with filial devotion, of the arrival of Cardinal D'Estrées as ambassador in the affair of the *régale*. This was why proceedings against the Metropolitan of Toulouse had been delayed.³

Meanwhile reports had reached Rome about the Assembly of the French Clergy at Saint Germain which, in a memorial to Louis, dated July 10th, 1680, had taken the King's part in most unbecoming fashion and protested against the "extraordinary procedure" of the Pope. The Assembly, so the

¹ Pio, July 20, 1680, *loc. cit.*, 122.

² Pio, July 27, 1680, *ibid.*, 124.

³ BERTHIER, I., 357.

document states, had learnt with extreme displeasure that the Pope had sent a Brief to the King in which he not only warned him not to subject some of our Churches to the right of *régale*, but even threatened to use his authority should the King refuse to bow to the Pope's fatherly representations. They had deemed it their duty not to remain silent in a circumstance of such gravity, when they had seen, to their great grief, the eldest son of the Church and her protector threatened in a tone which had been adopted on other occasions against such princes as had arrogated to themselves the Church's prerogatives. They could only view with sorrow a proceeding calculated to injure, rather than to uphold, the honour of religion and that of the Holy See. Such was their attachment to the King that nothing could separate them from him ; and since a protestation of this kind might help to deprive the futile efforts of the Holy See of their effect, it should be renewed with the utmost sincerity and devotion.¹ It is easy to imagine the impression made in Rome by such a document. On August 10th, 1680, Cardinal Pio wrote to the Emperor that the French Government had exercised strong pressure on the clergy with a view to their estrangement from the Holy See and a consequent increase of its own authority. France, so it seemed, wished to sow discord between Pope and clergy in order that Innocent XI. should be completely isolated and so compelled to invoke the King's help against the clergy, in return for which the Pope would have to make concessions in the matter of the *régale*. For the moment Rome was willing to wait for the arrival of Cardinal D'Estrées, but was resolved to take action if he did not arrive soon. There were still loyal French prelates who, though they had not dared to speak at the Assembly, nevertheless urged the Pope to intervene.²

Among the laity the last Brief of Innocent XI. was very adversely judged. People said that it adopted a most unusual tone towards the King. But the shameful attitude of the

¹ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 53.

² Pio, August 10, 1680, *loc. cit.*, 125.

French clergy was the object of no less blame, especially on the part of the educated classes.¹

Unfortunately at this precise time the head of the French clergy, François de Harlay, Archbishop of Paris, who had presided over the Assembly of the clergy, set the very worst example of complacency in the face of the arbitrariness of the Government by his action with regard to the Convent of Charonne, near Paris. The Augustinian nuns of Charonne enjoyed the right freely to choose their superioress every three years. In 1676 a royal ordinance forced on the convent a new superioress in the person of a nun who was herself a Cistercian. This nun was approved and installed by the Archbishop of Paris. By a Brief of August 7th, 1680, Innocent XI. declared this choice null and void and restored to the nuns their right of election.² However, a decree of the royal council declared the Brief invalid and appealed to Parliament, on the plea of abuse of the papal authority.³ Parliament forbade the nuns to give effect to the Brief, whereupon the Pope, by a fresh Brief, dated October 15th, 1680, commanded them to take no notice of the French decrees and to obey only their lawfully elected superioress.⁴

Fresh disturbances in the diocese of Pamiers also contributed to render the situation still more acute. The death of old Bishop Caulet, who died there on August 7th, 1680, was the signal for the outbreak of a miniature schism. The Chapter, whose duty it was to elect a Vicar Capitular for the period of the vacancy of the see, was split into two parties. That body was partly composed of Canons appointed by the late Bishop and partly of men named by the King on the basis of the right of *régale*. Those loyal to Rome elected

¹ GÉRIN (54 *seqq.*) adduces a number of proofs, whilst he declares that he knows of not one publication speaking favourably of the attitude of the clergy.

² BERTHIER, I., 360.

³ GÉRIN, 57. There was question of a so-called "appellation comme d'abus".

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 383.

D'Aubarède and Rech whilst the others got the Archbishop of Toulouse to name a certain Fortassin.¹ Innocent XI. decided, of course, in favour of the Roman party. In a Brief of September 25th, 1680, he condoled with the Chapter on the death of the Bishop and exhorted the Vicars Michel D'Aubarède and Bernard Rech, together with the Chapter, to follow the example of the deceased prelate.²

The royal intendant Foucauld, now repaired to Pamiers, installed Fortassin by force of arms and banished D'Aubarède and Rech.³ This the Pope could not suffer in silence. In a Brief dated October 2nd, 1680, he exhorted the Chapter to remain steadfast and ordered the election of another Administrator.⁴ On the same day he expressed his surprise to the Archbishop of Toulouse that he should have absolved priests whom the Bishop of Pamiers had declared to have fallen under the censures of the Council of Lyons and demanded the withdrawal of so illegal an act.⁵ The Chapter elected Jean Cerle as Vicar and on January 1st, 1681, the Pope assured him of his protection.⁶ Many people in Rome expected sharper measures, among them Queen Christine.⁷

Attempts were henceforth made in France to unmask Favoriti as a Jansenist and thus to bring about his fall. More and more the French ministers suspected him of being the instigator of the papal measures against Louis XIV. Accordingly, a royal decree ordered the papers of the late Bishop of Pamiers to be seized in the hope of finding compromising documents among them. On November 2nd, 1680, Cardinal Pio was able to inform the Emperor that these hopes had not been fulfilled; that Favoriti had always submitted his correspondence to the Pope and nothing incriminating

¹ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 58 seq.

² BERTHIER, I., 376.

³ GÉRIN, 59.

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 377.

⁵ *Ibid.*,

⁶ *Ibid.*, 393.

⁷ Pio, September 28, 1680, *loc. cit.*, 126.

could be found in it.¹ One consequence of these measures was a further altercation between the Pope and the French ambassador who had had a hand in the action against Favoriti. In the course of an audience Innocent spoke to him in sharp terms. The Duc D'Estrées replied that all those who opposed the *régale* were Jansenists, as was proved by the papers of the Bishop of Pamiers. People in France were very much surprised that the Pope should make common cause with these sectaries against a King who did so much for the Church and who repressed the Huguenots. Innocent replied that the King was indeed worthy of all praise when he displayed so much zeal against the Calvinists but how could that be reconciled with the fact that he had appointed that arch-Huguenot Maimbourg his own historiographer? ²

Not a little anxiety prevailed in France as to the likelihood of further measures by the Pope, hence a royal decree commanded anyone who received a papal document to surrender it unopened to the King.³ In view of measures such as these the hope of a compromise became more and more faint. Cardinal Cibo was anxious for a reconciliation but he had lost all influence as Innocent thought that France only showed so bold a front because she relied on that Cardinal's prestige; on top of everything Cibo fell ill again just then.⁴ At this time Cardinal Pio reported that France was thinking of excluding Cardinals Ottoboni, Carpegna and Azzolini at the next conclave on the ground of their hostility to France, for they and Favoriti were held responsible for the objectionable Briefs. Cardinal Pio further reported that though Cardinal D'Estrées would be received with every mark of honour, the Pope had no intention of granting him any concessions.⁵ As a matter of fact, without waiting for the arrival of the envoy, Innocent XI. took a further important step by reserving the whole affair of Pamiers to his own

¹ Pio, November 2, 1680, *ibid.*, 127.

² Pio, November 18, 1680, *ibid.*, 128.

³ Pio, November 30, 1680, *ibid.*, 129.

⁴ Pio, December 14, 1680, *ibid.* For Cibo, see LIPPI, 229.

⁵ Pio, December 14, 1680, *ibid.*

judgment and he himself informed the Archbishop of Toulouse, as the Metropolitan, of this decision.¹

D'Estrées had meanwhile set out, but he seemed in no hurry to get to Rome. He made a lengthy stay at Venice. Innocent complained of this delay at a consistory of December 14th in such severe terms that, contrary to the usual practice, the address was not recorded in the consistorial acts, in fact everything was done to suppress it.²

However, the French Cardinal was expected in January, 1681. It was generally believed that his instructions were to prevent a rupture at all costs, but to spare neither prayers nor threats in order to gain his object. The fact was that not everybody in France approved of the conduct of the ministers who were being sharply attacked in a number of pamphlets.³ In particular, the Archbishop of Paris, who was the object of universal contempt on account of his immoral life, was severely attacked.⁴ For all that it was feared in Rome that French intrigues might not be without making an impression even in the Eternal City. People recalled to mind the days of the previous pontificate, when all the representatives of the Powers united against the Pope⁵ and there was talk of all sorts of plans on the part of France, the aim of which was to isolate Innocent XI. and to provoke disturbances in the Papal States.⁶

Whilst D'Estrées was nearing the borders of the States of the Church, two Gallican works were condemned in Rome, not by a simple prohibition of the Index but by a special Brief. One was by Jean Gerbais, written by order of the Assembly of the French Clergy,⁷ the other was the History

¹ Pio, December 12, 1680, *ibid.*, 130.

² **Nunziat. diverse*, 106, f. 31^b, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ "Les bon Français s'irritent contre les mauvais conseillers du Roi; . . . des imprimés les déchirent publiquement en France." Pio, December 12, 1680, *loc. cit.*, 130.

⁴ See the portrait below, p. 286.

⁵ See Vol. XXXI., p. 501.

⁶ Pio, December 21, 1680, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Sur les causes majeures*; cf. REUSCH, II., 369.

of Lutheranism by Maimbourg. The General of the Jesuits was commanded to expel Maimbourg from the Society.¹

A feeling prevailed in cardinalitial circles that the Pope must act more energetically if France refused to put a stop to the innovations. The French ambassador informed his brother, the Cardinal, of the prohibition of the two books and advised him to ask for fresh instructions.² Cardinals Ottoboni, Carpegna and Azzolini once more counselled gentleness though they no longer hoped to obtain anything.³

The final decision was taken at the consistory of January 13th, 1681. Cardinal Cibo first learnt what was pending from public rumour and only on the previous evening did the Pope give him more precise information. In his allocution Innocent XI. explained how, from the moment when he accepted his election, he had foreseen that he would have to wage fierce contests with the secular Powers. He then turned to the question of the *régale* and drew a picture of the conduct of the King of France since 1673. Whereas formerly he had been content to watch over the revenues of vacant benefices, he now pretended to a real dominion over ecclesiastical offices of which he disposed according to his own good pleasure, thereby violating the decrees of the Council of Lyons. He then reminded the Sacred College of his three Briefs to Louis XIV. By way of a reply to them the King had announced the dispatch of Cardinal D'Estrées in the previous July, yet the Cardinal had not yet been seen in Rome. The situation of the Church allowed of no further delay. The Pope protested that he was determined to serve the true interests of the Church of France. He begged the Cardinals to assist him in this task, for he did not wish to act without

¹ DUBRUEL, *Extension*, 131; REUSCH, II., 584. Maimbourg was made to leave the Order on February 10, 1682, whereupon the King assigned a pension to him; cf. MICHAEL, *Döllinger*, 445, n. 1.

² Pio, December 28, 1680, *loc. cit.*, 131.

³ Pio, January 4, 1681, *ibid.*, 132.

their advice.¹ On January 23rd Cardinal Pio reported to the Emperor that those who had been instrumental in bringing about the consistory, were in favour of publishing the text of the allocution, but even Favoriti deprecated such a step.² When Cardinal D'Estrées at length arrived in Rome he was received with the highest honours and negotiations began at once. The rôle of go-between between the Curia and the brothers D'Estrées was assumed by Urbano Giorio who subsequently wrote an account of his activities as a mediator.³ The Congregation for the question of the *régale*

¹ **Cod. Barb.* 2896, Vat. Library. LÄMMER gives an Italian text (*Melet.*, 469). DUBRUEL (*Extension*, 133) gives Card. Pio's account. According to this source the Pope described the French councillors as "pessimi consiglieri Babilonici". It is quite possible that this expression may have escaped Innocent XI. in his excitement.

² Pio, January 23, 1681, *loc. cit.*, 135.

³ " *Il pontificato di Papa Innocenzo XI. ovvero ragguaglio istorico, nel qual si riferiscono tutte le contese insorte fra le due corti di Roma e di Francia, con i progetti di concordia fatti da Msgr. Urbano Giorio per impedirle da prima e poi comporle etc." The concluding chapter has the dedication to Innocent XI., dated June 29, 1689, *Nunziat. div.*, 106, Papal Sec. Arch. A contemporary copy is in the possession of Baron De Bildt. The author declares that he acted as mediator at the request of the Pope which had been made known to him by Favoriti and Cibo (f. 13). In the general interest of Christendom Giorio is anxious to preserve peace between Innocent and Louis. In the Pope he sees a saintly man whose best intentions are crossed by anti-French counsellors. He speaks in most severe terms of the Pope's advisers (f. 14 *seq.*), who had robbed well-trying Card. Cibo of all influence. Giorio is full of enthusiasm for Louis XIV. He sees in him (f. 115^b) a hero who was the glory of his age. He cannot understand why Innocent XI. would not make concessions to such a king by accepting a solution proposed by himself. If Giorio's attitude is absolutely Francophile, GÉRIN (*Révocation*, 427) nevertheless goes perhaps too far when he describes him as an "espion et pensionnaire de la France". On occasion Giorio has severe words for Louis XIV., and especially for his advisers. His lively account is not without historical value,

played no very special part in the negotiations. It drew up the Brief in which Innocent warmly expressed his thanks for D'Estrées' mission, though he also remarked that what had happened in the diocese of Pamiers ill agreed with the fine words of the royal letter of which the envoy was the bearer.¹ Soon after, in April 1681, the Pope quite unexpectedly ordered the suspension of the sittings.² The reason for this measure lay probably in the fact that France insisted on oral and direct negotiations between the Pope and Cardinal D'Estrées as the King declined to set down his reasons in writing and refused to acknowledge the competence of the Congregation in the question of the *régale*. Croissy declared that the only lawful authority to decide the question of the *régale* was the Parliament of Paris.³

In point of fact the first impulse for what now followed came from Parliament. That body took up once more the idea of a national Council with a view to using the clergy to protect its rear in the forthcoming attack against Rome. In the spring of 1681 the Bishops then in Paris met at the palace of the Archbishop for the purpose of discussing the situation of the Church. This was the so-called "Small Assembly".⁴ The leaders of the gathering were Archbishop François de Harlay of Paris and Le Tellier of Rheims. The result of the deliberations was submitted to Louis XIV. in the form of four articles which run as follows: 1. The French Bishops did the right thing when, for the sake of peace, they submitted to the declarations of 1673 and 1675 on the question

all the more so as it is in substantial agreement with contemporary documents.

¹ Brief of March 3, 1681, in BERTHIER, I., 406.

² DUBRUEL, *Congrégation*, 144.

³ *Il Sig. de Croissy ha detto che il Re non permetterà mai che le sue ragioni si mettano in scritto, e molto meno che si reconosca in questo affare pro giudice la congregazione deputata da N. S^{re}, mentre non veniva qui riconosciuto altro giudice in materia di Regalia che il parlamento di Parigi. *Cifra dal Nuntio* of April 21, 1681, Nunziat. di Francia, 166, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ *Petite Assemblée*.

of the *régale*. 2. Gerbais' book, which had been condemned by Rome, was approved in general terms. With regard to another book which, it was alleged, trenched rather too closely on the rights of Bishops, they were satisfied with the author's explanation. 3. The fifty-two Bishops disapproved of the papal decision regarding the nuns of Charonne which, they said, had been given without previous understanding with the Archbishop of Paris, their ordinary superior. 4. The measures taken by Rome in the dispute of Pamiers are described as an infringement of Gallican liberties. Finally they suggest the convocation by the King of a national Council or a General Assembly of the French Clergy.¹ Louis suffered the clergy to do as they pleased, without interfering with them, seeing that they provided him with a weapon in his struggle for the right of *régale*. It was generally thought in Paris that the King would not yield in the question of the *régale* though, on the other hand, he would not suffer France to separate from the Roman Church.²

Racine aptly describes this assembly of fifty-two Bishops, abjectly devoted to the King but neglectful of the first duty of Bishops, viz. that of residence.³ Three thousand copies of

¹ Text of the discussions and resolutions in GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 65 *seqq.* *Nunziat. di Francia*, 166 (Papal Sec. Arch.), contains (in code) Lauri's reports on the proceedings. On May 3, 1681, he reports that the proposal of a national council had been made "solo per far paura a Roma".

² It is generally thought "che il Re per qualunque accidente che arrivi sia risolutissimo di non comportar mai che il regno di Francia si separi dalla chiesa Romana, ogn'uno n'è persuaso; ma ogn'uno tiene anche per certo che S. M^{ta} non voglia cedere alla pretentione di usar della Regalia in tutte le chiese del regno". Lauri, April 7, 1681, *loc. cit.*

³ "Un ordre, hier venu de Saint-Germain,

Veut qu'on s'assemble. On s'assemble demain.

Notre archevêque, et cinquante-deux autres

Successeurs des apôtres

S'y trouveront. Or de savoir quel cas

S'y doit traiter, c'est encore un mystère.

C'est seulement une chose très-claire

the resolutions of the Assembly were printed and distributed.¹ With the exception of the Bishop of Arras, all the members of the Assembly seem to have signed its acts.² The King answered the courageous act of the Bishop with a *lettre de cachet* ordering him to leave the court at once, to return to his diocese and not to leave it in future without permission.³

The events in Paris greatly impeded Cardinal D'Estrées' negotiations in Rome, nor did public opinion in France expect any marked gain from them.⁴ Thereupon the Duchess of Savoy, at the prompting of Cardinal Rospigliosi, made an attempt at mediation by offering her services to the Pope through the Turin nuncio Muzio. Innocent gladly accepted the mediation but explained that it could only consist in enlightening the King since in view of the fact that the Church was indisputably in the right, an agreement could only be reached by Louis giving in.⁵ In these circumstances the Duchess did not dare to approach Louis XIV. though she felt convinced of the justice of the Pope's case.⁶

Whilst Cardinal D'Estrées laboured in Rome, or at least seemed to labour, on the basis of Rospigliosi's proposal, for a mutual "suspension" of any further action, fresh steps were being taken in France.

Que nous avions cinquante-deux prélats
Qui ne résidoient pas."

Œuvres de J. RACINE, éd. PAUL MESNARD, IV., Paris, 1886, 189.

¹ *Lauri, May 19, 1681, *loc. cit.*

² **Id.*, May 23, 1681, *ibid.*

³ **Id.*, May 26, 1681, *ibid.*

⁴ **Id.*, May 28, 1681, *ibid.*

⁵ "ma che essendo manifesta la giustizia della causa difesa dalla Stà Sua, non sapeva vedere qual altra forma di aggiustamento vi fosse che di sodisfare alla chiesa e di rivocar gli attentati contra di essa e desistere della vessatione di quelli che procurano di difendere le ragioni e la libertà," Cibo to nuncio Muzio, July 2, 1681, in BOJANI, II., 126.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 127.

(2.)

ON July 16th, 1681, Louis XIV. issued orders to the Archbishops of the realm that they should have elected at provincial assemblies of their clergy, delegates for a larger assembly of a similar kind which was to meet on October 1st.¹ The French clergy was in the habit of holding such assemblies at stated periods but originally and even at a later date, they were concerned, at least in the first instance, with temporal affairs, such as taxes and the like. The fact that it would not be so this time was only revealed in the letters of invitation to the Archbishops of Cambrai and Besançon whose dioceses had only recently been incorporated in the French realm. These prelates were expressly told that this time there would only be question of purely spiritual matters, the decision of which concerned equally all the Bishops of the Kingdom.² The Government was anxious to widen the range of the Assembly of the Clergy's authority in the spiritual sphere in order that, whilst attacking the Holy See, it might itself remain in the background and take cover behind the authority of the clergy. Already in 1670 the learned Baluze had advised Colbert in this sense, basing himself on the precedent of Philip the Fair, Charles VI and Louis XI. and XII. who, he said, had not acted otherwise.³

¹ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 75. The Assembly was commanded 'de faire députer deux du premier ordre et deux du second ordre pour l'assemblée générale'. Cf. HANOTAUX, *Recueil*, Rome, II., XIII.; CH. BELLET, *Hist. du card. Le Camus*, Paris, 1886, 211 seq.

² There was question of "une occasion où il s'agissait de *matières purement spirituelles*, à la décision desquelles tous les évêques de son royaume avaient, un égal intérêt; il estimait nécessaire d'y faire venir les députés des provinces, tant de l'ancien clergé de France, qui se trouvent ordinairement aux assemblées *tenues pour les affaires temporelles*, que des provinces nouvellement conquises". GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 117.

³ "Il peut arriver que le Roi sera bien aise de pouvoir opposer cette autorité [of the Assembly of the clergy] aux entreprises de la cour de Rome" (Baluze). *Ibid.*, 119.

Whilst preparing for the Assembly, the Government, of course, saw to it that only such ecclesiastics were chosen as deputies on whose devotion it could rely. If the choice fell on an unacceptable personality it was simply vetoed and the election of another ordered.¹ An Instruction was drawn up setting down the duties of the deputies. They were to draw up in a joint deliberation the measures to be taken for the settlement of the dispute over the *régale*, confirming them with their signature; they were also to do their best to put a stop to such encroachments by Rome, both past and future, as were contrary to the concordat. Special mention was made in this connexion of the alleged encroachments concerning Charonne, Pamiers and Toulouse. A further task of the Assembly was to maintain the jurisdiction of the Bishops as determined by the concordat. In the case of appeals to Rome the Pope must nominate commissaries empowered to give a decision in France itself. In short it was the deputies' duty to preserve the Gallican liberties by all suitable means.² Whatever the Assembly did to this end, even though it was done without special authorization, had the approval of the King.

This Instruction was drawn up by a commission presided over by the Archbishop of Paris and appointed by the "Small Assembly". It was then sent to the Archbishop as the work of this commission so that it had the semblance of being an exclusively clerical document. To preserve this appearance every passage that might have betrayed the pressure of the Government was expunged by order of Colbert, though in reality the Instruction had been submitted to the King and approved by him.³

In conformity with the royal command the Archbishops now convened their provincial assemblies. The Archbishop of Rheims, Le Tellier, met with a difficulty at the very outset

¹ *Ibid.*, 124, the customary form of invitation.

² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 127.

³ Letter of Colbert, June 16, 1681, *ibid.*, 125 *seq.*: "Sa majesté ayant estimé qu'il ne fallait pas qu'il parût rien de sa part qui déterminât les matières qui doivent être traitées dans ladite assemblée."

of his assembly. In its fourth point the "Small Assembly" had decreed that at the provincial assemblies Bishops alone would have a deliberative voice, whilst simple priests would only have a consultative one. The lower clergy, whom the Archbishop of Rheims had convened at Senlis, protested against this arrangement, but their protests were suppressed. Louis XIV. sanctioned this act of violence and saw to it that all the Bishops were promptly informed of it, so as to prevent a repetition of it elsewhere.¹ The King was afraid of opposition to his action on the part of the simple priests and on the part of the regulars who were not consulted at all. In other ways also the Government did not shrink from arbitrary measures. To the Archbishop of Rouen Colbert wrote that he wanted the Bishop of Lisieux to be a deputy. Accordingly that prelate was elected, and when an accident prevented him from putting in an appearance, the King simply dispensed with a fresh election and, by his own supreme authority, substituted for him the Bishop of Avranches.² Everywhere pressure was exercised on the elections. From his hiding place Cerle, the banished Vicar Capitular of Pamiers, issued two protests against these proceedings, but without effect. In these circumstances Cardinal Grimaldi, Archbishop of Aix, refused to convene an assembly. He maintained that it would be illegal in any case. The assembly would not be free, since the deputies whose election was desired were designated beforehand by royal letter. Nor would Grimaldi have anything to do with the Instruction. He issued a warning against the undermining of ecclesiastical authority as the secular power also stood or fell with it.³ A protest having been lodged with the King, Grimaldi was told in an autograph letter to drop

¹ *Ibid.*, 128.

² *Ibid.*, 129 *seqq.*

³ Report of the *Intendant* of Provence, August 12, 1681, to the Government on his conversation with Card. Grimaldi on the occasion of his submitting the instructions to him (*ibid.*, 135-147). Cf. *Lauri, August 1, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 166, Papal Sec. Arch.

all objections¹ and to comply with the King's will. Through the Intendant of Provence, Louis informed the Cardinal that it was his royal decision to leave the provincial assembly full liberty.² Grimaldi, however, did not trust him, and declined to convene the provincial assembly. However, just as it was intended to hold a national Council without the Pope, so did the Government not hesitate to organize a diocesan synod against the will of the Metropolitan. Bishop Valavoire of Riez was instructed to convene the assembly and to preside over its deliberations which, accordingly, led to the desired result.³ The clergy of Aix had stated their real sentiments, which were those of loyalty to Rome, in a memorial in which it charged its representatives to denounce the illegality of the extension of the right of *végale* and the Government's action at Charonne and Toulouse.

After so careful a preparation, thirty-four Bishops and thirty-seven other prelates from the hundred and twenty dioceses of France at length assembled in Paris in October, 1681. On November 1st, Bossuet delivered his famous inaugural discourse on the unity of the Church, a masterpiece of eloquence, full of excellent and noble thoughts, but resting on the Gallican standpoint. If they followed in the footsteps of St. Louis and Charlemagne, Bossuet declared, they would not separate themselves from the Chair of Peter; on the contrary, they would preserve the unity of the head and the members.⁴

The object which it was desired to realize by means of the Assembly is revealed by a glance at the person of its president, the Archbishop of Paris, François de Harlay. Born in Paris

¹ " toutes considérations cessantes." GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 147.

² " de laisser une liberté entière à ladite assemblée tant pour la nomination des députés que pour la manière dont la procuration leur doit être donnée. *Ibid.*, 146.

³ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁴ Text, *ibid.*, 148. *Il discorso, sento che fu lunghissimo e molto erudito, e che le cose vi furono portate in maniera, come se si fosse voluto salvar tutte le parti." Lauri, November 10, 1682, *loc. cit.*

in 1625, Harlay had become Archbishop of Rouen when only twenty-six years old. Mazarin, with his wonted clear-sightedness, had perceived that this highly gifted, eloquent, engaging and ambitious personality might become a valuable tool in the hands of the Government. In 1671 Harlay was translated to the archiepiscopal see of Paris and three years later he was raised to the rank of a Duke. He was a man wholly after the *Roi Soleil's* own heart; a charming *grand seigneur* and an accomplished courtier whose immoral life was no secret.¹ In the affair of the *régale* Harlay's conduct had been so satisfactory that he was selected for the chief rôle in the Paris Assembly, seeing that in questions affecting the Church, his opinions were, in fact, more radical than those of many laymen.²

Harlay's secretary well described his employer when he called him the Pope of this side of the mountains. Harlay seems in fact to have aspired to such a rôle. A report of 1682 describes him as an exceedingly unruly and ambitious man, who aspired to become the Patriarch of France. Harlay held the principle that, once a Bishop was confirmed by the Pope, he could act with absolute independence from Rome within his diocese.³ Bossuet describes him as a man who, at the Assembly, only thought of flattering the court and of doing the will of the ministers with the submissiveness of a lackey.⁴ Even in Harlay's lifetime Fénelon, in a letter to the King speaks of him as a corrupt, scandalous and incorrigible personage, whose only ambition it was to gratify the King.⁵

¹ SAINT-SIMON, *Mémoires*, II., 349. Cf. *Lettre de FÉNELON à Louis XIV.*, Paris, 1825, 23 seq. ² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 172 seq.

³ Report of Jacobelli, auditor of the nunciature at Venice, to Cibo, May 12, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 133.

⁴ "Feu M. de Paris ne faisait en tout cela que flatter la cour, écouter les ministres et suivre à l'aveugle leurs volontés comme un valet." GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 173.

⁵ "Vous avez un archevêque corrompu, scandaleux, incorrigible, faux, malin, artificieux, ennemi de toute vertu et qui fait gémir tous les gens de bien. Vous vous en accomodez parce qu'il ne songe qu'à vous plaire par ses flatteries." *Ibid.*, 175.

Harlay's conduct was admirably characterized in the few words in which Madame de Coulanges imparted the news of his death on August 25th, 1695: "The question now is to find someone to preach the funeral oration," she wrote; "it is said that only two little things make this duty difficult; namely, the life of the Archbishop and his death."¹ Some reports in the Papal Secret Archives of the year 1687 throw a most unfavourable light on the moral conduct of this Prince of the Church.²

Equally worldly, un priestly, and blindly devoted to the Government were the other leaders of the Assembly of Paris, viz. Serroni, Archbishop of Albi³ and one of Mazarin's creatures; Nicolas Colbert, the son of the minister, whom the Pope, at the instance of Louis XIV., had named coadjutor of Rouen with the title of Archbishop of Carthage⁴ and the second president of the Assembly, Charles Maurice Le Tellier, Archbishop of Rheims and son of the Chancellor, a prominent opponent of the prerogatives of the Holy See.⁵ Exclusive of the Archbishops, the Bishops of the Assembly

¹ "Il s'agit maintenant de trouver quelqu'un qui se charge de l'oraison funèbre du mort. On prétend qu'il n'y a que deux petites bagatelles qui rendent cet ouvrage difficile: c'est la vie et la mort." *Ibid.*, 169.

² *Cibo to the nuncio, February 4, 1687 (*Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, Papal Sec. Arch.): Nuncio Ranuzzi's attention is drawn to rumours according to which the Archbishop was suffering from a certain disease ("d'un male di cui la modestia consiglia a non dire il nome"). Ranuzzi is told to get in touch with La Chaize (similarly in the **Cifra* of March 11). La Chaize seems to have looked upon the matter as pretty harmless so that Innocent XI. informed the nuncio on May 22, 1687, that this may be so but that it was unseemly for an Archbishop to be so often in the house of a singer ("con tanta domestichezza e frequenza in casa d'una femina che canta"). The nuncio is told to speak to the King on the subject in order that the latter should induce Harlay to refrain; cf. also *Cibo to Ranuzzi.

³ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 176.

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 341.

⁵ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 189 seq.

numbered twenty-six. Among them there were men of great learning and exemplary conduct, but they did not dare to rise in protest against the encroachments of the Government.¹ Among the Bishops the outstanding figure was Bossuet who had only consented to be present at the particular request of the court.² The authorities were all the more anxious for the presence of the learned young Bishop, whose leaning towards the court was known, as the other luminaries of piety and learning, such as Fénelon, Mabillon, Rancé and many others, were kept at a distance by reason of their opinions.

In consequence of their subordinate rôle, the influence of the lower clergy on the Assembly was but slender. Besides Fleury, mention must be made of the Abbé Gerbais who had already taken up a position hostile to Rome in the question of the theses of 1663.³ His work on "Major Causes" had been qualified as heretical by Innocent XI. on December 18th, 1680, and censured accordingly. Gerbais was an intimate of Harlay as well as of the royal councillors and even before the opening of the Assembly he observed that it would not content itself with dealing with the question of the *régale* but that his book and the authority of the Church would also come up for discussion.⁴ In fact the "Small Assembly" had already given its opinion on the book.⁵ For all those members of the lower clergy who were allowed to take part in the Assembly the King had in readiness rich benefices, dioceses and abbeys with which to reward any services that they might eventually render to him.⁶

Besides the report of internuncio Lauri, we have two important sources of information on the proceedings at the Assembly. The first consists of notes by Abbé Fleury of a conversation with Bossuet. They only give the leading ideas

¹ *Ibid.*, 204-225.

² *Corresp. de Bossuet.*, éd. Urbain et Levesque, II., 256.

³ *Cf.* above, p. 248, and GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 482.

⁴ GÉRIN, 231.

⁵ Above, p. 280.

⁶ GÉRIN, 239 *seq.*

but despite their fragmentary nature these notes allow us a glimpse into the labours of the consulting commission. Then there is an unknown writer, but one who must have been in touch with Fleury, or perhaps with Bossuet, who drew up a survey of the whole course of the discussions.¹ As is the case in all big gatherings, the brunt of the work was borne by committees on which the Government managed to exercise pressure both directly and indirectly. The plenary Assembly adopted the proposals of the committees as its own decisions, all in a seemingly ecclesiastical framework.

The study of the question of the *régale* was entrusted to the Grand Chancellor, Le Tellier, his son Archbishop Le Tellier of Rheims and Bossuet. The two Le Telliers led the discussion. The commission started from the assumption that certain people were making strenuous efforts to destroy both the liberties of the Gallican Church and their foundations.² This was, of course, aimed in the first instance at Innocent XI. who, according to French opinion, should not have intervened in the conflicts of Charonne and Pamiers before he had had the affair examined on the spot by his commissaries, as was laid down by the concordat.³ However, here there was no question of appeals in the sense of the concordat, but of the protection by the Pope of oppressed clerics. With this pretence of safeguarding Gallican liberties against alleged encroachments on the part of the Pope, the true liberties of the Church of France were in reality being surrendered to the King and his advisers. On February 3rd, 1682, the Assembly allowed the idolized head of the realm to extend the right of *régale* to all the dioceses of the realm after Louis had agreed to various slight concessions in regard to the practical exercise of the

¹ *Nunziat. di Francia*, 166, Cifre da Lauri, 1681, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. the two accounts in GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 264 *seqq.* (hereafter quoted as FLEURY in GÉRIN and ANONYMUS in GÉRIN).

² " Cleri Gallicani de ecclesiastica potestate declaratio " : " Ecclesiae Gallicanae decreta et libertates a maioribus nostris tanto studio propugnatas, earumque fundamenta, sacris canonibus et patrum traditione nixa, multi diruere moliuntur." *Mention*, 26.

³ ANONYMUS in GÉRIN, 268 *seq.*

right.¹ It was on such a basis that the first of the four Gallican Articles of 1682 was formulated. It embodied a doctrinal statement, and asserted that the King and all secular princes were in all respects independent of ecclesiastical authority in everything temporal and that the Pope had no power to depose a prince.²

In this way a solution was also found for the question of *régale* since it was looked upon as a prerogative of the French crown which the Pope could not touch. The Article which the Assembly accepted on March 19th was a very dangerous one, as any delimitation of the secular sphere had been purposely omitted so that, by means of a wide interpretation, it could be made to include almost every question in dispute between the spiritual and the secular powers. In the next three Articles the Assembly dealt with the range of papal power, though this point had not been foreseen at first.³ In one of the sessions of the committee the Archbishop of Rheims and his father insisted on a discussion of the boundaries of papal authority, but Bossuet opposed the proposal on the ground that it lay outside the pre-arranged scheme of their discussions.⁴ The Bishop of Tournai, Gilbert Choiseul, was at first in favour of studying the question but Bossuet succeeded in dissuading him by representing to him that the discussion would only increase their divisions. On the other hand, Colbert pressed for the discussion of the question.⁵ Louis XIV, yielded and instructed Harlay accordingly.⁶

¹ *Id.*, *ibid.*, 266 ; statement by the King on the application of the right of *régale* and its extension to all dioceses in *Mention*, I *seqq.*, 23 *seqq.* ; MOURRET, 330.

² Text in *Mention*, 26, 28.

³ At the King's special request the Assembly had named (on November 29, 1681), a commission of twelve to examine the Sorbonne's six theses of 1663 ; *cf.* GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 276 *seq.*

⁴ " Evêque de Meaux répugnait. Hors de saison." FLEURY in GÉRIN, 263.

⁵ " Colbert insistait et pressait le Roi " FLEURY, *ibid.*

⁶ " Archevêque de Paris, ordre du Roi de traiter cette question." *Ibid.*

Since it was no longer possible for Bossuet to prevent a discussion of the matter, he sought at least to delay a decision for as long as possible. To this end he proposed that the question should be carefully studied in the light of ecclesiastical tradition.¹ The Archbishop of Paris thought otherwise. The Pope, he said, having driven the French so far, would now have to rue his conduct, whilst to the King he explained that Bossuet's proposal would take too much time.² Renewed pressure on Louis XIV. by Colbert resulted in a royal ordinance to the commission to conclude and decide on the question of papal authority.³ The Bishop of Tournai was charged with the drafting of the Article but his work satisfied no one.⁴ Thereupon Bossuet was asked to try to formulate the papal prerogatives. His draft was examined at a meeting at the house of the Archbishop of Paris when it met with strong opposition. There were vehement disputes when the request was put forward that the lawfulness of appealing from the Pope to a General Council should be included in the Article. To this Bossuet objected by pointing out that the theory of such appeals had been expressly condemned by Bulls of Pius II. and Julius II. No occasion should be given for an attack on these decisions.⁵ After lengthy discussion the last three Gallican Articles were formulated by the committee. All the Assembly had to do was to approve them.

The first of the last three Articles—the second of the whole series—asserted that the decrees of the fourth and fifth session of the Council of Constance concerning the superiority of the Council over the Pope, were valid not only for the conditions then existent, but universally. The third Article

¹ " Evêque de Meaux propose examiner toute la tradition pour pouvoir allonger tant que l'on voudrait." *Ibid.*

² " Pape nous a poussés, s'en repentira. Archevêque de Paris dit au Roi que durerait trop." *Ibid.*

³ " Ordre de conclure et décider sur l'autorité du Pape. Colbert pressait." *Ibid.*

⁴ " Evêque de Tournai chargé dresser les propositions : mal et scolastiquement." *Ibid.*

⁵ FLEURY, *ibid.*

rejected as groundless the objections to the above theory and insisted that the Pope was bound to exercise his authority only in conformity with the canons and to respect the customs of the Gallican Church. The fourth Article acknowledged the Pope's preponderant authority in questions of faith and the fact that his decrees were binding on each and every Church, but denied that they were unalterable if they did not meet with the assent of the whole Church.¹

It was at first thought that Harlay was chiefly responsible for the four Articles. When the English ambassador met the Archbishop in the King's antechamber he congratulated him on the great success of the Assembly. For a moment Harlay felt quite confused but ended by expressing his profound satisfaction.² However, as time went on, the opinion gained ground that Bossuet, the outstanding intelligence in the whole gathering, who was responsible for the shape and form of the Articles, was likewise their spiritual father.³

Bossuet differed profoundly from François de Harlay by the dignity and purity of his life ; he did so too by his attitude towards the Holy See, in fact this had become so evident already in 1663, on the occasion of the question of the theses, that the royal councillors had put him on the list of those who had a bad mark against their name.⁴ This was bound to weigh heavily on the mind of a somewhat timorous man⁵ who yielded to none of his contemporaries in his unconditional devotion to Louis XIV. The renowned orator and learned theologian was a genius but not a firm character. This fact was recognized by one of Colbert's confidants as early as 1663. He represents Bossuet as able, self-satisfied, anxious at all

¹ Text in *Mention*, 28 *seqq.*

² Jacobelli, auditor of the nunciature in Venice, to Cibo, according to Abbé Gondi who had returned from Paris, May 12, 1682, in BOJANI, III., 133.

³ Napoleon I., for instance, always appealed to Bossuet as a crown witness for his pretensions.

⁴ GÉRIN, App., 481 *seq.*

⁵ "Le faible de Bossuet était une timidité candide, presque naïve." MOURRET, 327.

times to please those around him and to adjust himself to their opinions.¹ Bossuet, so the report continues, thought at the time of the disputes of 1663 that the tension between Pope and King would be a passing phase, hence he began to adopt more and more a middle position which made him acceptable to both parties.² The report also lays stress on Bossuet's tendency to join that party which would best serve his interest.³ It goes without saying that court circles left nothing undone to attach such a man to their cause by showing him great favour; in this they succeeded easily enough seeing that, after all, Bossuet inclined towards Gallicanism, though a moderate Gallicanism.⁴ At Rome Bossuet stood in high esteem with Innocent XI. by reason of his justly famous *Exposition de la doctrine catholique*, published in 1668, and this esteem he was anxious to retain. Of his discourse at the opening of the Assembly of Paris he said himself that he could have delivered it in Rome, in the very presence of the Pope⁵; that it was meant to exercise a restraining influence on Rome as on the Assembly.⁶ But it also met Louis XIV.'s views to such an extent that he was no less satisfied than the Pope.⁷ However, the four Gallican Articles were bound to turn Rome's satisfaction into the opposite sentiment. As their real author Bossuet designates Colbert: he alone had persuaded the King to take advantage of the dispute over the *régale* to bring up once more the question of papal infallibility and the theses of 1663, a step in which the Archbishop had blindly followed him.⁸ As for himself, as a member of the committee set up for the purpose of discussing the delimitation of papal authority, he had endeavoured to save what could still be saved and for that

¹ GÉRIN, 287 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 287 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 290.

⁴ MOURRET, 328.

⁵ *Corresp. de Bossuet*, II., 268.

⁶ F. STROWSKI, *Bossuet*, Paris, 1901, 285 *seq.*

⁷ GÉRIN, 293 *seq.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 284 *seq.*

reason he had been willing to undertake the drafting of the articles dealing with the matter.¹

How great the peril was appears from some notes in Fénelon's own hand.² According to this document the Bishop of Tournai, Gilbert Choiseul, who but for Bossuet's strong opposition would have been commissioned to draft the four Articles, was an out and out Gallican ; he stood for the view that not only the Pope personally, but the Holy See as such, could fall into heresy. Bossuet was not prepared to go so far, for he firmly believed in the indefectible orthodoxy of the Holy See. According to this account then, which Fénelon reproduces as from Bossuet's own lips,³ the latter only undertook the arduous task in order to avoid a greater evil. Bossuet himself subsequently appealed to the service which he had rendered to the Holy See when he took this affair into his own hands. Bossuet's confidant, the Abbé Ledieu, maintains the same view in his memoirs.⁴

When we picture to ourselves Bossuet's position in the light of these historic documents, we must acknowledge that the Bishop of Meaux' sentiments differed profoundly from those of Colbert and Harlay who allowed themselves to be guided by hatred of Rome. Nor can it be denied that Bossuet honestly strove to avoid an even greater evil. Yet the question imposes itself : for a man of so much learning and one endowed with so great a gift of eloquence, would it not have been far more becoming if, regardless of all human respect and petty calculations, he had raised his voice not only in committee, but likewise in the Assembly of the Clergy ? Bossuet himself

¹ Above, p. 291.

² GÉRIN, 263.

³ *Ibid.*, 295 seq. ; FÉNELON, *De SS. Pontificis auctoritate*, c. 7 ; *Œuvres*, II., Paris, 1848, 10 seq. "Fides huius sedis," says Bossuet (*ibid.*, 11), indefectibilis est, ut ex promissione Christi et traditione Ecclesiae patet, at vero iudicia Sedis non sunt infallibilia. . . . Si Sedes illa circa fidem erraret, non erraret pertinaci et obstinato animo, a ceteris ecclesiis ad rectae fidei tramitem cito, revocaretur."

⁴ GÉRIN, 296.

seems to have felt that his was a false position. This is shown by his many attempts to justify his conduct once he realized that nearly the whole Catholic world condemned the four Gallican Articles. He then explained that it had been his intention to formulate the liberties of the Gallican Church not as they were understood by Parliaments but by the Bishops ; that he had always endeavoured so to define the authority of the Holy See as to remove from it all that might cause alarm and to make this sacred power, without any loss to itself, appear attractive to the whole world, even to the heretics and to all its enemies.¹

However, by now the four Articles had been raised to the dignity of decrees and on April 14th, 1682, they were forwarded to all the Bishops of France together with a circular which, after emphasizing the need of the Councils, enjoined on the prelates not to tolerate a contrary teaching either in church or school.² Louis XIV. had already approved the Articles on March 22nd ; at the same time he gave orders that they should be registered everywhere and taught in all schools and seminaries and that all teachers should swear to them each year.³ All this is at variance with the claim of Bossuet and other members of the Assembly that they only meant to embody an opinion, not to define a doctrine. Parliament gladly registered the Articles on March 23rd.⁴

Whilst the deliberations of the Assembly of Paris were in their initial stage, conversations were taking place in Rome between the French envoy extraordinary, Cardinal D'Estrées and Innocent XI. All hope of a compromise did not appear to have vanished ; for as was shown by the sudden and unexpected suspension of the Congregation of the *régale*, the Pope was in a conciliatory mood. But then, about eight weeks before the decision on the four Articles, there arrived a letter from the Assembly of the French Clergy, dated February 3rd, 1682, in which the Pope was instructed on the

¹ *Corresp. de Bossuet*, II., 280 seq.

² *Mention*, 44 seq.

³ *Ibid.*, 33 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 36.

boundaries of the ecclesiastical and secular powers. The letter describes the *régale* as a secular affair, a prerogative of the crown, and exhorts the Pope to preserve the peace and unity of the Church in a spirit of conciliation. The King's work on behalf of the Church and his action against heresy are extolled. The Pope was likewise reminded of the decisions of Parliament, and the prerogatives of the French crown.¹

This letter produced a twofold reaction. It arrived about mid-February, together with the declaration of the Assembly of the Clergy approving the extension of the right of *régale* to the whole of France.² Innocent XI. immediately convened once more the Congregation of the *régale* and submitted the letter for its examination. Cardinals Ottoboni, Azzolini, Colonna and Ludovisi were present at the first session on March 12th. Agostino Favoriti officiated once more as secretary.³ The Congregation took a long time to draw up a reply. A first draft was rejected because it was not sufficiently explicit in its condemnation of the action of the French clergy. At the next session (the Congregation met only once a week) the draft was revised.⁴ After the text of the four Articles had been received, the nomination of qualificators was suggested to the Pope, with a view to proceeding to a censure of the said Articles, in accordance with the practice of the Inquisition. The Pope was likewise requested to give all the nuncios accurate information on the situation in view of the excitement throughout the world. A similar step should be taken with all the Generals and Procurators of Orders and the Catholic Universities, so as to prevent the French Government from cunningly misrepresenting the state of affairs. An eye should be kept especially on the University of Louvain.⁵ On April 11th, 1682, a reply was dispatched.⁶ "The sons of my

¹ *Mention*, 6.

² *Ibid.*

³ DUBRUEL, *Congrégation*, 144.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Text in BERTHIER, II., 26, and *Mention*, 37. In the latter the Brief is dated April 2, 1682, moreover the text in *Mention* differs

mother have striven against me !” the Pope exclaims in the words of Holy Writ. The French Bishops had shown fear where there was no cause for fear ; they should have applied to themselves their quotations from Yvo of Chartres and made Louis XIV. see that he was on the wrong path. The Bishops had no cause to fear the royal anger since on their own testimony, Louis was most pious, God-fearing and well disposed towards the hierarchy. Yet they had not even attempted to resist, but had admitted defeat at the very outset. “ Which of you,” he asked, addressing the Bishops, “ has entered the arena in order to fight the battle of the House of Israel ? Which of you has had the courage to endure persecution ? Is there one of you who, though alone, has cast a solitary vote for the preservation of the prerogatives of the Church ? You have unanimously pronounced for the royal rights, and the voices that were heard were those of royal servants, whilst the Bishops remained silent, thereby bringing down upon the clergy of France shame and humiliation which had better be forgotten for ever, lest they should be an everlasting monument of the disgrace of that clergy.” May the French Bishops withdraw from their false path ! In virtue of the authority entrusted to him by God he, the Pope, solemnly condemned all that the French clergy had done or decided in the affair of the *régale*.

To make sure that the Brief would get to France it was dispatched through both Venice and Brussels. The papal representative in Paris was instructed to lay it before the Secretary of the Assembly, and when this had been done, to distribute four or six copies in Paris through a third person. It had not been deemed wise in Rome to send the document to the presidents of the Assembly, the Archbishops of Paris and Rheims, for in that case France would never have heard

here and there, though without alteration of the sense, from that of BERTHIER, apart from wrong spellings. Perhaps this version, taken from the official documents of the *Assemblée*, is based on a draft of the Brief which, through an act of indiscretion, found its way prematurely to Paris.

of the Brief.¹ The papal manifesto created an enormous impression in France. In many quarters it was hailed with delight, for the greater part of the nation did not side with the court Bishops, to whom the Brief also came as a shock. The Archbishop of Rheims, in particular, showed great indignation because the Pope, as he put it, had treated the French hierarchy like simple parish priests or like schoolboys.² In France the Bishops were reproached with having formulated doctrines condemned by the Councils, especially in regard to papal authority. Even the Queen repudiated the doctrines of the Assembly. She declared that she would continue to hold fast to the teaching of the Roman, not the Gallican, Church. Influential persons, such as the Duc d'Orléans and Marshal De Villeroi, seem to have drawn the King's attention to the feeling that prevailed among the people.³

For all that, the Bishops did not hesitate to take further anti-Roman steps. On May 6th, 1682, a deputation called on the internuncio for the purpose of presenting a written protest. This Lauri refused to accept. However, with the help of one of Lauri's servants the deputies succeeded in leaving the document on the nuncio's desk. It contained a protest against all Innocent XI.'s Briefs; the Pope, it said, could only have acted as he did owing to complete ignorance of Gallican liberties.⁴

On the same day the French clergy sent a fresh letter to Innocent XI. It is full of adulation both for the King and the Pope whose desires and aspirations had the same common

¹ DUBRUEL, *Congrégation*, 145.

² " *Così grande e così universale è stato l'applauso fatto al breve di N. S.^{re} responsivo alla lettera dell'assemblea, che i vescovi ne sono rimasti mortificati." Lauri, May 18, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia* 168, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ " *Continuano i rimproveri che si fanno ai vescovi da tutti gl'ordini di persone. . . . La regina medesima non ha lasciato di disapprovare le procedure dell'assemblea et altre volte disse che ella non credeva altro che quello, che insegna la chiesa Romana e non già la Gallicana." Lauri, June 11, 1682, *ibid.*

⁴ *Mention*, 48 *seqq.*

aim. Hence they pray that Innocent, together with Louis XIV., who fought so boldly against heresy, would preserve the peace so necessary to the Church.¹ In a circular addressed to all the clergy, also dated May 6th, 1682, the Assembly informed them of the position they had taken up in regard to the Pope's letter, sought to justify their action, and expressed the hope that the whole of the clergy would approve the steps they had taken.²

However, all these efforts did not succeed in calming the growing uneasiness. It would seem that the King's confessor, La Chaize, advised him to dissolve the Assembly lest it should go even further on the path it had taken.³

The name of La Chaize is frequently mentioned in connexion with the controversies of this period, but it is exceedingly difficult properly to appraise the part played by him. Bishop Caulet of Pamiers was of opinion that whatever had been done against himself and his Chapter in the question of *régale*, had to be put down to the confessor's account⁴; in fact he threatened the latter with the anger of God. La Chaize replied: "The King has better advisers than myself in the matter of the prerogatives of his crown; the question of the *régale* was decided before I entered his service."⁵ That in matters connected with Gallicanism Louis XIV.

¹ *Mention*, 53 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 60 *seqq.*

³ *Lauri, May 29, 1682, *loc. cit.* Since Lauri had but little intercourse with the government and the court, he was obliged to rely chiefly on public opinion and confidential reports. In the present case, he observes, it was difficult to ascertain whether La Chaize acted from a genuine desire that the situation should not become still more acute, or because he feared an attack on his Order by the Assembly ("per zelo di non veder passar le cose più avanti o pure perchè tema che non sia fatto pregiudizio alli privilegi della sua Congregazione come a tutti gli altri regolari").

⁴ DUBRUEL, *Bullet. de litt. ecclés.*, 1911, 372.

⁵ "Le Roi a de meilleurs conseillers que moi pour examiner les droits de sa couronne." La Chaize on June 26, 1679, *ibid.*, 373.

preferred to consult other counsellors than Jesuits is an *a priori* probability. But in the question of the *régale* the confessor sided with the King.¹ He believed in the right of the crown and felt that the Pope ought to be more complacent towards a sovereign who did so much for religion.² But in regard to the four Gallican Articles La Chaize told the King that, though his Order would teach them, it would be with such explanations as to render them harmless where the rights of the Pope were concerned.³ He himself disapproved the four Articles and took no part in the Assembly of 1682.⁴

Innocent XI. was very dissatisfied with La Chaize and spoke of him in terms of the utmost severity. He had hoped to influence Louis XIV. through his confessor and found fault with La Chaize because the latter considered that the political decisions of the King did not come within his competence as a confessor.⁵ On the other hand the Pope overestimated the Jesuit's influence. The papal demands involved La Chaize in so desperate a situation that he told the nuncio on one occasion that in future he would not meddle with any question that concerned Rome, for in that

¹ His own evidence, *ibid.*

² “*rilasciar un poco del suo rigore per un re che faceva tanto bene alla chiesa.” The French nuncio, December 10, 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ “*Da persona che può interamente saper le intentioni de' PP. Giesuiti mi è stato asserto, che in quei luoghi della Francia dove essi hanno parte nelle università, i loro lettori nel corso di quest' anno di studio insegneranno le proposizioni dell' assemblea del clero, ma le interpreteranno in tal maniera che Roma non potrà offendersene, e che di ciò il padre La Chaize se ne sia dichiarato con S. M^{tà} med^{ma} remonstrandole, che nel senso che l'assemblea l'ha pronunciate, la Compagnia non le può insegnare.” Lauri, November 6, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 168, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ BRUCKER, *La Compagnie de Jésus*, 591.

⁵ “*che s'ingannano grandemente quelli, che gli han detto, ch'egli non deve impacciarsi di simile materie” [French action in Flanders]. The nuncio on May 2, 1684, *Nunziat. di Francia*, Papal Sec. Arch.

quarter they demanded the impossible of him. The King, he declared, took counsel with others also, especially with Archbishop François de Harlay, and he usually acted on their advice.¹ Innocent XI. was so indignant when he heard of this statement that he forbade the nuncio to have anything to do with the confessor. Ranuzzi explained that La Chaize was the only person at court from whom he could get some measure of help and support, and that without him the situation would grow still worse for Rome.² Thereupon the nuncio was allowed to resume relations with him. It is impossible to absolve La Chaize from weakness and an excessively favourable opinion of Louis XIV. The Venetian ambassador, Girolamo Venier (1682-8) says of him that he knew how to cloak politics with the mantle of religiosity, but that his courage failed him when there was question of considerations of State and the possibility of opposition towards ministers with whom he was anxious not to quarrel.³ Internuncio Lauri observed that La Chaize might indeed render useful service to the Church, though it was not to be expected that his attitude would undergo a complete change, or that he would risk losing the favour of the court, all the more so as he had for the most part made his own

¹ *Report of the Paris nunciature of July 1, 1686, *ibid.*, 172^a; report by Seb. Foscarini from the nunciature of Venice in BAROZZI-BERCHET, III., 382 *seq.*

² La Chaize complains, " che costì [in Rome] è tenuto di cattivo concetto attribuendosi a lui tutto quello che non succede secondo li desiderii di S. Beatitudine, anco di affari, nei quali egli non ha parte alcuna. [Ranuzzi wishes to deal with him], " perchè in fine si cava più da lui che da ogni altro, e se manca il suo aiuto, gli affari anderebbono anco peggio." Report of July 29, 1686, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

³ " *E egli ardito, provveduto di sentimenti accomodati alla politica egualmente che alla religione, soddisfa con certa apparente osservanza il pio genio del Re, si rilascia dove l'interesse di Stato e l'inclinazioni dei ministri, coi quali sta unito, ricerca facilità ed autorità trascendente sopra la disposizione di innumerabili opulentissimi beneficii." BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Francia*, III., 451.

the opinions favouring the King which he judged to be right in every way.¹

It is probable that Cardinal D'Estrées' reports from Rome were a decisive factor in the King's attitude. Assuredly, the latest developments in France, which had occurred after his departure, by no means facilitated the latter's task in Rome, and he appears to have drawn the King's attention to the fact,² for was it not precisely his mission to prevent the condemnation of Gallican liberties and the right of *régale*? However, as soon as the steps taken by the Assembly of the Clergy became known, the *Zelanti* got the upper hand in Rome; the Congregation of the *régale*, reinforced by the addition of several theologians, resumed its labours in numerous sittings and took into account its previous deliberations preparatory to a condemnation of the *régale*.³ D'Estrées' task was further impeded by the circumstance that opposition to the four Articles was on the increase in Paris, so much so that on May 9th Louis unexpectedly closed the Assembly and on June 29th ordered it to disperse. All the acts had to be given up; they only came once more into the possession of the clergy in 1710.⁴ This wholly unexpected step of the King was no doubt due to the circumstance that the Pope was once more disposed to

¹ “ *Se la congiuntura e la qualità dell'affare lo permetterà, ma non è da credere che sia per cambiare interamente di condotta e mettersi a rischio di perdere il favore medesimo, tanto maggiormente che egli è già imbevuto al meno in gran parte delle opinioni favorevoli alla corte, così che le crede verissime ” (Report of October 26, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 168, Papal Sec. Arch.) For La Chaize, cf. BRUCKER, *loc. cit.*, 591; DUBRUEL, *Excommunication*, 612.

² Lauri on June 5, 1682, *loc. cit.*, “ il sigr card. D'Estrées, dicesi, habbia informata S. M^{ta} dei gravi pregiuditii che portano a i suoi negotii le procedure irregolari dell'assemblea.”

³ DUBRUEL, *Congrégation*, 145. Cf. *the draft of the constitution “ Cum primum ” of April 11, 1682, in *Cod.* 309 of Bibl. Casanat., Rome.

⁴ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 277.

negotiate with Cardinal D'Estrées. The Congregation of the *régale* was accordingly dismissed once again, and on May 8th, 1682, its labours came to an end.¹

Innocent XI.'s change of mind was probably due to the political situation in general, as well as to the Turkish question. Cardinal D'Estrées took up once more the proposal worked out by Cardinal Rospigliosi on the occasion of the former's mission to Rome. This was that both sides should provisionally refrain from any new step. When on June 15th D'Estrées prayed Innocent XI. to agree to this, and also to include in the " armistice " all that had been done at the Assembly of the Clergy, the Pope assented to the request ² on condition that the Assembly was first dissolved, since its members had separated themselves from ecclesiastical unity.³

This armistice was to render possible preliminary peace negotiations. The news of the dissolution of the Assembly was the occasion for much rejoicing in Paris.⁴ There was a general wish that a solution of the dispute acceptable to

¹ DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*

² " *Yesterday Card. D'Estrées prayed the Pope a degnarsi di soprasedere nelle ulteriori dichiarazioni alle quali era applicato nelle materie correnti dell' assemblea, che lo stesso haverebbe fatto S. M^{ta} a fine di aver luogo di poter trattare dello stato delle cose presenti per veder se vi fosse modo da poterle terminare con sodisfazione reciproca." Cibo to Lauri, June 16, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

³ " *Quella conventione però che chiamaron tregua non fu fermata che prima non fosse disciolta per opera del cardinal D'Estrées e colla mano aggiutrice (non direm della nostra) del cardinale Giacomo Rospigliosi l'assemblea del clero in Parigi, rendutasi dall'unione." Giorio, Raguaglio (see above, p. 278, n. 3).

⁴ " *Di questo scioglimento dell'assemblea par che tutta la città se ne sia rallegrata, come da essa non ne habbia ricevuto grande edificazione nè pure ne sperasse vantaggi considerabili alla religione cattolica, del che ne fanno testimonianza diverse pasquinate et altri detti mordaci che contro di essa pubblicamente si riferiscono con applauso di circostanti." Lauri, July 3, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia, 168*, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. also the **Cifra* of July 13, 1682, *ibid.*

both parties might be found.¹ But this was no easy task, were it only for the fact that the two parties were not of the same opinion as to the bearing of the agreement. The Pope refrained from condemning the right of *régale* and the four Articles, but in return he expected the other side to abstain from all innovations. However, in many circles in France the execution of the laws on the *régale* of 1673 and 1675, as well as of the four Articles of 1682, was not considered an innovation. These things, it was argued, were accomplished facts before the armistice.² The situation was further complicated by some episcopal nominations by the King which the Pope could not confirm. Louis XIV. wished to reward certain ecclesiastics for their services at the Assembly by conferring bishoprics on them. The Pope demanded that the candidates should first disavow the four Articles, but to this the King would not consent.³ The candidates were the two priests, Augustin de Maupeou and Claude de Saint-Georges, who had had the sees of Castres and Clermont conferred upon them.⁴ Difficulty was likewise experienced in filling the see of Pamiers. Louis had already desired to give a new pastor to that diocese at the beginning of 1681, but two Bishops in succession declined the offer. Louis only acceded to their refusal after both had declared that only love for their own dioceses inspired their refusal.⁵ The Pope had made up his mind to accede to a new nomination for Pamiers only on condition that the Vicar Capitular, Cerle, and those Canons who cherished Roman sympathies, were first restored to their rightful positions. On the other

¹ “*E grande il desiderio che qui tutti hanno di sentir perfezionato l’accomodamento delle correnti differenze con sodisfazione reciproca di S. B^e e del Re. Anzi molte volte l’han già pubblicato per fatto, mostrando dispiacere quando poi han saputo che non era vero.” Lauri, July 27, 1682, *ibid.*

² *Lauri, June 26 and August 31, 1682, *ibid.*

³ *Lauri, August 31, 1682, *ibid.*

⁴ *Lauri, October 26, 1682, *ibid.* Cf. also *Recueil des instructions*, II., Rome, *Introd.*, p. xv *seqq.*

⁵ *Lauri, January 10, 1681, *ibid.*

hand Louis insisted that the Pope should be the first to give way; only then would he give the desired satisfaction.¹ All these reasons made a settlement of the dispute between Pope and King impossible.²

Though Louis XIV. had dissolved the Assembly of the Clergy, he was unwilling to abandon its decisions, that is, the four Gallican Articles. He maintained his edict of March 12th, 1682, by the terms of which these Articles had to be registered and taught by all the theological Faculties. But this roused an opposition of unexpected strength which found an echo even in other countries.

(3.)

Strangely enough the first sign of opposition came from the Parliament of Paris. Not that that body objected to the contents of the Articles as such, what it objected to was the fact that the clergy should have presumed even to discuss the limits of the royal power. In the opinion of Parliament everything was so clear in this respect that neither the Assembly of the French Clergy nor the universal Church had any right to busy themselves with it. The Attorney General, Achille Harlay, issued a declaration in this sense which the King allowed Parliament to register, together with the four Articles, but it was to be done secretly, so as not to rouse the clergy unnecessarily.³ With this protest it was intended to prevent a possible change of opinion on the part of the clergy, for the question of the royal power was thereby declared to be beyond all doubt.

¹ *To Lauri, October 14, 1682, *ibid.*, 168.

² “*Ma fermatasi appena la tregua fra la Santa Sede e il clero di Francia insorse incontanente nuova materia di contrasto, posciachè coll’avviso pervenuto in Roma d’alcune chiese vacate in Francia fu inteso con meraviglia, che la nominatione fatta dal Re cadesse in due di que’ soggetti contumaci di Roma, a causa di essere intervenuti nell’assemblea di Parigi.” Giorio, *Ragguaglio*, 32.

³ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 333 *seq.*

However, attacks against the four Articles also came from other quarters and from quite different motives; in fact opposition to their contents and spirit became ever stronger both within and without the French frontiers. At the University of Paris unexpected opposition arose against the royal decree of March 1682, ordering all the Universities of the realm to register the four Articles, and it required force to repress it. At that time the Catholic Faculty included some 750 Doctors. Colbert's papers show that by far the greater number of them, and precisely the most learned and devout, condemned the four Articles and refused to register them.¹ Their determination won for them extraordinary applause from popular circles.² Innocent XI. instructed nuncio Lauri to praise the Doctors and to express his satisfaction.³ These widely spread sentiments could hardly escape Louis XIV., but he was determined not to yield; hence the Government had recourse to its old expedients of bribery and threats. On May 1st, 1682, a parliamentary deputation went to the Sorbonne. No one knew of its intentions except Syndic Pirot who had been won over to the court. On the basis of a royal ordinance the deputation demanded the insertion of the four Articles in the registers of the University. The aged Bétille, who was the senior dean, did not dare to resist; he escorted the deputation out of the room but did not return. Accordingly Syndic Pirot refused all further discussion, with the result that the Assembly dispersed without having arrived at a decision.⁴ Louis XIV. was greatly annoyed. On May 16th he sent an order to Pirot from Versailles to see to the execution of the decree. To the Doctors he denied any right to discuss or to dispute about a royal ordinance, and Pirot was

¹ Cf. the composition of the Doctors, *ibid.*, 341-8.

² “ *Non ordinario è stato l'applauso che le voci popolari han fatto alla costanza de' dottori di Sorbona.” Lauri, June 22, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 168, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ *To Lauri, June 15, 1682, and subsequently, *ibid.*

⁴ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 349 *seqq.*

empowered to take appropriate steps in the event of further resistance.¹

The King was all the more angry as he feared that Rome might hear of the opposition of the University to the four Articles.² But despite the King's anger the Faculty refused to give in. Its leaders were Doctors Mazure, Despérier and Blanger, against whom the King was so incensed that he had a mind to dismiss them from the University. Colbert counselled moderation, lest the public should come to hear of any resistance. The Attorney General, Achille Harlay, gave similar advice, especially as there was reason to fear a change of opinion among the clergy, of whom a great number were still in Paris. Hence it was deemed more prudent that the King should not assert his authority too hastily or too frequently.³ However, by July 15th, 1682, it was realized that nothing would be gained by waiting. Achille Harlay reported to Colbert in this sense. He had no new suggestions to make, but merely observed that the King should take the least harmful course.⁴

Louis deemed the situation so serious that on that same night he dispatched a courier to Paris with a royal instruction for the Procurator General, on the strength of which the Faculty was strictly forbidden to discuss the matter further. It was ordered to send a deputation to Parliament at seven in the morning for the purpose of inserting the four Articles in the register of the University.⁵ The secretary of Parliament transcribed the four Articles in the registers of the Sorbonne and the leaders of the opposition were banished.⁶ These measures, however, only served to rouse feeling in the capital, a circumstance which may have contributed to the dissolution of the Assembly of the Clergy on June 29th.

¹ Text of the royal letter, *ibid.*, 351.

² Memorial of Colbert to the Procurator General Achille Harlay, *ibid.*, 352.

³ *Ibid.*, 353-5.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 356.

⁵ Text of royal letter, *ibid.*, 357.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 358, 361.

By measures of violence and by pressure upon individual members of the Faculty, the Government at length succeeded in getting 162 out of 750 Doctors to yield to the King.¹ They obediently informed him that they shared his view of the four Articles and at the same time begged him to allow them to take part once more in the sittings of the Faculty. Thereupon the Government chose to consider these obsequious divines simply as the *Theological Faculty*, to which permission was given to resume its sittings on July 31st, 1682.² The consequence was that the Pope now judged the teaching of the University to be schismatical.³

The University of Douai, which had only recently come under French suzerainty, adopted the same attitude towards the four Articles as that of Paris. Threats were at first fruitless, as the Doctors declared that they were resolved to maintain the old teaching. Twice the Faculty of theology unanimously rejected the suggestion that it should register the four Articles,⁴ but in the end Louis got his way here also by forcible means.⁵

The ranks of the opponents of the Government were further reinforced by the Archbishop of Besançon and the Parliament of Dôle in Burgundy. Both the Archbishop and the president of the Parliament declared they could not bring the new teaching into harmony with their conscience, and both offered

¹ Text of royal letter, *ibid.*, 364.

² Cf. the full account, *ibid.*, 364-489, especially the acts of the Faculty published, *ibid.*, in *Appendice*, B. 522-571.

³ * [X. must not take his degree in Paris because the Sorbonne " sostiene una dottrina piena di temerità e di protervia schismatica." *Cifra al Nuntio*, October 12, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ " *All'esempio della Sorbona si può aggiungere quello dell'università celebre di Duay, la qual, benchè suddita della Francia e concussa dalle minacce, ha ricusato già per due volte con voti concordi di registrar le proposizioni dell'assemblea per non partirsi dall'antico suo istituto, che è di tenere la dottrina opposta." To the Spanish nuncio, July 19, 1682, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 158, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁵ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 387 seq.; *Coll. Lac.*, I., 845 seq.

their resignation to the King.¹ Parliament refused to embody the four Articles in its registers as it had reason to fear nothing less than a popular rising. An earthquake, of which the impression was still fresh, and which was interpreted as a sign of heaven's displeasure, added force to the general aversion for the new teaching.² At this time the University of Perpignan also set itself against the doctrines of the Assembly of Paris.³

Just as the Jansenists as a body sought to exploit the situation in their favour, the Jansenist University of Louvain, the only one of the non-French Universities, pronounced against the four Articles. For this it was commended by the Pope, who took up the defence of its prerogatives when these were threatened by the State.⁴ On April 12th, 1682, the nuncio in Madrid was instructed by Innocent XI. to intervene with the King of Spain on behalf of Louvain, seeing that it was the only University able to neutralize the Sorbonne. On this occasion the Pope described Paris as an avowed enemy, so to speak, of papal authority.⁵

On this point opinion in Spain favoured the Pope. News of the conduct of the French clergy had been received with indignation in that country, and the Bishops and the Universities thought of issuing a joint declaration against

¹ *Lauri, June 12, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 168, *loc. cit.*

² “*Parimente l'arcivescovo di Bisanzone ed il parlamento di Dola in Burgogna hanno costantemente ricusato di registrarle, anche per ovviare una sollevatione che il popolo minacciava inorridito dall' impietà di quei dogmi et insieme dal terremoto, che in quel tempo medesimo si fece sentire orribilmente in Borgogna.” To the Spanish nuncio, July 19 1682, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 158, *loc. cit.*

³ *To the same, August 16, 1682, *ibid.*

⁴ Briefs in BERTHIER, I., 389, 435 ; II., 34.

⁵ *[The University of Louvain] è oggi l'unica per quello che appartiene alla erudizione ecclesiastica, la quale possa far contrapeso all'università di Parigi, nemica quasi dichiarata dell' autorità apostolica.” *Cifra al Nuntio*, August 16, 1682. *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 158, Papal Sec. Arch.

the decisions of Paris. When the Pope heard of this proposal through the Spanish ambassador in Rome, he exhorted the nuncio in Madrid to do everything in his power to further the step, whilst he himself would remain in the background, so that the declaration might be of even greater value.¹ The Spanish Inquisition also seemed about to protest against the four Articles. The Pope set even higher hopes on its intervention than on the declaration of the Bishops and the Universities, which might possibly be inspired by political considerations.² However, the Inquisition temporized so long that Innocent's patience gave out at last. He now exhorted the nuncio to do his utmost lest politics should prevent all further declarations.³ The Pope would have wished to see the most learned among the Spanish Doctors writing against the four Articles,⁴ hence it was no small satisfaction to him when the nuncio submitted to him the draft of a dissertation by the Benedictine Aguirre. No doubt the popular, easily understood form of the dissertation pleased him a great deal more than its matter, of the scientific value of which he did not think very highly. The Pope was likewise not pleased with the language, which was too sharp in places, for this might lead readers to put a bad construction on the writer's eulogy of the King of France and the French people, so that offence might be given even to such circles in France as were well-disposed towards the Church. The

¹ **Cifre al Nuntio*, June 21, October 11 & 25; December 6, 1682, *ibid.*

² To the same, January 3, 1683, *ibid.*, 161.

³ * To the same, January 31, February 28, March 14, 1682, *ibid.*

⁴ " *V. E. non può eseguir meglio la mente di Nostro Signore quanto col procurare destramente e come da se la censura di cotesta Inquisitione contro le propositioni del clero di Francia, e di eccitare con la medesima circospettione molti de' dottori più riputati in cotesta università a confutarle." To the same, April 25, 1682, *ibid.*, Similarly in the **Cifre* of May 9 and June 20, 1683, *ibid.*

nuncio was accordingly told to see to it that all such passages were expunged.¹ In the sequel Rome approved the book.² The Curia also heard with satisfaction that the Jesuit Tirso Gonzalez intended to write against the French errors.³ The Inquisition at last condemned the Articles of 1682, for which the Pope expressed his approval to the nuncio on July 4th, 1683.⁴

Nowhere were the French theses more sharply rejected than in Hungary. The Hungarian episcopate, headed by the Archbishop of Gran, George Szelepcsényi, forbade the teaching of the four Articles.⁵ This demonstration created so disagreeable an impression in France that the Government demanded that it should be censured. At first Louis XIV. thought of inducing the Archbishop of Paris to publish a counter-declaration, but Harlay felt little inclined to do so; he had not yet forgiven the King the sudden dissolution of the Assembly of the Clergy, which he took as a public censure on himself. The King's confessor, La Chaize, also refused to have anything to do with the business.⁶ The Archbishop of Rheims, however, took up the matter with zest. He was anxious to regain the King's confidence, which he had forfeited

¹ " *E parso nondimeno che egli parli alle volte con qualche mordacità e che i medesimi encomii da lui fatti del Re christmo e della natione Francese sieno misti di qualche acredine e capaci di essere interpretati per ironici. [Perciò egli deve far rimostranze al Padre], rappresentandogli quanto la maniera da lui tenuta sia poco decente della gravità della materia." To the Spanish nuncio, April 25, 1683, *ibid.*

² *To the same, November 5 and 19, 1684, *ibid.* Cf. D'AGUIRRE, *Defensio cathedrae S. Petri*, Salmant, 1683.

³ To the Spanish nuncio, November 21, 1683, *Nunziat. di Spagna, loc. cit.*

⁴ *To the same, July 4, 1683, *ibid.*; also MIGUÉLEZ, *Jansenismo y regalismo en España*, Valladolid, 1896.

⁵ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 377; PETERFFY, *Conc. Hung.*, II., 438 *seq.*; ROSCOVÁNY, *Mon.*, I., 224-6, Nr. 215.

⁶ Cf. Lauri's numerous *reports in *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, Papal Sec. Arch., in particiular **Cifra* of April 2, 1683.

by some remarks of his at the expense of La Chaize.¹ However, in the joint deliberations of Parliament and the theological Faculty the proposed censure of the Hungarian declaration met with sharp opposition. The Archbishop of Rheims is said to have observed that it looked as if the Pope had more partisans at the Sorbonne than the King. Only by violent measures could he hope to obtain his point.² It took forty-five sessions to secure the condemnation of one proposition alone, namely that which ascribes to the Holy See exclusively the right to judge in matters of faith, in virtue of a divine and unalterable privilege. The Assembly declared with the utmost solemnity that this proposition was false in so far as it deprived the Councils and the Bishops of their authority.³ Further decisions could not be arrived at, and even this censure had only been made possible by foregoing the prescribed two-thirds' majority of votes, and by acting on a simple majority.⁴

Whilst the action of the French clergy was thus meeting with vigorous opposition in the most diverse States, Innocent XI. maintained a profound silence. The fact was that negotiations with D'Estrées were still proceeding and the Pope did not wish to precipitate matters. A fresh difficulty

¹ *Lauri, August 31, 1682, *ibid.*, 168. The Archbishop of Rheims spoke of La Chaize as "asino" and "bestia". The king made him apologize; he did so but "non senza far violenza al proprio naturale".

² *che il Papa paresse che havebbe più partiali in Sorbona che il Re. Lauri, April 2, 1683, *ibid.*

³ "quatenus excludit ab episcopis et conciliis, etiam generalibus, iudicandi de fidei controversiis auctoritatem, quam habent immediate a Christo," GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 378.

⁴ *Lauri on April 18, 1683, where he speaks of a two-thirds' majority and expresses the hope that it would not be obtained. The same on May 31, 1683: "L'affaire di Sorbona è rimasto poi terminato con sollecitudine maggiore di quello che altri havea creduto. Si è concluso a pluralità di voti che la propositione di Strigonia sarà censurata. *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, Papal Sec. Arch.

very nearly caused a complete collapse of the discussions, namely, an attempt by France to bring pressure to bear on Ottoboni through Venice, with a view to compelling the latter to take Louis XIV.'s side. However, the Venetian *chargé d'affaires* in Paris refused to have anything to do with such a plan; he explained that in Church matters the Republic left the Cardinals perfectly free. Through internuncio Lauri the affair became known in Rome.¹ Such was the indignation of Innocent XI. that he threatened to break off the negotiations unless Ottoboni was given satisfaction within a very short time.²

Up till now the Pope had not allowed a single occasion to escape him of holding out a hand for peace and of giving the King proofs of his particular goodwill. A fresh opportunity presented itself when the Dauphin's eldest son was born, who received the title of Duke of Burgundy. By Briefs dated September 1st, 1682, Innocent congratulated the French court on the happy event.³ Minister Croissy expressed a wish to nuncio Lauri that the Pope would send a nuncio to Paris, to bring swaddling clothes blessed by the Pontiff, according to custom; this would gratify the King who would not fail to give proof of his desire to satisfy the Pope.⁴ Innocent was very willing to comply with this request, but he made it a condition that his envoy should be treated in becoming fashion and that the French Government should first make satisfaction for what had happened at the death of nuncio Varese. Although Cardinal D'Estrées informed the Pope that with regard to the last point nothing could be hoped for from the King,⁵ Innocent's desire for peace decided him to send a nuncio without conditions.⁶ This

¹ *Lauri, September 14, 1682, *ibid.*, 168.

² *Lauri, October 16, 1682, *ibid.*, Lauri was watched by spies in Paris; *cf.* his *letter of September 14, 1682, *ibid.*

³ BERTHIER, II., 48 *seqq.*

⁴ *Lauri, September 21, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 168, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁵ *To Lauri, October 14, 1682, *ibid.*

⁶ *To the same, October 16, 1682, *ibid.*

decision was evidently in part arrived at in view of the war against the Turks for which Innocent hoped to secure the King's co-operation. La Chaize told Lauri that he would do everything in his power to facilitate a settlement of the disputes.¹

The news of the impending mission of a nuncio with the blessed swaddling clothes for the King's grandson, called forth immense joy throughout France. The Pope's desire for peace was universally acknowledged, all the more so as in this present instance the gift of swaddling clothes was something quite unusual, for as a rule these were only sent for the children of crowned heads. Lauri urged the choice of a nuncio who could speak French well, in order that he might deal directly with the King, for, as he pointed out, though Louis XIV. understood Italian quite well, he never used it in his relations with ambassadors.²

The appointments to vacant dioceses remained a sore point in the negotiations with Cardinal D'Estrées, especially with regard to Pamiers, and both King and Pope stuck firmly to their own points of view. It was not a question of persons, for the Abbé Bourlemont, whom the King proposed, was agreeable to the Pope; but Innocent persisted in his demand for the reinstatement of the Vicar Capitular Cerle and the Canons loyal to Rome. Louis demanded the exact opposite.³ The affair annoyed the King to such a degree that even the dispatch of a nuncio failed to satisfy him

¹ *[La Chaize] "mi ha mostrato gran dispositione di contribuir dal canto suo quanto potrà per facilitar l'accommodamento delle cose." Lauri, November 2, 1682, *ibid.*

² " *Io non saprei esprimere a V.E. il giubilo che tutti hanno sentito, perchè quanto più si mostrano persuasi che N. Sre non era in obbligo di far questo passo, tanto maggiormente ne argomentano le ottime intensioni di S. Stà verso le sodisfationi del Re e ne sperano un intiera corrispondenza per parte della M^{tà} S." Lauri, November 2, 1682, *ibid.*

³ *Lauri, September 21, 1682, *ibid.*; *to Lauri, October 14, 1682, *ibid.*

completely. He decided to leave the question of the vacant sees alone.¹

The choice of the much travelled, worldly wise Angelo Ranuzzi as nuncio gave great satisfaction in France.² On March 20th, 1683, Cibo informed Lauri that the Pope had blessed the swaddling clothes, and on April 27th he announced that Ranuzzi would set out on the following day.³ A Brief of April 22nd had informed the French court of the departure of the envoy extraordinary.⁴ The nuncio journeyed through Provence where he had an opportunity for an interview with Cardinal Grimaldi.⁵ He was not allowed to enter the capital at once for Louis feared lest Ranuzzi should get in touch with the clergy.⁶ The nuncio remained at Orléans, where he had occasion to complain that his movements were being watched.⁷ He only reached Paris towards the middle of July 1683. Ranuzzi's first report from Paris, dated July 19th, makes it quite clear that the handing over of the blessed swaddling clothes was not the real purpose of his mission. Its main object was to persuade Louis to join in the Turkish war. If this was to be achieved an essential preliminary was France's reconciliation with the Emperor.⁸ The substance of the letter accrediting Ranuzzi was simply a realistic description of the Turkish peril accompanied by a request

¹ *Lauri, November 9 and December 25, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 168, Papal Sec. Arch.

² Lauri to Cibo, January 4, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 138.

³ *To Lauri, April 27, 1683, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, *loc. cit.*; BOJANI, III., 139.

⁴ BERTHIER II., 86 *seqq.*

⁵ *Lauri, May 24, 1683, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *The Archbishop of Paris, François Harlay, told Lauri in confidence "che il Re non haveva voluto permettere a Monsgr. Nuntio di entrare in questa città durante l'assenza della M^{tà} S. per dubbio che non si prevalesse di tal congiuntura per far pratiche con vescovi e altri ecclesiastici contro il servizio di S. M^{tà}," Lauri, July 5, 1683, *ibid.*

⁷ *Ranuzzi, July 11, 1683, *ibid.*

⁸ **Id.*, on July 19, 1683, *ibid.*

for help. It is evident that this was either known or suspected in France, because the audience of the inconvenient messenger was put off until the moment when the Turks stood before Vienna and news of the fall of the imperial city was momentarily expected.¹

On July 23rd, 1683, Ranuzzi had his first interview with Croissy, of which he sent an account to Rome in four separate reports. From the Turkish war the minister quickly turned the conversation to the question of the *régale*. He laid stress on the excellent dispositions of the King, whose keenest desire it was, in co-operation with the Pope, to safeguard the general welfare of the Church. On the other hand the great dearth of priests in France compelled the King to deal with this evil with all the means with which the Gallican liberties and the prerogatives of his crown provided him, and he was surprised that in this matter the King should meet with opposition instead of help on the part of the Pope. Ranuzzi replied that the King could not publish the decrees on the *régale* without going against his conscience, and even simple prudence should have stopped him from touching so delicate a matter. Croissy pleaded the troubled times as an excuse for his master; Louis lacked contact with the Holy See since the Paris nunciature had remained so long vacant, consequently the King had been forced to discuss ecclesiastical questions with hotheads (*buttafuochi*) who led him astray; but by now all these men had fallen into disgrace.² Croissy, however, made it clear that the King could not undo what had been done, for in all this he saw a principle of statecraft which did not suffer the impression to be created that he would not carry out obligations once assumed by him.³ Ranuzzi replied that this was regrettable, for surely questions of this kind must be judged from another point of view.⁴

¹ Cf. IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 27 seq.; THEIN, 80.

² By "buttafuochi" must be chiefly understood the Arch-Bishops of Paris and Rheims who had fallen in the King's esteem.

³ Report of July 23, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 144 seqq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 146.

In point of fact, as Giorio observes, Louis' ideas of religion were those of a soldier rather than a divine.¹

Ranuzzi frequently met La Chaize. The confessor did his best to extol the good Catholic sentiments of the King. He explained that Louis had never liked the Assembly of the Clergy, especially not its decisions; he had merely tolerated it; his patronage of it had only been apparent, else he would not have dissolved it so abruptly, regardless of the pleading of the Archbishops of Paris and Rheims, who wanted it to continue.² La Chaize emphatically declared that Louis was ready to give open proof of his good dispositions towards the Church, and if the Pope desired it, he was prepared to make himself master of Geneva, even though Rome had not sufficiently appreciated the conquest of Strasburg, which was of such advantage to the Catholic Church.³

The proposed conquest of Geneva appealed to Innocent XI. since it would mean the disappearance of the Calvinists' city of refuge, but he pointed out that there was a very great difference between the conquest of Strasburg and that of Geneva.⁴ The Pope approved of Ranuzzi's observations

¹ " *La cui professione è di guerriero, non di teologo. Giorio," Ragguaglio.

² " che a S. M^{tà} non haveva potuto piacere quella radunanza dell'assemblea del clero, nè tampoco quello che si fece in essa, ma che l'ha tollerato et ancora ha mostrato di favorire le loro operationi per essere le cose all'hora ridotte nello stato, nel quale si trovavano, essendo ben poi potuto osservare con quanta resolutione S. M^{tà} troncò il corso alle conferenze senza prestar orecchio alle replicate istanze et a gli artifici usati dagli Msg^{ri} arcivescovo di Reims et arcivescovo di Parigi per tirarla avanti e passare, come avevano in animo, ad altre novità nelle materie de' regolari et della morale, che il Re sempre loro costantemente ricusò col far seguire il discioglimento dell'assemblea in quel medesimo giorno, che gli haveva prefisso, et col non permettere, che si radunassero più." Ranuzzi to Cibo, August 20, 1683, in BOJANI, III., 151.

³ Ranuzzi, August 20, 1683, *ibid.*

⁴ The Pope is glad of the King's victories, " massime quando

to Croissy. He steadily refused to confirm the Bishop of Pamiers, but made known his readiness to provide for the remaining vacant sees if the candidates proposed to him were free from the suspicion of heresy.¹

Ranuzzi's efforts for a reconciliation between Louis XIV. and the Emperor were without effect as in this matter the last word was spoken by Louvois, the minister for war.² The proposals which the Pope made in Rome to the Duke D'Estrées were likewise in vain. The conversations on the subject clearly showed that the French Government stuck to its point of view whilst it strove at the same time to induce the Pope to yield on the question of the Gallican Articles.³

The proclamation of a jubilee which the Pope granted at this time gave rise to a fresh difficulty. Innocent had instructed the nuncio not to forward the Brief relative to the jubilee to the Archbishop of Toulouse, as that prelate

queste saranno congiunte con quelle della religione cattolica, come appunto sarebbe l'espugnatione di Ginevra, nido et asilo miserabile della perfidia de' Calvinisti." Cibo to Ranuzzi, September 14, 1683, *ibid.*, 158.

¹ " *Pamiers non può nello stato presente esser proposta, e le altre [chiese] saranno speditamente proviste da N. S^{te} ogni volta che da S. M^{ta} vi siano nominate persone idonee e non sospette di non sana dottrina," Cibo to Ranuzzi, August 17, 1683, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, Papal Sec. Arch.

² IMMICH, 28.

³ THEIN, 85, " *che questa nazione è così volubile che quello che in un giorno vuole, nell'altro non lo vuol più ; . . . nè deve far difficoltà che il sigr. card. D'Estrées si trovi espressamente in Roma per questi affari, poichè si sa bene, e l'esperienza purtroppo l'ha fatto conoscere che per quanta buona volontà habbia S. E. di accomodar le cose, giammai ha potuto avanzare un poco. Anzi dopo ch'ella si trova in Roma, le difficoltà si sono accresciute se non per altro se non perchè dovendo S. E. operare secondo gli ordini di questa corte, nulla può fare, se buone disposizioni non cominciano di quà." Lauri, September 13, 1683, *Nunziat. di Francia.*, *loc. cit.*

was in schism.¹ On the other hand Croissy informed the nuncio that publication of the jubilee would only be allowed in France if the Brief was sent to all the Archbishops.² Innocent gave way on this point also, but in view of his readiness to yield his disappointment was all the more bitter when he saw that France took no notice of the agreement by the terms of which neither side was to take any fresh measures for the time being. In an exchange of opinions with Croissy the nuncio laid the Pope's complaints before the minister. Croissy would not admit that any fresh steps had been taken by France since the agreement; the whole affair of the four Articles and the *régale* were accomplished facts before this, so that in giving effect to these decrees the Government in no way acted against its promise. The violation of the treaty, according to Croissy, was on the side of the Pope, for precisely in consequence of his promise to take no new step, Innocent was bound to provide for the see of Pamiers and other vacant benefices. In his answer Ranuzzi granted that the four Articles had been formulated previous to the conclusion of the treaty, so that their withdrawal could not be demanded on the ground of that agreement. It was otherwise with the execution of existing decrees, for without a doubt these came within the treaty of suspension which otherwise would be meaningless. For the rest, when he gave his assent to the treaty the Pope had in no way suspended

¹ " *essendo quel prelato scismatico et a questo conto non indirizzandosi a lui di quà alcuna speditione." Cibo to Ranuzzi, October 5, 1683, *ibid.*

² " *senza escludere alcuno, perchè se havessi fatto diversamente, il Re non havrebbe potuto permetterlo." La Chaize, who had also tried in vain to mediate, spoke to the same effect. He desired that the Archbishop of Toulouse should first submit to Rome. The King agreed to this but was dissuaded by Louvois who feared lest Rome should take advantage of a letter of submission to France's prejudice by interpreting it as an admission on the part of France that she was in the wrong. Ranuzzi on September 10, 1683, *ibid.* Cf. *Ranuzzi on December 10, 1683, *ibid.*

the papal authority and he retained all his freedom when there was question of appointments to positions in the Church.¹ Innocent XI. approved the nuncio's answer, but nevertheless observed that Ranuzzi should have laid stress on the fact that it was of the essence of the suspension that the newly framed decrees were not carried into effect. If their execution were proceeded with, an impression would be created that the suspension had legitimized the innovations, which was not at all the case.²

Innocent saw that all his goodwill was in vain since it was impossible to come to an understanding on the bearing of the agreement. He regretted having followed Cardinal Rospigliosi's advice for he, on his part, felt obliged to abide by the terms of the agreement, though France refused to do so. The damage which the suspension was bound to do, was grievously felt by him, as its terms tied the hands of the Head of the Church who was no longer able to take the appropriate means for the preservation of the Church's independence.³

An understanding was no longer to be expected. Innocent maintained his standpoint and had recourse to the only weapon still at his disposal. He refused their Bulls to the

¹ *Ranuzzi on November 15, 1683, *ibid.*

² “*Ha V. S. ill^{ma} replicato bene al sigr. di Croissy circa l'osservanza della sospensione. Poteva solamente aggiungere, che quanto non dovesse restar sospesa l'esecuzione di tutte le novità fatte, verrebbe ad essere affatto inutile detta sospensione, la quale consiste unicamente in trattenerne l'esecuzione delle medesime novità, altrimenti col poter continuar ad eseguirle dopo la sospensione si verrebbe in un certo modo a renderle legittime, mentre parrebbe che si facessero coll'acquiescenza di S. S^{tà}.” Cibo to Ranuzzi, December 7, 1683, *ibid.*

³ “*Mentre doveva riuscire di tanto detrimento e discapito alla sana dottrina et alla libertà della Chiesa coll'impedire la necessaria difesa et l'uso de' rimedii opportuni alla S^{tà} di N. S^{re} senza porre alcun freno a cotesta corte che si crede permessa ogni licenza di non osservare il concerto.” Cibo to Ranuzzi, February 15, 1684, *Nunziat. di France, 172^a, Papal Sec. Arch.*

Bishops of Castres and Clermont, whom Louis had named, on account of their having taken part in the Assembly of 1682. Yet the Government still hoped to force him to yield. Cardinal D'Estrées suggested to the King not to submit to the Pope any new names as episcopal sees became vacant, until the Bulls for the Bishops of Castres and Clermont should have been issued. The King followed this advice.¹ He threatened to make canonical provision for vacant sees without the Pope. The right of nomination to bishoprics, it was argued, had originally belonged to the metropolitan; it had only been transferred to the Pope by the concordats, and since by his denial of the Bulls Innocent had violated these treaties, their dispositions lapsed and the metropolitan recovered his rights.² Innocent XI. was not shaken by these threats. He remained firm, though now, as before, he was ready to grant Bulls for such candidates as were not suspect of heresy. Now it was claimed in France that the four Articles of 1682 were free of errors, seeing that they had never been condemned by the Pope. Innocent instructed the nuncio to oppose such agreements with the utmost energy and to let it be known that the censure of those Articles had been almost ready for publication; if publication had been deferred, it was solely at the urgent request of the King and Cardinal D'Estrées, when suspension was agreed upon instead.³

¹ HANOTAUX, *Rome*, I., 319.

² *Ibid.*, 320 *seqq.* A proposal of the kind had already been made by the Bishop of Albi at the Assembly of the Clergy of 1682, though it was not accepted. He subsequently regretted his action as he feared that Rome might hear of it. Cf. *Lauri, May 11 and 18, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 1682 *loc. cit.*

³ “*e quando le sia dal medesimo risposto che la dottrina delle quattro propositioni non è condannata, e che per tanto non può chiamarsi non sana, ella potrà replicare che la censura di dette propositioni era già qui discussa et maturata et in punto già di uscir fuori, e non la trattenne nissun altra cosa che l'istanza fatta dal Re e rappresentata dal card. D'Estrées per una sospensione, la quale è stata fin hora osservata religiosamente da Roma,

If we may believe subsequent assurances of the French Government, Cardinal D'Estrées, in concert with the King, suggested the following solution of the problem of providing for the vacant sees: it was that the members of the Assembly of 1682 should write a respectful letter to the Pope and make the profession of faith prescribed by the Council of Trent.¹ However, when Cibo sought to mollify the Pope, the latter observed: "We shall do all we can, and overlook everything that may be overlooked, but to make Bishops of people whose doctrine is suspect, that we cannot do."²

Hope of an improvement in the situation diminished visibly whilst various incidents added to the Pope's annoyance and Louis' conduct became more and more reckless. Thus, on August 6th, 1685, without giving any reason, he ordered Cardinal Bouillon into exile either at Cluny or at Tournus.³ Innocent XI. protested against this measure on August 28th and on November 9th. He declared that his action was prompted solely by love of justice, for Bouillon had never stood up for the Pope.⁴ Although even Cardinal D'Estrées was of opinion that Innocent XI. had acted with great moderation, Louis was indignant at his intervention. In a letter of September 27th, 1685, he told Cardinal D'Estrées that he would not be dictated to by the Pope, for he was master of all his subjects, priests as well as layfolk, and no

ma non da Parigi." To Ranuzzi, January 27, 1685, *ibid.*, 172^a. Cf. the draft of the Constitution *Cum primum*, on the four Articles, April 11, 1682, in *Cod.* 309 of the *Bibl. Casanat.*

¹ HANOTAUX, *loc. cit.*, 319.

² "Tutto quello che si può fare, faremo; tutto quello che si può dissimulare, dissimuleremo; ma fare vescovi quelli che sono sospetti di cattiva dottrina, non è possibile." D'Estrées' report to the King, November 20, 1685, in GÉRIN, *Révocation*, 428.

³ *Ranuzzi, August 6, 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, *loc. cit.*; GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 406.

⁴ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, *loc. cit.* On *February 12 and 19, 1686, Innocent XI. renewed his protests.

one had a right to interfere.¹ Besides this, news also reached Rome that the column of the Corsicans had been re-erected at Paris, in the new Place de la Victoire, together with an inscription which was an insult to the Holy See.² This time, however, Louis informed the nuncio through La Chaize that he would not tolerate anything that trenched on the honour of the Pope.³ However, in Alsace the King allowed himself some violent encroachments on the rights of the Church, a particular victim being the monastery of Murbach. The nuncio's protests only elicited the reply that it would be impossible to settle any dispute to the Pope's satisfaction until the question of the *régale* and the four Articles was solved.⁴ However, Innocent felt he could not give way. Those were mistaken, he declared, who thought they could frighten him with threats; he would rather suffer anything; his just cause would surely prevail in the end.⁵

¹ " Je suis maître absolu de tous mes sujets, tant ecclésiastiques que laïques, et que personne sans distinction n'a droit de se mêler de ce que je juge à propos de leur ordonner." GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 407.

² " *È paruto sommamente strano a S. B^e che nel tempo istesso che qui si son fatte tutte le dimostrazioni possibili verso detta M^{tà} del Re in commendazione della pietà e del zelo con cui si è dalla M^{tà} S. procurata la conversione de' Calvinisti, si sia costì eretta di nuovo la piramide de' Corsi con una iscrizione latina e francese tanto ingiuriosa a questa corte." To Ranuzzi, April 23 and 30, 1686, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

³ *Ranuzzi, May 27, 1686, *ibid.*, 172^a.

⁴ *There occurred in France " giornalmente pregiudizii et aggravii alla S. Sede, e si mettono le mani nelle materie ecclesiastiche, come se il Papa non fosse al mondo. Tutto ciò è così manifesto, che qui non si può negare, . . . che sin tanto che penderanno le differenze note sopra la Regalia e le propositioni, niun negotio passerà mai bene, come per lo contrario tutti caminarrebbero facilmente, quando le sudette discordie fossero state composte." Ranuzzi, September 2, 1686, *ibid.*

⁵ " *Quelli che hanno detto e che dicono tuttavia a V. E. che sin tanto, che resteranno pendenti le differenze della Regalia, nissun negotio passerà mai bene per Roma, fanno conoscere che costì credono di poter a forza di ingiustizia e di concussioni

The tension between Rome and Paris became even more acute when Innocent XI. refused the Cardinal's hat to the Bishop of Beauvais who had been proposed both by France and Poland, a refusal that caused Croissy to observe that for France the Pope was a foreigner. Innocent openly expressed his indignation at such a remark: words of this kind, he said, were unworthy of a minister of the Most Christian King; to describe the Pope as a foreigner, especially in the conferment of ecclesiastical dignities in France, betokened a schismatical disposition: moreover, Cardinals were appointed for the good of the Church, not for that of the various States.¹

In recognition of his services Ranuzzi had been raised to the purple at the Consistory of September 2nd, 1686.² On the occasion of the presentation of the red hat to the new Cardinal, Louis delivered a speech in which he dwelt on his profound veneration for the Pope.³ But these were mere words: his actions were very different, so that the Pope once more seriously considered the idea of condemning at length the right of *régale* and the four Articles. It was

espugnar l'animo di N. S^{re}. et indurlo a concorrere in quei partiti che sono contrarii alla libertà et al bene della Chiesa, ma s'ingannano grandemente, mentre per qualsivoglia violenza S. S^{ta} non sarà mai per allontanarsi di ciò che le viene prescritto dal debito suo pastorale con una fiducia in Dio che debba a suo tempo farsi conoscere et iudicare causam suam." To the nuncio, September 21, 1686, *ibid.*

¹ " *Il discorso fatto a V. E. dal sigr. di Croissy non è da ministro di un re christ^{mo} nè da huomoc attolico, creandosi i cardinali per la Sede apostolica, per la Chiesa e non per i principi e per le nazioni, e non potendosi senza scisma considerare il Papa per estraneo, massime nella collazione delle dignità ecclesiastiche e nel esercizio di quella giurisdizione che gli è stata data da Dio e che non potrebbe esser negata al suo primato senza eresia." To Ranuzzi, October 15, 1686, *ibid.*

² GUARNACCI, I., 205. Cf. the Brief for Ranuzzi of September 8, 1686, BERTHIER, II., 293.

³ *To Ranuzzi, December 10, 1686, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc.cit.*

impossible to delay much longer owing to the grave danger lest the doctrinal errors contained in the four Articles should take root in France, when it might be pleaded that no condemnation had come from Rome.¹ A decisive step had to be taken : of longanimity the Pope had furnished abundant proof. Accordingly Innocent laid the two burning questions before the Inquisition. The Holy Office studied them and drew up the Bull of condemnation *Cum primum*. Cardinal Casanata, but more especially Schelstrate and Casoni, Favoriti's cousin and successor in office, took a lively part in the discussions. On August 15th, 1688, Schelstrate informed Cardinal Casanata that the text of the Bull, which had been subjected to yet another change, was ready and that Casoni was anxious that the Constitution should be published.² However, this was once more prevented. Instead the Most Christian King took fresh measures of violence against the aged and defenceless Head of the Church the interests of which he professed to serve.

¹ *Cf. Ranuzzi on November 12, 1685, *ibid.* La Chaize appealed already then (1685) to that argument : " La Chaize mi ha risposto essere horamai stabilito l'uso di sostenere le propositioni, la dottrina delle quali qui si vuol' havere per buona, mentre non è condannata nè da concilio alcuno nè dalla Sede Apostolica."

² *Cod. 309 of the Bibl. Casanat., Rome:

CHAPTER V.

REVOCATION OF THE EDICT OF NANTES—LOUIS XIV.'S VIOLENT MEASURES AGAINST INNOCENT XI.

(1.)

IN the course of his quarrels with Innocent XI., Louis XIV. had repeatedly drawn the Pope's attention to what he was doing for religion by repressing the Huguenots. He imagined that this would particularly impress so pious a Pontiff. Moreover he was well aware that the Holy See had never sanctioned the concessions made by Henry IV. by the Edict of Nantes, by which he granted them the free practice of their religion in places that were already Protestant, with the exception of Paris, political equality with Catholics and the retention of their places of security.¹ On the other hand the Huguenots were not satisfied even with these extensive concessions. During the minority of Louis XIII. they clearly betrayed their ambition to constitute a separate Republic within the State. When they had once more recourse to violence and allied themselves with foreign Powers, Richelieu intervened: he put an end to their separate political status whilst leaving them freedom of religion.² On the whole things remained thus under Mazarin also, but when Louis XIV. took over the reins of government, a complete change took place. Convinced that religious unity was an essential requisite for a well ordered State, he was resolved from the first to do away with the religious cleavage which had done France so much harm. He knew that on this point the overwhelming majority of his Catholic subjects were with him, for the latter saw in the Calvinists a foreign body within

¹ Cf. our data, Vol. XXIII., 147 *seqq.*

² Cf. our data, Vol. XXVIII., 422 *seq.*

the framework of the State which sensibly injured the national unity. In this matter the King was able to rely unconditionally both on his officials, the clergy and on all the outstanding personalities of France: Bossuet, Massillon, Racine, La Bruyère, Arnauld were all of one mind in this respect. The clergy strove before everything else to bring back the erring sheep to the fold of the Church by means of writings, sermons, conferences and popular missions. But if from this side instruction and persuasion alone were employed for the most part, whilst forcible methods were frowned upon, that circumstance did not prevent the public functionaries from making use of every means at their disposal. In this way the policy of persuasion turned increasingly into one of intimidation and coercion.¹ From about the end of the seventies, after the Peace of Nymegen had freed Louis from his foreign enemies, his action against the Huguenots became more and more sharp.² This was due to a conjunction of circumstances in which politics and religion were strangely mixed. From the first the monarch who stood for the maxim "L'Etat c'est moi" deemed it an intolerable thing that one section of his subjects should think otherwise than himself in so important a matter as religion. Politicians such as Louvois and Le Tellier encouraged this feeling. In the funeral discourse for Queen Henrietta of England, Louis heard Bossuet's remark that the diversity of sects had brought about the downfall of Charles I. Pellisson, himself a convert, represented to the King that the obstacles to the conversion of the Calvinist preachers were mostly of a material kind and this led to the foundation of a fund for the assistance of converts. Then came, in 1675, the influence of Madame de Maintenon, a niece of the Huguenot leader Agrippa d'Aubigné and a convert since 1649. This gifted lady had been in charge of the education of the King's children since 1669. She did her best to reconcile him to his lawful wife. When the Queen died in 1683 the King secretly married

¹ MOURRET, *L'Ancien Régime*, 293.

² See SCHOTT in HERZOG-HAUCK's *Realenzykl.*, XIV.³, 98 seq.

Madame de Maintenon who sought to bring about a change in the moral conduct of the frivolous monarch.¹ The royal confessor also worked in this sense, but La Chaize was much less acceptable than Madame de Maintenon. Louis felt the need of atoning for his licentious conduct and he now thought of seeking the pardon of heaven by a crusade against the heretics, after the manner of the great men of the Middle Ages. In October 1680, Madame de Maintenon wrote in a triumphant strain that the King was thinking seriously of the conversion of the Huguenots, and that soon there would be only one religion in France.² When this hope, which was shared by most French Catholics, proved an illusion, and many Huguenots emigrated, Louis decided, on the advice of Colbert, to confiscate their property. On March 18th, 1681, he published an ordinance by the terms of which recalcitrant Huguenots were to be forcibly converted by having soldiers quartered on them. The result was that Calvinism disappeared from Poitou within nine months.³

Things had gone thus far when the disputes between Louis and Innocent XI. took a more acute form. This gave additional importance to the problem of the Huguenots. Louis XIV. was not blind to the fact that through his conflict with the Holy See, he, "the eldest son of the Church," had got into a wrong position. Hence, when protests became ever louder on all sides, he resolved to give a convincing proof of his Catholic sentiments by persecuting the heretics, thus compelling the Pope to thank him publicly for the conversion

¹ On Mad. de Maintenon see the monographs by GEFROY (2 vols., Paris, 1887) and HANOTAUX (Paris, 1904) and DÖLLINGER, *Vorträge*, I. (1890), 357 *seqq.* SCHOTT (98) also says that the oft-repeated assertion that Mad. de Maintenon was chiefly responsible for the revocation of the Edict of Nantes and that she influenced Louis XIV. in that sense in order to make sure of the support of the clergy in her efforts for the King's hand, cannot be upheld. But the influential woman had certainly a large part in the destruction of Calvinism.

² MOURRET, 293 *seq.*

³ SCHOTT, *loc. cit.*, 99.

of so many, whilst he would at the same time induce him to yield on the question of the *régale*. It was undoubtedly at his instigation that the assembly of court Bishops of the year 1682 published a letter of exhortation, dated July 1st, in which they urged the erring "brethren" to come back. The letter ended with a threat that should they remain obdurate, they would have to bear the inevitable painful consequences.¹

When in the summer of 1683 the Huguenots of the Vivarais and the Dauphiné sought to defend themselves by force of arms, the rising was suppressed by the military. After that the war with Spain gave them a year's respite; however, as soon as peace had been signed the persecution began once more. The *Intendant* of Béarn, Nicolas Joseph Foucault, quartered the troops, now unemployed in consequence of the peace, on the Huguenots. This manœuvre was so successful that by August 1685, Béarn, the chief bulwark of Protestantism, only counted from three to four hundred Calvinists. Equally rapid results were achieved by the same violent means at Nîmes, Montpellier and other places.² By the autumn Calvinism in France had been reduced to a few small groups scattered here and there. All this confirmed Louis XIV. and his minister in the conviction that there was now only one more step to take in order to seal the utter destruction of Calvinism, viz. the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. This was done by an

¹ The exhortation was in vain. With good reason it was pointed out to the French clergy that it also failed in its duty and had broken its vow of obedience to the Holy See; GÉRIN, 392.

² ROUSSET, *Louvois*, III., 459 *seqq.*; SCHOTT, *loc. cit.*, 100; RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, III., 497 *seqq.* According to GÉRIN (*Révocation*, 387) Louis XIV. was not at first in agreement with the *dragonnades*. But even though the king may not have known the details of the cruel procedure, he heard enough and approved only too much. Foucault writes: "M. de Louvois has informed me that it was the king's will that the dragoons should remain with the nobles, until their conversion, and that they should be allowed to indulge in the greatest disorders" (*Mém. de N. J. Foucault*).

edict drawn up by Le Tellier and signed by Louis XIV. at Fontainebleau, about mid-October, after a few points had been altered. With its registration by the Parliament of Paris on October 22nd, it came into force. The main dispositions were these: recall of all privileges granted by Henry IV. and Louis XIII.; absolute prohibition of the exercise of the Calvinist religion and of all Calvinist schools throughout the kingdom; the banishment of all preachers who refused to be converted; rewards to converts; amnesty and restoration of their property to emigrants who returned to their native land. To justify this measure the King pleaded that in consequence of the mass conversions to the Catholic Church there was no longer any reason for the Edict of Nantes.¹

¹ Cf. E. BENOIST, *Hist. de l'Édit de Nantes*, 3 vols., Delft, 1693-5, and *Éclaircissements hist. sur les causes de la révocation de l'Édit de Nantes*, 2 vols., Paris, 1788; L. AUBINEAU, *De la révocation de l'Édit de Nantes*, Paris, 1879; SANDER, *Die Hugenotten und das Edikt von Nantes*, Breslau, 1885; SCHOTT, *Die Aufhebung des Edikts von Nantes*, Halle, 1885; GENELLI, *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, XXXI. (1886), 268 s., 400 s., 519 s.; ZIMMERMANN, *Katholik*, 1911, II., 134 s.; BAIRD, *The Huguenots and the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes*, 2 vols., New York, 1895; YVES DE LA BRIÈRE, *Dict. apologétique*, III., Paris, 1916, 1023-1047. On the King's power to recall the privileges granted by his predecessors—even apart from the many violations of the Edict by the Calvinists, H. Grotius says: "Norint illi, qui Reformatorum sibi imponunt vocabulum, non esse illa foedera, sed regum edicta ob publicam facta utilitatem et revocabilia, si aliud regibus publica utilitas suaserit" (*Apol. Riveti discussa*, 22). The other question, whether the Catholic Church derived more harm than advantage from the measure which by its violence and harshness hindered the peaceful conquest (cf. PICOT, I., 179 seq.; RÄSS, *Konvertiten*, III., 285 seq.), must probably be answered in the affirmative. FRANCK PUAUX (*Rev. hist.*, XXIX. (1885), 242 seqq) exaggerates the influence of the French clergy and does not rightly appraise the motives which caused proceedings against the Huguenots to appear to Louis XIV. desirable from political reasons.

As the measure was received with enthusiasm by high and low throughout the whole of France, Louis XIV. hoped more than ever that the Pope would now change his mind on all the questions in dispute. Already the vain monarch saw himself exalted as another Constantine, whilst he also imagined that as a reward for the extirpation of heresy in France, he had a claim to concessions in the matter of the *régale*, and to recognition, or at least tacit toleration, of the Gallican Articles. In this he was utterly mistaken. Already at the beginning of 1683, when Cardinal Sacchetti informed him of the return of more Protestants to the Catholic Church in France, Innocent XI. had exclaimed: "What is the good of it, if all the Bishops are schismatics?" The Pope feared that France, following England's example, was about to sever itself from the Holy See.¹ Meanwhile Louis stuck to his purpose. With a view to defeating the Pope's action in regard to France, he caused the more passive attitude of the Holy See in the question of the Huguenots to be represented as a secret favouring of the Calvinists.² Moreover Louis persevered in his hope of extorting concessions from the Pope as a reward for what he had done for the conversion of the Protestants. Croissy and La Chaize had made representations in this sense to the nuncio, but Innocent resolutely rejected all such bargaining and instructed the Jesuit General to write to La Chaize that, as in duty bound, he should explain to the King that his demands could not be granted in conscience.³

¹ "Che importa di dimolire tanti tempii, se sono tutti i vescovi scismatici? Faranno come in Inghilterra." Card. D'Estrées to the King, January 14, 1683, in GÉRIN, *Révocation*, 387.

² *Ibid.*, 392.

³ " *Oltre quello che fu da me scritto con le passate sopra il discorso fattole dal sig. di Croissy e dal Pre La Chaise intorno al concedere al merito acquistatosi dal Re nell' estirpatione del Calvinismo con la Chiesa, l'estensione della Regalia e la pronta provisione di cotesti vescovati vacanti, N. Sre ha fatto parlare a questo padre generale de' Giesuiti perchè scriva al sudetto P. La Chaise, incaricandogli di far conoscere al Re secondo il

In these circumstances Louis XIV. convoked a fresh Assembly of the French Clergy for May 1685.¹ At Rome events in France were regarded from the first with great anxiety. The Pope instructed Lauri to keep a watchful eye on the Assembly,² whereas Louis XIV. wished the Holy See to be left in the dark with regard to the proceedings at that gathering.³

Up to this time the Assembly of the French Clergy had always had more than one president. The new Assembly broke with the tradition when, at the sitting of May 30th, 1685, it offered the presidency to Archbishop Harlay of Paris alone. This step was taken on the plea that Harlay's great ability and the outstanding services which he had rendered to Church and State, showed him to be worthy of such an honour. Thus it seemed as if the rumours to the effect that France aimed at the establishment of a patriarchate under Harlay, were not without solid foundation.⁴ The Assembly set up a committee for the purpose of drawing up a profession of faith (*exposition de la foi catholique*), with a view to facilitating the return of Protestants to the Catholic Church.⁵ The nuncio did not fail to draw the King's attention to the danger of such an undertaking, since there was an agreement

debito, che ne ha, che per ricompensa di un'opera meritoria, S. M^{ta} non può chiedere e S. B^e non può concedere contro coscienza l'estensione della Regalia proibita sotto pena di scomunica maggiore dal concilio di Lione, nè promuovere al grado di vescovo quei soggetti che nell'assemblea del 1682 hanno dato fuori una pessima dottrina." Cifra al Nuntio del 15 gennaio 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a, Papal Sec. Arch. The nunciature reports quoted in the sequel are all in code.

¹ GÉRIN, 399. There had been no such Assembly since 1682.

² *To Lauri, February 17, 1685, *loc. cit.*

³ " Il est bon, ainsi que vous le remarquez, de laisser à la cour où vous êtes l'inquietude, qu'elle peut avoir des résolutions de cette assemblée," Louis XIV. to D'Estrées, March 23, 1685, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 401.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 400.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 401.

with the Pope that no innovations would be made. Louis replied that he had asked the Assembly to do this because the heretics wrongly attributed to the Catholics dogmas which, in reality, were not dogmas of the faith at all, thereby deceiving the ignorant ; but as for innovations, he would not introduce any. La Chaize spoke to the same effect.¹ The commission, of which Archbishop Serroni of Albi was president, was completely under the influence of Harlay, without whose order nothing was undertaken and who was spoken of as the very oracle of the French clergy.² On July 11th, 1685, Serroni was able to announce the termination of the labours of the commission. Three days later the members of the Assembly presented themselves before the King for the purpose of requesting him to confirm their decisions. Louis was anxious to imitate the example of Justinian and Charlemagne, who had given their sanction to ecclesiastical decisions, whilst the Assembly, eager to imitate the Council of Chalcedon, likened the Archbishop of Paris to St. Cyril who had presided over the Council of Ephesus!³ On the occasion of the audience with the King, Daniel De Cosnac, Bishop of Valence, delivered an address in which he extolled Louis as the destroyer of heresy, proclaimed the services rendered by him to the Catholic Church in Holland and Germany and drew his attention to yet another vast field of action, viz. England.⁴

Innocent XI. was kept informed of these proceedings, both by the nuncio and by Cardinal Cibo ; in this they followed the directions of Cardinal D'Estrées, who himself faithfully

¹ “ *a fine di chiudere la bocca agli eretici che pervertiscono con infinite imposture le persone non intendenti con dar loro a credere : i cattolici credono ciò che effettivamente non credono ” (the nuncio on June 20, 1685, *ibid.*). Cf. Louis XIV.'s letter to D'Estrées in GÉRIN, 400, in which the King says that they would not revert to the four Articles and explain papal authority exclusively in the sense of the Council of Trent.

² GÉRIN, 401.

³ *Ibid.*, the original quotes thus.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 401 *seq.*

carried out Louis' instructions. Cibo sought to remove the Pope's distrust of Louis by praising his services to the Church, and by endeavouring to show that the fears entertained in Roman circles were groundless. However, the Pope maintained his reserve ; his only remark was that if Cibo's explanations tallied with facts, there was no ground for any misgivings.¹ Louis, however, was not satisfied with such qualified praise ; what he desired was public recognition by the Pope, and he complained of the latter's reserve. To D'Estrées he wrote that the triumph of the good cause would give him satisfaction ; to himself he promised grace from God, who beheld the secrets of his soul, to enable him to complete the work.²

As for the new profession of faith which the French clergy had submitted to the King for confirmation, a contemporary³ states that under the influence of Harlay and the Jesuits, the Assembly was prepared to go much further than the Council of Trent in order to meet the Protestants. However, the King judged that such a step was too risky, especially at a moment when such great efforts were being made for the restoration of religious unity in France. Accordingly the nuncio saw his labours crowned with success. Louis refused to confirm the decision of the Assembly.⁴

At this point an incident occurred which rendered the situation considerably worse. After the termination of the Assembly the profession of faith became known ; in fact it was spread among the general public by means of the press. Thereupon the nuncio protested, the Archbishop found himself under the necessity of condemning his own work, and the King forbade the diffusion of the printed sheets. With this Louis imagined that he had done enough so that his anger was extreme when he learnt that the nuncio had nevertheless

¹ " Quando sia così, non habbiamo da dolerci, tutto andrà bene," D'Estrées to the King, July 24, 1685, *ibid.*, 402.

² GÉRIN, *Révocation*, 403.

³ BENOIST, in GÉRIN, 403.

⁴ *Ibid.*

forwarded a copy to Rome ; that the Pope had submitted it for examination to a Congregation¹ ; that the Congregation was actually discussing it, and that any errors that might be found in it, would be condemned by the Index.² The mere thought that a Roman Congregation should busy itself with an ordinance issued in France, examining and condemning it, a document, too, that had already been condemned and suppressed by the Archbishop of Paris and the King, seemed to Louis intolerable ; it prompted him to further dangerous steps.

Whilst these events were happening in Paris, a fresh insult to Innocent XI. and to the papacy itself was perpetrated. A simple priest of the name of Berthe, who was also Rector of the University of Paris, being desirous of taking a doctorate at the Sorbonne, had chosen for the subject of his disputation the defence of the four Articles. The theses were printed and dedicated to Louis XIV. after which the University accepted them.³ Harlay presided at the disputation whilst the University bore the cost of the promotion and the printing. In order that the affair might not be ignored in Rome, the theses were affixed to the door of the nunciature.⁴ In point of fact Rome did not remain silent. On October 9th Ranuzzi was instructed to protest to Croissy and La Chaize both against the erroneous teaching of the theses and their being affixed to the nunciature.⁵ Innocent XI. let the King know that it ill agreed with his fight against an older heresy to substitute new errors in its place.⁶

¹ GÉRIN, 403.

² *Ibid.*, 404.

³ *Ibid.*, 407.

⁴ *The nuncio on September 17, 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.* ; GÉRIN, 408.

⁵ *To the nuncio, October 9, 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.* : The nuncio must protest against the " pubblicazione delle tesi del rettore di Sorbona ; della pessima dottrina, che in esse si contiene, e dell'insolenza usata in affigergne la stampa alla sua porta ".

⁶ " *Vuole ancora che ella dica a S. M^{tà} che mentre da lei si stanno sradicando di cotesto regno con tanto buon successo le

Louis XIV. had already sought to justify himself in a letter to Cardinal D'Estrées dated October 4th, 1685. It was not absolutely certain, the letter stated, that the theses had really been affixed to the nunciature for not a trace of it could be discovered on the door! If it did happen, it could only be considered as an act of courtesy, the intention being to bring the document to the knowledge of the nuncio. In the same letter Louis expressly claimed for his Sorbonne the right to defend Gallicanism.¹

Ranuzzi's reports supplied Rome with particulars about the progress of the conversions of the Huguenots and the zeal of which the King gave proof in this respect. The number of converts was already estimated at 400,000 souls. One of the principal means employed consisted in bribing leading circles. Much obstruction came from the Calvinist ministers who urged their followers to emigrate. But even their resistance could be overcome with golden weapons, hence it was possible to count on the complete extinction of the heresy within a measurable period. This necessitated the erection of new churches, Ranuzzi added, and according to La Chaize it was Louis' intention to build sixty new ones. Moreover the King was not content with exterminating heresy in his own territory, on the contrary, he had urged the Duke of Savoy to do the same and promised him every assistance to that effect. The conversion of the Huguenots was the chief topic of conversation at court, Ranuzzi wrote, but everybody was surprised that Innocent XI. had not one word of commendation for the King. The nuncio urged the Pope to address to Louis a Brief, publicly praising him for what he had done.²

eresie vecchie, non si dovrebbero favorire e promover nuovi errori." To the nuncio, October 16, 1685, *loc. cit.*

¹ " Et comme la cour de Rome soutient ses maximes par toutes sortes de voies au delà des monts, on peut aussi en deçà demeurer dans les sentiments, qui ont toujours été suivis et qui ne sont point contraires à la véritable doctrine chrétienne." GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 408 *seq.*

² " *Il fervore, col quale hora si usa qui ogni opera immaginabile per l'oppressione dell'eresia, ha prodotto effetto tale, che

Innocent defended himself against the reproach of indifference. Whenever an occasion had presented itself, he had expressed his satisfaction with Louis' action against the Calvinists to the Duke D'Estrées as well as to the other ambassadors, and he promised to send the desired Brief by the next courier.¹ However, though the Pope was willing to take a favourable view of the King's action against the Huguenots, representations in an opposite sense were also made to him; Queen Christine, in particular, described to him in vivid colours the cruelty of a procedure which was utterly at variance with the spirit of the Gospel. She particularly represented that the Pope was not being called upon to take any part in the whole business of conversion and that he was treated as if he were of no consequence; so long as the four Articles were upheld in France there would be no question of papal authority there, and Protestants might become Catholics without submitting themselves to the Pope. Innocent admitted that he had not been allotted his share in the work of conversion, but he nevertheless deemed it his duty to praise Louis and to pray for final success since the four Articles were less objectionable than downright heresy.² But he was not

si calcolano in due mesi sino a 400^m convertiti . . . , facendosi come suol dirsi il ponte d'oro, particolarmente ai loro ministri, che sono pertinaci per farli uscire dal regno, quando non si rendono all'allettamento di un annua pensione loro assegnata. . . . [Non si può comprendere], che S. B^e non ne mostri minimo gradimento nè applaudisca in alcuna maniera alla pietà con la quale il Re vi si impiega. The nuncio, October 15, 1685, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

¹ " *Dell'egregia pietà e zelo che con tanta sua gloria e merito dimostra il Re christianissimo nell'esternar dal suo regno, il Calvinismo, ha sempre la S^{tà} di N. S^{re} parlato con somma lode non solo a questo sig. Duca d'Estrées sempre che è stato all'audienza, ma ancora a tutti gli altri ministri de' principi; et è S. S^{tà} dispostissima a testificar questi medesimi sentimenti anche a S. M^{tà} con un breve che sarà inviato a V. S. Ill^{ma} col venturo corriero." To the nuncio, November 9, 1685, *loc. cit.*

² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 418.

satisfied. To Ranuzzi he wrote that the heretics who returned to the Church on the basis of the four Articles would never make good Catholics since they would retain the worst of the errors they had professed before their conversion, viz. their anti-papal theories.¹

At last the nuncio was able to hand to the King the promised Brief, dated November 13th, 1685.² In his very courteous letter of thanks of the same year Louis was unable wholly to disguise his disappointment ; he had looked for more than praise and a promise of prayers on the part of the Pope.³ Louis' letter to Cardinal D'Estrées of the same day shows that in recognition of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the King had expected the Pope to yield in the affair of the *régale* ; he was even ready to meet the Pontiff to some extent ; he would have agreed to the Pope confirming, as a favour, the prerogatives of the crown which he believed to be his by right.⁴ Croissy and La Chaize also spoke to the nuncio in this sense. La Chaize thought that the Pope might very well relax his strictness in some measure, seeing that the King had deserved so well of the Church.⁵ There was widespread

¹ “ *Gli eretici convertiti col motivo delle quattro proposizioni, che contradicono a i diritti et all'autorità pontificia, non possono esser buoni cattolici, mentre restano nella pessima dottrina, che hanno sempre tenuta prima di convertirsi secondo gli empîi principii della loro eresia.” Ranuzzi must tell this to the King when an opportunity occurs. To the nuncio, November 27, 1685, *loc. cit.*

² BERTHIER, II., 260.

³ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 429.

⁴ Quand je lui demanderais de confirmer par des grâces tout ce que je crois posséder avec justice comme des droits attachés à ma couronne, Sa St^é ne devrait pas faire de difficulté dans cette occasion de se servir du pouvoir et des trésors que Dieu lui a confiés pour faciliter en tout ce qui dépend d'elle l'achèvement de ce grand ouvrage. *Ibid.*, 430.

⁵ *Croissy thought that the Pope should “ allargar la mano e versare i tesori della Chiesa con accordare al Re quello ch' egli desiderava e che può pretendere di conservarsi come legittimamente suo ”, and La Chaize added that the Pope should “ rilasciar

satisfaction in France that the Pope had openly praised the great hero of the faith, Louis XIV.¹

Innocent continued firm in his point of view as Cardinal D'Estrées soon realized. Louis, too, had to admit that there was no likelihood of a solution of the question of the *régale*, unless he submitted to the Pope's wishes,² for in the meantime an answer had arrived from the Pope to the suggestion for concessions in that matter. Innocent declared once more that he fully appreciated Louis' action against the Protestants. He had at all times acknowledged the merit of the King, but his reward must be expected from the divine goodness and mercy. Hence he exhorted Louis to refrain from demands that offended against God and justice. New and destructive heresies must not be introduced in France while such excellent steps were being taken against the old ones. Let Louis think of the hour of death and of the account he will have to give to God, for on the day of judgment human interests and reasons of policy would count for nothing.³ The Francophile

un poco del suo rigore per un Re che faceva tanto bene alla Chiesa e che è inclinato a farne ancora più, se S. B^{ne} mostrasse di gradirlo con altro che con un breve". The nuncio, on December 10, 1685, *ibid.*

¹ The nuncio, on December 17, 1685, *ibid.*

² "Si vos remontrances ne produisent aucun fruit, il n'en faut plus attendre sous ce pontificat." Louis XIV. to Card. D'Estrées, December 6, 1685, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 430.

³ " *La ricompensa per quello che si opera da S. M^{tà} intorno alla conversione degli eretici si deve attendere dalla bontà e misericordia divina e non desiderar cose, che sono contro il servizio di Dio e contro la giustizia et il bene del medesimo regno, nel quale si cerca di aprir la strada a nuove eresie con dottrine perniciose e con imponer l'obbligo alle università et ai dottori di rinsegnarle nel tempo stesso che con tanta applicatione si procura di estinguere le vecchie . . . ; che [il re] comparisca a rendere un strettissimo conto d'ogni sua azione alla M^{tà} Divina, nel cospetto e tribunale della quale non han luogo le considerazioni di humano interesse, nè giovano punto le ragioni politiche " (to the nuncio, January 1, 1686, *loc. cit.*). In the *Cifra of April 9, 1686 (*ibid.*), these instructions are repeated.

Cardinals in Rome now made a supreme effort to dispose Innocent more favourably towards Louis, with the result that the Pope decided on a further step. At a consistory of March 18th, 1686, he once more bestowed great praise on the King, though he mentioned at the same time the Emperor's brilliant victories over the Turks.¹ Contrary to all established custom, Cardinal D'Estrées wished to reply on the spot to the Pope's allocution by a eulogy of Louis XIV.; but the opposition of the Cardinals compelled him to desist.² The Pope ordered a *Te Deum*, to be followed by the customary public rejoicings on such occasions. The French party, however, pointed out that it was the season of Lent, so that it would not be possible to give to the celebrations the necessary pomp, hence they requested the Pope to transfer them till after Easter, a suggestion to which he agreed.

The celebrations in honour of the revocation of the Edict of Nantes were held in Rome on April 29th. Innocent XI. held a papal *cappella* and at its conclusion intoned the *Te Deum*. This was followed by the public rejoicings and at night there were the customary illuminations. The brothers D'Estrées received permission to prolong the solemnities; these were held in the French national church of St. Louis, at the residence of the French ambassador [Palazzo Farnese], and at such convents and hospices as depended on the French crown. The detailed reports of the two D'Estrées were meant to show at Versailles how, under their inspiration, the achievements of the King were being extolled in Rome.³

But Louis was under no delusion as to the fact that his representatives in Rome had failed in their main purpose; they had not obtained the desired concessions in the sphere of ecclesiastical policy. Of what use to him was the belated papal recognition, obtained with difficulty and linked with the eulogy of the Emperor? After all, it went without saying that Rome would approve his intention to extirpate heresy: no Pope could act otherwise.

¹ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.* (435) gives the text of the allocution.

² *Ibid.*, 436.

³ *Ibid.*, 437 *seq.*

Innocent carefully weighed the good and the bad consequences that might follow from the action of the King of France against the Huguenots. He was well aware, not only of the secondary aims of Louis, but likewise of the risk and the wrongfulness of his violent procedure. In the course of a conversation with Queen Christine about mid-October, 1685, he observed that persecution did not diminish heresy, on the contrary, it spread it.¹ The Pope was also afraid of the inevitable and injurious repercussion upon Catholics in Protestant countries, especially in England.²

A report by the Venetian ambassador, Girolamo Venier, bearing on Innocent's attitude on the question of the Huguenots, is of great importance. According to this document, Innocent openly and explicitly condemned Louis XIV.'s despotism and his use of brute force; conversions, he observed, were not made by armed apostles; this was a new missionary method of which Christ our Lord had made no use. Moreover, the moment for combating Calvinism had been badly chosen by Louis since he was at the same time fighting against the Holy See.³ The Pope spoke quite openly, although he had been previously accused by the French, on account of his reticence on the question of the Huguenots, of being a friend of the Calvinists. In the summer of 1687 Cardinal D'Estrées likewise reported that the Pope showed but little interest in what was being done in France for the extirpation of heresy.⁴

The Pope gave the King a manifest proof of his disapproval

¹ *Ibid.*, 417; GRAUERT, II., 280 *seqq.*

² GÉRIN, 425.

³ BAROZZI-BERCHET, III., 467 *seq.*: "Anco per questo la corte di Roma si è astenuta dal dar lode a quella, benchè zelante azione, pubblicando che non fosse proprio far missione di apostoli armati, e che questo metodo nuovo non fosse il migliore, giacchè Cristo non se ne era servito per convertire il mondo; inoltre parve inopportuno il tempo di guadagnar gli eretici allora che eran più bollenti le controversie col Papa." Not only RANKE (*Päpste*, III., 115), but BROSCHE (I., 442) strongly maintains that Innocent XI. disapproved of Louis XIV.'s cruel action.

⁴ Reports of July 24, 1687, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 439.

when precisely those Bishops received tokens of his high regard who had protested against the brutal persecution of the Huguenots.¹ On the Archbishop of Grenoble, Le Camus, who had incurred Louis XIV.'s displeasure, and who had raised his voice against the oppression of the Huguenots, the Pope bestowed the purple in September 1686.²

(2.)

Whilst Louis XIV. vainly hoped for concessions in the question of the *régale* by persecuting the Protestants, there arose a fresh dispute which was destined to lead to the most outrageous acts of violence against the Holy See. In course of time the ambassadors of foreign princes in Rome had permitted themselves great encroachments. Not content with their personal immunity, and that of the ambassadorial residence, they as it were vied with one another in stretching ever further their franchises (*franchigie—franchises*) and the space within which their immunity was in force—the “quarter,” as it was called. They claimed as a right that the papal Government should refrain from official measures within the quarter and that the papal police (*sbirri*) should not so much as be seen there; the administration of justice was to be exclusively the affair of the ambassadors. The consequence of these ever increasing pretensions was that criminals sought shelter in those districts, and the quarters became the hiding place of the dregs of the Roman populace. There they enjoyed the protection of the ambassadors who demanded considerable sums of money in return. The representatives of foreign Governments demanded even further privileges. With their permission the tradesmen with whom they dealt affixed the arms of the respective nations to their houses, as a result of which the immunity of the quarter was also claimed for these

¹ *Ibid.*, 438; IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 67.

² See Brief of September 8, 1686, in BERTHIER, II., 292. Cf. CH. BELLET, *Histoire du card. Le Camus*, Paris, 1886.

dwellings and for those who occupied them. To other persons also the ambassadors granted the right to use their arms; in this way these people, in return for suitable acknowledgment, also enjoyed the immunity of the quarter. To this was added yet a further abuse. For a sum of money certificates were issued to the effect that the bearer belonged to the suite of an ambassador; this exempted him from the ordinary Roman justice. Moreover since the ambassadors enjoyed immunity from customs, they made arrangements with commercial establishments with a view to their goods reaching Rome under the name of the respective ambassador, free of duty. The profit derived from these transactions was divided between the ambassador and the tradespeople.¹

As long as such a situation obtained in Rome, it was impossible for the Pope to establish decency and order in his capital. Moreover these abuses led to frequent conflicts between the papal Government and the ambassadors.

This usurped immunity of the quarter had given rise, under Alexander VII., to the so-called Corsican conflict which had proved the occasion for a deep humiliation of the Holy See. From the very beginning of his pontificate Innocent XI., who was determined on a reform, resolved to put an end to these abuses; hence he was greatly pleased when the King of Spain informed him in 1677 that he was prepared to forgo "the quarter" if the other princes did so too.² The Pope promptly brought this to the notice of the French Government through the nuncio and, despite an evasive reply,³ he summoned the ambassadors to put a stop to the abuse of the armorial bearings. The same summons was addressed to the Cardinals as they too had begun to imitate the diplomats.⁴ An ordinance

¹ Cf. *Giustificazione della bolla*, 3 seqq.; GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 385; BOJANI, in *Rev. d'hist. dipl.*, XXII. (1908), 350 seqq. On the abuse of the exemption of the quarter cf. also **Cod. Urb.*, 1706, p. 177, 181, 203, Vat. Lib.

² To Varese, June 30, 1677, in BOJANI, 357. Cf. *Recueil des Instruct.*, Rome I., 297 seqq.

³ Letter of July 13, 1677, in BOJANI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Letter of November 24, 1677, *ibid.*, 358.

on the subject was then published. As the Spanish ambassador, Marchese di Carpio, refused to take any notice of it, Innocent XI. refused to give him audience.¹ On the part of France the Pope hoped for willingness to meet his demands in consequence of the influence of the accommodating minister Pomponne.²

Venice was the first to feel the unbending will of the Pope. After the recall of its ambassador, Barbaro, Innocent announced that he would not receive his successor, Zeno, until the Republic had renounced the quarter.³ Venice yielded to the Pope's firmness and dispatched another ambassador in May 1679.⁴ On the other hand, in France, Pomponne had been replaced by Croissy and the change made itself promptly felt in the question of the quarter also.⁵ The Pope's representations remained unheeded and the freedom of the quarter continued to be insisted upon.

Conditions were worst in the Spanish quarter of Marchese di Carpio. In the great earthquake of Malaga, Innocent saw a divine punishment for the abuse of the quarter.⁶ On December 21st, 1681, he made it known that he would not receive a new Spanish ambassador if he refused to renounce the quarter.⁷ However, all efforts were fruitless so that Innocent considered the King of Spain to have incurred the censures of the Bull *In coena Domini*.⁸ The Pope, he declared,

¹ *Ibid.*

² *Giustificazione della bolla, 10 seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, II ; to the Paris nuncio, June 22, 1678, in BOJANI, 360.

⁴ BOJANI, *ibid.*

⁵ GÉRIN, *La disgrâce de M. de Pomponne*, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXIII. (1878), 5 seqq.

⁶ *To the Spanish nuncio, November 24, 1680, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 156, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. *to the same, February 16 and April 13, 1681, *ibid.*, 158.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ " *Con occasione che la mattina del Giovedì santo si rinovò la bolla *In coena Domini* con la solenne cerimonia nota a V. E., ha considerato N. S^{re} che S. M^{ta} cattolica per l'assenso et il

could not suffer Rome to be turned into a Babylon by such abuses.¹

However, all was in vain. Innocent instructed the nuncio to give a last warning ; Spain refused, on the plea that France continued to enjoy the quarter. The Pope declared that there was a great difference, for Spain went far beyond France in its extension of the freedom of the quarter.² When Marchese di Carpio was named Viceroy of Naples Innocent XI. gave effect to his threat not to receive another ambassador before the quarter had been renounced. The fact was that the

fomento che presta al mantenimento del quartiere in Roma, vive del continuo illaqueata nelle censure per la disposizione del § 9º, non 19º, come per errore è scritto nella lettera di V. E., e molto più per quello che apertamente ne dice il § 20º. Nè suffraga per esimere il Re da tale incursione o il vano rispetto di non voler pregiudicare alle sue reali prerogative o l'esempio di quello che fanno altri ambasciatori, perchè avanti il tribunale di Dio niuna di queste ragioni sarà di alcun momento. Intende S. Stà che V. E. torni ad insinuarlo alla M^{tà} Sua et al confessore, perchè, sebene vede per esperienza ch'è opera perduta, tuttavia vuol la sodisfazione di poter dire di non haver mai lasciato mai di ammonire S. M^{tà} pel desiderio che porta della sua eterna salute et anche della felicità temporale sua e de' suoi regni, conoscendosi per prova che questi inconvenienti gravissimi irritano la divina indignatione." To the nuncio, March 29, 1682, *ibid.*

¹ " *Non può S. Stà abbandonar la cura di levare il quartiere, nè mai si quieterà fino che non vede abolita questa abominatione che impedisce l'amministrazione della giustizia e fa divenir Roma una Babilonia per le ragioni tant'altre volte significate a V. E. e da lei a cotesta corte. Vuol perciò la S^{tà} Sua che V. E. non cessi far le solite istanze e d'incaricarne la coscienza del Re e de' ministri e di minacciare i flagelli della divina vendetta. E confermi pur quanto ha già rappresentato circa la determinatione inflessibile di non voler S. Stà ammetter nuovo ambasciatore ordinario o straordinario che sia, se prima non depone ogni pensiero di godere il quartiere." To the nuncio, April 12, 1682, *ibid.*

² *To the nuncio, July 2, 1682, *ibid.*

Spanish ambassadors had extended their power over so large a district that it could be described as a small town. What would Madrid say, Innocent asked, if a foreign ambassador were to claim such liberties there? ¹ The Pope's constancy triumphed in the end: the King of Spain renounced the quarter.²

Thus the only difficulty now came from France. In 1684 various incidents occurred when a certain Dragonelli was arrested by the papal police in the neighbourhood of the Palazzo Farnese and the pontifical *sbirri* were thereupon detained in the palace. Innocent XI., in his protest to the King of France, represented that the freedom of the quarter had never been recognized by the Popes: he would only receive a new French ambassador if he renounced this freedom.³ However, Paris was unwilling to yield. Louis consulted Créqui, a former ambassador, who asserted that the matter of the quarter had been settled in his time with the Governor of Rome.⁴ This the Pope denied most emphatically; never had such an arrangement been arrived at, he said.⁵ Thus the question of the French quarter remained unsolved.

On January 30th, 1687, the French ambassador, the Duke D'Estrées, died quite unexpectedly in Rome.⁶ On the same

¹ *To the nuncio, September 27 and October 25, 1682, *ibid.*

² *Giustificazione della bolla*, 13.

³ “*S. S^{ta} non si sarebbe mai indotta ad ammettere un altro ambasciatore, quando questo avesse dovuto pretendere di mantenere nell'usurato possesso del quartiere.” To the French nuncio, October 14, 1682, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 172^a.

⁴ BOJANI, *loc. cit.*, 351 *seq.*

⁵ “*E cosa certissima, che sopra tal punto non si è mai ammessa condicione alcuna e che si è dissimulato e tollerato bensì, ma mai permessa l'usurpazione de' pretesi quartieri.” To the nuncio, October 21, 1684, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *To the French nuncio, January 30, 1687, 177, Papal Sec. Arch. Death had been so sudden that the ambassador could not receive the Last Sacraments. He died “*senza haver potuto dare alcun signo manifesto di pentimento [et] ha finito suoi giorni con l'abominazione del quartiere su lo stomacho, non

day the Pope informed the French Government that a new ambassador would only be received on the condition already laid down.¹ Thus a conflict threatened in which neither side could be expected to yield—not the unshakable Pontiff bent on a reform, and still less the haughty monarch who was wont to meet his opponents arms in hand.

In view of the gravity of the situation many persons tried to find an amicable solution, more particularly Urbano Giorio who had already acted as intermediary between the Vatican and Cardinal D'Estrées in the question of the *régale*. A memorial from his pen² draws a lively picture of the various peace proposals hitherto made in vain. He now suggested a new one, though he too felt that the abuse of the immunity of the quarter could no longer be tolerated. In his opinion it would be enough for the re-establishment of peace if the Governor of Rome were to grant to the French ambassador a certain freedom of quarter which would, however, only

senza un timor ben grande " (to the nuncio, February 11, 1687, *ibid.*). The body of the ambassador " *fu heri portato processionalmente dalla parocchia di S. Caterina alla chiesa di S. Luigi con quella solemnità et accompagnamento del majordomo, famigliari e guardia Svizzera di Palazzo, di vescovi assistenti e di altri prelati, tutti in cavalcata, che suol praticarsi con i card. decani del Collegio." To the nuncio, February 8, 1687, *ibid.*

¹ " *Ella debba dire liberamente al sig. di Croissy et al Re medesimo, che havendo la St^a Sua sofferto per tanti anni e con tanta pazienza la violenta usurpatione del preteso quartiere, non vuole in alcun modo soffrirla più hora che è piaciuto a Dio chiamare a se l'ambasciatore, ne sarà mai per ammettere alcun nuovo ambasciatore di S. M^{ta} quando questi sia per pretendere il quartiere o franco sudetto nel modo che si è fatto protestare più volte e che si è protestato e si pratica con li altri principi " (to the nuncio, January 30, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*). Ranuzzi informed Croissy more than once of this attitude of the Pope. In a letter to Croissy of February 12, 1687, he stresses the fact that this was the third time he communicated this information (*Cod. Bildt, p. 2*). Cf. MSGR. D'ARMAILHACQ, *L'église nationale de St. Louis des Français à Rome*, Rome, 1894, 45.

² *Ragguaglio, f. 14, *Nunziat. diverse*, 106, Papal Sec. Arch.

include the Piazza Farnese and the side streets. Cardinal D'Estrées fell in with the proposal and the secretary of the embassy, Della Croce, whom he was about to dispatch to Paris as the bearer of the news of D'Estreés' death, was charged to get the proposal accepted there.

The Pope's decision preceded the answer of Paris. Cardinal Spinola, Governor of Rome, had approved Giorio's proposal and laid it before the Pope.¹ However, Innocent XI. declined a solution of the question which would oblige him to give up his strict principles and to make concessions.² Moreover, the Pope did not wholly trust Cardinal D'Estrées because in the course of the negotiations in the affair of the *régale* he had come to know a less commendable side of his personality. In view of reports current at the time, that Cardinal D'Estrées would be the next French ambassador, nuncio Ranuzzi was instructed to make it quite clear in Paris that a Cardinal of the Roman Church would not be recognized in Rome as ambassador of a foreign Power.³

¹ *Giorio (*loc. cit.*) invariably calls Spinola after his titular church of S. Cecilia and describes him as "ministro più d'ogni altro disposto e più d'ogn'altro acconcio a tal maneggio". Spinola was the first to receive the purple from Innocent XI. (September 1, 1681). He had family relations with Spain. Innocent named him Governor of Rome; see GUARNACCI, I., 123, 127. Spinola was one of the Francophile Cardinals who wished to preserve peace with Louis XIV. Lavardin's Instruction of July 14, 1687 (see below, p. 354) says of him: "Il a toutes les qualités pour être un bon Pape, son gouvernement seroit facile, il est porté à faire des grâces il aime les plaisirs et et la conversation . . . ; on croit, s'il étoit Pape, on couviendroit aisément avec lui de ce que Sa Majesté désireroit" (*Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 352).

² Giorio **Ragguaglio* (f. 53^b, *loc. cit.*): "Mentre il cardinal D'Estrées colla spedizione fatta a Parigi del suo segretario aveva messi in opera tutt' i sforzi dell' intelletto e della penna per stabilirlo col Re suo signore, il card. S. Cecilia di commissione del Papa diede risposta: non accommodarsi il Papa a verun partito, onde avesse la S^ta Sua a rimettere alcuna cosa di suo."

³ *Quando ella s'accorgesse che costì si pensasse di appoggiare l'ambasciaria al sudetto card. D'Estrées o ad altro cardinale

In order to create a *fait accompli*, Innocent XI. charged the Governor, Cardinal Spinola, to have the French quarter combed by the papal police.¹ Spinola, however, proceeded with great consideration because, together with some others, he continued to hope for an understanding the chances of which he was anxious not to spoil. He accordingly arranged with Cardinal D'Estrées, who lived at the Palazzo Farnese, that the expedition of the papal police would only take place after the Cardinal had left the palace. D'Estrées, who had convinced himself that the French claims in regard to their quarter could not be upheld, removed to the Villa Pamfili near S. Pancrazio,² alleging reasons of health, after which the French quarter was occupied by the pontifical police. This took place before February 11th, 1687.³ The

a chi bisogna, che la Stà sua non sarà mai per ricevere con tal carattere alcuno di loro." To the nuncio, February 1, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*, 177.

¹ *Anzi insinuò [Spinola] avergli comandato il Papa di far scorrere per la piazza et per le vie contigue al palazzo gl'officiali della giustizia. Giorio, Raggiaglio, f. 53^b, *loc. cit.*

² *Il cardinale [Spinola] però come ministro d'esperienza e di senno andava assai moderatamente eseguendo gl'ordini del Papa, acciochè le cose non precipitassero a rottura, ma rimanessero sempre in stato di accomodamento di trattato . . . ; il temperamento fu, che prima che gl'ufficiali di corte incominciassero a passeggiar la piazza e le vicinanze del palazzo Farnese, il cardinale sene appartasse transferendosi a titolo di miglior aria e di sanità alla villa Pamfilia nelle vicinanze di S. Pancratio (Giorio, Raggiaglio, f. 54, *loc. cit.*). Cardinal D'Estrées' stay at the Villa Pamfili is also mentioned in Cibo's **Cifra* of February 18, 1687, to Rannuzzi, 177, *ibid.*

³ *Eight days have gone since the funeral for the deceased Duke D'Estrées. "Questo governo ha mandato e continua a far passeggiare la giustizia nel quartiere, che dall'ambasciatore suddetto veniva con violenza ritenuto. Il sig. cardinale D'Estrées non ha mancato di mostrar sentimento con ammirazione che chiunque conosce che ammettendosi la pretenzione ch'egli haveva di ritener come cardinale nazionale e comprotettore della corona il medesimo quartiere, sarebbe un errore peggiore del

Queen of Sweden's spontaneous renunciation of her quarter strengthened Innocent XI. in his determination not to grant a similar franchise to Louis XIV. His hope that the King of France would see the necessity of yielding was all the greater as Louis had cleared Paris of its criminal elements, hence he could not expect that Rome should remain a place of refuge for miscreants.¹ The Pope was, therefore, painfully surprised when Croissy declared himself strongly opposed to renouncing the quarter and even threatened to uphold the abuse by force. Innocent XI., however, felt convinced that the King thought otherwise than his minister who neglected no opportunity of mortifying the Holy See.² In these circumstances the return of the envoy Croce from Paris was awaited with impatience in Rome; as a matter of fact D'Estrées requested an audience of the Pope immediately after his arrival. Innocent was ailing, so the Cardinal was referred to the Secretary of State, Cibo, should his business be urgent.³

Information from Paris was to the effect that the King had assented to Giorio's proposals. Louis XIV. wished to appoint the youthful Duke D'Estrées as his new ambassador,

primo, mentre con simile esempio ogn'altro cardinale haverebbe potuto prendere la cosa istessa." To the nuncio, February 11, 1687, *ibid.*, 177. NAVENNE (II., 3) gives February 12, 1687, as the day of the occupation.

¹ *By the death of the French ambassador "e con la spontanea cessione di questa Regina", the quarter no longer exists. "S. Stà si persuade che il Re christianissimo, che estirpò, anni sono, con tanta sua lode e merito da cotesta città i ladri e gli assaissni, sia per non pretendere di sottenero in Roma un asilo" (to the nuncio, March 4, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*). On the Queen of Sweden's renouncement, see GRAUERT, II., 338. An undated* copy of the renunciation is in the Papal Sec. Arch., *Arm.*, III., 21, f. 214.

² The Pope described Croissy's conduct as a "modo ardito, ingiusto et empio" and exceeding all bounds. To the nuncio, March 8, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*

³ *To the nuncio, March 11, 1687, *ibid.*; Giorio **Ragguaglio*, f. 54^b, *loc. cit.*

but when the latter declined the nomination for personal reasons he took up once more the idea of appointing Cardinal D'Estrées.¹ The younger Cardinals especially, and the Pope's nephew, Don Livio Odescalchi, would have been glad of D'Estrées' nomination for they hoped that he would do away with the quarter and thereby remove the threat of a conflict.² However, Innocent once more declared that he could not recognize a Cardinal as ambassador inasmuch as a Bull of Urban VIII. was against appointments of this kind.³ He felt greatly hurt when he learnt that Louis XIV. shared Croissy's view on the disputed point. By his orders the nuncio had to tell Père La Chaize that the Pope very much wondered how it was possible, in these circumstances, that the King could receive sacramental absolution.⁴ Various objections were raised in Paris; Croissy explained that the freedom of the quarter was a purely secular matter. On his part Innocent made it clear to the nuncio that those who strove to deprive the Pope of part of Rome by transactions of this kind, incurred the censures of the Bull *In Coena Domini*.⁵ When at an audience of March 22nd, Cardinal D'Estrées turned the conversation to the question of the quarter, the Pope refused to discuss the subject.⁶ Hence all attempts at mediation were doomed to failure.⁷ For all that, Innocent still relied

¹ *Ibid.*, f. 55.

² “ *Le nuove creature del Papa di maggior grido riprovarono il fatto. Fra questi il cardinale S. Cecilia [Spinola] . . . e lo stesso Don Livio Odescalco, duca di Cerci, nipote del Papa, cercarono di persuadere al Papa l'accettazione del cardinale.” *Ibid.*, f. 56.

³ *Ibid.*, f. 55. Giorio sees in the rejection of the Cardinal merely an act of hostility towards France on the part of some influential circles in the Pope's immediate entourage.

⁴ *To the nuncio, March 15, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

⁵ *To the nuncio, March 18, 1687, *ibid.*

⁶ *To the nuncio, March 22, 1687, *ibid.*

⁷ Giorio continued to work for a compromise. On March 10, 1687, he proposed to Cardinal Spinola to send an envoy extraordinary to Paris with the information that D'Estrées would be

on the King who, he thought, was bound to see the justice of the papal claims.¹

Paris had meanwhile realized the hopelessness of D'Estrées' candidature. The Cardinal's own suggestion was that the embassy should be left vacant; in that case he would hold the post *de facto*, though without the title, and by this means the question of the quarter would be shelved.² But the French Government refused to adopt this suggestion and appointed the Marquis de Lavardin to the post: the nomination was made public on March 31st, 1687.³

received as ambassador. In this eventuality Giorio guaranteed a satisfactory solution of the question of the quarter since the King was anxious to have a representative in Rome. Giorio boasts of being acquainted with the secret instructions of the Paris nuncio and asserts that all Italy longed for a peaceful settlement. He explains that Venice had instructed its ambassadors in Rome and Paris in that sense (**Ragguaglio*, f. 57^b *seqq.*, *loc. cit.*). A scheme put before the Paris nuncio by Card. von Fürstenberg was also rejected by the Pope. The idea was that the abolition of the quarter should be paid for by the elevation to the purple of the Archbishop of Beauvais (*to the nuncio, March 29, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*). Louis XIV. greatly desired this elevation; *cf. Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 330 *seq.*

¹ "S. Stà va sperando che . . . la Mtà del Re sia per dar luogo alla ragione nè habbia da insister più in una cosa contraria a ogni legge humana e divina e che non si pratica nè si pretende meno tra i Sciti e tra le altre nationi più barbare." To the nuncio, March 29, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

² NAVENNE, II., 5.

³ *Ibid.* The nomination was made known on that day whilst the designation of Lavardin, according to Giorio (f. 61^b) had already been decided on March 25, 1687. Henri de Beaumanoir Marquis de Lavardin, was well known in France for his bad manners. Saint-Simon calls him "un gros homme extrêmement laid, de beaucoup d'esprit et fort orné, et d'une médiocre conduite", and in 1675 Mad. de Sévigné wrote: "C'est le moins lâche et le moins courtisan que j'aie jamais vu." *Cf.* NAVENNE, II., 9. France had no ambassador's house in Rome. There was a chance just then of acquiring one. Card. D'Estrées urged its

The Pope had no objection to the person of Lavardin, but he informed the French Government that the latter would only be received at the papal court after renouncing the quarter.¹ He was fully resolved to endure every kind of injury rather than yield on this point: he felt confident that God would not forsake his Church.² With a view to clarifying the situation he resolved to expose his point of view irrevocably before the world. By a Bull of May 12th, 1687, he declared the immunity of the quarter suppressed; those who contravened this prescription incurred the censures of the Maundy Thursday Bull. At the same time he confirmed anew the Bulls of previous Popes as well as his own of November 26th, 1677.³ With the exception of D'Estrées and Moidalchini, all the Cardinals present subscribed to the new Bull.⁴

purchase. In the new locality it would be possible to forgo the quarter without the appearance of yielding to the Pope (Card. D'Estrées to the King, May 1, 1687, *loc. cit.*). Louis XIV. refused to buy as he did not wish to give this satisfaction to the Pope (May 22, 1687); *cf.* NAVENNE, II., 8. There are many *papers in *Cod. Barb.* 5647, Vat. Lib., on the dispute with Lavardin.

¹ *To the nuncio April 15, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.* The **Cifre* of April 19 and May 10, 1687, are to the same effect; *ibid.*

² *To the nuncio, April 26, 1687, *ibid.*: His Holiness would rather "esser tagliata in pezzi" than yield. *Cf.* NAVENNE, II., 9, and a similar utterance of the Pope in LIPPI, 247. In the above-mentioned *Cifra* of April 16, 1687, Ranuzzi was instructed to inform the King, Croissy and Lavardin of the Pope's determination.

³ Text in *Mention*, 68 *seqq.* *Cf.* SOL, *Rapports*, 17.

⁴ Card. Moidalchini was in the pay of France and frequently claimed arrears "perchè non potendo sussistere in questa corte [Romana] senza goder delle gratie che S. M^{tà} mi fa, son constretto di supplicar V. E. a voler spedirmi l'ordinanza", etc.; *cf.* GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 385; *id.* *Révolution*, 464, n. 1. In a memorial to the Pope D'Estrées stated the reasons that led him to act as he did (*letter of D'Estrées to the Pope of May 23, 1687, *Am.*, III., 20, f. 52, Papal Sec. Arch.). The very next day a sheet was published

When Louis XIV., who was in Flanders at the time, heard of this decision, he became so angry that he ordered Lavardin to set out for Rome at once and to take charge of the quarter to its full extent. But the strictest order was to be enforced there and no fugitive from justice or any member of the criminal class was to find shelter and protection there.¹ However, Lavardin's departure was delayed. His instruction bears the date of July 14th, 1687²; thus Giorio had had time to make yet another attempt at mediation, on a new basis, before the new ambassador set foot in the Papal States. Cardinals Cibo and Rospigliosi, as well as the Venetian ambassador in Rome, Girolamo Lando, were keen supporters of these efforts whilst the Pope's advisers worked in the opposite sense, as Giorio learnt from the Queen of Sweden whose sympathies had all of a sudden swung round in favour of France. Cardinal Spinola none the less laid the new proposal before Innocent XI. By its terms the Governor of Rome would grant to the ambassadors a limited quarter franchise whilst the right of asylum was suppressed. Though the Pope had refused him as ambassador, Cardinal D'Estrées, according to Giorio's account, had magnanimously assented to the plan.³ In Roman circles the new plan of reconciliation was deemed acceptable since it was capable of satisfying both sides; various Cardinals and ambassadors likewise advised the Pope to adopt it.⁴

in Rome which gave the substance of the letter from the papal point of view. A reply from the French side was published on May 31, 1687. Both *writings are in *Cod. Cas.*, 309, of the *Bibl. Casanat.* Cf. also *the reports of May 24 and 31, 1687, in the Archives of the Austrian Embassy at the Vatican (Vienna), No. 579, which contains both sheets. *Cod. Bildt*, 204 *seqq.* also contains them.

¹ Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 62, *loc. cit.*; *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 310.

² *Recueil des Instructions*, 287 *seqq.*

³ Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 62^b, *loc. cit.*

⁴ “ *Pareva, che il modo ultimamente proposto a S. Stà per mezzo del cardinal S. Cecilia da Msgr. Giorio et avvalorato ancora dalle voci di alcuni ministri de' principi, oltre l'autorità de'

However, Innocent XI. declined the new proposal ; what he wanted was not negotiations but strict compliance with the Bull.¹

Meanwhile, an attempt was made in France to misrepresent the Pope's attitude. Croissy permitted himself to speak of the Bull in terms which were sternly refuted by Innocent XI. The decree, the Pope explained, was in line with the Bulls of his predecessors and implied no interference with the royal prerogatives.² He likewise emphatically rebutted the assertion that Rome demanded the renunciation of the quarter in so exacting a fashion only from the King of France whilst concessions were being made to the Spanish ambassador.³ Cardinal D'Estrées added to the confusion by inaccurate reports when he described the abuses in the French quarter as trifling. Innocent XI. repeatedly took the authors of these false reports sharply to task ; the abuses in the French quarter, he said, were such that it needed all the sophistry of a Cardinal D'Estrées to contest them.⁴ The assertion that

cardinali, che consigliavano a S. Stà di accettarlo, togliesse di mezzo tutti i aggravi et che fermasse un accomodamento di reciproca sodisfazione al Papa et al Re di Francia." Undated letter, Archives of Austr. Embassy at the Vatican (Vienna), No. 579.

¹ " *Ma altrimenti è piaciuto al Papa, costantissimo per quello, che ne riportò nuovamente il cardinale S. Cecilia, in non voler ammettere alcun partito, ma voler l'osservanza precisa della sua bolla." Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 66^b, *loc. cit.*

² *To the nuncio, June 21 and July 8, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*

³ *To the nuncio, July 22, 1687, *ibid.* ; cf. NAVENNE, II., 10, who says that, according to a letter of Card. D'Estrées to the King, Spain's renunciation of the quarter gave the Pope greater pleasure than the destruction of 30,000 Turks.

⁴ " *Non si può impedire che quei cervelli che si nutriscono di sconcerti e d'inquietudine, non scrivino di quà a cotesta corte delle continue falsità." *Cifra* of July 22, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.* In the same way, the **Cifra* of August 12 and 19, 1687, *ibid.* " *Le violenze et i disordini, che sono succeduti nel preteso quartiere dell'ambasciatore di Francia, sono così manifesti a

the question of the quarter was a purely secular one and that the solution was already contained in the Treaty of Pisa, was likewise firmly rejected by Innocent XI. who described the freedom of the quarter as a grievous injury to Papal authority.¹

Even now the Pope stuck to his conviction that, at bottom, the King of France was well disposed and was only misled by his ministers. Accordingly he left nothing undone to influence Louis directly if he saw that such an attempt had the slightest chance of succeeding. In this respect he no longer counted on the King's confessor, the well-known Père La Chaize.² One satisfaction for the Pope in those troublous days was the attitude of the people of Rome who looked upon Innocent XI. as a Saint even during his lifetime. The Romans were fully convinced of the justice of his cause and resented any interference with the sovereign rights of the Pope. This may have contributed to Innocent's unshakable determination not to yield but rather, as Cibo wrote, to endure every kind of trial, after the example of his predecessors in Peter's Chair during the period of the invasion of the Barbarians.³

The reference to the epoch of the Barbarians was not by

tutta Roma, che non hanno bisogno di prove e non possono essere contraddetti che dal signor cardinale D'Estrées, il quale esercita sempre la perspicacia del suo ingegno in sostenere paradossi et negare le cose più chiare del sole di mezzo giorno." *Cifra* of August 5, 1687, *loc. cit.*

¹ " *Quartiere non è altro che una sfacciata violazione della sovranità del Papa " (to the nuncio, September 2, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*). Cf. the **Cifra* of September 9, 1687 (*ibid.*), and the French view in *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 292 *seqq.*

² *Vuole [il Papa] che S. E. faccia dire a Madama di Maintenon, che forse ha il zelo, che non ha il Padre La Chaize di avvertire il Re che simile accidente [Louis XIV. had fallen from his horse] è un avviso del cielo " (to the nuncio, September 9, 1687, *loc. cit.*). On Mad. de Maintenon's attitude towards the Holy See, cf. LANGLOIS in *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, 1929, 33-72.

³ *To the nuncio, October 7, 1687, *loc. cit.*

any means out of place for the French ambassador, Lavardin, was approaching with an armed suite and Cardinal D'Estrées was secretly filling the Palazzo Farnese with armed men whom the King of France sent to him in small parties.¹ In conversation with the nuncio, Croissy uttered all manner of threats so that the Pope had cause to prepare for almost anything. True Innocent would not have dreamt of offering armed resistance even had he had the means to do so.² Meanwhile more and more armed Frenchmen were entering the territory of Siena where they joined Lavardin. When the latter reached Bologna, the papal Legate did not go to meet him, for Innocent XI. was indignant at the ambassador's advance under arms. He complained that he was being treated like the Huguenots. France's action only served to confirm him in his resolution to uphold the Bull.³ Even the Italian princes failed to induce

¹ *To the nuncio, October 21, 1687, *loc. cit.* In England Card. D'Estrées was considered as the author of all the acts of violence against the Holy See as he counselled the French Government not to yield. In this he appealed to England's insistence on Prince Rinaldo d'Este's elevation to the cardinalate, which secured its object. He told the French Government to act in like manner in the question of the quarter and to seek the alliance of England. This was communicated, with the utmost secrecy, to nuncio Adda in London by Lord Sunderland (*Letter of the nuncio of October 17, 1687, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 15, Papal Sec. Arch.

² " *Intorno alla forza et alla violenza che costì minacciano, V. E. ha parlato al signor di Croissy con quella prudenza e spirito, che N. Sigr. appunto desiderava, non volendo S. Stà far guerra per difendersi, nè meno quando la potesse fare, lasciando che Dio si prenda il pensiero di difendere la giustizia della sua causa." (To the nuncio, October 21, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*). On Card. D'Estrées armaments in Rome, *cf.* *To the nuncio, November 11, 1687 (*ibid.*); NAVENNE, II., 11; GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 392 *seq.*, where in addition to 100 rifles and 200 pistols already forwarded, Louis XIV. announces the dispatch of 300 muskets (September 30, 1687) to enable him, should the need arise, to arm the French colony in Rome.

³ " *In una congiuntura così strana non è mancato chi ha saputo dire, non passar gran cosa dissimile il procedere che si fa

him to change his mind, though in their anxiety lest all Italy should be involved in a calamity, their ambassadors made attempts in this sense. Three days before Lavardin's entry into Rome, Senator Lando, the Venetian ambassador, made a supreme effort to induce the Pope to receive the former as ambassador because in no circumstances would the Italian princes range themselves against the King of France: at any rate Venice would take no step that might give offence to Louis XIV. Similar representations were made by the Grand Duke of Tuscany who dispatched a special courier to Rome not only with a communication to the Pope, but with letters also to Cardinals Chigi and Medici. To all these counsels and exhortations the Pope made no reply, as he deemed them superfluous.¹ It was quite true that if war had broken out the whole of Italy would have been involved whilst all Venice's forces were required for the war against the Turks; but Innocent XI. was no Julius II. and he was resolved to suffer every injustice rather than appeal to arms.

After Lavardin's spies had assured him that he would meet with no armed opposition, he made his entry into Rome through the Porta del Popolo on November 16th, 1687.² A bodyguard of French gentlemen, all officers of the French navy, constituted his escort.³ Cardinals D'Estrées and Maidalchini went out to meet him and waited for him at

hora dal Re christianissimo contro il vicario di Giesù Christo da quello che per ordine di S. Mtà è stato praticato contro gli Ugonoti di cotesto regno." To the nuncio, November 11, 1687 *ibid.*

¹ Report to Paris of a French agent in Rome, dated November 18, 1687, in GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 397.

² The date is variously given. NAVENNE (II., 13) gives the date of the entry as Sunday, November 11; Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 70^b), November 13; the other sources: Sunday, November 16, 1687. The latter date is correct. On November 22, 1687, Card. Cibo also wrote to nuncio Tanara in Cologne on Lavardin's entry on November 16; see LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 473. Cf. SOL, *Rapports*, 13 *seq.*

³ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 388 *seqq.*

Acquatrasera. They were joined by the Duke of Bracciano, the Prince of Belmonte and the foreign ambassadors in Rome. The two Cardinals, Lavardin and his wife, and two persons of the suite, took their place in one of the six-seater carriages provided by Cardinal D'Estrées. The cortège was opened by thirty French gentlemen; then came the luggage and the Swiss mercenaries, followed by twenty other gentlemen in carriages. Twenty pages and as many servants walked immediately before the ambassador. Then came the sedan chairs of the ladies and more gentlemen and the secretaries of the embassy. The rear was brought up by twenty gentlemen in carriages and twenty-five on horseback. The entire suite was armed with pistols, carbines and arquebuses so that the entry had a very martial character. The cavalcade marched through the Corso towards the Piazza Navona and from thence to the Palazzo Farnese. In order not to provoke the Romans unnecessarily, Lavardin at least refrained from entering to the sound of trumpets. Accordingly, the procession moved without much noise through the narrow streets lined with vast numbers of people who had come to watch the unusual spectacle. Lavardin distributed plentiful alms to the poor but only a few of them were moved to shout *Viva Francia!*¹ On reaching the Palazzo Farnese the armed men lined the approach through which Lavardin entered, after which the French flag was hoisted. The armed men remained in occupation of the *piazza* in front of the embassy far into the night.²

Lavardin's first care was to see to the guarding of the

¹ BROSCHE (*Kirchenstaat*, I., 443) speaks of the Romans' dislike of the Pope because of his too strict government. He thinks that the acclamations were due to that circumstance. His source is a *cifra* of Lando, the Venetian ambassador in Rome, dated October 25, 1687.

² On Lavardin's entry, cf. Card. D'Estrées' report to the King of November 18, 1687, in NAVENNE, II., 13 seq.; Giorio, **Ragguglio*, f. 70 seq.; *Giustificazione della bolla*, 16 seq.; GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 396 seq.; Card. Cibo's report to nuncio Tanara at Cologne, November 22, 1687, in LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 473; *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 289 seq.

Palazzo Farnese. He feared an attack by the papal troops, hence he turned the palace into an armed camp as if he were in hostile territory. None of these things escaped the Pope. He ordered prayers in all the monasteries and lodged a protest against France's action with the representatives of the other Powers.¹ The papal troops were given strict orders not to approach the French quarter so as to avoid every occasion of a clash. Innocent was determined to wait until Lavardin's conduct should have made him obnoxious to the Roman people.²

One of Lavardin's first acts in Rome was the removal of one objection to the sovereign rights claimed by the ambassadors when he at long last established law and order in the French quarter. As many as from one to two hundred vagabonds established themselves in the courtyard of the palace. No one knew the names and origin of these people. The criminal elements who were wont to meet there, especially at night, since the doors remained always open, frequently quarrelled among themselves; on such occasions blood often flowed. Lavardin was obliged to use force to clear the palace. Four Swiss from his private suite were not enough and it was necessary to have the doors guarded day and night by eight men. In addition to this the quarter was constantly scoured by six watchmen.³ Louis XIV. had strictly enjoined Lavardin to keep his men in check and to see to it that law and order prevailed in the quarter, and to punish sternly the authors of disorder. For the rest he was to refrain

¹ Lavardin's report of March 30, 1688, to the King, NAVENNE, II., 15. The French ambassador relates that the Pope also had had the Palazzo Farnese watched by processions of penitents which continually passed in front of the palace, singing psalms. He says that it took him all his will power to stop him from sending his soldiers after the "penitents".

² Report of a French agent in Rome to Paris, November 23, 1687, in GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 398 *seq.* Cf. NAVENNE, II., 16.

³ *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 310. This description of the quarter was drawn by Lavardin himself in his reports of March 30, April 17, 1688, to the King; cf. NAVENNE, II., 15 *seq.*

from the use of arms. If he failed to obtain an audience from the Pope, it would be his duty to wait quietly for the death of aged, ailing Innocent, after which he would have to exercise pressure on the conclave and to establish contact with the new Pope.¹

Lavardin was destined to fail in his task. One cause of this failure was his own imprudence and another and more serious one came from Cardinal D'Estrées who could not get over the fact that the French embassy, which had been uninterruptedly held by his family for over a hundred years, should now be in other hands. Only the authority of their common sovereign kept up the apparent harmony of the two French functionaries. When his quite unsuccessful stay in Rome came to an end, Lavardin blamed the Cardinal for his failure.²

Innocent XI. could not but resent Lavardin's conduct as a grave infringement of his sovereignty, especially as the measures taken by him against the freedom of the quarter were abundantly justified. Moreover by his conduct alone Lavardin had incurred the censures of the "Maundy Thursday Bull", without any further step being required.³ Notwithstanding this circumstance he solicited an audience with the Pope, which was of course refused. In prevision of such an eventuality, Lavardin had been instructed to have recourse to threats. He was to insist on the execution of the Treaty of Pisa, by the terms of which Castro and Ronciglione were to return to Parma,⁴ and even to hint at the sequestration of Avignon. For a time he contended himself with protesting against the denial of an audience. Both by this denial as

¹ Cf. GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 398; *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 310.

² Proofs and details below, p. 404 *seq.* Cf. GÉRIN, *Révolution*, 462 *seq.*

³ Innocent XI. thought the same of Card. D'Estrées; cf. the anecdote in GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 402. See also *Giustificazione della bolla*, 17.

⁴ Cf. Vol. XXXI., p. 106 *seq.*

well as in other ways, Lavardin was made to realize that he was excommunicated.¹ It was customary to celebrate annually a solemn High Mass at the Lateran on the feast of St. Lucy, in memory of Henry IV.'s return to the Catholic Church. When the Pope learnt that Lavardin intended to assist at this Mass, he instructed Cardinal Chigi, the archpriest of the Lateran basilica, to stop the sacred function at once should Lavardin put in an appearance.² Innocent took no further steps against the ambassador but he watched the development of things all the more closely. Even so, his conduct greatly annoyed Versailles. When it was learnt that the Pope persisted in his refusal to receive Lavardin, Croissy informed the nuncio that the King would no longer give him audience.³

On his arrival, Lavardin had paid his respects to the various ambassadors in Rome and made a show of friendly feelings towards Innocent XI. He appears to have spoken with particular frankness to Marcello Sacchetti, the envoy of the Knights of Malta. He also called on Cardinals Cibo and Spinola, to whom, as well as to the Maltese envoy, he dropped

¹ *Giustificazione della bolla*, 17 seq. Lavardin acted on his instructions; cf. *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, I., 311 seq. The demand for the execution of the clause of the Treaty of Pisa concerning Castro had been suggested to Louis XIV. already in 1681 by Abbé Melani. On February 14, 1681, the latter suggested the dispatch of an army of 4,000 men to Castro, in order to intimidate the Pope (**Cifra da Lauri* of February 14, 1681, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 166, Papal Sec. Arch.). In 1683 Croissy told the envoy of Parma that France would not object at all if the Grand Duke insisted on the Pope carrying into effect the Treaty of Pisa (**Lauri*, January 24, 1683, *ibid.*, 170).

² " *Il Papa, che mirabilmente signoreggia tutte le passioni, fece all'ora cedere a i rispetti del ben pubblico i stimoli della vendetta privata, si che quella solenne ingiuria fu in lui soppressa dal consiglio, non fu soppressa, com'altri credettero, dal timore." Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 71^b.

³ This happened on December 10, 1687; cf. GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 411. The Pope had expected it, for in a **Cifra* of September 30, 1687 (*Nunziat. di Francia*, 177) he had exhorted the nuncio to patience should he be refused admission at court.

a hint that at his very first audience he would renounce the right of the quarter at the feet of the Pope.¹ For the rest, by his equivocal position between Pope and King, Cardinal Cibo had forfeited the confidence of both, a circumstance of which he complained to Cardinal D'Estrées.²

The situation grew worse when the French Government threatened nuncio Ranuzzi with the occupation of Avignon and Castro. The first threat was made through a certain Doctor Ammonio, who brought to the nuncio's knowledge certain remarks to this effect made by the King and Croissy. Through the same channel the Pope brought to the notice of the King and his ministers the fact that, in consequence of their action in the question of the quarter, they had incurred major excommunication, and that by their conduct towards the nuncio they were incurring new censures which would hasten the punishment God had in store for them.³ Ranuzzi had been ordered by Innocent XI., immediately after Lavardin's entry into Rome, to inform the King that he had incurred the censures of the Bull *In coena Domini*.⁴ Ammonio

¹ This is true in so far as Louis XIV. had strictly enjoined him not to tolerate any disorder within the sphere of his immunity (quarter). The asylum for criminals and people of every description must be suppressed. There must be no public games and Lavardin must refrain from the abuse of "lettres de familiarité". By suppressing the abuse of the quarter Louis hoped to satisfy the reforming Pope. Cf. *Recueil des Instructions*, I., 291, 310. " *ch'ammesso che l'ambasciator fosse all'udienza, avrebbe deposto a' piedi del Papa e ceduto il quartiere." Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 72.

² *Ibid.*

³ " *che la Mtà Sua et i suoi ministri sono incorsi nella scomunica maggiore imposta da quell'autorità che Giesù Christo, Signore nostro, ha lasciato al suo vicario in terra contro chiunque fosse per usurpare il preteso franco, che coll'usare di mali trattamenti fuor d'ogni convenienza e dritto a V.S., S. Mtà non farà altro che aggiungere censure a censure et accelerare quei castighi che Dio sin hora ha differiti." To the nuncio, December 16, 1687. *Nunziat. di Francia*, loc. cit.

⁴ DUBRUEL, *Excommunication*, 619.

carried out his commission for the King who made light of it since, in his opinion, the conflict over the quarter was of a purely secular nature. Louis, nevertheless, enjoined the strictest silence on Ammonio as to what had happened.¹ Ranuzzi drew the attention of the Curia to the consequences of the publication of the excommunication. Publication was omitted and in this way the whole affair remained a secret which has only been brought to light by modern research.²

The direct threat of the occupation of Castro and Avignon seems to have been first made to the nuncio by Croissy himself, on December 26th, 1687.³ False rumours circulating in Paris as to what had happened at the Congregation of the Holy Office, the source of which was probably D'Estrées, did not improve the situation. By order of the Pope, the Cardinals had been informed at the aforesaid Congregation that they must have no communications with Lavardin. Cardinal D'Estrées thereupon declared that he could not be bound by this prohibition inasmuch as pressing reasons compelled him to act otherwise. Rumour put on the whole affair a construction so unfavourable to the French that the Pope saw

¹ *Ibid.*, 624 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 619. One may ask whether Innocent XI. really meant to declare the King to have fallen under *Excommunicatio latae sententiae*, viz. whether he wished this announcement to the King to be a judicial act. Dubruel attaches too much importance to the affair, seeing that similar expressions occur in Innocent XI.'s dispatches and their meaning is that "as a matter of fact" Louis XIV. should be excommunicated, on account of the Bull which punishes any action against the prohibition of the quarter with the censures of the Bull *In coena Domini* (*cf.* Innocent XI.'s attitude towards the King of Spain, March 29, 1682, *supra*, p. 344). Had there been a real, intentional excommunication the Pope would surely have recalled his nuncio from Paris. This view explains the Pope's subsequent energetic *démenti* to Card. D'Estrées according to which he had never thought of excommunicating Louis XIV. ("che ha mai pensato a scomuniche et a scomunicare il Re [GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 626], without supposing a "restricto mentalis", as Dubruel does (*loc. cit.*, 629).

³ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 411.

himself compelled to declare that the various embellishments were at variance with the facts.¹

If, until now, the attitude of Innocent XI. and Louis XIV. towards each other had been one of mutual watchfulness, the situation underwent a change when the Pope showed no sign of willingness to fall in with Louis' plans in regard to the Cologne coadjutorship. Lavardin became increasingly aggressive, for he knew that his sovereign made the removal of existing differences between the Holy See and himself dependent on the Pope's yielding on the question of Cologne.²

Certain incidents at Christmas, 1687, led to an open conflict. On the evening of December 24th, Lavardin went to the French national church of St. Louis for the midnight Mass.³ He was ceremonially received at the door of the church by the parish priest, Abbé d'Hervault, an Auditor of the Rota, and the rest of the clergy who escorted him into the sanctuary where a *prie-dieu* had been prepared for him. He received Holy Communion with the rest of the faithful.⁴ Thereupon the Pope commissioned the Cardinal Vicar Carpegna to lay an interdict on the church of St. Louis, since the clergy had admitted the notoriously excommunicate Marquis De Lavardin to the sacred function and to the Sacraments.⁵ Lavardin's reply was a public protest against the papal decision. He described

¹ *To the nuncio, December 16, 1687, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.* ² On the question of Cologne, *cf.* below, p. 374.

³ The *Giustificazione della bolla* describes this as an extraordinary step taken by Lavardin with a view to defying the Pope as it was not customary for the French ambassadors to attend this Mass which was connected with the *Quarant'ore*.

⁴ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 403; NAVENNE, II., 17; *Giustificazione della bolla*, 18; Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 38^b *seq.*

⁵ The interdict was published in print on December 26, 1687. There is a copy in *Cod. Bildt*, p. 5. The *Giustificazione d. b.* (18) gives the Latin text and an Italian translation. The interdict was only raised at the end of February 1688, and that only out of consideration for the parish; *cf.* **Cifra* to the nuncio, March 2, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, Papal Sec. Arch. *Cod. Barb.* 3308, Vat. Lib., has many *theological, historical and political writings on the interdict of S. Luigi.

Innocent's action as unjust and the censures as invalid and, by a ruse, succeeded in getting the document placed in the hands of the Cardinals.¹

In France the report of these events acted like oil on fire. However, the general situation, and especially the French aspirations with regard to Cologne which could not be realized without the Pope's concurrence, momentarily restrained Louis from violent measures though he heaped reproaches on the Paris nuncio. At the King's request the Parliament of Paris examined the new situation. On January 23rd, 1688, Denis Talon made a speech in that assembly in which he proffered the gravest accusations against Innocent XI. He asserted that the Pope had tampered with France's rights by insisting on his theory of papal infallibility. Once again, Innocent was branded as a friend of the Jansenists who lent an all too willing ear to his advisers, all of whom were declared enemies of France. From this soil, Talon went on to say, sprang the Bull against the quarter and the interdict against S. Luigi, both being abuses of the papal authority, for the whole affair of the quarter was an entirely secular question. Talon could only see one means of saving France's threatened rights, namely a General Council to which he appealed.² The whole of Parliament expressed its agreement with him, like him appealed to a General Council and forbade the publication of the Bull.³ Talon's speech and the

¹ The French text is in *Cod. Bildt*, p. 11 seq. ; an Italian translation, *ibid.*, 7 seqq. Cf. Cibo's report to nuncio Tanara at Cologne, December 28, 1687, in LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 474 ; SOL, *Rapports*, 13, 14.

² The text of Talon's speech (as extract from the Parliamentary Registers) is in *Cod. Bildt*, pp. 29-42. Talon reminds the French of the attitude in the affair of the Corsicans (Vol. XXXI., p. 95) !

³ Appeal and decree in *Mention*, 78 seqq. In *Cod. MS.*, 309, of the Bibl. Casanatense, Rome, there is an original print of the decree. Text also in *Cod. Bildt*, pp. 42-6. Cf. Cibo's *report to nuncio Tanara at Cologne, February 21, 1688, LAEMMER, *loc. cit.*, 496, and the **Cifra al Nuntio* of February 10, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

parliamentary resolution were printed and on the morning of February 8th, 1688, together with Lavardin's protest, they were put up in various public places in Rome,¹ in fact the document could be read even at St. Peter's, at the place where the papal Bulls were affixed, as well as at the Cancelleria. Lavardin likewise handed copies to the diplomatic representatives and to the Queen of Sweden, the Portuguese ambassador

¹ Letter of Card. Cibo, of February 8, 1688, to the Cologne nuncio, in LAEMMER, *loc. cit.*, 475. This marked the opening of a campaign of pamphlets which gave birth to some quite unworthy productions. Lavardin advanced the theory that ambassadors carrying out their instructions could not fall under ecclesiastical penalties. The papal reply is in the repeatedly quoted *Giustificazione della bolla*, Ch. III., p. 29 *seqq.* of which is particularly directed against Lavardin's claims. There is a copy in *Cod. Bildt*, pp. 15-28, and in *MS. Cas.*, 309, of the Bibl. Casanat. There are a number of memorials and pamphlets in Papal Sec. Arch., *Arm.*, III., n. 20 and 21. The French views were summed up in the following four articles which busied the Roman Inquisition :

(1) " Minister regis, legatus quorum persona etiam inter nationes barbaras sacrosancta est, non potest unquam incurrere censuras ecclesiasticas pro his quae spectant functiones sui officii " (from Lavardin's protest and Talon's speech).

(2) " Sufficit dicere March. Lavardin esse legatum Regis christianissimi et consequenter exemptum ab omnibus censuris ecclesiasticis, quamdiu character illo erit insignitus et quamdiu exequetur mandata regis, domini sui " (from the protest).

(3) " Quod Papa non potuerit condemnare tamquam legatum, quandoquidem character ipsius cum respectu suarum functionum eximebit [?] ab his fulminibus " (ex actu appell.).

(4) " Neque reges nostri, neque eorum officiales possunt esse obnoxii alieni excommunicationi pro omni quod respicit muneris sui exercitium."

Many memorials were handed in, one of them by Schelstrate. The Inquisition decided that the above theses were heretical and drafted a condemnation which was never published. Cf. *MS. Cas.*, 309, *loc. cit.*, where there are the personal notes of Card. Casanata, who was a member of the Roman Inquisition.

alone being spared.¹ Lavardin also let no occasion escape to insult the Pope. In challenging fashion he attended Mass at St. Peter's. Innocent accordingly commanded the whole of the Roman clergy to stop the sacred functions as soon as Lavardin appeared. He forbade his soldiers to salute the Marquis and gave orders that at the approach of the French ambassador the chains before the doors of the pontifical palace should be put up so as to prevent his entrance.²

It would seem that in behaving as he did, Lavardin felt that he could rely on the sympathies of certain discontented circles in Rome. The centre of the malcontents was Queen Christine of Sweden. Shortly before Lavardin's arrival a quarrel had arisen between her and Innocent XI. as a result of the action of the papal police against a spirit merchant who formed part of her suite.³ These proceedings seem to have caused her to regret having renounced the quarter. In July 1687, a French agent in Rome was able to report to Paris that the Queen was impatiently waiting for the arrival of Lavardin as she hoped that the situation in Rome would grow worse in consequence; in view of her annoyance with the Pope this would give her great satisfaction.⁴ Both the Spanish ambassador and Queen Christine hoped to recover the quarter as they claimed parity with France.⁵ Christine had got into touch with Lavardin even before his entry into Rome

¹ Cf. Lavardin's report to Louis XIV., February 9, 1688, in NAVENNE, II., 17 *seq.*

² Lavardin to the King, February 3 and 10, 1688, *ibid.*, 19. To his letter Lavardin added Innocent XI.'s prohibition of the carnival which, he said, was specially directed against himself as the Pope desired to stir the Roman people's resentment. The prohibition threatens transgressors with the galleys if they were men, whilst women would be fined 1,000 or more gold scudi. An original print of the prohibition of February 9, 1688, is in *Cod. Bildt*, p. 1.

³ GRAUERT, II., 339 *seqq.*

⁴ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 394.

⁵ *Ibid.*

and had offered him her services.¹ So she deemed the moment propitious for defying the papal authority. It had come to the ears of the Governor-General of Rome that the Queen intended to go to a meeting of some scientific academy. He accordingly requested her on no account to admit into her retinue any person wanted by the representatives of the law. The Queen informed the Governor that she held him in great respect, the best proof of it being the fact that she did not have his messenger thrown out of the window. After that she set out with a large suite which included all her protégés.² Lavardin was delighted with this change of feeling in the Queen. In view of the community of interests in regard to the question of the quarter, previous mutual disagreements were put on one side and Lavardin was allowed to call on the Queen. It is said that on that occasion Christine extolled the King of France to the sky, hailing him as the hero of the century, whereas for the Pope she had nothing but invectives. The enmity between Cardinals D'Estrées and Azzolini may have contributed to this *rapprochement* between the Queen of Sweden and Lavardin.³

These circumstances provided the French Government with a welcome support in its attitude towards the Pope. However, Innocent XI. remained unmoved though he deeply resented the mortifications inflicted on his nuncio. Even now he felt convinced that Louis XIV. was unaware of the true state of affairs and since he believed that a change for the better would ensue if the King could be enlightened on the true situation, he instructed nuncio Ranuzzi to get in touch with Madame Brinon, the superioress of Saint-Cyr, in order to influence Louis by this means.⁴ Innocent also hoped to realize

¹ Lavardin to the King, November 5, 1687, in NAVENNE, II., 20.

² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 400 *seq.*

³ NAVENNE, II., 20 *seq.* D'Estrées strove to represent to the King Lavardin's conduct in Rome as imprudent (*ibid.*). Cf. GRAUERT, II., 346 *seqq.*

⁴ “ *S. B^{ne} soffrirà con fortezza tutte le violenze che potessero essere usate e continuerà a gemere avanti Dio, donec transeat

his end through the influence of the King of England. In March 1687, he had requested James II., through the London nuncio Adda, to draw Louis' attention to the wrongfulness of his conduct and to restrain him from further steps.¹ It was a great comfort to the Pope that the King of England as well as the King of Spain understood and approved his attitude: next to God he now relied on these two Catholic monarchs.

The nuncio in Paris could do nothing. He was watched both by the Archbishop of Paris and by La Chaize, who kept the King informed of all he said and did.² But this was not enough for Harlay; together with the ministers he brought pressure to bear on the clergy with a view to preventing their having any intercourse at all with the nuncio.³ At the English court the Archbishop of Paris was believed to be the real instigator of France's anti-papal attitude and La Chaize was suspected of making common cause with him.⁴ Among the Catholic Princes, the King of Spain in particular stood by the Pope, in fact it would seem that Charles II. actually proposed to the Pope an alliance against France, a proposal which, as the common Father of Christendom, he

iniquitas" (to the nuncio, February 17, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.* The nuncio had been requested by a *Cifra of December 9, 1687 (*ibid.*), "che mantenga e stringa sempre più la corrispondenza con Madama Brin [!] per tenere almeno aperta una strada da tentare d'illuminare il Re sopra le cose che potranno occorrere."

¹ *To nuncio Adda, March 1, 4, 8, May 31, June 14, etc., 1687, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 15, Papal Sec. Arch.

² GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 411 *seq.*

³ *To the nuncio, March 9, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ The King had asked Lord Sunderland how France could treat the Pope as she did. The latter replied: "ch'egli credeva che l'arcivescovo di Parigi ne fosse il promotore e capo come facendo il disugutato di Roma per proprii fini d'ambitione, e poteva essere ancora il Padre de la Chaise intrinseco del medesimo vescovo." *Nuncio Adda on January 9, 1688, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, *loc. cit.*

declined. However, precautions were taken in Spain so as to be ready for any event.¹ The Spanish Armada was to be ready to put to sea in May and the Viceroy of Naples and the Governor of Milan were ordered to increase their troops and to put them at the disposal of the Pope should he make a request to that effect. Spain suggested that the Pope should request the King of England to allow part of his fleet to cruise with the Spanish Armada in Mediterranean waters, with a view to giving the King of France an unmistakable hint and preventing him from any enterprise against the Italian coast.² Innocent approved Spain's precautionary measures; one could never feel safe from France, he said, for they had to deal with a nation which sought to obtain its own end by every possible means, regardless of every consideration of reason and justice.³

As a matter of fact France's naval preparations justified the fear that she planned an attack on the Papal States. Accordingly the King of England sought to mediate. In an autograph letter to Louis XIV. he begged him to refrain from measures of violence against the Holy See. James showed the draft of his letter to nuncio Adda in London; according to Adda's account it was couched in rather sharp terms.⁴ The Pope was not averse to English mediation, for though he would not hear of negotiations on the matter in dispute, he nevertheless hoped that intervention by a royal personage would be crowned with some success. Already on February 7th, 1688, he had made use of James to inform the

¹ The decision was come to in the Council of State, as the Pope was reported to have said on two occasions, [di] "tenersi lontano da far leghe". The Spanish nuncio, February 19, 1688, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 161, Papal Sec. Arch.

² *Ibid.*

³ " *mentre si tratta con una nazione che non dà luogo alcuno alla ragione et alla giustizia, ch'è solita a valersi d'ogni pretesto per i suoi fini, e che ne' suoi moti può havere delle seconde intenzioni." To the Spanish nuncio, March 21, 1688, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Nuncio Adda, February 6, 1688, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, *loc. cit.*

French ambassador in London that if anything were undertaken against the Papal States there would be question, not of the patrimony of the Odescalchi family, but of the patrimony of St. Peter and of Jesus Christ Himself.¹ In a Brief of February 14th, 1688, he expressed his thanks to the King of England for his efforts.²

The first French reply seemed to hold out some hope.³ Louis accepted James II.'s mediation and announced that out of consideration for England he had put off his plans against Rome. The King of England thought that this meant that France was weary of the dispute with the Pope,⁴ so he decided to send Lord Howard, the nephew of Cardinal Howard, to Rome as his ambassador. Innocent thanked the King for his goodwill but the departure of Lord Howard was delayed.⁵

The mediation of the Duc d'Orléans, which the Paris nuncio had hailed with great satisfaction, led to no result. The Pope was determined not to enter into negotiations of any kind on the real question in dispute. He requested the Paris nuncio, through the intervention of the Duc d'Orléans, to induce the Dauphin to exercise his influence with the King, for Innocent still clung to his belief that Louis, deceived as he was by his advisers, only needed to be enlightened.

¹ “ *che nella controversia presente non si tratta del patrimonio della famiglia Odescalco, ma di quello di S. Pietro e di Giesù Christo.” To Adda, February 7, 1688, *ibid.*

² BERTHIER, II., 388. Lord Sunderland showed the Brief to Adda in London (*Adda, March 12, 1688, *ibid.*). Cf. also the Brief of March 13, 1688, BERTHIER, II., 390.

³ *Adda, March 5, 1688, *ibid.* Cf. also Giorio **Ragguaglio*, f. 142^b: “ Dichiarò se contento il Re christianissimo di rimetter tutto nella mediazione del Re d’Inghilterra.”

⁴ “ *haverebbe sospeso le sue risoluzioni per qualche tempo nelle correnti emergenze.” Sunderland thought, “ che in Francia fossero stracchi dell’impegno preso di mero capriccio e suggestione di cattivi consiglieri.” Adda, May 7, 1688, *Nunziat. d’Inghilterra*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *To Adda, June 5 and 26, 1688, *ibid.* On Howard’s mission, see GÉRIN, *Révolution*, 443 *seq.*

True, he sharply condemned the conduct of the French Government,¹ but for all that he did not altogether decline the Duke's mediation. Croissy, on his part, informed the nuncio that his sovereign was prepared to accept the Duke as arbiter and asked Ranuzzi whether he was empowered to negotiate.² The nuncio could only answer that he would ask Rome for the necessary powers. However, even now the Pope was not prepared for any kind of concession; the intriguers at the French court would have seen in such an act not a concession, but a recognition of their pretensions.³

Innocent was the less inclined to hope for any good result from negotiations as the French threats against the Holy See were being constantly repeated. Hence he felt compelled to take measures of precaution. The garrison of Civitavecchia was reinforced and the regiments of the papal army were brought up to their full complement. The Pope protested once more that he did not want war with France, though he was not disposed to overlook everything in silence: it was his intention to offer resistance if Civitavecchia were attacked. For the rest Innocent needed more troops for the protection of the Italian coast against the Berbers and for the preservation of order in Rome where resentment against the French had assumed such proportions that there

¹ “ *che non si troverà alcun principe, per barbaro che sia, che habbia usati mai tali strapazzi ad un altro principe.” To Ranuzzi, May 11, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*

² GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 412.

³ “ *che in riguardo o a titolo del quartiere sudetto non si potrebbe mai concedere nissuna cosa benchè minima, . . . senza dar luogo così nel presente come nel tempo avvenire a gli huomini pieni di cabale e di sofismi, de' quali suol sempre abbondare cotesta corte, di argomentare dalla concessione medesima che la pretensione del quartiere avesse avuto in se qualche ombra di ragione ” (to the French nuncio, May 18, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*). Croissy represented the affair as if the nuncio had requested the Duke of Orleans to mediate (*cf.* the French account in GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 412). This was denied both by Ranuzzi and by Rome (*cf.* *to Ranuzzi, May 25, 1688, *loc. cit.*).

was reason to fear popular excesses.¹ The Pope's prevision was seen to have been fully justified for there was no real desire in France to arrive at an amicable understanding. The French ambassador in Madrid officially proposed to the Spanish Government to make common cause with France on the question of the quarter, but as his suggestion was not submitted in writing, the Spanish Government made no reply.²

France's constantly renewed threats had their cause not so much in the question of the quarter as in the situation at Cologne which had now become of capital importance in European politics.

The aged Archbishop and Elector of Cologne, Maximilian Henry of Bavaria, was completely subservient to France. Louis XIV. controlled everything he did through the Dean of the Chapter, William von Fürstenberg, to whom, under pressure of France, Innocent XI. had granted the purple.³ Louis' sole aim was to assure his influence at Cologne for the future also, inasmuch as through the Elector he would be able to have a say in the affairs of the Empire. To this end there was, of course, no better means than to secure the succession of Cologne for his protégé, Cardinal von Fürstenberg. Louis' first step in this direction was wholly successful: by an agreement of May 25th, 1687, the Elector named the Cardinal his coadjutor with the right of succession. This meant the exclusion of the House of Wittelsbach which

¹ “ *N. Sr^o non ha fatto altro che ordinare che siano riempite le compagnie de' soldati che mancarono nella passata campagna, e dato qualche piccolo provvedimento alla sicurezza di Civitavecchia, stante le continove e brutali minaccie di Croissy e del maresciallo D'Estrées, al quale S. Stà, benchè costante nella risoluzione di non far guerra, non lascierebbe di opporsi con tutto il vigor possibile per impedire l'acquisto, quando gli venisse per tentarlo, di quella piazza.” To Ranuzzi, June 8, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

² *The Spanish nuncio, July 8, 1688, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 161, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ September 2, 1686; cf. GUARNACCI, I., 195.

had so long held the see of Cologne. Maximilian Henry thereupon obtained Cardinal von Fürstenberg's promise that he, in his turn, would eventually make young Clement of Bavaria his coadjutor.¹ In order to invest the question of the coadjutor with at least the semblance of ecclesiastical procedure, the formal election was committed to the Chapter of Cologne: the decision was to be made on January 7th, 1688. Both the Emperor and Louis XIV. sent their agents to Cologne for the purpose of influencing the Canons. In imperial circles it was openly stated that Fürstenberg's election would not be recognized. Everybody feared the outbreak of a general war. In consequence of these rumours Louis massed his troops on the frontier for the purpose, so he announced, of ensuring freedom of choice for the Chapter which he knew to be solidly bound to him by golden ties. At this juncture several German Princes requested the Pope to forbid the election.²

It was, of course, necessary for Innocent XI. to take up a decisive position in the matter, but as was his wont, he did not do so openly. Since the nomination of a coadjutor could only take place with the consent of the Pope, and as this had not been obtained, nuncio Tanara of Cologne was instructed to watch closely what was going on and to keep the Elector fully informed. He was to explain that the Pope did not see the need of a coadjutor, hence he would not give his confirmation if one were elected. Moreover, the Archbishop was in such good health that he was quite equal to the duties of his office; above all, in view of the intrigues of various political parties it was not opportune to appoint a coadjutor; in this respect it was immaterial whether he was named by

¹ GÉRIN, *Élection*, 82 *seqq.*

² *Tanara, on November 16, 1687, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 60 (Papal Sec. Arch.): "The Duke of Geldern, who is of a violent temperament, is reported to have said che l'imperatore e l'imperio non permetteranno mai si elegga per coadiutore un ministro di Francia, quale asserisce essere il sigr. card. di Fürstenberg. Publica che deriverebbe da tale elettione una guerra generale, etc."

means of an election by the Chapter or through a so-called postulation.¹

This should have disposed of the affair. However, intoxicated as he was by a sense of his power, Louis XIV. still hoped to make the Pope change his mind though he had had plenty of opportunities to convince himself of Innocent XI.'s inflexibility. So the negotiations went on and Fürstenberg's success seemed assured, though the Cardinal feared intervention by the Pope as he already held an episcopal see. The nuncio explained to him that the Pope's one and only aim in the question of the coadjutorship was the tranquillity of Germany and to this purpose all personal considerations had to give way.² The election of a coadjutor actually took place at Cologne on January 7th, 1688. The Chapter was fully aware of the fact that it had indulged in an uncanonical act, hence it described its action not as an election but as a mere presentation, in the hope that the Pope would subsequently recognize the *fait accompli*. For the moment Innocent XI. remained silent, though the Emperor had been most anxious that he should explicitly forbid the election. Fürstenberg was unanimously elected by the Chapter, except for one vote, and he now waited for his confirmation by Rome³: this

¹ *To Tanara, December 6, 1687 (*Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.*): The nuncio should "insinuare destramente al sigr. elettore, che trovandosi in età et in salute così vigorosa, non pare che possa haver bisogno di coadiutore, che però S. B^{ne} non sarebbe per indursi nello stato presente di concederglielo, massime, quando fossero vere le pratiche e le arti che le parti s'imputano vicendevolmente". The same holds good in a postulation. Cf. *Letter of December 13, 1687, to Tanara; *ibid. Barb.* 5190, f. 40-60, Vat. Lib., a **Relazione* on the Cologne electoral conflict, probably by Tanara himself. The narrative is in the first person, lively, the exact statements of which are confirmed by first-class sources. It was only composed after the death of Innocent XI. (August 29, 1689), since he is spoken of as dead.

² Tanara, on December 26, 1687, *Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.* The Pope, we read, had "per unico oggetto il riposo della Germania".

³ IMMICH, *Innocenz, XI.*, 78 seq.

Louis XIV. sought to extort in Rome, on the advice of Gravel, the French agent at Cologne. It was hoped in France that Innocent XI. would be less unyielding in the affair of Cologne than he was in other conflicts.

Gravel's suggestion was that in the event of a refusal, the Pope should be threatened not only with the seizure of Avignon and the execution of the Treaty of Pisa in respect of Castro, but that he should also be frightened with the threat of another Assembly of the French Clergy.¹ Louis did not need a repetition of such counsels. In a letter of April 1st, 1688, he stated that the confirmation of the Cologne election was a necessary condition for an understanding between the Pope and France and that its denial would provoke a European war.² All this time the Pope had been completely ignored in the election; outwardly he continued to observe events in silence. Though the court of Vienna did its utmost against Fürstenberg,³ Innocent confined himself to remonstrances, through his nuncio, with the Elector and Cardinal Fürstenberg, with a view to persuading them to abandon their uncanonical attitude. The Cardinal expressed his willingness to submit to the Pope.⁴

The whole question became even more acute when the Elector Maximilian Henry was taken ill. Innocent instructed the nuncio to influence the Elector himself through the latter's confessor, as this was likely to be his last illness.⁵ It is easy to understand the general excitement at Cologne for no one

¹ *S. M^{té} ne s'arrêtera pas à ôter seulement au Pape le comté d'Avignon et à l'obliger à l'exécution du traité de Pise, mais qu'elle pourra bien aussi faire rassembler le clergé de son royaume pour montrer la nullité de ce procédé et pour lui donner en même temps quelque mortification plus sensible. Should Innocent XI. refuse to yield, it would be due to the "imbécillité où le grand âge a réduit le Pape, etc.". Gravel to the King, January 10 and 26, 1688, in GÉRIN, *Élection*, 89 seq.

² *Ibid.*, 91.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Tanara, on May 16, 1688, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *To Tanara, April 17, 1688, *ibid.*

could fail to see the political bearing of the affair. The foreign envoys contributed to the general confusion by their efforts to win over the Canons to their side by every means at their disposal. Whilst the French troops on the borders of the archdiocese were being constantly reinforced, Vienna made it clear that it would never consent to Fürstenberg's elevation.¹

The situation took an entirely new turn with the death, on June 3rd, 1688, of the Elector Maximilian Henry.² The whole question of the coadjutorship was now meaningless for, as the Pope observed, one does not assign a coadjutor to a dead man. Through the nuncio he admonished the Chapter to look only to personal merit in the new election and to proceed in accordance with Canon Law.³ The struggle for the archbishopric which now began was, at bottom, a contest between the German Emperor and the French crown for one of the highest dignities of the Empire. In view of the passions aroused on both sides a peaceful solution was seemingly out of the question. The two competing candidates were the seventeen years old Elector Clement of Bavaria and Cardinal von Fürstenberg. According to Canon Law neither of them was eligible without a papal indult since Fürstenberg held the see of Strassburg and Clement lacked the requisite age; accordingly both prayed for a papal dispensation. From the outset Innocent XI. showed a strong determination not to suffer Louis XIV. to meddle with the affairs of a purely German diocese. Hence Fürstenberg's candidature was hopeless from the first. Nuncio Tanara was instructed to express to him the Pope's regrets that he could not consider him. At the same time he was admonished not to do anything

¹ *Tanara, May 30, 1688, *ibid.*

² GÉRIN, *Élection*, 96; IMMICH, *loc. cit.*, 80.

³ *mentre non può darsi un coadiutore a un morto... N. Sre vuole ch'ella (Tanara) faccia intendere a i capitoli delle chiese vacanti (the Archbishop of Cologne had also held the See of Münster) che il desiderio e la mente di S. B^{no} è che procedino canonicamente nell' elettioni, facendo cadere nelle persone più digne. To Tanara, June 26, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.*

likely to jeopardize public tranquillity.¹ Towards the youthful Bavarian Prince the Pope adopted a very different line of conduct. Outwardly he took not a single step in his favour but on July 5th, 1688,² he instructed the nuncio to do all that prudence permitted, with a view to his election; at the same time he complained to the nuncio of the concentration of troops on the frontier ordered by Louis XIV.³ On July 17th, 1688, Innocent XI. forwarded a Brief to Prince Clement of Bavaria declaring him eligible⁴; thus the latter only required a simple majority of votes for a valid election. Cardinal Fürstenberg's position was quite different; as

¹ *To Tanara, June 26, 1688, *loc. cit.* The Emperor demands that consideration should be had for the Empire: "ma non si sa comprendere, con qual ragione il Re christianissimo possa pretendere d'ingerirvisi, mentre egli non sarebbe mai per permettere che nè l'imperatore nè alcun altro principe entrasse nelle provisioni de' vescovati e de' feudi del suo regno." The warning to Fürstenburg was renewed on July 1, 1688, in a *Cifra to the nuncio (*loc. cit.*): "ch'egli con la sua prudenza sia per contenersi in maniera che non succedano sconcerti e non venga turbata la quiete publica." Cf. E. BÖHMLÄNDER, *Die Wahl des Herzogs Joseph Klemens von Bayern zum Erzbischof von Köln 1688*, in *Oberbayr. Archiv.*, LVII., 224-284; SCHRÖRS, *Kurfürst Joseph Klemens und Madame de Ruysbeck*, in *Annalen des Hist. Vereins für den Niederrhein*, 1915, 1-77; GÉRIN, *Révolution*, 445 *seq.*

² " *N. Sr^e vuole ch'ella con la necessaria prudenza e circospezione prenda tutte le congiunture che se le presentaranno di aiutare le pratiche che si faranno a favore del sigr. principe di Baviera per la vicina elezione di cotesta chiesa." To Tanara, July 5, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.*

³ " *L'accostar truppe alle frontiere di cotesto elettorato non pare veramente un procurare nelle prossime elezioni quella libertà che dice il sigr. cardinale Fürstenberg volersi dal Re christianissimo " (to Tanara, July 10, 1688, *loc. cit.* Acts of violence by the French against the Abbey of Murbach, in which Innocent XI. suspected some of Fürstenberg's relatives to have had a part, increased his unwillingness; cf. *Cifra of July 14 and 21, 1688, *ibid.*

⁴ BERTHIER, II., 404.

the occupant of a see there could only be question, in his case, of a so-called "postulation" for which he required two-thirds of the votes. This situation remained unaffected by his giving up Strassburg as he was not entitled to take such a step without papal sanction. Moreover, Innocent XI. was resolved not to confirm Fürstenberg even in the event of a postulation. He charged nuncio Tanara to say and do nothing, should the Chapter proceed to postulate on behalf of Fürstenberg, regardless of the tranquillity of the Empire.¹ The election took place on July 19th, 1688. It yielded neither the simple majority required by the Prince of Bavaria nor the two-thirds' majority needed for a postulation for Fürstenberg.² Thus according to Canon Law, it was left to the Pope to make provision for the archiepiscopal see. Louis XIV. wrote to the Pope on July 22nd, 1688, requesting him to confirm Fürstenberg's postulation. He pointed out that he had never yet received a token of the Pope's favour and that the consequence of the rejection of the Cardinal would be a most bloody war; hence His Holiness should act with prudence.³ Nuncio Tanara adopted an attitude of complete reserve for which he was praised by Innocent XI. The Pope declared that in this instance there was no canonical postulation since the requisite number of votes had not been obtained.⁴

¹ The nuncio must not start the "solito processo", but remain passive "in caso che cotesto capitolo senza riflettere al bene et alla sicurezza publica sia proceduto a postulare il cardinale Fürstenberg". To Tanara, July 24, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.*

² IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 84; GÉRIN, *Élection*, 105.

³ " *che il rifiuto che ella venisse a fare al cardinale di Fürstenberg delle bolle, causasse qualche guerra che non potrebbe essere se non molto sanguinosa." *Arm.*, III., 20, f. 279 and 21, f. 185, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ " *la quale [postulazione] non havendo havuto il numero de' voti richiesti da' sacri canoni, non solamente non dev'esser considerata per canonica, ma nè meno chiamarsi postulazione." To Tanara, July 31, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.*

French circles nevertheless expected Fürstenberg's confirmation as otherwise the King would make the Cardinal's cause his own and defend him by force of arms against the decrees of Rome and his other opponents.¹

D'Estrées had recourse to gentler means in promoting the wishes of the King ; he endeavoured to demonstrate not only the validity of the postulation for Fürstenberg, but even sought to prove that he had been elected by a majority of the Chapter. However, Innocent declared that there was neither postulation nor election.²

Louis XIV. continued to hope that he would get his wish ; to this end he sought to link the question of Cologne with the other contested points between Paris and Rome. Lord Howard, whom James II. had sent to Rome for the purpose of mediating in the question of the quarter,³ at last arrived there and on August 3rd the Pope received him in audience. Innocent, however, informed him that he would not submit the case to arbitration.⁴ From the French King, he repeatedly protested, he wanted not a favour but his right. In a note in cypher to the French nuncio Ranuzzi, he complained that Louis employed dragoons against him, as he did against the Huguenots, and that he threatened him with his fleet as he threatened the pirates of Algiers.⁵ On the question of the

¹ *nel qual caso S. Mtà christianissima sarebbe a riconoscere per propria la causa di S. Eminenza et a difenderla non meno dagli decreti di Roma colle proteste, appellazioni e rimedii giuridici, che colla forza dell' armi da quelle de' suoi nemici." Tanara, August 1, 1688, *loc. cit.*

² *To Tanara, August 3, 1688, *loc. cit.*

³ See above, p. 372.

⁴ *To Adda, August 3, 1688, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 15, Papal Sec. Arch. *Howard threw himself repeatedly at the Pope's feet, "supplicando al Papa di accettare la mediazione del suo Re ; il Papa la ricusò da prima col motivo, che non poteva cadere la mediazione sopra cosa che non era commune col Re di Francia, perchè tutt'era del Papa solo, intendendo il Papa del quartiere." Giorio, *Ragguaglio*, f. 143.

⁵ " *Con mandar quà Lavardin accompagnato da i dragoni haveva trattato il capo visibile della Chiesa come gli Ugonotti

quarter the Pope absolutely refused to negotiate. Louis XIV. now tried his personal influence with the Pontiff. On the morning of August 4th, 1688, a gentleman of good appearance called upon the papal Secretary, Casoni. He described himself as a Fleming and requested an audience with the Pope. When Casoni referred him to the official who dealt with such applications, the stranger declared that he was a Frenchman and was the bearer of a secret letter of his sovereign to the Pope. Casoni was shown a sealed letter which, in fact, looked exactly like Louis XIV.'s autograph letters. He accordingly requested the stranger to come back in the evening as he must first inform the Pope and the Secretary of State. This was done and the Pope ordered the Secretary of State to receive the royal letter. In the evening Casoni took the stranger to Cibo to whom he made himself known, by means of a note in the King's own hand, as Marshal de Chamlay; at the same time he declared that he had orders to deliver the letter to the Pope in person. Innocent, however, stuck to his decision even when the Marshal called in Cardinal D'Estreés' help and the latter expressed his readiness to guarantee that the Pope could receive the envoy without danger to his personal safety. Marshal de Chamlay was obliged to depart without having achieved anything.¹

Meanwhile Fürstenberg saw his hopes vanish. He complained to the Cologne nuncio of the Emperor's pressure on the election which had resulted in his exclusion. In reply the

del suo regno; inviando quà l'armata maritima lo verrebbe a trattare come i pirati Algerini con scandalo et orrore anco degli stessi infedeli." To Ranuzzi, August 3, 1688, *Nunziat. de Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*

¹ *To Ranuzzi, August 21, 1688, *ibid.* Cf. IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 85; he names the ambassador Marquis Chamlay who was commissioned to offer to the Pope the abolition of the quarter in return for the recognition of Fürstenberg and the Bishops of the Assembly of 1682 presented by the King; GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 409. Both base themselves on ROUSSET, *Histoire de Louvois*, 2^e partie, t. 2, p. 63 *seqq.* The account varies in some small details. Cf. also GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 113.

Pope explained to him that in this matter the position of the Emperor was not the same as that of the King of France. If the Emperor felt that a candidate was also an opponent, it was open to him to prevent such a man from obtaining one of the most exalted positions; moreover, the exclusion of one candidate did not limit the Chapter's freedom of choice. On the other hand, Louis XIV. had no business whatever in Germany; in his case one might indeed speak of the suppression of the freedom of election since he excluded all candidates except one.¹

The consequence of the refusal to receive the secret messenger—a quite unexpected step—was that Louis XIV. now declined the English mediation.² As a matter of fact,

¹ “*L’oppressione che viene usata in Francia alla libertà canonica delle elezioni, non ha alcuna proporzione con quella che il sig. card. di Fürstenberg suppone essere stata usata dall’ambasciatore cesareo in questa elezione . . ., massime quando tal esclusione procede dal capo e dal sovrano dell’imperio, il quale trattandosi di eleggere uno dei suoi principali consiglieri e ministri, come sono gli elettori, et il principe di un stato considerabile, che rileva da lui, pare che possa con ogni giustizia pretendere che questo non sia suo diffidente. Il Re christianissimo per il contrario non ha che far niente in Germania, e però non si sa com’entri ad alzar la voce et a voler con includere un solo, escluder tutti gli altri, il che propriamente è un togliere la libertà a i capitoli. Nè qui havendosi una così grande e continua esperienza delle violenze del medesimo Re che minaccia e tratta il Papa com’ognun sa, si dura gran fatica a creder che possa haver minacciato col mezzo di suoi ministri i capitoli di Colonia e di Liegi.” To Tanara, August 21, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia, loc. cit.* Louis XIV. demanded from the Pope: Fürstenberg's installation at Cologne, the filling of the vacant sees in France, recognition of the right of *régale*, reception of Lavardin as ambassador and concession of a limited immunity of the quarter in Rome, in which the strictest order would be maintained; cf. Chamlay's instruction of July 6, 1688, in *Recueil des Instructions*, Rome, II., 1-25. Louis was prepared to meet the Pope a long way as he had realized that neither Card. D'Estrées nor Lavardin would secure an understanding with Rome.

² Giorio, *Ragguaglio, f. 144.

Louis could no longer indulge the hope that the Pope would yield. Though no decision had as yet been arrived at on the question of Cologne, the situation left no room for doubt as to the final result. Louis had made of the affair of Cologne a trial of strength. The Pope's attitude thwarted the long prepared scheme. At a time when Louis had reached the zenith of his power and all European States were falling more or less completely in line with his directions, an aged priest in Rome was the one and only sovereign to dare offer the all-powerful monarch steady, if merely passive, resistance. Undeterred, he held up before the autocrat the moral law which binds even the mightiest rulers. True, in the sequel, opposition made itself felt all over Europe, but Innocent alone stood, like an unshakable rock amid the rush and turmoil of events. He discountenanced all ill-considered haste, strove to preserve peace and never wearied of drawing the attention of Christendom to the common enemy in the East. It is this that chiefly constitutes the lasting importance of this pontificate in the history of the world, an importance not appreciated for a long time, especially not by the Pope's contemporaries. Louis XIV. saw in the Pope merely an opponent who delighted in crossing his most cherished plans; hence he was determined to show no consideration for the Vicar of Christ. On August 21st, 1688 the Intendant of the navy, De Vauvré, received orders to make preparations for an expedition against the coasts of Italy. Louis intended to dispatch thither by sea 3,000 foot soldiers and 800 cavalry.¹

The best account of the anti-papal feeling which prevailed in French Government circles may be seen in a letter of the King to Cardinal D'Estrées, dated September 6th, 1688.² With masterly distortion of truth Louis draws up a list of alleged acts of hostility by the Pope against himself. Misled by France's enemies, the Pope had always been against the Most Christian King and had refused to accept his envoys, a thing which

¹ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 407.

² *Mention*, 104; cf. the covering letter for Card. D'Estrées, dated September 6, 1688, in GÉRIN, *Révolution*, 451.

had never been done even by the most decided enemy. Hence the Pope would be to blame should a general war break out. Louis could no longer see in him any other than a secular prince who made common cause with his enemies. In spiritual things he would continue to treat the Pope with the respect to which he was entitled. The King depicts himself as a long-suffering, patient, peace-loving ruler who had borne injuries with rare patience and had received Rome's secret envoy.¹ With patent hypocrisy he went on to say that he regretted to see the peace of Europe so grievously threatened by the conduct of Innocent XI. that the Emperor was no longer able to prosecute the Turkish war with the necessary energy. He then announces that henceforth he would show no consideration for Innocent, but would order his troops to march into Italy to occupy Castro and Ronciglione, since by the terms of the treaty of Pisa these duchies should long ago have been handed over to his ally, the Duke of Parma. Avignon would be occupied simultaneously and time would show whether the Pope could recover it or whether it would be assigned to the Duke of Parma, to indemnify him for the long delayed surrender of the above named duchies. In conclusion the King declares that he would continue to give his support to Fürstenberg and to those Canons of Cologne who were devoted to him ; he also declines the Pope's mediation in the question of the succession to the Palatinate which was pending. Cardinal D'Estrées was told to read this letter to the Pope and to hand him the original ; the Cardinals he was to provide with copies.²

D'Estrées expected that the Pope would be intimidated by this threatening letter, but to his immense surprise Innocent

¹ Viz. a Neapolitan priest, Carlo Cavari, whom Livio Odescalchi had sent to mediate in Paris, without the Pope's knowledge. By way of credentials Cavari had only a letter of Livio. Louis XIV. received him several times, but refused to negotiate until he should be empowered to treat by the Pope.

² Card. Casanata's copy is in **Cod. Cas.*, 309, of the Bibl. Casanat., Rome ; another copy is in *Arm.*, III., 20 f. 281 of Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. *SOL, Rapports*, 16 ; *MAZZATINTI, Inventarii*, I., 173 seq.

listened to the reading of the lengthy communication without betraying the slightest emotion. He replied quite calmly and in a few words that his actions had never been inspired by hostility towards France but solely by his conscience ; no doubt he was old and ailing whereas the King was powerful, but Louis too would one day have to give an account to God of his conduct.¹ By the King's command Lavardin forwarded a copy of the royal letter to all the princes and States of Italy. In a covering letter dated September 18th, 1688, Lavardin declared that his sovereign had no ambition to make conquests in Italy, but no one must presume to oppose him !² In view of the wide publicity which the royal libel was thus given, a rejoinder on the Pope's part was imperative.³ In that document the accusations of the King

¹ GÉRIN, *Révolution*, 456 ; IMMICH, *Innocenz XI.*, 94. This disposes of GÉRIN's account (*Assemblée*, 410) according to which Innocent XI., in his excitement, ordered the Bulls for Joseph Clement of Bavaria to be drawn up. Our account rests on Card. D'Estrées' report to the King. It is true that the Pope was indignant at the letter. In the **Cifra* of September 18, 1688 (*Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*) he tells nuncio Ranuzzi in Paris that it would have been better for the king to restore to the church of Liège her confiscated properties of Dinant and Bouillon, than to threaten the Holy See with the sequestration of Avignon and Castro.

² " *Che [il Re] non ha alcun disegno di far conquiste in Italia e molto meno di turbare il riposo e la tranquillità, pur che alcuno non se gli opponga." *Cod. Cas.* 309, *loc. cit.* A copy is in Papal Sec. Arch., *Arm.*, III., 20 f., 287^b.

³ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 416. He gives the French text under the heading *Réflexions pour servir de réponse sur la lettre en forme de manifeste que M. le card. D'Estrées distribue*. The Papal Sec. Arch., *Arm.*, III., 21 f., 396, has the Italian version : *Risposta di uno che ama la verità circa la lettera al cardinale D'Estrées (6 September, 1688). Cf. *Riflessioni di uno che ama la verità sopra la lettera che va publicando il sigr. card. D'Estrées, in *Cod. Cas.*, 309, *loc. cit.* The three documents are in agreement. Leibnitz records that public opinion approved the papal declaration. GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*

of France are refuted one by one and all the wrongs done to the Holy See recalled to his mind. With regard to the refusal to see the secret envoy, the Pope recalls the fact that at the time of the dispute between Alexander VII. and Créqui, Louis had declined an autograph letter from that Pope and that he had not as much as acknowledged the second Brief on the question of the *régale*. In regard to the question of Cologne, the right of the King to meddle with German affairs is absolutely denied ; as for the succession in the Palatinate, Innocent declares that he had never desired anything but peace and at no time had he aspired to the rôle of a mediator. He would remain firm despite all threats and would rather endure anything than give way ; if necessary he was ready to end his life as a martyr.

Louis was resolved to carry out his threats. His first step was to order the Marquis de la Trousse, on September 13th, to be prepared to invade Avignon and to expel the papal vice-legate. The Bishop of Vaison in Venaissin, who was loyal to the Pope, he ordered to be arrested and banished.¹ Croissy used words and threats of such offensiveness towards Ranuzzi that the Pope forbade the nuncio to have anything to do with the minister.²

For some time already the Paris nuncio had been under police surveillance. The gendarmerie had orders not to allow him to leave under any circumstances ; should he attempt to do so, he was to be arrested, though not in Paris but at a distance of two or three miles from the capital.³ Evidently Louis feared public opinion to some extent. In Paris the position of the nuncio was no longer respected ; things went so far that Ranuzzi's *maggiordomo* and one of his servants were arrested and when news arrived that certain individuals

¹ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 410.

² “ *il quale [Croissy] ha parlato a modo che potrebbe parlare un moro africano et un’huomo brutale, com’egli veramente fa conoscere sempre più di essere.” Ranuzzi, September 14, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*

³ Order of the King of August 28, 1688, in GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 413.

in Lavardin's suite had been condemned to death because they had attacked some papal *sbirri*, Croissy declared that the servants of the nuncio must be made to share a similar fate.¹ The Pope met these fresh provocations by recalling the nuncio. Innocent, however, suspected that Louis would not consent to the nuncio's departure. He exhorted Ranuzzi, should this prevision be verified, to endure everything patiently and to enforce strict discipline on his household.² In effect Louis refused the nuncio leave to depart for he wished to retain him as a hostage. Meanwhile Lavardin had been instructed to assume an air of arrogance [*hauteur*] in his duties as ambassador, to add to the number of his armed men, to seize the person of the papal Secretary Casoni and to have him taken to a French fortress.³

On September 18th, 1688, Innocent gave his decision in the affair of Cologne. He confirmed Prince Clement of Bavaria after the Consistorial Congregation had made a searching examination into the conduct of the election.⁴ All Fürstenberg's efforts with the Cardinals had been in vain.⁵ A further plan for an accommodation submitted by Giorio was likewise rejected although the English envoy, Howard, advocated it and its author had requested the support of Queen Christine. According to this plan Fürstenberg would have received papal confirmation on condition that he accepted young Clement of Bavaria for his coadjutor with the right of succession and swore fealty to the Emperor.⁶

¹ *Ibid.*

² " *[S. Stà] vedendo in tal forma gravemente offesa e mal sicura la sua rappresentanza, supplica S. Mtà a permetterle di partire e ritornarsene in Italia." Ranuzzi, September 14, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

³ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 407; *Id.*, *Révolution*, 463 seqq.

⁴ BERTHIER, II., 408. For the examination of the election cf. **Cifra* to Ranuzzi, August 24, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*, and *Cod. Cas.*, 309, *Bibl. Casanat.*; Papal Sec. Arch., *Arm.*, III., 20-1 seq.; IMMICH, *Innocenz*, XI., 86.

⁵ Cf. *correspondence with Card. Azzolini in *Arm.*, III., 20 f., 271, Papal Sec. Arch. ⁶ Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 73 seq.

On September 24th, in the presence of the Archbishop of Paris and the royal confessor La Chaize, Louis announced his decision to appeal to a General Council in respect to every point of his conflict with Rome.¹ This appeal was made in effect in Parliament on September 27th, 1688.² An Assembly of the Clergy associated itself with the appeal on September 30th.³ The Parliament of Provence decreed the annexation of Avignon and Venaissin to France.⁴

On September 21st, 1688, Innocent XI. repeated the recall of the nuncio, but as the King would not allow him to leave, the Pope commanded him at least not to act any longer as nuncio.⁵ Ranuzzi had made use of one of his servants in the transmission of his reports to Rome. But the situation had now become so acute that the servant did not dare to return to France. Archbishop Marini of Genoa tried to assure the transmission of correspondence through some merchants; however, the nuncio made use of the couriers of Tuscany, Spain and Venice.⁶

The preparations for the annexation of Venaissin and Avignon became daily more serious; on October 11th, 1688, Cibo had to inform nuncio Tanara at Cologne of the occupation of that papal territory by Marquis de la Trousse. The papal vice-legate was compelled by threats to leave Avignon, after which de la Trousse, with six officers, took possession of Avignon and assumed judicial authority there.⁷ By a letter dated October 9th Lavardin endeavoured to dispel the anxiety

¹ GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 411 seq.

² *Cod. Cas.*, 305 (*loc. cit.*) contains an *extract from the Registers of the Parliament of Paris on these proceedings; also *Arm.*, III., 20, f. 30, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ *Procès-verbal* in *Cod. Cas.*, 309, *loc. cit.* GÉRIN, *Assemblée*, 412 seq. *Cod. Cas.* contains also a *treatise against the appeal.

⁴ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 410.

⁵ *To Ranuzzi, September 21 and 23, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁶ *To Ranuzzi, October 2 and 12, 1688, *ibid.*

⁷ Cibo's letters to Tanara of October 2 and 11, 1688, in LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 476.

to which such measures were bound to give rise among the various princes and States of Italy. In this communication he emphatically declared once again that they were in no danger ; the King only wished to give effect to the Treaty of Pisa ; the territory of the Papal States would not be curtailed in any way and only the patrimony of the Odescalchi would be confiscated for the purpose of covering expenses.¹

That Louis was capable of any violence, notwithstanding these assurances, was shown by his conduct in Paris. He did not yet feel sure of the nuncio, hence the police surveillance of the nunciature was made more stringent and on October 8th, 1688, a gentleman of the name of Pidou de Saint-Olon received orders to betake himself at once to the nunciature for the purpose of watching the nuncio's every step.² Saint-Olon arrived at the nunciature at ten o'clock in the evening, when Ranuzzi had already retired for the night. He found the house almost empty. Most of the furniture had been removed so that his first care was to send for his own bed. He would not allow the nuncio to be awakened. In the morning Ranuzzi, greatly surprised at the presence of the uninvited guest, announced that he would forthwith request a farewell audience. His one thought now was to get away, and he began to pack his silver. He transferred the secretariate to another room from which Saint-Olon thought an attempt to escape might easily be made. Ranuzzi learnt through his auditor that the King refused to grant him a farewell audience. So he no longer went out, and said Mass daily in his room at which his gaoler Saint-Olon, whom he considered to have incurred excommunication, was not suffered to be present.³ On October 15th, in view of the fine weather, the

¹ *poichè la sua intentione è che solo i beni della casa Odescalchi e de' suoi parenti siano malleadori delle spese che S. Mtà sarà obligata a fare per l'esecutione del sudetto trattato (*Cod. Cas.*, 309, *loc. cit.* ; *Arm.*, III., 20, f. 277 ; III., 21, f. 168. Parliament's appeal of September 27, 1688, was appended to the letter.

² GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 414 *seq.*

³ Saint-Olon's reports to Croissy, October 9 and 13, 1688, *ibid.*, 416.

nuncio announced his intention of taking a walk. On the two preceding days he had had company at table. With this guest he went for a drive without accepting Saint-Olon's company. By the latter's orders some lackeys also mounted the coach. Ranuzzi told the coachman to drive to Saint-Lazare, the large establishment of the Lazarists, where he asked the Superior General's permission to walk in the garden, a permission which the latter gladly granted. Thereupon Ranuzzi declared with tears that he would not leave the house and that if he was refused a room he would stay in the garden. The General vainly endeavoured to make him change his mind. Ranuzzi breathed again when the King allowed him to reside there.

The nuncio had only decided on this step after he had vainly begged for shelter in various monasteries of Paris.¹ In the sequel also Ranuzzi had much to endure from Saint-Olon. The constant presence of the man who followed him everywhere, even at his new residence, and who did not suffer him to say Mass in peace, was exceedingly irksome to the nuncio.² Ranuzzi had taken the precaution of putting the archives of the nunciature in a safe place. The Pope praised him for having done so, seeing that he found himself in a country which had no regard for the law of nations. Innocent desired Ranuzzi to make yet another request for an audience with the King, for the purpose of protesting against the treatment inflicted on him.³

¹ Saint-Olon's second report, of October 13, 1688, to Croissy, and reports of October 16, 1688, *ibid.*, 417 *seq.*

² Cf. Saint-Olon's numerous reports to Croissy, *ibid.*, 420 *seqq.*

³ “ *È stata ottima la precauzione di nascondere le scritture per esimersi anche intorno ad esse dalle violenze che le potrebbero essere usate da chi non osserva più nessuno di quei riguardi che sono osservati dagli stessi barbari ” (to Ranuzzi, November 13, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.*). “ *N. S. mi commanda d'incaricar di nuovo a V. E. la buona custodia delle sue scritture per esimerle da i pericoli, a' quali si può giustamente apprendere che restino esposte in un paese, dove non si fa più alcun conto del dritto delle genti, violato già in tante minacce anco nell'istessa persona di V. E. ” (to Ranuzzi, November 16, 1688, *ibid.*)

That Innocent XI. was indignant at the treatment of his envoy need hardly be stated. Louis XIV.'s conduct hurt him all the more as at that very time the King of England made yet another attempt at mediation between Rome and Paris. To make negotiations possible Innocent raised the prohibition forbidding Ranuzzi to enter into relations with Croissy and left the negotiations with the minister to the nuncio's discretion.¹ However, Paris showed no sign of readiness for peace. The Archbishop held another meeting of the secular and regular clergy, to obtain its approval of the appeal to a Council after 26 Bishops then staying in Paris had taken a similar step on September 30th.² The French troops in Italy were being constantly reinforced so that under pressure of the "Zelanti", the Pope also raised fresh troops.³

Meanwhile events of the utmost importance had occurred—events calculated to affect the relations between Innocent XI. and Louis XIV. As a sequel to the complications at Cologne, in which Louis had been defeated, he now renewed his pretensions to the Palatinate and in September 1688, he ordered his troops to invade the territories in question. Open war between France and the Emperor was thereby rendered unavoidable though Innocent had hoped to conjure such a calamity by so many years' efforts towards a reconciliation. Louis published a manifesto in which he endeavoured

¹ " *Essendosi accettata da N. S^{re}, com'ella intenderà da una mia lettera in piano, la mediazione del Re d'Inghilterra nelle differenze che pendono con cotesta corte, S. Stà, non ostante l'ordine contrario già da me per sua parte datole, rimette alla prudenza et all'arbitrio di V. E. il trattare con il sigr. Croissy, quando egli venisse per parlarle." To Ranuzzi, October 23, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

² LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 476. *Letter of Cibo to Tanara at Cologne, October 30, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 60, *loc. cit.* Cf. the *speech of the royal Procurator-General at the Assembly, *Arm.*, III., 20, f. 187, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ *To Ranuzzi, November 2, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

to throw all the blame upon the Emperor.¹ The real motive of the war was France's jealousy of Leopold I. who had won such brilliant successes over the Turks that before long the constant Turkish peril would be removed. But once the Emperor would be free in the East, he would be in a position to call France to account for her many acts of force and her treaty violations. Hence Louis wished the Turkish peril to continue; this would be most easily realized if the Emperor was compelled to spread his forces over several theatres of war. Even the massing of troops on the frontier of the Electorate of Cologne, which Louis had ordered under pretext of assuring a free episcopal election, had compelled the Emperor to take measures of defence.² Nor did Louis XIV. fail to inform Constantinople of his plans. At the end of August he let it be known there that he intended to order his troops to march into the Palatinate and to throw an army into Italy, measures that would compel the Emperor to withdraw his armies from Hungary and to transfer them to the Rhine and to Italy. To the French ambassador at Constantinople the King observed that presumably the Grand Vizier would not fail to draw his own conclusions from this information.³ On September 10th, 1688, he reported that his troops had advanced on Philippsburg; the Turks would now get more favourable peace terms.⁴ Louis likewise

¹ IMMICH, *Innocenz*, XI., 95. *Arm.*, III., 21, f. 378 (*loc. cit.*) has a reply to Louis XIV.'s manifesto, dated Vienna, October 18, 1688: " *Responsio ad manifestum Gallicum circa bellum intimatum."

² The Emperor was afraid of a *coup de main* by Louis XIV. against Cologne: " che la Francia oltre la forza aperta si servirà ancora d'artificii e di corruzioni per impossessarsi di Colonia senza perdita di tempo." For six weeks Fürstenberg had not shown himself in Cologne, " forse per dubbio di non esservi arrestato " (Tanara on September 5, 1688, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 60, *loc. cit.*). Cf. *ibid.*, the **Cifre* of September 10 and 19, October 18, November 3, 4, and 21, 1688.

³ Instruction to Girardin, French ambassador at Constantinople, of August 22, 1688, in GÉRIN, *Élection*, 121.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 122.

interested himself in the conclusion of peace between Poland and Turkey; Poland would then be in a position to attack Brandenburg and he himself would be able to carry out, without fear of disturbance, his designs against Holland seeing that William of Orange had sailed for England. Thus a European war had now become imminent.¹

At the same time French diplomacy sought to bring pressure to bear on Spain with a view to her adopting a policy of benevolent neutrality towards France. After the march on Philippsburg the French ambassador at Madrid suggested that the Spanish crown should assume the rôle of a mediator; however, as events soon showed, the offer was not seriously meant nor was anything laid down in writing.² The real intention was to divert Spain's attention from what was actually happening, for France's action against Italy could not fail to give rise to the gravest uneasiness in the Pyrenean peninsula. Marchese de los Balbases told the French ambassador that he failed to see how Spain could remain neutral in the event of French troops attacking the Papal States; since Naples was a papal fief Spain was bound to interfere if the Pope desired it.³

¹ "Ainsi voilà une guerre générale dans toute l'Europe dont je ne doute point que les Turks ne tirent un grand avantage," *ibid.*

² "L'ambasciatore di Francia ha parlato al Marchese de los Balbases procurando di giustificare le resolutioni del suo Re et ha parlato in modo come se convitasse questa corona a farsi mediatrice, ma non se ne è spiegato apertamente." To the nuncio also the French ambassador said, "che questa corona non potesse fare azione più degna che farsi mediatrice." The Spanish nuncio on October 28, 1688, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 161, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ "Balbases discorrendo coll'ambasciatore [Francese] di queste materie di neutralità gli disse che non sapeva come potesse haver luogo, quando il Re di Francia inquietasse l'Italia e particolarmente N. Sr^o, che ben sapeva che il regno di Napoli era feudo della Chiesa e che doveva soccorrere la Santa Sede, quando lo richiedesse, oltre che non potevano piantarsi l'armi del Re di Francia nello Stato del Papa, posto nel mezzo d'Italia, senza dar gelosia a tutti." The Spanish nuncio on December 23, 1688, *ibid.*

Innocent was powerless in the face of these events. Once again his ceaseless efforts for the preservation of peace among the Christian princes were thwarted and war clouds were ominously lowering even over the Pontifical States. His finances were so completely exhausted just then that he was forced to stop his subsidies to the Emperor and to Poland. Moreover he himself was nearly always ailing. Unless he was willing to allow the States of the Church to be overrun by the soldiery of an unscrupulous conqueror, he must needs humble himself and agree to such measures as might contribute to the preservation of peace. Hence he was glad of the fresh offer of mediation by the King of England.¹ Lavardin had complained to the Maltese ambassador that he had not yet obtained an audience from the Pope. When this complaint came to the ears of Innocent XI., Cibo was instructed to inform Lavardin that it would be possible to negotiate through the Maltese ambassador. Lavardin replied that he would at once ask for fresh instructions from his sovereign. The Pope also sent for Cardinal D'Estrées to whom he explained that he nursed no rancour against the King of France; he also requested the Cardinal to intervene with Louis XIV. in order to prevent the latter from taking further action against the Papal States. D'Estrées promised to do all that was in his power.²

¹ *Adda on November 15, 1688, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 15, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. the Instruction of the English envoy Porter of February 1689, in GÉRIN, *Révolution*, 476 seq.

² *To Ranuzzi, November 23, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, *loc. cit.* The Cardinal should intervene, "che S. M^à non permettesse che si facessero altri passi nè s'innovasse di vantaggio, il che S. E. mostrò di voler fare." The nuncio in Vienna was informed of this step. Cf. Card. D'Estrées' report to Louis XIV, in MICHAUD, III., 77: Le Pape termina cette conversation en disant, qu'il désirait que je témoignasse a V.M.^{té} qu'il souhaitait de pouvoir être bien avec elle, et qu'après avoir essayé tant de choses, ses états pussent être au moins garantis de la venue des troupes . . . ; que le Roi devrait retirer ses troupes et ne pas faire la guerre à un vieillard de soixante dix-huit ans.

A strange light was thrown on Lavardin's love for peace by the fact that, under the eyes of the Pope, he celebrated the capture of Philippsburg with a display of fireworks and illuminations, though it was not customary in Rome to celebrate victories over Christian princes, especially as this event was the signal for the general war the outbreak of which the Pope was so anxious to prevent.¹

On the other hand Innocent expected a great deal from the English mediation. King James had sent Cardinal D'Este to Rome to negotiate, and Innocent allowed him to establish contact with Lavardin in the same way as he had previously done in the case of Howard. But his hope that the liberation of the Paris nuncio would be the first fruit of the negotiations² was doomed to be cruelly thwarted. The fact was that Louis XIV. did not really want a reconciliation. Moreover the King of England was no longer in a position to impart to his mediation the necessary weight since William of Orange had attacked him in his own realm.³ Catholic Spain was still being deluded with negotiations, so that there was not

¹ *Il marchese di Lavardin ha fatti questa sera fuochi et illuminazioni in Piazza Farnese con due fontane di vino e con frequenti salve di mortaletti per la presa di Filisburgo, contro ogni convenienza e costume e con scandalo universale, mentre in Roma non si sono mai fatte allegrezze per vittorie e vantaggi riportati contro principi cattolici. To Ranuzzi on November 23, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

² " *S. Stà ha stimato di dover permettere al sigr. card. D'Este, venuto quà con tanto suo incommodo in una stagione così avanzata per i sudetti affari con ordini replicati del medesimo Re, di poter trattare con il marchese di Lavardin nel modo che a tal intuito permesse già a Milord Howard nel tempo che si trattenne in questa corte. Oltre l'haver accettata la mediazione d'Inghilterra N. Sr^o crede di dover anco far chiamare a se il card. D'Estrées per far tanto maggiormente conoscere il suo sincero desiderio per la quiete publica." To Ranuzzi, December 7, 1688, *ibid.*

³ Cf. the **Cifre* of nuncio Adda in London, of November 26, December 13 and 17, 1688, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra, 15, loc. cit.*

a single Power able to give a measure of protection against France. The arrogant King's reply to the papal demand for mediation addressed to Cardinal D'Estrées, reflected this situation. What Louis wanted was complete surrender. Innocent was to receive Lavardin as ambassador without condition and within a time limit of one month, viz. up to January 25th, 1689, and at the same time to declare his readiness to negotiate concerning an indemnity to be paid to the King of France. If the Pope rejected these demands the troops of Dauphiné and Languedoc would invade the Papal States where they would comport themselves with the utmost hostility. This was Louis XIV.'s Christmas gift to the aged Pontiff who desired nothing so ardently as peace! Cardinal D'Estrées nevertheless gave some hope of a peaceful settlement and referred to the refusal of the Bulls to such clerics as had taken part in the Assembly of 1682,¹ hence there is reason to think that the asperity of the King's language was just a threat for the purpose of inducing the Pope to make concessions. On January 1st, 1689, Cibo communicated to the nuncio in Paris the King's final demands. He was instructed to enlighten La Chaize and to get him to persuade Louis to grant the Pope at least the necessary time for negotiations of such importance and delicacy.²

¹ *To Ranuzzi on December 28, 1688, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.* D'Estrées informed Card. Cibo "che detta risposta consisteva in mostrar una precisa premura che S. Stà per tutti li 25 del venturo mese risolvesse di ammettere Lavardino come ambasciatore senza alcuna riserva per passar dopo a discutere le altre sodisfazioni pretese da S. Mtà, se non, che si sarebbe cominciato a far silar le truppe di Linguadoca et del Delfinato verso l'Italia con ordine di venir ad invadere lo Stato della Chiesa con ogni più rigorosa ostilità." This information was somewhat modified when D'Estrées communicated it to the Pope for he omitted all reference to the peremptory time limit and the threats, but after the audience with the Pope, he spoke to Cibo in the same strain as before.

² " *che si desse il tempo che richiede un trattato di simil importanza e difficoltà." To Ranuzzi, January 7, 1689, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*

Innocent did not dare to take so important a step on his own authority alone, so he laid the question before the *Congregazione di Stato* for examination. That body was of opinion that in the first instance, negotiations with Cardinal D'Estrées should continue. Once the demands of the King of France were fully known a decision might be reached.¹ On January 9th, 1689, the Congregation held another sitting. With regard to the question of the quarter it was decided to maintain the previous standpoint ; even a limited quarter, consisting of the Piazza Farnese and the side streets was rejected. On the other hand the Congregation was prepared to promote to episcopal sees clerics who had taken part in the Assembly of 1682, should the King absolutely insist on his nominations. The Congregation furthermore requested the Pope to put himself in a state of defence and to demand in his turn that Louis XIV. should make satisfaction for the injuries he had had to endure at his hands.

D'Estrées urged that the reply to the King's demands should be given within the prescribed time limit. France, he said, no longer insisted on the immunity of the quarter but merely desired a statement of the Pope's view on the honours to which the French ambassador in Rome was entitled by the terms of the Treaty of Pisa. Innocent protested his willingness to meet the King to the uttermost limits of what was possible but that he needed time to enable him to take counsel.² D'Estrées promised to do his best to find a

¹ " Che si dovesse mantener viva la pratica con il medesimo sigr. cardinale D'Estrées per ritrarne tutto quel lume che si potesse intorno a i desiderii et alle pretensioni del Re christianissimo a fine di haver luogo dopo di farvi sopra le necessarie considerazioni " (to Ranuzzi, January 4, 1689, *ibid.*). Ranuzzi was requested to send his *cifre* both viâ Lyons and Venice as the matter was too important.

² *Cibo* *reports fully to Ranuzzi, January 11, 1689 (*Nunziat. di Francia*, 177), on the decisions of the congregation of " ieri l'altro. I signori cardinali che vi si trovarono presenti furono di parere unanime, che quanto al quartiere si dovesse negare anche restringimento di esso alle sole strade che circondano il palazzo

satisfactory solution though Louis was still very angry with the Pope in consequence of the issue of the Cologne election. He was nevertheless prepared to drop Cardinal Fürstenberg. The French ambassador in Munich informed the Bavarian court that his sovereign was willing to acknowledge Prince Clement of Bavaria as Elector on condition that Bavaria undertook to remain neutral in the war against the Emperor. To this Munich refused to consent ; the French proposal was, however, passed on to Vienna in the hope of securing better terms in the negotiations for an alliance then pending.¹

The Pope replied to France on January 15th, 1689. He declared that the French ambassador's treatment in Rome would be in accordance with the Treaty of Pisa and the law of nations. With regard to the participants in the Assembly of 1682, Louis was requested to propose other names ; but if he insisted on the nominations already made, Rome would wait for further explanations from each of these priests.² At the same time Innocent dispatched a

dell'ambasciatore con termini rispettosi, bensì, ma costanti e non dissimili da quelli praticati altre volte, e quanto a i soggetti intervenuti alla sudetta assemblea, che in caso che S. Mtà persista di non voler nominar altri, come converrebbe, restandosi d'accordo di rimuovere l'impedimento che vien loro dato dall'esser rei di haver approvate le quattro proposizioni, l'appellatione al futuro concilio et altro, si possa ammettere il trattato per esaminare le dichiarazioni o trattazioni che essi saranno per fare . . . S. Stà gli [al cardinale D'Estrées] ha risposto con dire di restar nella solita disposizione d'incontrare tutte le giuste soddisfazioni del Re, di non cercar suterfugii e di esser pronta ad admettere i temperamenti possibili, ma che conveniva che la Mtà Sua desse tutto il tempo che bisognava per affare di tal peso."

¹ *The French ambassador reports that Fürstenberg, "secondando le premure del Re di Francia riconoscerbbe per elettore di Colonia il sigr. Duca e lo renderebbe possessore pacifico dell'arcivescovato, quando il sigr. elettore di Baviera volesse astenersi dal pigliare partito in questa guerra." Tanara on January 9, 1689, *Nunziat. di Colonia*, 60, *loc. cit.*

² *To Ranuzzi, January 15, 1689, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

Brief to Louis XIV., in which he eulogized his action against the heretics and expressed his confidence that in time to come the Pope and the King of France would work together for the good of the Church.¹

If the Pope really believed that he could cherish such a hope, that fact may have been due, to a large extent, to a supreme and very important attempt at mediation by Giorio who was in close relation with Cardinal Estrées as well as with the Queen of Sweden.

This is what he proposed: The right of *régale* in France was to remain restricted within the boundaries fixed by the Council of Lyons. The King must revoke his edicts to the contrary, after which the Pope on his part would find ways and means to give satisfaction to the King. The four Articles of 1682 would be prohibited by the Pope but not censured, as there was reason to fear that the latter course would give rise to too much agitation in France. Louis would revoke the edict making the four Articles part of the law of the land; whilst the clergy, which to some extent shared the responsibility for their publication, would make an act of submission to the Pope according to a formula to be drawn up for the purpose; after that the nominations made by the King would be recognized. The Pope would not insist on the complete abolition of the quarter, but would be satisfied if the ambassadors renounced their more exaggerated claims; the Governor would then concede the quarter with the Pope's tacit toleration. The question of Cologne was to be solved in this fashion: the Pope would address a Brief to the Emperor and another to the Elector of Bavaria, to persuade them, in the interest of European peace, to recognize Fürstenberg.

Giorio himself, no doubt, was convinced that these proposals would not be accepted, but he felt that in making them the Pope would give the King a proof of goodwill; the

¹ BERTHIER, II., 425 (Brief of January 15, 1689). Cibo (*to Ranuzzi, January 18, 1689, *Nunziat. di Francia, loc. cit.*) describes the Brief as "pieno di espressioni di paterna stima per il Re christianissimo."

consequence would be that Louis would refrain from further measures against Rome. For the rest Giorio's proposals included a clause to the effect that Avignon and Castro would be guaranteed to the Pope, and that France condemned the libels published against his person. On the other hand the Pontiff would allow justice to run its course against those who had sought to prejudice him against France. Lavardin's audience would set the seal on the reconciliation and the Pope would mark the occasion by proclaiming a jubilee.¹

When he drew up these proposals Giorio was unaware of the hidden forces which dominated the situation; above all it was not clear to him that French diplomacy did not desire a compromise. That this was so was shown by the conduct of the French Government even at this stage. Despite the fact that negotiations were pending, Ranuzzi had not yet recovered his personal freedom.² Croissy however, got in touch with him but desired the negotiations to be conducted in the strictest confidence. Innocent, with good reason, distrusted a proposal beneath which he suspected a trap and declined negotiations of this kind; he was anxious for everything to be above board.³ Nor would he fall in with Ranuzzi's proposal that his own liberation should be made an essential preliminary of further negotiations. The Pope did not wish to create an impression that he was drawing out the affair. On the other hand he was very willing that Ranuzzi should request the King of England to intervene on his behalf. The new English ambassador, Lord Porter, was expected at this time in Rome.⁴ The latter arrived at the end of February, 1689, when he took up his residence with

¹ Giorio, **Ragguaglio*, f. 141-89b.

² Saint-Olon to Croissy, February 8, 1689, in GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 423. The nuncio avoids Saint-Olon and forbids his suite, under pain of dismissal, to have anything to do with him,

³ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, February 1, 1689, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, February 22, 1689, *ibid.*

Cardinal D'Estrées. Innocent announced his readiness to receive him in audience immediately.¹

Whilst the Pope was doing his utmost to find a peaceful solution of existing difficulties, his eyes were at last to be opened to the fact that France did not want peace, that she deemed herself strong enough to settle every question with the sword and that Cardinal D'Estrées was acting dishonestly. The Cardinal had represented to the Pope that negotiations with Louis XIV. would be considerably facilitated if he were to receive a flattering Brief. Innocent was prepared to consent to this also, and in order that the result might be as favourable as possible he had both the draft and the Brief itself submitted to Cardinal D'Estrées. D'Estrées declared himself satisfied; he was requested to forward the Brief and he even distributed copies of it in Rome but the original he did not dispatch, in fact he denied ever having received it!²

In these circumstances the negotiations could not be continued. On March 15th, 1689, the Pope instructed the nuncio in Paris to explain to the Venetian ambassador that it was not the Pope who stultified England's intervention but that, on the contrary, the fault lay exclusively with the French Government which was determined to decide all questions by force, though it was precisely France that had sought England's mediation. Innocent now no longer entertained any hope of a peaceful settlement of the conflict.³

¹ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, March 1, 1689, *ibid.*

² *The Brief had been "primo comunicato in minuta e poi mandato nella forma solita al medesimo cardinale [D'Estrées], il quale, invece d'inviarlo, come doveva, a S. Mtà lo fece correre in copia per le mani di tutti e negò dopo con gran disinvoltura di haverlo mai ricevuto. Un procedere tanto contrario alla buona fede et alla probità ha prodotto una non ordinaria ammirazione in S. Benè e farà nell'avenire pensare al modo che dovrà tenersi nel trattare con simili persone". Cibo to Ranuzzi, March 8, 1689, *ibid.*

³ " *ma cotesta corte che non vuol procedere con la dovuta giustizia e buona fede e pretende di vincer tutto con la violenza e con l'artificio, mentre è noto che dalla medesima corte non è

Lavardin saw his expectations of a successful mission vanish and he blamed Cardinal D'Estrées for his utter failure. The Pope instructed the nuncio to urge La Chaize to remonstrate with the King; if the latter failed to do so he would be failing in his duty.¹ That there was no sincere wish for peace in Paris is further confirmed by the fact that Croissy was for ever making fresh demands; thus he brought up once more the question of Cologne which the Pope considered as finally disposed of and demanded yet another Cardinal's hat for France.²

Such conduct may have been in part due to the ill success of France's policy in Spain, so that every consideration was brushed aside. Spain's declaration of neutrality, which France had striven for, was not made in the form desired by her. The Government of Madrid protested repeatedly that it would honour every existing treaty between France and Spain, but this answer did not satisfy the French ambassador; what France really demanded of Spain was nothing less than the complete surrender of Flanders, an act that would have been at variance with existing agreements. On the occasion of his recall, the French ambassador at Madrid paid a farewell visit to the nuncio on March 17th, 1689, when he complained that the latter had not actively taken the side of France. To this the nuncio replied that Spain was bound to look on a suggestion of this kind as a war capitulation, not as a treaty.³ Accordingly Spain abandoned her neutrality; she mobilized her fighting forces and repeated the order previously given to the Viceroy of Naples and the Governor of Milan, to hold

stata mai ammessa la sudetta mediazione da lei prima non solo ricevuta ma richiesta." Cibo to Ranuzzi, March 15, 1689, *ibid.*

¹ " *Si dice che Lavardin parli con grand'indignazione del card. D'Estrées, considerandolo per autore e fomentatore di tutti i presenti torbidi e più atto con le sue buggie e cabale a guastare che ad accomodare le cose," *ibid.*

² *Cibo to Ranuzzi, March 29, 1689, *ibid.*

³ *The Spanish nuncio, March 17, 1689, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 106, *loc. cit.*

their troops at the disposal of the Pope should he express a desire to that effect.¹

Meanwhile Lavardin's unpopularity in Rome grew apace. The Duke of Bracciano, who was also the head of the House of Orsini and who had long stood by Lavardin, now dropped him in ostentatious fashion. The Queen of Sweden alone remained loyal to him.² The ambassador even forfeited the confidence of his sovereign. He was too independent; thus on one occasion he raised a force of 200 men without anyone's order. He was unaware of the fact that, by Louis's orders, he was watched by his own officers and that the King was informed of all he did.³ On April 14th, 1689, Lavardin was recalled. The commander of the French troops in Rome received orders to escort the Marquis to the frontier of the Papal States; from there the latter was to proceed to Leghorn and embark for France.⁴ Cardinal D'Estrées informed the Secretary of State, Cibo, of the news of Lavardin's recall and his early departure.⁵ On March 27th the latter's mercenaries began preparations for their departure. The provisions accumulated by them in the Palazzo Farnese were sold, after which they set out in perfect order on April 30th by way of the Piazza Navona and the Piazza del Popolo. Cardinals D'Estrées and Mairalchini took part in this exodus. The cortège consisted of about 550 persons, for the whole French colony left at the same time: 150 armed men and 72 coaches were counted. Lavardin seemed very unhappy for his mission had cost him 80,000 scudi out of his private income and all he had earned was dishonour and excommunication.⁶ As Lavardin wished to journey through Milanese territory, he

¹ *Report of the Spanish nuncio, May 29, 1689, *ibid.*

² GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 426 *seq.* Cf. also NAVENNE, II., 25.

³ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 428.

⁵ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, April 26, 1689, *Nunziat. di Francia*, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Report on Lavardin's departure, *Arm.*, III., 21, f. 344, Papal Sec. Arch.; Cibo to Tanara at Cologne, April 30, 1689, in LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 477; NAVENNE, II., 25 *seq.*

begged for a passport from the Spanish Governor, Conte Fuensalida. The passport was made out, not without a touch of malice, for "the so-called ambassador Lavardin". The latter indignantly returned the document, whereupon he was given a safe-conduct in the desired form.¹ Lavardin's departure was followed by that of the English envoy, Cardinal Este, on May 17th.²

Nuncio Ranuzzi was still hampered in his freedom. The Pope had warned him to keep a strict watch over his servants lest they should give occasion for complaint.³ Both the King of England and Cardinal Bonsi did their best in Paris to secure his liberation.⁴ When information reached Paris that Lavardin had safely reached Siena, Saint-Olon received a royal order, on May 13th, 1689, to leave the nuncio alone and to inform him that those of his servants who were in prison would be set at liberty.⁵ On June 4th, 1689, the Pope instructed Ranuzzi to ask for a farewell audience with the King since it was incompatible with the nuncio's honour that he should remain in Paris any longer. He was to call on the princes and princesses only if the King first received him. He was strictly forbidden to pay farewell visits to the ministers and to La Chaize, in fact he was told not to receive them should they call on him: he was to justify such an action by the plea that his belongings were all packed up. On the other hand the Pope desired the nuncio to call upon the Queen of England and the foreign envoys.⁶

Ranuzzi was not received by the King, so after waiting for a considerable time, he returned to Italy where he found Innocent X. no longer among the living.⁷

¹ GÉRIN, *Ambassade*, 428.

² *Cibo to Ranuzzi, May 17, 1689, *loc. cit.*

³ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, April 5, 1689, *ibid.*

⁴ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, May 10, 1689, *ibid.*

⁵ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 429.

⁶ *Cibo to Ranuzzi, June 4, 1689, *loc. cit.* The order to leave was renewed on June 11 and 21.

⁷ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 431.

CHAPTER VI.

INNOCENT XI.'s ACTIVITY WITHIN THE CHURCH—REFORMS AND CREATIONS OF CARDINALS—JANSENISM AND CONTROVERSIES ON MORAL THEOLOGY—BEGINNINGS OF THE SCHISM OF UTRECHT—CONDEMNATION OF THE QUIETIST MOLINOS—STATE OF THE MISSIONS.

(1.)

DURING the Pontificate of Clement X. the Oratorian Mariano Sozzini had drawn up a comprehensive programme of secular and ecclesiastical reform¹ which the Altieri Pope was too old to carry into effect. With Innocent XI. the right man seemed to have ascended the Chair of St. Peter to execute the suggestions made in that document. Innocent modelled himself on Adrian VI. to whom he frequently referred. The ingratitude of the Roman people towards that "holy Pontiff", he often observed, had been punished by the sack of Rome in 1527.² It was probably Slusius who had drawn Innocent XI.'s attention to this predecessor of his. Innocent XI. was so eager to imitate him that a Protestant scholar gives it as his opinion that rarely had a Pope attempted the work of reform in all its aspects with so much determination and consecutiveness.³

In the very first year of his pontificate Innocent XI. showed what great importance he attached to the Bishops'

¹ *Copy in the Convent of SS. Quaranta, Rome. **Observationes M. Sozzini in bullam de rebus ecclesiasticis non alienandis*, in *Cod. O.*, 116, n. 4 of Bibl. Vallicelliana, Rome. On M. Sozzini see MORONI, II., L. 15.

² See the *Avviso* of April 15, 1679, which proves the lasting misunderstanding of Adrian VI. by most Italians, SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 272.

³ BENRATH, in *Herzog-Hauck's Realenzyklopädie*, IX.³, 144.

duty of residence.¹ He created a Congregation of four Cardinals and four Bishops to examine the fitness of candidates for the episcopate in Italy.² At Rome the Pope reformed the tribunals of the Curia and the Cancellaria.³ The Roman clergy were exhorted to avoid every form of luxury and especially to wear the cassock.⁴ He renewed Alexander VII.'s decree to the effect that no one was to be ordained priest who had not previously made the Spiritual Exercises and ordination to private titles was not allowed, except in cases of necessity⁵; rather fewer priests but good ones, was Innocent XI.'s principle.⁶

At the beginning of Lent the Pope repeatedly inculcated their duties on the parish priests of Rome, laying particular stress on the necessity of preaching the Gospel to the people in simple, practical fashion, and on the religious instruction of youth.⁷ Parents were charged, under pain of excommunication, to send their children to the catechism classes and

¹ See the *report of Card. Carlo Pio to Leopold I., October 31, 1676, State Arch., Vienna; **Avviso* of April 10, 1677, Vat. Lib. Cf. also COLOMBO, 16; **Cifra al Lauri*, August 28, 1680, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 164, Papal Sec. Arch.

² NOVAES, XI., 13. By order of the Pope, G. B. Spinola, Bishop of Sarzana, held a visitation in Corsica; see **Acta apost. visit. insulae Corsicae*, 1686, *Cod. B.*, VIII., 5 and 6 of the University Library, Genoa. Cf. Spinola's *report of August 16, 1687, *Bibl. Civica*, Genoa.

³ MORONI, VII., 157.

⁴ LIPPI, 54. On the attempt in 1678 to introduce the wearing of the cassock among the German clergy also see an article by G. GUTMENSCH, based on documents in the Papal Sec. Arch., in *Salzburger Chronik*, 1908, No. 129. In 1681 Innocent XI. tried to reintroduce the clerical dress at Mayence, Trèves, Paderborn and Münster; cf. BERTHIER, I., 392 *seq.*, 396 *seq.*, 404 *seq.*

⁵ NOVAES, XI., 13 *seq.*

⁶ Cf. **Avviso* of March 25, 1679, Vat. Lib. Innocent XI. held similar convictions with regard to religious. *Ibid.*, *February 12, 1679.

⁷ See **Avvisi* of February 27, 1677, September 10, 1678, and March 11, 1679, Vat. Lib.

boys armed with handbells were made to go through the streets to call the young to these lessons.¹ In every *Rione* the Pope erected at his own expense schools for destitute girls.² He was keen on extending these catechetical instructions to the adults and to soldiers.³ He was equally solicitous for the spiritual and the bodily welfare of the sick in hospital. He renewed Pius V.'s stringent ordinance enjoining physicians to make their visits to bed-ridden sick people dependent on the reception of the Sacraments.⁴ He also published a special ordinance on the cultus of the Most Holy Sacrament of the Altar.⁵

At the beginning of his pontificate Innocent XI. showed very great strictness in granting Indulgences and requests for benefices,⁶ but later on he became much more liberal. When there was question of coadjutors for Bishops, especially if they were to have right of succession, personal considerations did not weigh with him at all,⁷ though he showed himself somewhat more amenable when candidates were put forward by princes who had deserved exceptionally well of the Catholic cause, as, for instance, Philip William of Pfalz-Neuburg.

The Pope kept a particularly watchful eye on the preservation of discipline by the members of religious Orders. Without

¹ **Avviso* of December 25, 1678, *ibid.*

² LIPPI, 58.

³ **Avviso* of March 19, 1678, *loc. cit.* Indulgences for Observants teaching the Catechism in *Bull.*, XIX., 684.

⁴ LIPPI, 59. On Pius V.'s ordinance cf. our data, Vol. XVII., 89 *seqq.* The Papal Sec. Arch. (*Bandi*, V., 9, p. 25-6) contains : " *Distribuzione di persone religiose all'assistenza ne' bisogni spirituali degli infermi nelli hospedali di Roma," dated February 10, 1676 ; " *Istruzione d'ordine d'Innocenzo XI. per li religiosi ripartiti alla visita quotidiana degl'infermi nelli spedali di Roma, acciochè, sicome il fine et oggetto di questo pio essercitio è il medesimo a tutti così fra la diversità de' sacri operarii sia uniforme il modo di praticarlo," dated 1677.

⁵ *Bull.*, XIX., 103. Cf. *ibid.*, 41, against abuse of consecrated Hosts.

⁶ BERTHIER, I., 22, 67, 365.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 340, 349.

consulting their protector, Cardinal Barberini, he ordered a strict visitation of the Franciscan Convent of Araceli by Cardinal Gregorio Barbarigo, who had a reputation for sternness. This visitation brought to light certain abuses contrary to poverty¹; thereupon religious conscious of similar faults were seized with a wholesome fear.² How strict the Pope's views were on the observance of poverty was discovered by a certain Dominican who wished to present him with a sumptuously bound book. Innocent refused to accept the gift on the ground that such luxury did not become a religious.³ The Benedictines of S. Callisto were told to return to St. Paul's outside the walls; their representations that the air there was bad were met by the Pope's terse remark that "this was also the case at the Vatican".⁴ In June 1677 an edict was published forbidding all religious in Rome to live out of their monasteries; offenders were to be severely punished. By the autumn, despite much opposition, the reform was an accomplished fact.⁵ Within that same year all the monasteries of Rome were subjected to a visitation by order of the Pope.⁶ In Tuscany and Lombardy the Pope reformed the Dominicans⁷ and in Poland the Cistercians.⁸ The Capuchins received much support from him.⁹ Special attention was given to the restoration of discipline in convents of nuns,¹⁰ for whom Innocent prescribed annual spiritual exercises.¹¹ If he attached so much importance to the reform of the Orders it was because he looked on these associations

¹ **Avviso* of January 1, 1677, Vat. Lib.

² **Avviso* of February 6, 1677, *ibid.*

³ **Avviso* of June 12, 1677, *ibid.*

⁴ **Avviso* of February 13, 1677, *ibid.*

⁵ **Avviso* of June 5 and 19, September 4 and 11, 1677, *ibid.*

⁶ **Avviso* of January 1, 1678, *ibid.*

⁷ NOVAES, XI., 14.

⁸ *Bull.*, XIX., 611.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 138, 139, 142; BOJANI, II., 287 *seqq.*

¹⁰ LIPPI, 55.

¹¹ **Avviso* of September 10; 1678, Vat. Lib.

as centres of light for the Church.¹ However much his ceaseless efforts to this end deserve recognition, efforts eventually crowned with success,² it must be admitted that at times he lost himself in mere trifles.³

Innocent XI. granted papal confirmation to the convent of the Benedictines of the Blessed Sacrament founded in Paris by the Venerable Mother Mechtilde; to the Rule of the Carthusians; to the Congregation of the Bavarian Benedictines founded in 1684 and to the Association of secular priests founded by Bartholomew Holzhauser, a Society which he would have been glad to see spread over the whole of Germany. The Piarists received much encouragement from him and the Society of nursing Brothers founded in South America by Pierre de Béthencourt, the so-called Bethlehemites, was erected by him into a formal religious institute under the Rule of St. Augustine.⁴

As early as May 1677, it was rumoured that the Pope was preparing a Bull which would put a stop to nepotism once for all.⁵ However, it was soon learnt that many Cardinals were of opinion that it was not possible to tie the hands of a future Pope,⁶ but when certain investigations brought to light the fact that since Clement VIII. 30 million scudi had

¹ **Avviso Marescotti*, July 14, 1685, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Thus Card. Carlo Pio reports on Oct. 17, 1682: Card. Casanata orders divers reforms for religious. Among other things, they are forbidden to have musical instruments in their cells and a lay brother must walk by the side of the priest, not behind him, "come se fosse il suo servitore" (State Archives, Vienna). Cf. also Servient's report of October 22, 1682, in *Michaud*, I., 239 *seq.*

⁴ HEIMBUCHER,² I., 158, 198, 257, 479; II., 275, 364. Cf. *Bull.*, XIX., 241, 513, 591, 613, 616. On B. Holzhauser, cf. besides *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, VI.², 191 *seq.*, BERTHIER, I., 346, 350, 355, 365. Life by GADUEL, Paris, 1668; *Hist. polit. Blätter*, CXVIII., 142 *seqq.*

⁵ First announcement in **Avviso* of May 29, 1677, Vat. Lib.

⁶ **Avvisi* of June 12 and 19, 1677, *ibid.*

gone to the nephews,¹ the Pope felt strengthened in his determination. Without the knowledge of the Secretary of State Cibo, the auditor Giovan Battista de Luca, Secretary of Memorials, was instructed to prepare a draft for the Bull.² Its early publication was expected³ when strong protests were raised by the nephews of former Popes who relied on Cibo's influence. The opposition was headed by Cardinals Barberini and Chigi. The former urged that the prohibition could not be carried through in practice and that it would not provide a real remedy.⁴ Meanwhile the draft of the Bull had been submitted to all the Cardinals for their opinion. The majority approved the Pope's resolution but nearly all of them made some objections. Azzolini questioned the opportuneness of the measure.⁵ Rospigliosi and Altieri, on the other hand, were in favour of the publication of the Bull, whilst Barberini and Chigi maintained their opposition.

¹ **Avvisi* of April 16 and May 7, 1678, *ibid.*

² *Card. Carlo Pio's *report of September 17, 1678, State Archives, Vienna.

³ **Avvisi* of December 21 and 31, 1678, Vat. Lib.

⁴ **Avvisi* of December 31 1678, January 4, 1679, *ibid.*, and Card. Carlo Pio's *reports of December 24 and 31, 1678, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ Card. Pio forwarded the draft to Vienna on October 13, 1678 (State Archives). This **Minuta* of the Bull is in *Carte Strozzi*, 235, p. 82, of the State Archives, Florence. In *Ottob.* 2816, I., 2-20 (Vat. Lib.) the **votum* of Azzolini (also in *Barb.* 5662, p. 105 *seqq.*, *ibid.*), 22-36 Maidalchini's **votum* (*cf.* MICHAUD, I., 354), 34-49 Carpegna's **votum*, 50-73 Albizzi's **votum*. *Cf. Cod.* 683 of Bibl. Corsini and *Cod. Ital.*, 190, p. 272 *seq.* of the State Library, Munich. In the Altemps Library, sold in 1908, I saw a *" Discorso fatto di un zelante a Innocenzo XI." against publication of the Bull. The author of the *" Discorso sopra la bolla del nepotismo " in *Cod. Ital.*, 552, p. 141 *seqq.*, proposes a middle course: 20,000 scudi a year from Church benefices would be enough for one who until then had wrongly enjoyed 100,000 (State Lib., Munich). *Cf.* also the **Judicium* of the Dutch Augustinian Michael van Hecke, intended for Card. Cibo, *Cod. R.* 3. 7, p. 184 *seqq.*, *Bibl. Angelica*, Rome.

It was urged in particular that the evil consisted not in nepotism itself, but in its abuse.¹ Secular Governments also, Spain in particular, raised objections to the papal plan. In Madrid it was feared that with the removal of nepotism the Holy See would become too wealthy!² Cardinal Ottoboni and the Pope's Vicar, Cardinal Carpegna, also joined the opposition.³ Since it was impossible to secure a majority in the Sacred College Innocent XI. was compelled in the end to refrain from carrying out his praiseworthy intention.⁴ It would seem that Azzolini's doubts as to the opportuneness of the measure proved decisive.⁵

Innocent XI.'s strictness also had a salutary effect on the College of Cardinals. Not one Cardinal dared to take part in the festivities of the carnival of 1677.⁶ The great freedom of speech and the earnest admonitions which marked the preaching of the palace preacher, the Capuchin Bonaventure of Recanati,⁷ were wholly in keeping with the Pope's own ideas and he supported these exhortations in every way. Accordingly, in April, 1677, a number of Cardinals began

¹ " *Tutto il male et odiato del nepotismo consiste nel mal uso," *Vat.* 8632, p. 132 *seq.*, *Vat. Lib.*

² *Card. Carlo Pio's *reports of December 31, 1678, January 7 and 21, 1679, *State Arch.*, Vienna. *Cf.* **Avviso* of October 1, 1678, *Vat. Lib.*

³ **Avvisi* of June 17, 1678 and January 14, 1679, *ibid.*

⁴ LIPPI, 49 *seq.* After there had been no mention of the Bull for years the Pope returned to his plan in 1681 (MICHAUD, I., 355) and again in 1688. On April 9, 1686, Card. Pio *reports that the Bull against nepotism was once more on the *tapis*; that the *minuta* of it had been handed to Card. Slusius and the *sottodatario*.

⁵ *Barb.* 5662, p. 200, *Vat. Lib.*

⁶ **Avviso* of February 27, 1677, *ibid.*

⁷ **Avvisi* of April 10 and 24, 1677, *ibid.*; MABILLON-MONTFAUCON, *Corresp. inédite avec l'Italie*, I., Paris, 1846, 191 *seqq.* For Recanati *cf.* D. CALCAGNI, *Vita del P.B. da Recanati*, Messina, 1702. His " prediche dette nel palazzo apostolico " were printed at Venice in 1709.

to give religious instruction to the children on Sundays in their titular churches and to the amazement of the Romans they continued to do so even when the hot weather set in.¹ Besides the splendid Cardinal Barbarigo, Cardinal Barberini was likewise remarkable for special religious fervour.² On the other hand the Pope felt compelled to address serious admonitions to Cardinals Maidalchini and Ludovisi. They bore fruit with Ludovisi³ whereas very unfavourable rumours circulated concerning Maidalchini, so that the Pope forbade him to have anything to do with women.⁴ Cardinal Carpegna was severely rebuked for having allowed, as the Pope's Vicar, a musical entertainment to take place during Lent.⁵

In view of Innocent XI.'s principles it was to be taken for granted that he would only bestow the purple on thoroughly deserving subjects. He expressed himself most unequivocally on this point already in June 1677.⁶ Such was his unwillingness to increase the Sacred College that in 1678 people believed he would die without having created a single Cardinal.⁷ When in the autumn of 1678 ambassadors and Cardinals spoke of the necessity of augmenting the College of Cardinals

¹ **Avvisi* of April 3 and 10, May 22, and July 13, 1677, Vat. Lib.

² **Avviso* of July 17, 1677, *ibid.*

³ An **Avviso* of March 19, 1677, states: Yesterday the Pope conversed with Card. Ludovisi in St. Peter's, "Dissero tutti, che questo Papa vivo sia santo, più d'ogni santo ch'è morto, mentre egli solo col rissanar questo cardinal ha fatto un miracolo, che non ha mai fatto alcun santo" (Vat. Lib.). In *Cod. f. 1, 19* of the Chigi Library: "*Ostien e Velit. episcopatus visitatio facta per Nicol. card. Ludovisium a, 1684."

⁴ **Avviso* of April 3, 1677, and July 23, 1678, *loc. cit.*, and Card. Carlo Pio's *report of June 8, 1680, State Arch., Vienna. Card. B. Pamfili, who was a great music lover, also received an exhortation to lead a priestly life; **Avviso Marescotti*, January 6, 1885, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

⁵ Card. Carlo Pio's *report of March 11, 1679, *loc. cit.*

⁶ **Avviso* of June 5, 1677, Vat. Lib.

⁷ "*Moriatur sine filiis," *Avviso* of April 23, 1678, *ibid.*

now that peace had been concluded, his answer was that these two things were in no way correlated. After the death of Cardinal Litta in 1679, 16 Cardinals' hats were free and as the result of further deaths the number rose to 18 by December.¹ However, those who had hoped that the Pope would now come to a decision were disappointed: they had to wait patiently until the autumn of 1681. At length, on September 1st, when all hope had nearly vanished,² Innocent XI. carried out his first nomination of Cardinals at which sixteen prelates, all of them Italians, received the purple.³

Most of the new Cardinals had distinguished themselves under the eyes of the Pope in Rome, as, for instance, the *Maestro di Camera*, Antonio Pignatelli, the Auditor and Secretary of Memorials, Giovan Battista de Luca, the Governor, Giovan Battista Spinola, the Datarius, Stefano Agostini, the Dean of the Rota, Flaminio Taja, the Master of the Apostolic Palace, the Dominican Raimondo Capizucchi, the Auditor of the Camera, Urbano Sacchetti, the Treasurer-General, Gian Francesco Ginetti, and the Consultor of the Inquisition, Michel Angelo Ricci. Francesco Buonvisi, Stefano Brancaccio, Savio Mellini, Marco Galli and the learned Franciscan Conventual Lorenzo Brancati had done good work as nuncios.⁴ To these must be added the Archbishop of Milan, Frederick Visconti, and Benedetto Pamfili who owed his elevation to the Pope's grateful feelings for Innocent X. Taja and Ricci declined the cardinalitial dignity out of humility and were

¹ **Avvisi* of September 2 and December 23, 1679, *ibid.*

² Report in MICHAUD, III., 109.

³ GUARNACCI, I., 127 *seqq.* (with portraits of the new Cardinals); CARDELLA, VII., 243 *seqq.*; NOVAES, XI., 31 *seqq.* Characteristics in respect to their eligibility in " *Scrittura politica sopra il conclave da farsi per la morte d'Innocenzo XI," in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, A., f. 3.

⁴ A *Vita* of L. Brancati was written by B. COMANDUS (Roma, 1698), another by G. BARA (Roma, 1699). On R. Capizucchi see TAURISANO, *Hierarchia ord. Praedic.*, Roma, 1916, 58, 116; for Buonvisi, *cf.* MAZZUCHELLI, II., 4, 242 *seqq.*, TRENTA (Lucca, 1818) and *supra*, p. 95, 131, 141.

only prevailed upon to accept it by the pressing representations of the Pope.¹

Previous to the promotion Cardinal Ottoboni had spoken against the elevation of De Luca but he remained alone in his opposition.² One other malcontent was Cardinal D'Estrées who in a somewhat lengthy discourse spoke of his amazement that the wishes of his sovereign, the "greatest monarch in the world", who had done so much for the conversion of the Calvinists, had not been taken into account.³ The candidate for whom Louis XIV., in conjunction with John Sobieski, had expended all his diplomatic tricks was Toussaint de Forbin Janson who had long acted as French ambassador in Poland.⁴

Undeterred by failure the King of France had every effort made on behalf of Forbin during the ensuing years, but though the King of Poland also warmly supported him, the Pope persevered in his refusal.⁵ When in the autumn of 1683, the French Government became increasingly persistent, Innocent XI. instructed his nuncio in Paris to emphasize the fact that the nomination of Cardinals was exclusively the affair of the Pope who would have to give an account of it to God. With regard to Poland's intervention he pointed out that princes could only recommend candidates belonging to their own territory.⁶ After the September promotion there

¹ **Acta consist.* in *Barb.* 2896, Vat. Lib. At this time the following dissertation was written: "An quis constringi possit in statu libero ad acceptandum dignitatem cardinal." (*Cod. Ital.*, 68, State Lib., Munich). A **Vita del Card. Taja* " in *Barb.* 4879, p. 82 *seq.*, Vat. Lib.

² Card. C. Pio's *report of September 13, 1681, State Arch., Vienna.

³ Text of address in **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.* Cf. MICHAUD, III., 110.

⁴ BERTHIER, I., 60, 62; MICHAUD, III., 94 *seqq.*

⁵ MICHAUD, III., 111 *seq.*

⁶ " *Intorno alle istanze fatte dal Re per la promozione N. Sre risponde che si raccomanderà a Dio che l'ispiri a farla, quando sarà maggior servitio suo e della Sede Apost., e che la promozione già

still remained ten vacant seats but for the moment the Pope showed not the slightest inclination to fill them.¹ One year after another went by but the expected nomination of new Cardinals did not take place so that people began to look for an explanation of the delay. Many thought that the secret of the Pope's reluctance lay in his desire to shorten the next conclave by curtailing the Sacred College.² There were even those who claimed to have information that he intended to lower the number of Cardinals from seventy to fifty.³

By April 1685, as a result of further deaths, the number of vacancies in the Sacred College had risen to twenty-six.⁴

fatta non fu intiera. Che i principi raccomandano e non nominano al cardinalato e devono farlo di soggetti degni e de' più meritevoli de' loro regni e d'intiera sodisfattione del Papa, il quale è tenuto a render conto al sig. Dio dell'elezione de' soggetti che da lui si promuovono. Che i principi devono raccomandare soggetti de' suoi regni e nazionali, perchè questi possano assistere a' Sommi Pontefici con sicure e veridiche informazioni per le occorrenze de' medesimi regni e proteggere appresso i re gl'interessi della Sede Apost. e l'immunità della Chiesa. E che, quando la Stà Sua inclini a sodisfare il Re di Polonia, stimerà di non poterlo fare se non di soggetto Polacco per le ragioni e considerationi accennate di sopra e singolarmente secondo l'intentione del concilio di Trento, che vuole che siano assonti al cardinalato soggetti di tutte le nazioni. A tutto questo S. Stà aggiunge, V. S. Ill. assecuri S. Mtà che non si è data licenza alcuna al Nunzio di Polonia di procurare di esser raccomandato da quel Re, e che ciò che può esser stato detto in questo genere, non ha fondamento di sorte alcuna etc. To Ranuzzi, September 28, 1683, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 170, p. 10, Papal Sec. Arch.

¹ Cf. MICHAUD, III., 115.

² **Avviso* of November 25, 1684, Vat. Lib.

³ “*Le Pape a donné ordre d'examiner la bulle de Sixte V, qui fixe le nombre des cardinaux à soixante et dix.” It is rumoured that he wishes to reduce it to fifty, “s'il trouve que ce changement puisse estre avantageux à l'église,” *Nunziat. di Francia*, 160, *loc. cit.*

⁴ **Avviso* of April 28, 1685, *loc. cit.*

More than ever there was talk in Rome of an impending promotion¹ and by the end of the year definite names were mentioned,² yet the Pope came to no decision though the palace preacher, Bonaventure of Recanati, who enjoyed great esteem, had urged it already in March.³ Only on September 2nd, 1686, fully five years after Innocent XI.'s first creation of Cardinals, did he proceed to the second which was also his last.⁴

On this occasion non-Italians figured largely among the twenty-seven new Cardinals and the wishes of various Governments had been considered, though only in so far as the Pope deemed it expedient; thus the representative in Rome of the King of Poland, John Casimir Dönhoff, and yet another Pole, viz. the Bishop of Ermland and Grand Chancellor, Michael Stephen Radziejowski,⁵ received the purple, whereas Forbin was passed over this time also though he had been warmly recommended both by Poland and by France.⁶ The latter's utterly French attitude in the Turkish question, as well as in the Gallican conflicts, could not but cause him to appear to the Pope as quite unsuitable for admission into the Supreme Senate of the Church.⁷ Louis XIV.'s displeasure

¹ MICHAUD, III., 122 *seqq.*

² The **Avviso Marescotti* of December 1, 1685 (Bibl. Vitt. Emmanuele) mentions "il P. Coloredo della Chiesa nuova, il confessor di S. Stà [Marracci], et P. Ger^{mo} Berti prete di S. Agnese, tutti in concetto di virtuosi e di vita esemplarissima.

³ **Avviso* of March 24, 1685, *loc. cit.*

⁴ GUARNACCI, I., 194 *seqq.* (with portraits); CARDELLA, VII., 264 *seqq.*; NOVAES, XI., 51 *seqq.*; **Miscell.*, p. 117 *seq.* of Campanello Archives, Campanello, near Spoleto, and the "Lives of Cardinals" written in 1696, Liechtenstein Archives, 1, 4, 24, Vienna.

⁵ Cf. *Zeitschrift für Geschichte Ermlands*, XX. (1919); *Des Herrn Kardinals und Primatis in Polen M. Radziejowski Lebensbeschreibung und was derselben anhängig*, Cologne, 1704.

⁶ MICHAUD, III., 111 *seqq.*, 125.

⁷ Cf. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 72 *seq.*

was all the greater¹ as the only Frenchman by birth to be raised to the cardinalate on this occasion, namely Etienne Le Camus, Archbishop of Grenoble, was particularly distasteful to him by reason of his opposition to the four Articles of 1682. Le Camus, who bestowed the utmost care on the administration of his diocese and founded two seminaries, was inclined to favour Jansenist opinions, hence he was an opponent of the Jesuits and of probabilism.²

With the nomination in 1686 of Max Gandolf von Kuenburg, Archbishop of Salzburg,³ Leopold von Kollonitsch, Bishop of Raab and Johann von Goës, Bishop of Gurk,⁴ the Emperor Leopold was given three representatives in the Sacred College, but the satisfaction of the Hofburg was greatly diminished by the circumstance that the purple had also been bestowed on an old opponent of the House of Habsburg and a keen partisan of Louis XIV., namely Wilhelm Egon von Fürstenberg, since 1682 Bishop of Strassburg. Both he and John Walter Slusius, one of the Pope's intimates,⁵ were by birth subjects of the Empire.

Innocent XI. took into account the wishes of Portugal in the elevation of the Archbishop of Braga, Verissimo de Lancastre. Spain was liberally treated, for the red hat was bestowed on the Bishop of Salamanca, Pedro de Salazar, the learned Benedictine José Saens de Aguirre and the Vicar-General of the Archbishop of Messina, Fortunato Carafa.

The Italian Princes were also given representatives in the Supreme Senate of the Church in the persons of Francesco

¹ MICHAUD, III., 125 *seqq.*

² On Le Camus *cf.* biographies by A. LALOUETTE (Paris, 1720) and BELLET (*ibid.*, 1886) and *Lettres, publ. par Ingold* 1892).

³ WIDMANN, *Salzburg*, III., 321 *seqq.* The numerous copies of diplomatic reports in the *Studienbibliothek* of Salzburg probably got there through Max Gandolf.

⁴ On Kollonitsch see above, p. 177; on J. v. Goës, *Allg. Deutsche Biographie*, IX., 323 *seqq.*; WURZBACH, V., 244.

⁵ *Supra*, p. 20.

Maria de' Medici¹ and Rinaldo d'Este.² The choice of Gian Francesco Negroni, the Treasurer-General, who was very unpopular in Rome, and that of Pier Matteo Petrucci, so often mentioned during the quietistic troubles,³ was not a happy one. The other Italians on whom Innocent XI. bestowed the red hat in 1686, were entirely worthy of the honour as, for instance the Vice-Gerent of the Cardinal Vicar, Jacopo de Angelis, Opisio Pallavicini, who rendered brilliant services in promoting the Turkish war during his nunciature in Poland,⁴ Angelo Maria Ranuzzi who acted as nuncio extraordinary in Paris in 1683,⁵ Marcello Durazzo, who had represented the Holy See first at Lisbon and then at Madrid,⁶ Carlo Stefano Anastasio Ciceri, since 1680 Bishop of Como where he did splendid work in accordance with the ideals of Innocent XI., the *Maggiordomo* Orazio Mattei, the Auditor of the *Camera* Domenico Maria Corsi, the *Presidente delle armi*, Fulvio Astalli, the Chamberlain Gasparo de' Cavalieri, the devout and learned Oratorian Leonardo Colloredo,⁷ and lastly the excellent Marcantonio Barbarigo.

¹ On F. M. de' Medici, who laid down the purple in 1708 in order to prevent the extinction of the family, cf. MORONI, XLIV., 93 *seq.*, and REUMONT, *Toscana*, I., 462. An " *Instruzione ab ill. S. D. Franc. de Medici cardinale futuro " in *Barb.* 5217, Vat. Lib.

² Rinaldo d'Este also resigned the purple in 1695, to preserve his family. On his journey to Rome for the reception of the red hat (1688), see his *letters to Card. Barberini in *Barb.*, LX., 9, p. 1 *seqq.*, Vat. Lib.; *ibid.*, p. 11, *on his stay in Rome (November, 1688).

³ Cf. below, p. 443.

⁴ Cf. above, p. 118.

⁵ Cf. above, p. 315.

⁶ In the *account of the Cardinals of 1696 we read of Durazzo : " Quanto di merito si può dire in un degno ecclesiastico, tutto si possiede da questo porporato," Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

⁷ P. M. PUCETTI, *Vita di L. Colloredo*, Roma, 1738. In the **Miscell.* of the Campanello Archives we read of him : " Dà speranza di riuscir gran soggetto per la chiesa di Dio."

Well-informed contemporaries speak in high terms of nearly all these Cardinals,¹ but the greatest praise went to Barbarigo, a kinsman of saintly Bishop Gregorio Barbarigo and a worthy heir of his spirit. As a young priest at Padua he had greatly at heart the work of catechetical instruction. When he became Archbishop of Corfu in 1678, he founded a seminary and he was indefatigable in all works of charity. Besides the qualities of which this activity was the proof, Innocent XI. particularly valued the firmness with which Barbarigo had safeguarded his episcopal dignity against the Venetian General Morosini. The persecution of which Barbarigo became the object on the part of the Government of Venice hastened his admission into the Sacred College of which he became an ornament.²

Innocent XI. promoted the cult of the Saints in many ways,³ but he disapproved of the cost of canonization which had risen enormously.⁴ By a decree of October 15th, 1678, he considerably reduced this expenditure in accordance with proposals made by the Congregation of Rites.⁵ He only carried out one beatification when, in June, 1679, he raised to the altar the Bishop of Lima, Turibius.⁶ Among pious practices he particularly favoured the Way of the Cross⁷ and the Confraternities of the Rosary.⁸ He himself joined the Confraternity of Jesus and Mary for the Holy Souls founded at Rome in 1687.⁹

¹ Cf. *Scrittura politica sopra il conclave da farsi per la morte d'Innocenzo XI., Liechtenstein Archives, A., f. 3.

² Cf. A. VOLTINI, *De vita et moribus M. A. Barbarici card.*, Faventiae, 1877, and P. BERGAMASCHI, *Vita del card. M. A. Barbarigo*, 2 vols., Roma, 1919.

³ Cf. *Bull.*, XIX., 390, 392; NOVAES, XI., 16 seq., 22, 30 seq., 48 seq., 65.

⁴ Examples in NOVAES, XI., 18, note.

⁵ *Bull.*, XIX., 123 seq.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 190.

⁷ Cf. *Katholik*, 1895, I., 335.

⁸ *Bull.*, XIX., 180, 181, 194.

⁹ The Arciconfraternità di Gesù e Maria, which since 1923 has its seat in SS. Vincenzo ed Anastasio, still preserves the Pope's sacco.

Like so many of his predecessors, Innocent XI. came in conflict with Portugal in consequence of the action of the Portuguese Inquisition against the so-called Neo-Christians. Since July 1677, the Pope had insisted on the Inquisition forwarding to Rome the minutes of any proceedings taken against such Neo-Christians who were accused of secretly adhering to Judaism. However, all his exhortations, as well as the representations of nuncio Marcello Durazzo, were in vain, for the Inquisition was backed by the Portuguese Government.¹ In the end the Pope saw himself compelled, on May 27th, 1679, to deprive the Inquisitor Verissimo de Lancastre and his officials of their powers, on account of their obstinate disobedience, and to transfer these faculties one more to the Bishops.² The conflict over the reform of the Portuguese Inquisition, which at times took on a most violent form,³ was only settled in August, 1681, when the Inquisitor made his submission. Thereupon he was reinstated in his office but at the same time detailed directions were laid down for the treatment by him of the Neo-Christians.⁴ Five years later the Portuguese Government succeeded in procuring the red hat for Verissimo. Innocent no doubt forgave him because he had arrived at the conviction that Verissimo's fault was due solely to weakness.⁵

At the beginning of 1683 the Pope protested against certain decisions of the Polish Diet which were prejudicial to the liberty and immunity of the Church.⁶ In Spain the old Cæsaro-Papistic tendencies were for ever giving rise to disputes between the Holy See and the Government. Not only in Spain proper but in her dependencies also, viz. Naples, Milan and the Netherlands, the Church's immunity continued to be

¹ *Bull.*, XIX., 20 *seqq.*; BERTHIER, I., 105, 108 *seq.*, 221 *seq.*; BOJANI, II., 102 *seq.*

² *Bull.*, XIX., 174 *seq.*; BERTHIER, I., 321 *seq.*

³ BOJANI, II., 127 *seq.*

⁴ *Bull.*, XIX., 402 *seq.*

⁵ *Cf.* above, p. 418, and Verissimo's characterization in the "Scrittura politica" quoted, p. 419, n. 6.

⁶ BERTHIER, II., 63 *seq.*

frequently infringed.¹ When on the occasion of a Chapter of the " Clerics Minim ", some royal councillors interfered with the prerogatives of the Church, things went so far in 1678 that a formal rupture between Rome and Madrid seemed imminent. The Pope remained firm and won a complete victory in this dispute.² But it seemed impossible to uproot the old system. When all admonitions had proved in vain, the Holy See had recourse to sterner means with a view to preserving the rights of the Church so frequently violated. At the beginning of 1680 the Pope refused to renew the " Cruzada " and other favours because of the abuses committed in the expenditure of the money. The Government now gave way in one case, but Innocent insisted on the removal of all the abuses of which he had complained.³ Above all he insisted on the abolition of the so-called *Monarchia Sicula*. So crying an abuse was made of this privilege that in April 1681, Innocent XI. remarked that the *Monarchia Sicula* would end by proving the ruin of the Spanish monarchy.⁴ But the Spanish authorities were not prepared to yield.⁵ The Pope ended by losing patience and in 1687, though Cardinals Cibo and Carpegna sought to

¹ *Ibid.*, I., 20 seq., 46, 68 seq., 128 seq., 389, 430, 435; II., 21, 34. BOJANI, II., 238 seq., 240, 288 seqq., 299 seqq.

² BOJANI, II., 381, 401, 411; BERTHIER, I., 217 seq., 305; *Bull.*, XIX., 131.

³ BOJANI, III., 49 seqq., 53, 57, 63, 73, 93; BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Spagna*, II., 658; **Cifre al Nuntio di Spagna* of March 3, April 27, and May 11, 1681, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 158, Papal Sec. Arch. In his letter of January 23, 1687, to Charles II., Innocent XI. maintains his objections against the indult " De millionibus " because the money was not properly used; BERTHIER, II., 328 seq.

⁴ Cf. **Cifre al Nuntio di Spagna*, February 2 and April 13, 1681 (" V. S. Ill. . . . non lasci fra tanto temere opportunamente che la Monarchia Sicula possa un giorno per giusto giuditio di Dio rovinar quella di Spagna, se non vi si pone rimedio "), *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 158, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁵ **Cifre al Nuntio di Spagna* of December 7, 1681, March 1 and 29, April 26 and July 19, 1682, *ibid.*

dissuade him, he directed the nuncio to excommunicate the Neapolitan authorities. The Cabinet of Madrid, however, insisted on the sentence being suspended and made the permission to raise a tenth from the Spanish clergy for the Turkish war dependent on its withdrawal.¹ In South America also the Pope had to protest against the violation of the ecclesiastical prerogatives of the Bishop of Cartagena.²

During the great struggle with Louis XIV. on questions of principle, Innocent XI. did not forget to raise his voice against the ill-treatment of some monasteries by the royal functionaries.³ How much the spirit of absolutism violated the rights of the Church in every direction may be gathered from the fact that even under Leopold I., whose personal piety was so remarkable, the imperial officials permitted themselves at times the most grievous encroachments.⁴ On February 3rd, 1685, the Pope felt obliged to warn the Emperor not to draw down the divine malediction upon the war with the Turks by interfering with the freedom of the Church.⁵

(2.)

If Cæsaro-Papalism delighted in openly attacking the Holy See, a far more serious peril, because an internal one, arose from the sectarian movement in France and Flanders which continued to spread in secret. Since the Clementine Peace a great many people were deluded as to the real situation by the outward appearance of tranquillity. Innocent XI.

¹ **Avviso* of March 22, 1687, State Archives, Vienna; BERTHIER, II., 328, 342. On Innocent XI.'s attitude towards the Spanish bull fights *cf.* BERTHIER, I., 359, 429 *seq.*

² BERTHIER, II., 327 *seq.*, 391 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, I., 334.

⁴ Thus at Trent in 1677; BERTHIER, I., 66 *seq.*; LEVINSON, *Nuntiatuiberichte*, II., 690, 693 *seq.*, 716 *seq.* On a conflict between Innocent XI. and Venice over the Greeks of that city *cf.* BERTHIER, I., 174 *seqq.*; *Rev. d'hist. et de littér. relig.*, I., 211 *seq.*

⁵ BERTHIER, II., 212.

himself, in the first years of his pontificate, seems to have interpreted the Jansenists' policy of reserve as an abandonment of their ideas, hence it may be that with a view to winning them completely over, he showed the greatest mildness and condescension towards them.¹ When Bishop Henri Arnauld of Angers, brother of the great Arnauld, publicly extolled the convent of Port-Royal and sent its Constitutions to Rome through Pontchâteau, the Pope on his part also spoke in praise of the outstanding piety and the excellent discipline of the nuns.² Antoine Arnauld himself presented to the new Pope a copy of his great work destined to refute the Calvinist errors about the Holy Eucharist and his covering letter drew a friendly reply from Cardinal Cibo.³ If in this case it took the Pope two months to reply, two much discussed prelates received a friendly message after only three weeks, and that from the Pope in person. On learning that the Pope had spoken well of him, Bishop Pavillon wrote to Innocent XI. on November 3rd, 1676, whereupon Pavillon's docile follower, Caulet of Pamiers, imitated his master in this also on December 1st. Before replying to the two Bishops Innocent consulted the Cardinals of the Inquisition as he had done before writing to Arnauld,⁴ but in the end both prelates received Briefs couched in the warmest terms.⁵

Arnauld appealed once more to the Pope at the beginning of 1680⁶ when he was compelled to leave France. His crime,

¹ M. DUBRUEL in *Rev. d'hist. de l'église de France*, IX. (1923), 465-474.

² "Minime nos latebant, quae de singulari pietate et praestanti disciplina monialium Portus Regii Ord. Cist. literis 19. iunii datis prolixè ad Nos retulit fraternitas . . . tua." Letter of August 16, 1679, BERTHIER, I., 283, n. 742.

³ Arnauld to the Pope and to Card. Cibo, October 26, 1676; Cibo to Arnauld, January 2, 1677 (ARNAULD, *Œuvres*, I., 769, 771, 772). In September 1677, Arnauld excuses Cibo for the publication of the letter (*ibid.*, II., 9-18); Cibo's reply of November 10, *ibid.*

⁴ BOJANI, I., 15.

⁵ DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 470 seq.

⁶ *Œuvres*, II., 80-7.

he wrote, like that of all the other so-called Jansenists, was none other than that of having defended the sanctity of Christian morality against the shameless indulgence of the Jesuits, as well as St. Augustine's, or rather the Church's own teaching on grace. It was not surprising that notwithstanding the Clementine Peace, the Jesuits should have won the King over to their side seeing that he was familiar with them from his youth, and whosoever does not share their views on morals or grace, is described as a Jansenist. "Thus it has come to pass that soon nothing but the shadow of religion will be left in France. He who speaks according to the Gospel is styled a Jansenist; the earnest and strict following of the teaching of Christ meets with no toleration. This is shown by the fate of the convent of Port-Royal which is no longer permitted to receive novices. Let the Pope speak the word that will restore peace by declaring that a man is not a Jansenist if he holds the five propositions."

The papal secretary Favoriti cordially acknowledged the letter,¹ but nothing was done for Port-Royal although the Abbess also appealed to the Pope.²

In the sequel Arnauld was not satisfied with Innocent XI. At the time of the Pope's death he paid homage both to his

¹ April 9, 1680, *ibid.*, 87 *seq.* It begins: "Ferreus plane sit qui tenere lacrimas possit, intuens ex una parte eximiam eloquentiam, eruditionem, pietatem tuam de catholica religione tam praeclare meritas, ex altera vero miserum, in quo versaris, fortunae statum et conflatum malevolorum calumniis tempestatem . . . , cum maxime deceret te in domestico otio honoribus opibusque florentem vitae per summam virtutem actae et diuturni gloriosi laboris fructum uberrimum capere . . . Sed haeret haec pontificio cordi infixata cura, in omnem intenta occasionem eliminandi errores, et pacis Ecclesiae reddendae. Non tamen propterea silebit interim vox supremi Pastoris, videntis lupos in ovile irruentes." On Favoriti's friendliness towards the Jansenists *cf. Rev. d'hist. et de littér., relig.*, XII. (1907), 341 *seq.*; MICHAUD, IV., 436; LE CAMUS, *Lettres*, ed. Ingold, 346.

² May 25 and December 22, 1679, also on February 25, 1680, in ARNAULD, *Œuvres*, II., 88.

good intentions¹ and to his exemplary conduct towards his family, as well as to his efforts for the war against the Turks ; but in other matters he had lacked the light. In the first years of Innocent's pontificate the Jansenists set high hopes on him. The favourable remarks concerning them in the letters just mentioned were of course made public very quickly. One sentence in Cibo's letter to Arnauld² was even interpreted as meaning that the Pope was thinking of raising him to the cardinalate.³ A contemporary publication deploras in strong terms the effect of these tokens of papal goodwill. If the real state of things were known in Rome, we read, there would be great grief there ; these letters were already published everywhere ; they won a number of fresh adherents for the condemned party, grieved the well disposed and gave the opponents a pretext for boasting. Arnauld should have been first asked to recant, whilst the seventh chapter of the first book of his defence of the Holy Eucharist tended to the destruction of the papal primacy.⁴ One of the consequences of the papal manifesto had been the publication of four or five Jansenist writings.⁵ The French nuncio, Varese, reported on his part⁶ that the papal manifestos had called forth great surprise, for Arnauld had made open

¹ September 1, 1689, *ibid.*, III., 239.

² " Paternae caritatis . . . uberes significationes praestabunt opportunitates ornandi te," *ibid.*, I., 772.

³ *Analecta iuris pontif.*, II series, Rome-Paris, 1872, 284.

⁴ *Se Roma sapesse, in che stato sono le cose, sono certo che se n'affligerebbe assai ; quelle lettere fanno credere molte cose assai lontane dal vero, oltre che vi si lodano persone che sin'ora erano state stimate sospette nella fede. Queste lettere corrono in tutte le botteghe e fanno cattivo effetto nello spirito del popolo e ne tirano molti al partito condannato con gran ramarico delli huomini da bene e gloria delli adversarii, che fanno molto bene prevalersi anche di poca cosa. Letter of August 3, 1677, *Ottob.* 2491, Vat. Lib.

⁵ Ex. gr. *Centuria colloquiorum*, *Specchio della devozione* (no doubt Gerberon's *Miroir de la piété*), *Apologia Baii*, etc.

⁶ April 2, 1677, DUBRUEL, 471.

profession of Jansenism and he was still considered a Jansenist. Cibo replied¹ that he had only paid tribute to the universally appreciated book of Arnauld and to his intellectual gifts in a letter of pure courtesy which could not be withheld after his submissive letter to the Pope. When Cibo reverted to the matter,² Varese hinted in his reply,³ that unfavourable rumours were circulating and that the King himself had complained of the papal letters. As late as 1688 Talon had the boldness to maintain in the Parliament of Paris that ever since his accession Innocent XI. had not ceased to favour the Jansenists, so that the sect extolled him to the sky.⁴ Now there is not the slightest evidence to show that the Pope ever advocated or favoured the doctrines of Jansenism and a number of books and pamphlets of the party were prohibited during his reign.⁵ On the other hand it is true that Casoni and Favoriti, whom the Pope held in high esteem, were friends of Arnauld and favoured his followers.⁶ Upon one question which the Jansenists had pushed into the foreground, an important declaration was issued under Innocent XI. Whereas Arnauld demanded dispositions for the frequent reception of the Eucharist which would debar the majority of Christians from that Sacrament, the Congregation of the Council⁷ declared that frequent and

¹ April 30, 1677, *ibid.*, 472 *seq.*

² May 5, 1677, *ibid.*, 473.

³ May 14, 1677, *ibid.*, 474.

⁴ *Analecta iuris pontif.*, *loc. cit.*, 287; refutation, *ibid.*, 319.

⁵ For instance the Jansenist New Testament in the Mons translation (REUSCH, *Index*, II., 670); a pamphlet in defence of the Jansenist penitential system (*ibid.*, 454); the *Teatro gesuitico* and *Morale pratique des Jésuites*, vol. 1 and 2 (*ibid.*, 492); *cf.* 520 *seq.*, 523 *seq.*). *Cf.* *Analecta iuris pontif.*, *loc. cit.*, 316; [D'AVRIGNY], III., 160-7.

⁶ For Favoriti see GÉRIN, *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX. (1876), 439.

⁷ February 12, 1679, *Analecta iuris pontif.*, 6 series (1863), 1507. Reports of the consultors, *ibid.*, 7 series, 791-814. *Cf.* DENZINGER, *Enchir.*, ed. I. B. UMBERG¹⁴, Friburgi Brisg., 1922, n. 1147.

even daily Communion had been at all times approved by the Church and that she had laid down no fixed days of the week or the month for this, but had left it to the judgment of the confessor.

Certain acts of Innocent XI.'s government were of a nature to encourage the opponents of probabilism. Within the very year of his accession a book of Moral Theology was published which devoted more than a hundred pages to a refutation of every aspect of probabilism. The work was prefaced by a pastoral letter of the Bishop of Grenoble commending the book and by the approbation of seven other Bishops; one of these, the Bishop of Agde, particularly praised it because it broke with probabilism, "that monstrous doctrine which calls everything in question." Innocent XI. appointed the author, the priest François Genet, Canon theologian of Avignon and later on [1685] Bishop of Vaison. In a Latin translation the book even found its way into some Italian seminaries whereas a publication which attacked it was put on the Index of forbidden books, and on this occasion Genet's teaching was eulogized by Capizucchi, the Master of the Apostolic Palace.¹ The greatest among the French Bishops of the period, Jacques Bénigne Bossuet, also spoke approvingly of Genet's Moral Theology and prescribed it for his diocese.²

Bossuet was likewise one of those who, soon after Innocent XI.'s accession, appealed to him to condemn certain exaggerated propositions of the casuists.³ Requests of this kind had been previously made to Innocent X. and Alexander VII.⁴ and it was inevitable that they should be renewed even more insistently under Innocent XI. Guy de Sève de Rochechouart, Bishop of Arras, and Percin de Montgaillard,

¹ DEGERT, *Bullet. de littér. ecclés.*, Toulouse, 1913, 416 *seqq.*; REUSCH, II., 680.

² DEGERT, 442 *seq.*

³ Bossuet to Dirois, July 18, 1682, *Correspondance*, II., 310. So also the Bishops of Grenoble, Angers, Agen, Arras, Châlons, Saint-Pons. The last named sent an apology for the so-called Jansenists. DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 470.

⁴ See Vol. XXXI., p. 259.

Bishop of St. Pons, at once sent in a long petition requesting him to condemn, in virtue of his Apostolic authority, eighty moral propositions of which they submitted the list.¹ However, their letter did not remain secret. Louis XIV. suspected that under pretext of a purer morality they intended to revive the Jansenist controversies; accordingly he ordered the agents of the French clergy to warn the Bishops not to give the letter the support of their signature. Thereupon Innocent XI. complained that obstacles were being put in the way of free intercourse between the Bishops and himself,² but when the nuncio handed the papal Brief to the King, he replied that individual Bishops would not be prevented from communicating with Rome; all he wanted was to prevent a cabal.³ Antoine Arnauld, who had a hand in the affair, and Nicole who was the author of the petition, did their best to clear themselves in the eyes of the King.⁴ Among the Bishops who gave their adhesion to the letter of their two colleagues, Nicolas Pavillon specially distinguished himself.⁵

Despite the King's annoyance the complaints of the two Bishops reached the Pope. Under some pretext or other the advocates of the strict morality sent the Oratorian Poisson to the Eternal City. As an admirer of Descartes, and through the recommendation of the Duchess of Longueville, Poisson was received by Queen Christine and through her in the highest Roman circles. However, Poisson's secretary betrayed the latter's memorials to the Jesuits, and as in all probability he was also charged with commissions from Pavillon and Caulet in the question of the *régle*, the French Oratorians saw themselves forced to recall Poisson.⁶ His place was taken in September, 1677, by the Abbé De Pontchâteau. Though

¹ *Analecta iuris pontif.*, XIII. (1874), 939.

² Brief of July 28, 1677, *ibid.*, 952 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 953.

⁴ Arnauld to Pomponne, June 14, 1677, Nicole to the Archbishop of Paris, July 6, 1679, *ibid.*, 962 *seqq.*, 964 *seqq.* Cf. **Ottob.* 2491, Vat. Lib.

⁵ DUBRUEL in *Études*, CLXXXVIII. (1926), 402.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 403 *seq.*; BATTEREL, IV., 188.

a pupil of the Jesuits, Pontchâteau had embraced the principles of the Jansenists though this did not preserve him from a free and frivolous conduct. On returning to a more serious conception of life, Pontchâteau devoted himself wholly to the service of the Jansenist party whose agent he became in Rome. Besides fighting the lax moral teaching he was commissioned to save from condemnation the catechism of Henri Arnauld as well as two of his episcopal colleagues and to secure the confirmation of the Clementine Peace and especially a settlement of the question of the *régale*.

At Rome Pontchâteau lived in complete secrecy: he occupied a small room under the name of Joseph du Mené. No one knew who he was or what he did¹; but he succeeded in gaining a great ascendancy over a man whom Innocent XI. held in great esteem, viz. Agostino Favoriti. By reason of his enormous capacity for work and his facility in drawing up in elegant Latin an immense mass of memorials and Briefs, Favoriti could be considered Innocent's right hand,² and since he favoured the Jansenists and others professing kindred sentiments, the road lay open before Pontchâteau. On September 7th, 1677, he was allowed to hand to the Pope a letter of Pavillon dated July 30th.³ In it the Bishop of Alet begins by protesting against the interference of the King who had frustrated the representations of the Bishops of Arras and St. Pons on the subject of moral teaching. After that he passes on to the question of the *régale* and finally asks for a formal decree against the casuists. However, even such a condemnation would not do much good unless the Pope destroyed at the same time the boggy which did so much damage to the Church, the boggy, that is, that there still existed such a thing as a Jansenist heresy. No such thing existed, everyone in France bowed to the papal decisions; Clement IX. had recognized that fact when he restored peace to France. However, the opponents clung to the idea

¹ DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 404-8.

² *Ibid.*, 410-14.

³ *Ibid.*, 414-17; FLEURY, LXIV., 168-173; COEL. SFONDRATI, *Gallia vindicata*, St. Gallen, 1687, *diss.*, I, § 8, *doc.* 19, 249 *seqq.*

of the existence of an alleged heresy which could only be found in their imagination. With the accusation of Jansenism they defended themselves against Bishops and theologians, defeated every effort for the restoration of ecclesiastical discipline and the Christian life, and attacked St. Augustine's and St. Thomas' teaching on grace.

Innocent replied to Pavillon in a laudatory Brief couched in general terms,¹ but for the moment nothing more happened except that Pontchâteau returned to France about mid-October, 1677, a disappointed man. His mission was, nevertheless, of decisive importance for the question of the *régale* in the first instance, which was henceforth viewed by Rome as Pavillon saw it. Moreover the envoy had succeeded in establishing contact between Rome and Port-Royal. During a second visit to Rome he was able to introduce Louis du Vaucel, who under the name of Valloni most skilfully represented the cause of the Jansenists in the Eternal City for a period of twenty years.²

Of the eighty incriminated propositions submitted by the Bishops of Arras and Saint Pons, scarcely one was condemned. Meanwhile the University of Louvain had also assumed in Rome the rôle of accuser of a relaxed moral teaching. Originally it had only decided on this step in self-defence, for already under Clement X., in 1676, the opponents of the University had dispatched to Rome the Franciscan Bruno Neusser to protest against the opinions propagated by the Louvain professors.³ Hence the University sought to forestall the blow with which it was threatened by accusing its opponents. To this end it drew up a list of over a hundred lax moral propositions and in 1677 it sent a delegation of four professors to Rome to press for their condemnation.⁴

¹ Of September 19, 1677, in DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 419; SFONDRATI, *loc. cit.*, doc. 20.

² DUBRUEL, 420.

³ [D'AVRIGNY], III., 342.

⁴ REUSCH, II., 515, 521 *seqq.* The four professors were: Francis van Vianen, Martin Steyart, the Augustinian Christian Lupus and Lambert Le Drou (*ibid.*, 521), or Le Brou (MICHAUD, IV., 177), who soon left.

At the same time the University sought to obtain the approval of its teaching on grace. However, the Pope was unwilling to revive the controversy on grace. For the rest the delegates obtained a most eulogistic Brief,¹ and on March 2nd, 1679, sixty-five of the incriminated propositions were condemned by the Inquisition.

In this instance also not all that had been prayed for was granted. For one thing it had not been possible to obtain the condemnation of one proposition which would have been a blow to probabilism as such²; furthermore the sixty-five propositions were described as "at the very least scandalous and pernicious in practice", but the severest censures were not affixed to them; nor were they rejected by a solemn judgment of the Holy See but solely by a decree of the Inquisition. In its condemnation the Congregation confined itself to stating that the propositions, as formulated, were false and reprehensible, without considering whether or no they were actually taught by any theologians in the form now condemned. They are all textually taken from the letter of accusation of the professors of Louvain.³ When a controversy arose about the authorship of particular questions, the Roman authorities sought to suppress it by prohibiting a number of dissertations dealing with the point.⁴

¹ BOJANI, II., 29-49. Cf. *Letter to the Spanish nuncio, October 13, 1680 (*Nunziat. di Spagna*, 156, f. 36, Papal Sec. Arch.): Deputies Lupus and Vianen "seguita la condanna delle 65 propositioni se ritornarono in patria, benignamente accolti e licentiati, come meritavano, da S. Stà e dalla parte migliore di questa corte".

² The proposition to be condemned was as follows: "Potes sequi opinionem practicam probabilem circa honestatem obiecti, relicta quoque probabiliore et tutiore, quamvis tua, etiam in materia iuris naturalis." HENNEBEL, *Opuscula*, Lovanii, 1703, 19.

³ [V. DE BUCK], *Vindiciae Ballerinianae*, Brugis et Bruxellis, 1873, 153 seq. Proposition 22 of the decree is abridged. Many propositions were actually taught by individual professors.

⁴ REUSCH, II., 523 seqq. Cf. [D'AVRIGNY], III., 159, 343. Many propositions had been simply taken from the *Provinciales* by the prosecution. [D'AVRIGNY], III., 153-9.

The Roman decision had a sequel in some countries. In France, where the decrees of the Holy Office were not recognized, the Parliament of Paris explicitly rejected the condemnation of the sixty-five propositions.¹ The Pope was naturally indignant at this treatment of a decision arrived at in his presence; Pomponne was obliged to draw up a special memorial to pacify him.² Nevertheless the judgment of the Inquisition was not without effect in France. The Assembly of the Clergy of 1682 drew up in logical order, though with some omissions and additions, a list of propositions condemned by Alexander VII. and Innocent XI.,³ after which it condemned these 140 propositions by its own authority. An exposition of the opposite doctrine was appended.⁴ It was chiefly Bossuet who persuaded his fellow Bishops to take this step: he desired a confirmation of the condemnation by the Pope, or at least a formal Bull against the lax moral teaching which would be received with respect, as had not been the case with the decree of the Inquisition. The condemnation was particularly meant to strike at probabilism; in Bossuet's own words, it attacked it first in its foundations, then in itself and lastly in its consequences.⁵ As the Assembly of 1682 was abruptly terminated by order of the King the plan was not carried into effect.

The Roman decision against the sixty-five propositions caused a great stir in Flanders. The Jansenists naturally sought to exploit the sentence against the Jesuits whose moral teaching, they said, had now been condemned by the highest authority; on the other hand, the opponents of the Jansenists were all the more keen on securing a condemnation of certain theses taught at the University of Louvain. On July 12th, 1679, the Irish Franciscan, Francis Porter, presented a list of these to the Pope in the name of fifty priests of the secular and regular clergy. This time the Roman authorities

¹ BOJANI, II., 56 *seqq.*

² MICHAUD, IV., 180 *seq.*

³ Printed by BOSSUET, *Œuvres*, VII., Versailles, 1815, 259-281).

⁴ *Ibid.*, 281-322. On probabilism, *ibid.*, 309-322.

⁵ To Dirois, July 18, 1682, *Correspondance*, II., 310.

were anxious, before all else, to make sure whether the theses were really taught by anyone. Four theologians were commissioned to investigate the matter, after which came the formal examination of the propositions by another eight divines.¹

Porter was not the only representative of the Flemish opponents of the Jansenists. According to a report of the nuncio of Brussels, dated June 26th, 1679, the Franciscans Observant, the Carmelites, the Jesuits and some secular priests had banded themselves together for the purpose of agitating in Rome against Louvain through the Franciscan Patrick Duffy. They requested the nuncio to have these extracts from Louvain writings authenticated, but this the nuncio refused to do.² Duffy's first duty was to find powerful supporters for those who felt like himself. Louis XIV. already was on their side. Whilst the discussions of the sixty-five lax points of moral theology were still in progress, he requested Innocent XI., in an autograph letter,³ to proceed rather against the casuists who spread Jansenist errors from Louvain. Duffy was instructed, in the first instance, to endeavour to obtain the protection of the sovereign of Flanders, the King of Spain. But a long time elapsed before he was able to set out for Spain and when he at last arrived there, the nuncio refused to give credence to his accusations.⁴ Nevertheless, as a sequel to two discussions in presence of Cardinal Portocarrero,⁵ Duffy was sent to Rome in the name of the King of Spain. It is significant that the travelling expenses were borne not by the impoverished monarch, but by the Duchess of Medinaceli.⁶

In Rome the examination of the incriminated theses only began in 1682 and dragged on for a number of years. The Jansenists were afraid that a condemnation of the Louvain

¹ [D'AVRIGNY], III., 343 *seq.*

² ASTRÁIN, VI., 214 *seq.*

³ January 3, 1679, in MICHAUD, IV., 177 *seq.*

⁴ ASTRÁIN, VI., 214 *seq.*

⁵ January 27 and March 27, 1681, *ibid.*, 215.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 217.

theses would diminish the impression created by Innocent XI.'s condemnation of the 65 moral propositions.¹ As late as 1685 they hoped that consideration for Cardinal D'Estrées would prevent a condemnation, because the authorities would wish to avoid the sensation which the overriding of his opposition could not fail to provoke. The French particularly resented the twenty-ninth out of the thirty-one incriminated theses which dealt with the authority of the Pope as against the General Councils and with papal infallibility.

The Jansenists thought that Rome would not like to have it said that the proposition had been struck out because of the Gallicans and that consequently there would be no pronouncement on all the propositions.² Soon after attention was drawn to quietism and a selection of the Louvain propositions was only condemned by Alexander VIII.³

In Spain Duffy had found counsel and assistance especially with the Jesuit Tirso Gonzalez, the future General.⁴ In acting thus Gonzalez showed himself an opponent of the Jansenists, but he had also welcomed with satisfaction the decree of the Inquisition of 1679, for he was a keen antagonist of the real and alleged extravagances of the casuists. His efforts led to further pronouncements by the Holy See in favour of the stricter Moral Theology.

Gonzalez was an able and successful missionary.⁵ In that capacity he could not help seeing the moral decadence of many parts of Spain, and he feared that the too liberal decisions of certain moralists would further contribute to it.⁶ The thought of attacking not only particular inaccurate decisions, but the system of probabilism itself, was suggested to him by his colleague, Miguel de Elizalde, who in 1670

¹ Arnauld to Du Vaucel, July 26, 1685, *Œuvres*, II., 535 *seq.*

² Du Vaucel to Arnauld from Rome, June 16, 1685, *ibid.*, 535 note.

³ [D'AVRIGNY], III., 344.

⁴ ASTRÁIN, VI., 216 *seq.*

⁵ ELIAS REYERO, *Misiones del M. R. P. Tirso González de Santalla*, Santiago, 1913; ASTRÁIN, VI., 74 *seqq.*

⁶ ASTRÁIN, VI., 172.

had published, without the approval of his superiors, a much read book against probabilism.¹ Gonzalez defended his views with Oliva, the General of the Order, but was told that in the opinion of some very learned men many assertions in the latter's work ran counter to the views and the conduct of the universal Church, and that other theses of his were calculated to drive to despair and to favour the Jansenists ; that in fact the book really opened the way to laxism inasmuch as it made every man's private opinion the supreme arbiter of conduct.²

Gonzalez nevertheless stuck to his opinion. During the hot season of 1670 and 1672, when there was a pause in the work of the missions, he began to write a book in which he advocated certain new principles as a basis for a solution of controverted cases of conscience. Even according to Gonzalez, the principle of probabilism, if defended with the moderation displayed by the classical Jesuit writers, cannot injure good morals ; but as extended by some probabilists, it was most dangerous. These very words, written by Gonzalez to the General of the Order, John Paul Oliva,³ hint at the reason why Rome looked for a remedy against too lax moral decisions elsewhere than in an alteration of the fundamental principles of moral theology. Oliva's decision was to the effect that the new views should not be expounded in public, and that the book planned by him should be sent to Rome for examination.⁴

Gonzalez imagined that he was doing a great service to his Order by setting up his new principles ; his book, he thought, would shut the mouths of the critics of Jesuit moral teaching, particularly if he were allowed to dedicate it to the General.⁵ However, as might have been foreseen, five Jesuits chosen from five different nationalities,⁶ refused the *imprimatur* to the new work on the ground that it was in

¹ *Ibid.*, 161 *seq.*

² *Ibid.*, 164.

³ October 12, 1672, *ibid.*, 174.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 176 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 174 *seq.*

⁶ June 18, 1674, *ibid.*, 177-180.

opposition to the teaching of other Orders and Universities, and because the new opinions would lead to dangerous consequences. However, Gonzalez refused to abandon his plan. He thought of appealing to the highest authority of his Order, the General Congregation, in the interest of his views.¹ These he maintained publicly when in 1676 he became a professor at Salamanca, with the result that he was strictly enjoined not to cause further confusion by propounding the new doctrine.²

In the course of a mission given by him at Seville in April, 1679, Gonzalez became acquainted with the decree of the Index condemning a number of lax propositions. This altered the whole situation in his eyes. With the encouragement, perhaps, of the Madrid nuncio, he now appealed to Innocent XI. in person.³ After years of reflection, he wrote, he had come to see clearly a principle which would render excesses impossible in the field of moral theology, that is, the principle that it was not lawful to follow an opinion favourable to liberty if one realized that the opposite opinion, the one favourable to the law, was much more probable. If the Pope would proclaim this principle, the axe would be laid to the root of abuses and the oft-repeated lament over lax moral decisions would be silenced.

In addition to the Pope, Gonzalez also wrote once more to the General,⁴ begging him to enforce the above-mentioned principle on the whole Order, or at least on the Spanish Jesuits. He obtained permission, for his own person, to teach it,⁵ seeing that the new principle was little more than a fresh presentment of probabilism. Gonzalez' further proposal, namely, that instead of the ordinary probabilism the so-called equi-probabilism should be prescribed, was rejected. On August 10th, 1680, Oliva issued a circular in which he referred to the calumny that at several academies the members of

¹ *Ibid.*, 182.

² *Ibid.*, 184-9.

³ July 29, 1679, *ibid.*, 204.

⁴ September 9, 1679, *ibid.*, 191.

⁵ December 23, 1679, *ibid.*, 192 *seq.*

the Order propounded risky opinions in their teaching of Moral Theology. In order to counter these evil reports it was necessary to abide by the decrees already published by the Order. This did not by any means imply that the stricter opinion must always be followed; what was required in their teaching was not harshness but solidity.¹

Gonzalez was more successful with the Pope. After an exchange of letters between him and Cardinal Cibo, he submitted, in 1680, a short pamphlet explaining the fundamental principle already stated. The Pope passed it on to the Inquisition, which decided² that Gonzalez be informed, through the Secretary of State and the Spanish nuncio, that he was free to combat the opinion that one may follow a less probable opinion when it was opposed by a more probable one. In the same decree the Inquisition ordained that the General of the Jesuits should grant the same permission to all his subjects and that he inform all Jesuit Universities that it was the Pope's will that all of them should be free to write as they deemed best in support of the more probable opinion and to combat the opposite, milder view. The General was to exhort all to submit wholeheartedly to the Pope's command.³

¹ "Non enim duritiam, sed soliditatem exigimus doctrinae." IOH. FRIEDRICH, *Beiträge zur Gesch. des Jesuitenordens* (Abhandl. der Münchner Akademie 1881), 85.

² Decree of June 26, 1680, ASTRÁIN, VI., 208 seq.

³ The second part of the decree exists in three different versions. The one given above is undoubtedly the authentic one, for (1) when after long oblivion the decree of 1693 reappeared, Gonzalez invariably gives it in this form; (2) when Döllinger-Reusch gave another text and Mandonnet made use of it in the *Rev. Thomiste*, 1901 seq., the Jesuit General Martin, at the request of Jos. Brucker, appealed to the Holy Office, which supplied the above text as the only genuine one (cf. *Études*, XCI. [1902], 847 seq.). The text proposed by Döllinger-Reusch (*Gesch. der Moralstreitigkeiten*, I., 127 seq.) makes the Pope prohibit the defence of the opinion of the probabilists and to attack that of the probabiliorists. This, and a third substantially different text, which enjoins silence on the Jesuits on both systems

If this permission to combat probabilism were to become generally known it was certain that the decree would provide the enemies of the Jesuits with a pretext for the worst insinuations against them. Consequently, the General expostulated with the Congregation and submitted the draft of a circular addressed to the Order which, in his opinion, was calculated to satisfy the wishes of the Congregation. From its beginning, we read, the Society of Jesus had always watched over the purity of its teaching, though this did not prevent calumnies; it may even be that, as a result of the imprudence or ignorance of a few Fathers, the Jesuits have been denounced to the supreme tribunal of the Church as expounding in many Universities a most lax moral teaching. These calumnies were refuted by the laws and the constant warnings of Superiors. But since the accusations did not cease, the General of the Order commanded the professors of Moral Theology to carry out to the letter all the prescriptions of the General Congregations and the Generals. Whosoever failed in this respect must be removed from his chair. This did not mean that it was never lawful to follow a milder opinion, but even among the opinions accepted by many there were some which did not suit Jesuits. "We dislike all exaggerated indulgence in the explanation of human and divine laws; on the other hand a just moderation cannot displease us." "What is wanted," he repeats once again—"is not hard but solid doctrine."¹

In view of this circular the Congregation did not insist on its first order; it allowed itself to be persuaded by Oliva's arguments that publication of the decree was inadvisable, for otherwise it would undoubtedly have taken steps for its

(*cf.* BRUCKER, *loc. cit.*, 844), are perhaps mere drafts but were once more taken out of the registers of the Holy Office in the 18th century. (J. BRUCKER in *Études*, LXXXVI. [1901], 778-800; XCI. [1902], 831-846.) *Cf.* FRANZ TERHAAR, *Das Dekret des Papstes Innocenz XI. über den Probabilismus*, Paderborn, 1904; A. LEHMKUHL, *Probabilismus vindicatus*, Friburgi Brisg., 1906.

¹ ASTRÁIN, VI., 212-14.

execution. The decree of 1680 fell into complete oblivion ; when it was rediscovered in 1693 it was something quite new even for the members of the Congregation.¹ It was not even communicated to Gonzalez though he was the subject of at least the first part of the ordinance. Cardinal Cibo and the Madrid nuncio Mellini merely wrote to him that the Pope approved his zeal and piety and urged him to complete his book quickly and to forward it to Rome. The decree of 1680 is not even alluded to in all these letters.² After the Pope had repeated his wish, Gonzalez was able to forward his work to Rome at the end of June.³

Under the generalship of Oliva no Jesuit made any further attack upon probabilism, a fact of which Gonzalez repeatedly complained in his letters to the Pope. He did not object to other Jesuits defending the milder opinion, he wrote, but the opposite party should also be allowed a free hand, and he prayed the Pope to intervene with the General in this sense.⁴ When Oliva died he laid the same ideas before his successor Noyelle. He explained that the Order had sunk very low in Innocent XI.'s esteem by reason of its moral teaching. The honour of the Society demanded that some Jesuit, with the approval of his colleagues, should make a stand against this system so that the whole world should see that the Order as such was not sworn to it. Hence he desired to write on the subject himself and to dedicate the work to the General ; but if he was to produce something really worth while it was necessary that he should make the question the subject of all his lectures for a whole year : he accordingly begged leave to do this.

These representations achieved very little at first. Noyelle withheld the permission asked for and Gonzalez was only

¹ *Ibid.*, 214. Cf. extracts from Roman letters written by people who desired a condemnation of probabilism, in BRUCKER, *loc. cit.*, XCI., 842 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, LXXXVI., 788 *seq.*

³ ASTRÁIN, VI., 218 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 219 *seq.*

allowed to publish the concluding volume of a theological work of his because it did not mention probabilism.¹ Nor did Innocent XI. fall in with the proposals so often made to him. A book by Gonzalez on the Immaculate Conception was printed at the Pope's expense ; his work on the moral system was examined and approved but permission to print it was not granted.² Yet the much tried man saw his wishes fulfilled in unexpected fashion. Noyelle died at the end of 1686 and in the following year the General Congregation met for the purpose of giving him a successor. At the papal audience of the assembled electors, Innocent XI. spoke in such a way that everyone could see he wanted Tirso Gonzalez to be the new General. Though the latter had never held office as Superior, the Congregation complied with the Pontiff's wishes. When the newly elected General presented himself before Innocent XI., the Pope told him that his election was due to a particular disposition of divine Providence lest the milder opinion in Moral Theology should become the official teaching of the Society. He told Gonzalez to send to Rome some able exponent of the severer opinion and to leave all Jesuits free to expound the stricter doctrine. When it came to giving effect to this wish, difficulties arose at once, hence by order of the Pope, Cardinal Cibo sent for the new General and several members of the General Congregation and expressed the wish that the Pope's request should be made known by means of a special decree.³ The General Congregation accordingly declared that the Order had never prohibited and did not forbid now, the upholding of the more rigid opinion by those who deemed it the truer one.⁴

Gonzalez was dissatisfied with the decree but the further steps taken by him in favour of the stricter opinion came after the death of Innocent XI.

¹ *Ibid.*, 195-200.

² *Ibid.*, 219-225.

³ *Ibid.*, 229 *seqq.*

⁴ *Decretum* 18: *Institutum Soc. Iesu*, II., Florentiae, 1893,

(3.)

Whereas Jansenism was born of the disputes between scholars and its new views on asceticism and Christian perfection were based on erudition, a movement arose in Italy which from the first claimed to be nothing but asceticism, though it quickly led to capital consequences for the moral life and even threatened it in its very foundations.

Originally this new movement, namely quietism, appeared to be no more than a very harmless direction towards a life of prayer for devout, unworldly persons. As a means towards a deeper penetration into Christian spirituality and as exciting the will to comply with its demands, the Jesuit school in particular advocated a reasoned meditation of the truths of the faith. The new orientation sought to reach the same goal by a simpler and easier road. Not meditation, which at best was only of use to beginners, but contemplation was its watchword, contemplation, that is, not in the sense in which it is described by Teresa of Jesus or John of the Cross, in which it is unattainable by human effort, but such contemplation as may be acquired by our own efforts. In prayer, so it was claimed, everything depends on the inspiration of grace; hence at the very beginning of prayer we should abandon ourselves completely and with lively faith to the goodwill and pleasure of God, and allow Him to work in our soul. If He speaks to our spirit we must hearken to His words; if He remains silent, we must not attempt to make up for His silence by our own efforts. All distractions in prayer are compensated for by the merit of a simple surrender to God.

Since about the middle of the seventeenth century numerous publications had appeared, all claiming to teach a new and easy approach to prayer, and these books saw many editions. Their authors were invariably men with whose personal life no fault could be found. The Mercedarian Juan Falconi, who died at Madrid in 1638, was so zealous a priest that there was question of his beatification. The layman François Malaval of Marseilles, who had acquired vast learning despite

his blindness, was held in high esteem. So was the Oratorian Pier Matteo Petrucci. The danger of the writings of these men lay chiefly in the fact that they denied to the powers of the soul their proper activity in prayer. For the rest much of what they advocated was capable of a favourable explanation, though it was always liable to be misunderstood or misused. The consequence of the new principles, namely that all the emotions and tendencies of the interior life, as well as all external actions, were indifferent, was quickly arrived at, and thus the door was opened to the worst forms of immorality.

Meanwhile certain associations had been formed with a view to putting the new ascetic teaching into practice. It was soon seen that the thing was not so harmless as it looked. In 1567, in Upper Italy, by order of the Roman Inquisition, certain Oratories of St. Pelagia were suppressed. In these laymen acted as preachers and taught that interior prayer was the key to salvation and that it took the place of the Sacraments and works of penance. In 1671 and 1675 the Bishops saw themselves compelled to take action against quietistic associations on the estates of Count Scarampi in the dioceses of Albi and Savona. 1675 saw the conclusion of proceedings against the priest Lombardi in the Marches, who had died in the meantime. Lombardi had taught that external works of penance and vocal prayer were useless and that blind obedience to one's spiritual guide was the supreme law. Worse things were brought to light in the course of proceedings against Sor Giulia of Naples in 1611; against the priests Ricasoli and Fantoni at Florence in 1641 and the adventurer Francesco Borri at Rome in 1661. In their case dreams of the millennium and alchemistic superstitions were allied to gross moral aberrations.¹

Although the Inquisition repeatedly took action against the worst of these excrescences, quietism as such was not

¹ Cf. P. GUERRINI, *I Pelagiani di Lombardia* in *La Scuola Catt.*, 1922, 267-286, 359-381; A. BATTISTELLI, *Arch. stor. Lomb.*, 1925, 363-8; DUDON, *Molinos*, 45-8. On Fr. Borri, cf. Vol. XXXI., p. 127, n. 3.

condemned for the time being. On the contrary, on April 29th, 1676 the Bishop of Savona was told that the Inquisition did not condemn the prayer of quiet but only the claims of those who attached no value to vocal prayer and other religious practices of the Roman Church, or who guaranteed eternal salvation to those who practised the new kind of prayer.¹ As a matter of fact, quietism was destined to be in high honour, at least for a short time, even at the very seat of the papacy, when the able Michael Molinos made it his task to spread quietistic ideas there.

Molinos was a Spaniard, a native of the small town of Muniesa, south of Saragossa. According to the parochial registers still in existence he was baptized on June 29th, 1628. At the age of eighteen he became a cleric at Valencia.² The ideas advocated by him are likewise of Spanish origin. Among his authorities we meet with the names of Falconi and the peculiar Mexican ascetic Gregorio Lopez. Whilst still in his native town Molinos seems to have derived from the meetings of a secret association of priests the principles which inspired his future teaching.³ The idea of doing something big came to the young and gifted Doctor of theology when he was commissioned, on October 3rd, 1663, to promote in Rome the beatification of the priest Simon of Valencia.⁴ His efforts in that direction were unsuccessful; but when he found himself released from this charge in 1675, he was unwilling to exchange the metropolis on the Tiber for the narrow conditions at home, all the more so as he had meanwhile made a great name for himself as a guide of souls. Not alone nuns, but priests, religious and prelates sought his advice. He had his admirers in the highest circles, including the Princesses Ludovisi and Borghese, Queen Christine of

¹ DUDON, 47.

² *Id.*, 3 *seqq.* Dudon's monograph, well substantiated and based on documentary researches, has caused all other works on Molinos to become antiquated.

³ MENÉNDEZ Y PELAYO, *Heterodoxos españoles*, II., 559; DUDON, 13 *seqq.*, 17.

⁴ DUDON, 9 *seqq.*

Sweden, Cardinals Azzolini, Ricci and Cibo, and lastly the Pope's influential counsellors, Favoriti and Casoni.¹ When in 1675 the new spiritual master embodied his thoughts in a book, its front page displayed the approval of its teaching by the most renowned theologians, among whom appeared the name of the Jesuit Martin de Esparza. Permission to print was given by the Dominican and future Cardinal, Capizucchi. The book is entitled *Spiritual Guide*. It had three editions in the Spanish text and seven in its Italian translation. Later there followed Latin, French, Dutch and German editions. A new edition in 1681 had a preface by the Archbishop of Palermo, Jaime Palafox y Cardona, in which the highest praise was bestowed both on the author and his work.²

Of far greater consequence than all literary triumphs was the fact that one of Molinos' supporters was Cardinal Odescalchi, in whose favour he long remained, even after the Cardinal had become Pope Innocent XI.³ Pier Matteo Petrucci who, however, was not a disciple of Molinos, as his writings give proof of independence of him, though he must be considered as belonging to his school, also enjoyed the favour of Innocent XI. by reason of his piety and liberality. In 1681, the Pope raised him to the see of Iesi and five years later to the cardinalate.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, 147 *seqq.*; *cf.* 108.

² *Cf.* for the *Gula espiritual* HILGERS in *Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen*, 1908, 583 *seqq.*; DUDON, in *Recherches de science relig.*, July, 1911, and *Molinos*, 34 *ss.*, 100.

³ On September 12, 1682, Innocent XI. expressed his thanks for a letter of August 8, in which the Archbishop of Palermo recommended Molinos' person and book; the Pope observes that in the hands of inexperienced persons the book might do harm—it would be necessary to have it examined first. BERTHIER, II., 52.

⁴ *Cf.* above, p. 419. For Petrucci's life, see the following work by C. MARIOTTI, based on a MS. panegyric: *Il cardinal Pier Matteo Petrucci ed un saggio delle sue lettere e poesie spirituali*, Iesi, 1908, and DUDON, in *Recherches de science relig.*, 1914, *Mai-Juin, Juillet-October*.

It is said that Innocent XI. subsequently confessed that he was mistaken about Molinos.¹ That, as a matter of fact, the new teaching was anything but harmless, notwithstanding so much praise and approval, only came to light when the Roman Inquisition examined the close on 20,000 letters which Molinos had written as a spiritual director. Though on the whole the Spaniard's cautiously worded book was patient of a Catholic interpretation, the letters showed that on the traditional moral teaching he held utterly subversive notions. Until then it had been deemed a doctrine of the Gospel that all striving after the perfection of the Christian life depended on a constant struggle against the evil inclinations of the heart. Instead of this, Molinos taught that all personal effort was evil, because God wished to work in us without our co-operation ; all that man had to do was to leave to God all further action within the soul, whose powers must be suppressed—this, in fact, constituted the spiritual life ; all else was indifferent and purely external, such as the external works of penance and the veneration of the Saints ; even the Sacred Humanity of Christ was a material object so that love for it was not purely spiritual love. When interior temptations arise, such as impure or blasphemous thoughts, they should not disturb us, and we must neither consent to them nor resist them. It may even happen that the devil forcibly lays hold on man, compelling him to do things bearing all the outward marks of sin, but owing to the absence of consent they are not sins, as Job, for instance, uttered words of blasphemy without sinning ; these violences on the part of the devil are the most effective means of annihilating the soul and of leading it to union with God.

For a time the letters advocating these doctrines did not reach the general public which, for the time being, only knew Molinos' book. This was described as unassailable even by one of his opponents, the Oratorian Marchese. On the other hand, many priests came to see the harm done by the principles of the quietists, apart from the letters, in the course of their

¹ " Veramente siamo ingannati." DUDON, *Molinos*, 173.

ministry, for instance, as confessors in convents of nuns. They found that on entering the church, the nuns did not sprinkle themselves with Holy Water, closed their eyes at the elevation of the Host and the Chalice, and made no outward sign of reverence because they deemed a glance at the Host a sin. These nuns, the Jesuit Bartoli reported, recite no vocal prayers, scorn indulgences, deem themselves sinless, offer no resistance to temptations, communicate without confession, even when they have reason to fear that they have committed some grievous sin, and ascribe their immoral actions to the devil.¹ The Archbishop of Naples, Iñigo Caracciolo, further reports that these nuns no longer say the Rosary nor make the sign of the cross ; anything that crossed their minds they look upon as inspirations from on high which they do not hesitate to carry into effect.²

In view of Molinos' prestige it needed courage to oppose him, yet opposition could not long be delayed. It is not surprising that the Jesuits were the first to move, seeing that their ascetical teaching is the very antithesis of the new views, and one of the natural consequences of Molinos' rise was that many nuns would no longer hear of the simple guidance of the Jesuits.³

Molinos deemed it prudent to forestall the attacks which he knew to be preparing. In 1676, either personally, or through a friend, he printed a few letters in which he, the protagonist of contemplation, advocated ordinary meditation with a fervour which even a Jesuit could not have surpassed.⁴ However, he failed to avert the storm. Gottardo Bellhuomo, a former professor of philosophy and theology, novice master and provincial of the Province of Venice, also published a treatise on ordinary and mystical prayer, in which Malaval and Molinos were combated, though their names were not mentioned.⁵

¹ See BARTOLI, *Opere*, XXV., Torino, 1838, 26.

² DUDON, *Molinos*, 150.

³ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 63 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 65-7.

Thereupon Molinos took up his pen once more, though in the end he judged it best not to print his defence ¹ but to explain his standpoint to the Jesuit General Oliva by letter. Oliva answered courteously, but Molinos' explanations do not seem to have satisfied him.² When the most distinguished Italian Jesuit of the period, the famous mission preacher, Paul Segneri, announced his intention to write against quietism, he received every encouragement from his General.³

Segneri's book appeared in 1680,⁴ but it seemed fated to be the very means of procuring for quietism something like a triumph. It was a bad omen for Segneri that a refutation by Petrucci, dedicated to the Secretary of State, Cardinal Cibo, was allowed to appear, and that its author was soon after, viz. in February, 1681, raised to the See of Iesi. Before 1680 was out it became known that Segneri's book had been denounced to the Holy Office and notwithstanding all the apologies from the pen of a number of Jesuits and the intervention of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, the writings of Segneri and Bellhuomo were put on the Index of forbidden books in 1681.⁵ A refutation by Alessandro Regio,⁶ a member of the Order of the Regular Clerics Minor, shared the same fate in the following year.

However, the opponents of Molinos did not consider themselves beaten. The French Jesuit Honoré Fabri wrote at that time in Rome itself that quietism would never receive papal approbation, not even if Innocent XI. were personally favourable to it, an assertion which he would be most careful

¹ In *Vat. 8604, Vat. Lib. ; DUDON, 67 seqq.

² Cf. MARTIN ROBLES, *Del Epistolario de Molinos*, in *Escuela Española de arqueología e historia en Roma*, I. (1912), and the remarks of DUDON, 93 seqq.

³ DUDON, 102.

⁴ P. SEGNERI, *Concordia tra la fatica e la quiete nell'oratione*, Firenze, 1680.

⁵ TACCHI VENTURI, in *Arch. stor. ital.*, 5 series, XXXI. (1903), 127 seqq. ; HILGERS, *Index*, 551-563.

⁶ DUDON, 141 seqq.

not to make. Molinos had everything to fear : they must wait for the final issue.¹

For a time it looked as if the representations of the Oratorian Marchese to Cardinal Casanata were about to result in some steps being taken against quietism. At his instigation an inquiry was made from the confessors of Rome concerning the effect of the new method of prayer. The result of the inquiry led Marchese to draw up a memorial. Not one of the confessors consulted was a Jesuit. Marchese's memorial concludes with the signatures of some very distinguished Roman priests, none of whom were members of the Society of Jesus.² Hence the Jesuits were not alone in their opposition to quietism. In July 1682, the Inquisitor General of Brescia, the Dominican Cembali, prohibited quietistic gatherings, and the Inquisition was considering a circular addressed to all the Bishops of Italy against the new mystics.³ However, even though the Pope's confessor, Marracci, was a decided opponent of Molinos, and though the aged Cardinal Albizzi wrote a memorial against him,⁴ those circles in Rome from which a decision had to come, seemed to continue in their favourable attitude towards Molinos. But fate overtook him all at once and quite unexpectedly. In his letters Molinos had asserted that the devil at times violently got hold of man and forced him to do what had all the outward appearances of sin. The perilousness of his teaching was about to be demonstrated in his own person. The Inquisition had more than once received information that since 1675 the great mystic had not infrequently fallen into the grossest immorality. On July 18th, 1685, the police of the Inquisition presented themselves unexpectedly at Molinos' lodgings near S. Lorenzo in Panisperna, from whence they took him in broad daylight through the streets of the city to prison.⁵ From Cardinal D'Estrées' reports, it appears that

¹ *Ibid.*, 147.

² DUDON, 156 *seqq.*, who found the *memorial in *Cod. P.*, 177, of the Bibl. Vallicelliana.

³ *Ibid.*, 161 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 151, 154.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 168 *seq.*

for about four or five months Molinos had been the object of denunciations of such gravity that the Cardinals and Consultants of the Inquisition had unanimously decided to have him arrested. The Pope, who was most powerfully influenced by his confidants Favoriti and Casoni, both adherents of Molinos, would not at first hear of his arrest, but ended by giving his consent.¹

The unexpected visit of the police threw Molinos completely out of his serene contemplation. At first he tried to resist, his disconcertment betraying itself by excited talk whilst he was being taken through the streets. He called God to witness that he was innocent, threatened the police with the punishment of heaven, and remarked to one of the escort that he should deem it a privilege to be so close to Doctor Molinos—many of the most distinguished people in Rome would consider it an honour to have conversation with the man who was now being conducted to prison.²

As a matter of fact, the reputation of Molinos was by no means destroyed by his arrest. His servants kissed his feet as he entered the carriage of the Inquisition; he would soon be miraculously set free, they said, after which he would once more be revered as a saint. Even the learned Maurists then in Rome were very slow in realizing the true state of affairs. Queen Christine asked for news of the prisoner almost every day.³

¹ *Ibid.*, 171.

² *Ibid.*, 169.

³ *Ibid.*, 170 *seqq.*; GRAUERT, *Christine*, II., 336. Card. Pio *reports on July 21, 1685, the arrest of Molinos and his "seguaci: Il numero degl'ingannati si stima grande. Godeva questo il carattere di teologo della regina di Svezia. Sentita da S. Mtà la sua incarcerazione, disse con faccia allegra che, se era innocente, uscirebbe giustificato, se reo punito, come merita" On July 28, 1685, the Cardinal writes that in spite of the very secret procedure of the Index, there was a good deal of leakage: "Da questi si è inteso, che sia un cumulo di heresie unite. . . . Conviene implorare la mano onnipotente per sradicare questa peste, che haveva gettato profonde radici" (State Archives, Vienna). Queen Christine was also in relation with Malaval (see above,

Even at the Inquisition, Molinos did not at first lack protectors. Cardinal Azzolini would not admit at once that he had been mistaken in Molinos. The French ambassador clearly perceived, when on September 2nd, 1686, Petrucci, who shared the opinions of Molinos, was raised to the cardinalate, that even the Pope was not convinced for a time that quietism must be rejected.¹ In point of fact it was only after prolonged hesitation that Innocent XI. decided at last to take action against a man who had so long stood in the highest esteem with him. But when he had at last made up his mind in the matter, it was evident that a process against Molinos would have to be followed by another against Petrucci.² The prospect of a judicial examination of a Roman Cardinal was bound to prevent a speedy condemnation of Molinos quite as much as the chronic illness of the Pope, which for a long time made it impossible for him to assist at the cardinalitial congregations. Moreover disputes with Louis XIV. distracted Innocent XI.'s attention from everything else and it took time to collect and examine Molinos' 20,000 letters, to establish the meaning of equivocal statements by wearisome interrogatories and to question his accomplices.

D'Estrées, from whose letters it is possible to form some idea of the course of the process, nevertheless wrote as early as August 1685, that the issue of the affair would not be favourable to the accused.³ As a matter of fact things grew steadily p. 442). In the Azzolini Archives at Empoli Vecchio there is a *letter of Malaval to the Queen, dated Marseilles, August 17, 1682, in which he prays for her intercession with the Inquisition. *Letters of Christine to Malaval in the Library of Montpellier. For Malaval, cf. *Mém. de l'Acad. de Marseille*, 1868-9.

¹ See Card. D'Estrées' reports of September 3 and 10, 1686, in DUDON, 176 seq. Innocent XI.'s attitude towards Molinos has nothing to do with papal infallibility as Louis XIV. pretended; see *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VII., 2011.

² An *Avviso Marescotti* reports already on July 28, 1685: "Dicesi che Mons. Petrucci vescovo di Jesi, quale stampò qualche libro, possa venir chiamato a Roma e così anco alcuni altri di tal professione." Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

³ DUDON, 174 seqq.

worse for him. On November 24th, 1685, the Inquisition prohibited all the Spanish editions of his chief work in his native country.¹ Proceedings in Rome also made progress. Seventy witnesses were heard; 263 false propositions were textually extracted from Molinos' letters and acknowledged by him as his in their objectionable sense. The depositions of the women whom he had directed gave an idea of the aberrations to which the quietistic teaching had led.² Persons involved in the affair were being continually arrested in Rome.³ A circular of the Inquisition to the Bishops, dated February 15th, 1685, forbade all quietistic gatherings because of the open heresies and the shameful abominations which had resulted from them.⁴ The minutes of processes sent in by the Bishops proved still more clearly the danger of the whole movement.⁵ Molinos sought to defend himself at first; eventually he gave it up and confessed his guilt.⁶

The final sentence was arrived at by the Cardinals of the Inquisition in six congregations held between July 3rd and August 7th, 1687. After an absence of over a year, the Pope had once more attended the sittings in person.⁷ The 263

¹ *Ibid.*, 175 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 200 *seqq.*

³ See Card. Pio's *report of February 8, 1687, State Archives, Vienna, and the **Avviso Marescotti* of February 15, 1687 (arrest of the Servite Molinelli and others), *loc. cit.*

⁴ Text of the circular in DUDON, 273 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 181, 186 *seq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 202, 204.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 203 *seqq.*, after the *reports of Card. D'Estrées. An **Avviso Marescotti* of June 5, 1687 (*loc. cit.*) already speaks of the Pope's intervention: "Essendosi tenute in questa settimana diverse congregazioni sopra la causa de' Quietisti, il Papa istesso intervenne in quella di giovedì mattina, che durò più di quattro hore, dal che si ricava una moral certezza di doversi spedire in breve questo gran negotio." *Ibid.*, **Avviso Marescotti*: "Giovedì mattina intervenne S. S. per la terza volta alla congregazione del S. Officio tenuta espressamente per la causa de' Quietisti. Il P. Varese riformato di san Francesco vi fece la sua relatione, come havevano fatto nelle due antecedenti il consultore de'

erroneous propositions of Molinos had been reduced to sixty-eight; these were condemned as heretical, erroneous, blasphemous, dangerous, and, in practice, incompatible with Christian morality.

On September 3rd, 1687, the abjuration and condemnation of Molinos took place in the church of the Minerva, amid an enormous concourse of people, and in presence of almost the whole College of Cardinals.¹ At sight of the carriage which took him to the Minerva, cries were heard: "To the stake with him!" The reading of the sentence was several times interrupted by similar expressions of horror, and when he was taken back to prison the embittered populace showed unmistakable signs of its readiness to throw Molinos into the Tiber.²

The sentence was one of imprisonment for life.³ After the prison doors had closed upon Molinos on the evening of September 3rd, nothing more was heard of the once famous personage except his death, which occurred towards the end of 1696.⁴

Minimi conventuali et il P. Peres Carmelitano. Giovedì prossimo si compirà quest'opera con la relatione del Domenicano, doppo di che si spera sia pervenutosi all'ultimazione." In a *letter of August 30, 1687, Card. Pio informs Baron Stratmann of the satisfaction of the Cardinals of the Inquisition that the Pope had approved their decision concerning quietism. State Archives, Vienna.

¹ See the *Relatione* of Bibl. Corsini in LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 407 *seqq.*; **Avviso Marescotti* of September 6, 1687, *loc. cit.*; **Avviso* of September 6, 1687, in State Archives, Vienna. Other accounts in DUDON, 204 *seqq.*

² See D'Estrées' letter in DUDON, 207. The above quoted **Avviso* in the Vienna State Archives relates: "Ma quello ch' irritava maggiormente gli astanti, era il vederlo così franco e petulante che non diede mai alcun segno di rossore e confusione." Only when the cry rose once more: "fuoco! fuoco!" did he plead for pity and pardon. The **Avviso Marescotti* likewise says: "Molinos senza punto smarrirsi stette intrepido nel palco con faccia tosta, come se per un'altro si fosse fatta tal funtione."

³ Text of the sentence in *Anal. iuris pontif.*, VI. (1863), 1634 *seqq.*

⁴ DUDON, 249.

On September 4th, 1687, a few more of the followers of Molinos were made to recant and to receive sentence for their errors.¹ During the next two years we hear of more than one arrest on account of quietism; this fate befell even one of Cardinal Azzolini's theologians.² Archbishop Palafox, who in 1685 was translated from Palermo to Sevilla, was now cured of his enthusiasm for Molinos. In a pastoral letter he openly described him as a hypocrite who had succeeded in disguising his errors and abominations with diabolical skill.³ Innocent XI. also had long ago recovered from his predilection for the Spanish mystic. People in Rome deplored that in this as in other matters he should have allowed himself to be misled by false counsellors.⁴ A papal Bull of November 20th, 1687, formally condemned the sixty-eight propositions stigmatized by the Inquisition on August 28th.⁵ Segneri was permitted to bring out a new edition of his previously prohibited book against quietism, subject to some minor alterations.⁶

One exceedingly painful consequence for the Pope of the condemnation of the Spaniard was the fact that proceedings against a Cardinal of the Roman Curia, that is, against Petrucci, were now unavoidable.

¹ LAEMMER, *Melet.*, 410 *seqq.* (Brothers Leoni), 412 *seqq.* (sentence on Molinos' secretary, Peña).

² DUDON, 232; **Avviso Marescotti* of September 27, 1687 (*loc. cit.*): "In questa settimana molte donne, che stavano nelle carceri del S. Officio a causa dell'oratione di quiete, hanno fatta abiura privata, e poi sono state licentiate, e tra queste vi era la principale, la quale veramente ha dato segno fra l'altre del vero pentimento. Vien detto che habbia domandato d'essere penitentiata per li suoi gravi mancamenti, desiderando la carcere perpetua."

³ DUDON, 234.

⁴ **Avviso* of March 22, 1687 (State Archives, Vienna), which describes the "barboni" ("come quà hoggi si chiamano quelli, i quali con una falsa et affettata santità compariscono in vestimentis ovium") as those who deceived the Pope. Cf. also **Avviso Marescotti* of September 6, 1687, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Bull.*, XIX., 774 *seq.*

⁶ HILGERS, *Index*, 562.

Pier Matteo Petrucci was born at Iesi in 1636. In 1661 he entered the Oratory of St. Philip Neri and in the same year he was ordained priest. His pastoral zeal had earned him the highest esteem both of the faithful and of the Bishops of his native city. One of the latter, Alderano Cibo, was now Innocent XI.'s Secretary of State. As early as 1673, that is, before Molinos had published his chief work, Petrucci brought out his first ascetical treatise. Some subsequent publications were likewise written in 1673. The quietistic ideas of these writings were based on a work by the discalced Carmelite Joseph of Jesus and Mary.¹ When Segneri set out to attack Molinos, Petrucci openly took the Spaniard's part. The dispute in which he thus became involved did not come to an end even when, not long after, [1681], he was raised to the See of Iesi.² However, to all appearances his triumph was complete when on September 2nd, 1686, Innocent XI. raised him to the cardinalate in recognition of Petrucci's splendid works as a Bishop. "Where are now," Petrucci wrote on April 2nd, 1687, "the recantations and imprisonments of my servants and a score of other inventions which have been spread against me with so much 'honesty' ? I recant ? I should first have to be convicted of error."³ Thus did Petrucci express his assurance after his solemn entry as a Cardinal and an audience with the Pope which lasted five hours. But he overlooked the fact that he had had to let months go by before he could show himself in Rome as a Cardinal.⁴ Not long after that the proceedings against the quietists outside Rome brought to light the fatal fact that not a few of the suspects had had dealings with Petrucci, or had declared themselves his disciples. Among Molinos' letters there were some from Petrucci in which he consulted the leader of the quietists on the diabolical

¹ DUDON, 59 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 104 *seqq.*, 209 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁴ When he showed himself in the church of S. Maria del Popolo it was felt that he would be better advised if he withdrew from the fury of the people. **Avviso Marescotti* of September 13, 1687, *loc. cit.*

violences, though he did not share the gross errors of Molinos on this point. As early as January 20th, 1683, the Holy Office had forbidden Petrucci to have anything to do with a certain religious Congregation tainted with quietism.¹ On May 7th, 1687, the Inquisition decided to examine the Cardinal's writings ; thus his process was formally opened.² By June 19th the examination had so far progressed that the Cardinals judged it expedient to prohibit them ; forty-five propositions had been extracted from them, of which a number were described as heretical, or savouring of heresy.³

Thus the necessity of a papal decision became increasingly imperative, but Innocent XI. left nothing undone to save Petrucci. He entrusted the affairs to a congregation of four Cardinals, one of whom was Azzolini, the patron of the quietists.⁴ The four Cardinals were in favour of the condemnation of Petrucci's writings : their decision was that the latter should voluntarily present himself before Cibo, confess his errors and receive absolution. Cibo hesitated to carry out this commission, but the Cardinals refused to agree to his proposal that Petrucci should make his confession to the Pope himself and be absolved by him. On the other hand, Innocent XI. declared his willingness to meet Petrucci's wish to submit to him some other publications which maintained every one of the propositions taught by him and condemned by the Cardinals.⁵ It was unfortunate for the Cardinal that at this very moment certain ill reports concerning some of his penitents came from Iesi. The Pope ordered a secret inquiry which established the fact that at the very least the Cardinal had been wanting in discretion and firmness on questions of principle. By the end of September 1687, his condemnation could no longer be avoided. The Pope's one thought was that everything should be carried out with the utmost mildness, but his wish that the Cardinal's writings should be condemned

¹ DUDON, 214.

² *Ibid.*, 215.

³ *Ibid.*, 216.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 220.

without mention of their author's name, or of the titles of the books, met with no response except on the part of Azzolini. The special commission which Innocent XI. thereupon set up for the purpose of examining the Cardinals' objections, decided in the same sense. With a view to bringing the affair to a head, the Pope added two more Cardinals to those who were already engaged on the inquiry. The text of a recantation was then drawn up in all its details. Petrucci read it on December 17th in Cibo's room.¹

On his return to his episcopal city of Iesi he met with a splendid reception, with triumphal arches and inscriptions. But this did not prevent the publication, on February 5th, 1688, of the decree of the Index prohibiting his writings. Shortly before his death, Innocent XI. published a Brief² stating the fact of Petrucci's spontaneous appearance before him, his recantation, and the list of his errors as contained in fifty-four propositions. The purpose of the concluding dispositions of the Brief was to secure Petrucci for the time to come against further molestation.³

¹ *Ibid.*, 221-3. Text of recantation in HILGERS, *Index*, 564 *seqq.* The often well-informed author of **Scrittura politica sopra il conclave da farsi per la morte d'Innocenzo XI.* relates: "Petrucci fu assoluto dal Papa presenti li due cardinali Cybo et Ottoboni. La s. congregazione del S. Offitio ne restò disgustata, perchè contro la propria volontà et autorità, anzi senza esempio seguì tale assoluzione segretamente, quando voleva seguisse publica." Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

² May 26, 1689, first published by HILGERS, *loc. cit.*

³ Innocent XI.'s successor, Alexander VIII., who, as a Cardinal, had taken part in the inquiry against Petrucci, was less tolerant towards him; he forbade him to return to his episcopal city, but Innocent XII. allowed him to do so in 1694. However, Petrucci himself felt that Iesi was no place for him any longer. He returned to Rome already on January 1, 1695, where he deserved well by his work for the cardinalitial Congregations and his charitable undertakings. He died whilst on a pilgrimage to Montefalco, July 5, 1701, at the convent of the Poor Clares. Cf. DUDON, 257 *seqq.* In the **Scrittura politica* of 1886, we read that even then Petrucci had to endure attacks on his orthodoxy. The writer, however,

(4.)

The work of the missions developed under Innocent XI. along the lines opened by his predecessors. What Rome aimed at was a uniform direction of missionary activity as such by Propaganda, and of particular missions by Vicars Apostolic. Like Clement IX., the immediate predecessor of Innocent XI., Clement X., had shown great zeal in completing the new order of things by particular dispositions,¹ as when, for instance, he secured independence from Goa for the Vicars Apostolic. Innocent XI. continued in this path. Pallu, Propaganda's confidential agent in the Far East,² as a result of his complaints, obtained the drawing up of a Bull requiring all missionaries in the Far East to take an oath of obedience to the Vicars Apostolic. The Bull was never published but the heads of Orders were instructed by other means to require the aforesaid oath from their subjects in virtue of the vow of

says: " *Nondimeno io lo stimo un sant'huomo per se stesso che siasi ingannato per mancanza di intelletto e che non habbi ingannati altri per sua malitia." Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

¹ The decrees are only in part in *Ius pontif.*, I., 414, 417, 419-421, 423, 443, 448, 450, 451. Between October 23, 1673, and January 8, 1674, 16 Briefs went to China (MEJER, I., 359). A decree of April 6, 1673 (*ibid.*, 417) forbids writings on the missions without the permission of Propaganda, to be printed at the same time. The circumstance that this condition could not be complied with in Gallican France, explains that after 1673 no more missionary publications appeared there (BRUCKER, in *Etudes*, LXVIII. [1896], 335). For the pamphlets during the dispute, see SCHMIDLIN, in *Zeitschr. für Missionswiss.*, XI. (1921), 74. The formula used by the Jesuits in Siam when they took the oath of obedience to the Vicar Apostolic, Louis Laneau, on October 10, 1681, is in *Analectes pour servir à l'hist. ecclés. de la Belgique*, 3 series, VI. (1910), 45. As early as January 16, 1674, the Procurator General of the Jesuits had published an official declaration in the name of the General to the effect that the Order submitted unreservedly to the papal decrees on the powers of the Vicars Apostolic; see *Anal. iuris pontif.*, XXVIII. (1888-9), 143; JANN, 242 *seq.*

² Cf. Vol. XXX., p. 193; XXXI., p. 150 *seq.*

obedience. This was a far-reaching measure. The heads of Orders, who until then had had the direction of the missions in their hands, were now replaced by Vicars Apostolic, that is, by secular priests; consequently, the supervision of their subjects was to a large extent withdrawn from religious superiors.

The oath was first demanded in the missions in June 1680, but great difficulties arose immediately. The Archbishop of Paris, Harlay, found the oath incompatible with the Gallican liberties and Louis XIV. forbade all French subjects to take it. This caused no small embarrassment to Pallu. Resistance to the King would have gravely imperilled both himself and the Seminary of the Foreign Missions. On the other hand, Propaganda refused to agree to the mitigation of the obligation suggested by him. Help now came to Pallu from a quarter from which, without doubt, he least expected it, namely from the Jesuits whom he had excluded from his first proposal of mitigation. On June 26th, 1680, the General, Paul Oliva, commanded his subjects in the Far East to take the oath, and his order was obeyed. At Oliva's suggestion the King's confessor, La Chaize, obtained from Louis XIV. leave for the French missionaries to take the oath, though on condition that they made an explicit declaration that they did so with the permission of their sovereign. Propaganda was dissatisfied with this clause, which savoured strongly of Gallicanism, but ended by acquiescing in it.¹

The oath met with far greater opposition on the part of the other Orders. The Augustinians and Franciscans of Canton refused it; some of the Dominicans took it, but were severely reprimanded by their Superiors for doing so; other Dominicans were prepared to abandon the mission rather than take it.

¹ BRUCKNER, *loc. cit.*, LXVII. (1896), 504-6. On January 15, 1683, the Chinese Jesuit, Ferd. Verbiest, had written to Gregory Lopez that if the suspicious Chinese Government came to hear that the Jesuits took oaths of obedience to anyone, it might mean the ruin of the missions. They did all they could to hide even the fact of the existence of a Jesuit Provincial. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, VIII., 582.

The difficulty lay in the fact that the Spanish missionaries depended for their subsistence on the support of their sovereign, but the Spanish authorities looked on an oath to French Vicars as nothing less than treason. Moreover the papal Brief prescribed that its text should be made known by the General of the Order ; but this had not been done, hence there was not the necessary promulgation.¹ " We are between the anvil and the hammer," the Jesuit, Maldonado, wrote in 1682² ; " on the one hand we are pressed by the decrees of Propaganda, and on the other by the Government of Lisbon." Now it was necessary to consider the Portuguese, for not only were they in a position to withhold support from the missionaries, but they could make their dissatisfaction felt by the whole Order. The consequence was that Propaganda eased the constraint under which the missionaries found themselves by abolishing the oath to the Vicars Apostolic and limiting the duty of obedience to them.³ The inconvenience for the missionaries in having to obey both their religious superiors and the Vicars Apostolic, was overcome by choosing the Vicars Apostolic from the religious Orders and by subdividing the entire missionary territory into larger or smaller districts, independent of each other and entrusted each to one Society only. This was done in China in 1685, under Innocent XI., after the death of Pallu who had acted as administrator of all the Chinese missions, and again in 1696, in Indo-China, where at the same date a second Apostolic Administrator was entrusted with the general direction of all the missions. This reorganization of the missions has lasted up to this day. It was the long-sought solution of complications of many years' standing.⁴

¹ BIERMANN, 138-140.

² To the General, Noyelle, November 15 and 16, 1682, in *Analectes*, *loc. cit.*, 187.

³ Decrees of November 23 and December 14, 1688, BRUCKER, *loc. cit.*, 507 ; *Collectanea*, I., n. 234.

⁴ Propaganda was dissatisfied with the Jesuits in India because of their disputes with the Vicars Apostolic. On October 10, 1678, Innocent XI. ordered 7 Jesuit missionaries to justify

One consequence of the arrival of French secular priests in the Far East was the renewal of the conflict over the Chinese rites. The Seminary of the Foreign Missions from which these priests came had not entirely escaped the infiltration of Jansenism,¹ hence its pupils were *a priori* opponents of the Jesuits and inclined to view with suspicion whatever came from them. The consequences of this unfortunate circumstance only came to light at a later date.

Innocent XI's lively interest in the missions is attested by the fact that at the very outset of his pontificate he requested the Secretary of Propaganda, Urbano Cerri, to draw up a detailed survey of the state of the missions at that time.²

themselves in Rome. However, the Bull (JANN, 247 *seq.*) was not dispatched (BRUCKER, *loc. cit.*). Propaganda contented itself with summoning to Rome 3 missionaries, on March 13, 1679, and 2 on December 14, 1688. The latter came, but Innocent XI. allowed them, on October 11, 1692, to return to their mission (*cf. Synopsis actorum*, II., 403 *seqq.*, n. 5, 6, 17, 45; 415, n. 7); hence they seem to have sufficiently exculpated themselves. To a large extent the reports of Propaganda's missionaries about the insubordination, etc., of the Jesuits, were one-sided and exaggerated (see CERRI, in SCHMIDLIN, *Missionsgesch.*, 378); no less a man than Pallu himself defends them, in a letter of January 6, 1682, against their accusers; so did the Franciscan Bishop Della Chiesa of Peking (*Anecdotes*, VII., 201 *seq.*, 260). For all that things went so far that in 1684 Innocent XI. forbade the Italian Jesuit Provinces to receive any novices until full submission had been made (BRUCKER, *La Compagnie de Jésus*, 651 *seqq.*, 665 *seqq.*). General Oliva, as the only means of countering accusations, had offered to Propaganda to recall all his missionaries from India (*ibid.*, 653). According to R. CORRIGAN (*Die Kongregation de Propaganda Fide und ihre Tätigkeit in Nordamerika*, München, 1928, 45), the accusation of disobedience was for the most part unjust: "not rebellion against Rome but submission in spite of overwhelming difficulties is the outstanding feature of their conduct" (note added by KNELLER).

¹ CADRY, IV., 290 *seqq.*, 880 *seqq.*

² The work was quickly spread in MS.: at Rome, in *Vat. 9650, Borg. Cat.*, 311, *Vat. Lib.*; Altieri Archives, *Cod. X.*, c. 4;

This compilation, made towards the end of 1677, gives us an extremely interesting picture of the world-wide activities of Propaganda. Here are depicted not only the results of the work of half a century, but hints are also thrown out as to what should be done in the future. Of the wealth of data contained in the document only the more important ones can be quoted here.

Cerri shows the Orders engaged everywhere on the task of spreading the Gospel. Besides the Jesuits, the Capuchins were strongly represented. They were the principal missionaries in Mesopotamia and Arabia. The Congregation of Propaganda had recently sent Capuchins to Tiflis in Georgia. In Syria the Carmelites worked successfully by their side, especially at Aleppo where the Jesuits also laboured. The Discalced Carmelites had been established in Persia since the days of Paul V. The Armenian mission was in the hands of the Dominicans.

The Indian mission suffered grievously from the expulsion of the Portuguese who were only able to retain Goa. The Dutch allowed no Catholic priest to enter, especially no Jesuit. In the kingdom of the Great Mogul the Theatine mission had come to an end, though some Carmelites and French Capuchins still maintained themselves there. In the Spanish Philippine Islands, missionary work was done by Franciscans, Augustinians, Capuchins, Dominicans, Jesuits and Discalced Carmelites.

After prolonged persecution, better days seemed at last to

Bibl. Corsini, *Cod.*, 284 ; London, British Museum, *Cod.*, 17990 ; Perugia, Library, *Cod.* E. 8 ; Munich, State Library, *Cod. ital.*, 132. Cerri's anti-Jesuit remarks induced the anti-papal Englishman Richard Steele, who had obtained a copy from the library of St. Gall, to make an English translation: *Account of the state of the Roman Catholic religion*, etc., London, 1716 (copy in the city library, Frankfurt-a.-M.), which was at once followed by a French one: *État présent de l'Eglise Romaine dans toutes les parties du monde*, etc., Amsterdam, 1716. MEJER (I., 108) has accurately placed the composition of the work at the close of 1677. Cf. CORRIGAN, *loc. cit.*, 9, 19.

dawn in China. The Jesuit Verbiest had laboured in the Empire of the Middle since 1659, first as assistant, and afterwards as successor to the celebrated founder of the Peking observatory, John Adam Schall. In the persecution of the Christians during the minority of the Emperor Kanghi, he had had to endure chains and imprisonment. When Kanghi rose to power, Verbiest won his confidence by his knowledge of astronomy and secured both the liberation of his imprisoned colleagues and the surrender of the confiscated Christian churches. As Superior of the Chinese mission from 1676 to 1680, he displayed a singularly fruitful activity. His literary works in Latin and Chinese dealt with astronomy, physics, geography and Chinese history. Besides this he also wrote a handbook of religious doctrine and a translation of the Missal into Chinese.¹ He presented these works to the Pope who, in a lengthy Brief, bestowed high praise on his activities: "Though an immense distance separates China from us," we read, "the love of Christ nevertheless brings it very near to us."² The death of the learned Jesuit in January 1688, meant an irreparable loss for the Chinese mission.

Japan presented a gloomy picture for, after the persecution of 1615, there remained only fragments of the once flourishing missions.

In Africa the most important mission was that of the Congo, with an episcopal see in Angola.

Spanish America possessed a regular hierarchy and many convents, but there still remained vast numbers of pagans.

In the French Antilles the principal labourers were the Dominicans. In Canada Franciscans, Jesuits and Capuchins

¹ Cf. CARTON, *Le P. Verbiest*, Bruges, 1839; DAHLMANN, 30 *seqq.*; *Zeitschr. für Kath. Theol.*, 1901, 331 *seqq.*; H. BOSMANS *Annales de la Soc. d'émulation de Bruges*, LXII. (1912), 16-61 (documents), LXIII. (1913), 193-223 (relations with the Russian court), XLVII. (1924), 181-195; *Rev. des quest. scientif.*, 1912 (Verbiest as director of the astronomical observatory), 1913 (Verbiest's Chinese writings); SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, VIII., 574-586; CHERRY, in *The Month.*, CVI. (1906), 251 *seq.*

² BERTHIER, II., 9 *seq.*

had their own separate provinces, with the approval of Propaganda ; in 1670 a bishopric was established at Quebec. The Church made gratifying progress in that country, whereas in Brazil, on the contrary, she had to register serious losses under the Dutch domination, though here also better prospects opened with the return of the Portuguese. This circumstance moved Innocent XI., in the first period of his pontificate, to accede to the request of the Portuguese crown and to erect Bahia into an archbishopric, with Olinda and Rio de Janeiro as suffragan sees.¹ In 1677 the new diocese of São Luis do Maranhao was also added to it.² In the Spanish possessions in America, the evil life of the parochial clergy, which consisted mostly of clerics regular, was a source of grave scandal ; the Pope accordingly decided to subject them to the Bishops.³

The Dominican academy of St. Thomas, at Manila, was erected into a University by Innocent XI. Guatemala also was given a similar institution.⁴ In the interest of the missions the Pope entered into correspondence with the King of Congo, the Shah of Persia,⁵ and the rulers of Tonking and Siam.⁶ Great was his satisfaction when a Siamese embassy visited Rome in December, 1688, headed by the Jesuit Guy Tachard, who was escorted by three mandarins. They were received in audience on December 23rd. A few days later Tachard presented to the Pope some Catholic catechists from Tonking. The strangers were treated with the greatest courtesy. They were shown the principal churches and were permitted to take part in the solemn functions, with a view to stirring up their enthusiasm for the Church. At their departure they received rich presents ; for the King they were given a medal adorned with brilliants and a telescope ; for the King's first minister, a Catholic Greek, the Pope

¹ *Bull.*, XIX., 5, 7, 12. Cf. STREIT, I., 517.

² *Bull.*, XIX., 57.

³ BERTHIER, II., 180.

⁴ *Bull.*, XIX., 769 seq.

⁵ BERTHIER, II., 51, 113, 191.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I., 42, 290, 335, 337 ; II., 57 seq., 113, 119.

selected a picture of the Madonna by Carlo Maratta.¹ In a letter to the ruler of Siam, of which Tachard was the bearer, the Pope thanked the King for his protection of the missions and assured him that he would pray earnestly that "the Sun that knows no setting would shed its rays upon him and show him the way of life".²

In 1681 Innocent XI. had the joy of seeing the inhabitants of the Isle of Patmos renouncing the schism.³ In the same year the schismatical Patriarch John of Alexandria was invited by the Pope to return to the Roman Church. The Patriarch complied with the exhortation, as did the Chaldean Patriarch Joseph, the Syrian Patriarch Ignatius of Antioch and the Greek Metropolitan Euthymius of Tyre and Sidon. The Pope addressed laudatory Briefs to them.⁴ He also energetically intervened on behalf of the Franciscan guardians of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem in their sufferings at the hands of the schismatics, by appealing to all the Powers diplomatically represented in Constantinople.⁵ Unfortunately an attempt by Innocent XI., in 1683, to put a stop to the negro slave trade on the coast of Angola was unsuccessful.⁶

In 1686 Innocent XI. confirmed the establishment of a new mission for the Copts in Egypt.⁷ Two years later news reached Rome that the Mohammedan King George of Iberia, in Caucasus, had embraced the Catholic faith; a letter of congratulation was forthwith dispatched to that prince, who had, however, lost his throne in the meantime.⁸

¹ See *Lettera scritta da Roma in cui si dà notizia della udienza data da N. S. Innocenzo XI. al P. Guido Tasciard inviato dal Re di Siam, et alli Signori mandarini venuti dal medemo regno di Siam*, Roma, 1688. Cf. LIPPI, 69 seq.; COLOMBO, 21 seq.; C. CASSINA (*mag. caeremon.*), **Diarium*, Vat. 8390, Vat. Lib.

² BERTHIER, II., 423 seq.

³ *Ibid.*, I., 411.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I., 438 seq.; II., 142, 191, 223.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I., 81 seq. ⁶ MARGRAF, 192.

⁷ *Ius pontif.*, II., 96 seq.

⁸ Brief of May 14, 1688, in BERTHIER, II., 393. Cf. PIERLING, IV., 105.

(5.)

The Secretary of Propaganda devoted a special section of his report to the religious situation in Europe,¹ where at that time there were 74,700,000 Catholics, 27 million schismatics and 23,600,000 Protestants out of a total population of 128,000,000.² Russia was almost completely schismatic and it was in vain that Innocent XI. sought to enter into relations with its ruler.³ On the other hand, his efforts on behalf of the Union in Poland yielded excellent results. Innocent XI. did all he could to protect the Ruthenian Union in that country.⁴ The whole of northern Europe was Protestant. Sweden strictly forbade missionaries to enter the country under pain of death; the only means by which the Church was able to get in touch with the inhabitants was the circumstance that at this time the Swedes began to travel abroad. Thus there was a hope that during their stay in Rome and in Italy, they would conceive a very different notion of the Church from that put before them by their preachers at home. In Denmark a few Jesuits were at least able to act as embassy chaplains.

¹ Cerri (9) distinguishes two classes of non-Catholics, those who—and they are the majority—live under heretical princes (Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Russia, Tartary, Illyria, Greece, and the islands of the Archipelago), and non-Catholics living in Catholic territories, where they either enjoy the public profession of their religion or follow their errors in secret. The first category, besides Poland, includes certain German territories and Hungary.

² See the statistics of 1683 given by CIAMPI (II., 92 *seqq.*), on the basis of a MS. in the Bibl. Magliabecchi, Florence, according to which Germany numbered 8 million Protestants. The author gives remarkably high numbers for the Catholics of France: 35 millions against 30 in the rest of Europe, viz. 7 millions in Spain, 8 in Italy, 10 in Germany, 5 in Poland.

³ PIERLING, IV., 71 *seq.*, 93 *seq.*, 95 *seq.*

⁴ THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, III., 648 *seqq.*, 662, 681 *seq.*; BERTHIER, I., 32–7, 352, 431, 433; LIKOWSKI, *Gesch. des allmählichen Verfalls der unierten ruthenischen Kirche im 18. und 19. Jahrh.*, transl. by TŁOCZYŃSKI, Posen, 1885, 1 *seqq.*; I. PELESZ, *Gesch. der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom*, II., Vienna, 1880, 277, 286.

At Copenhagen there existed a community of fervent converts.¹ At Glückstadt and at Altona Jesuits were engaged in missionary work.

The Catholic Cantons of Switzerland possessed an excellent ecclesiastical organization. In the Protestant Cantons the ancient Church had been irremediably suppressed, but in those of mixed religion, the Capuchins laboured with great success.² Capuchins and Jesuits were likewise engaged in missionary work in various parts of the North German Diaspora.

¹ METZLER, 63.

² MEJER, II., 117.

CHAPTER VII.

THE NORTH GERMAN DIASPORA AND THE MOVEMENT FOR REUNION. CATHOLICS IN HOLLAND AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SCHISM OF UTRECHT. INNOCENT XI. AND THE REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND. DEATH OF THE POPE.

(1.)

The remains of the Catholic Church which had managed to survive in the north of Germany, had been deprived of their excellent leader by the death of the Vicar Apostolic Valerio Maccioni, on September 5th, 1676, shortly before the election of Innocent XI. One of the new Pope's first cares was to appoint a worthy successor to that deserving man. On the proposal of Duke John Frederick of Hanover, by a Brief of August 27th, 1677, he entrusted the difficult post to the Danish convert, Niels Stensen [Steno]. The choice was a very happy one.¹ Born in 1638 at Copenhagen, Steno had made a name for himself in the world of science as an anatomist and a geologist. In 1666 he had been appointed physician to the Grand Duke Ferdinand II. of Tuscany. In 1667, whilst at the height of his fame as a scholar, he returned to the bosom of the ancient Church. In 1675 he was ordained priest when, renouncing his learned pursuits, he embraced a life of strictest poverty and most earnest piety. On naming him Vicar Apostolic for the North German districts, in succession to Maccioni, Innocent XI. made him Bishop of Titiopolis and on March 24th, 1678, he extended his jurisdiction to Denmark also.² It is characteristic of the new Vicar Apostolic that, in execution of a vow, he made on foot the long journey from

¹ Cf. W. PLENKERS, *N. Stensen*, Freiburg, 1884; METZLER, in *Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CXLVIII., 81 seq., 174 seq., 261 seq.; PIEPER, *Propaganda*, 77 seq.; ID.; *Niels Steensen*, Kopenhagen, 1928.

² METZLER, *Apostol. Vikariate*, 52.

Rome to Hanover, where he took up his residence. However, his stay there was of short duration. John Frederick died on December 16th, 1679, without a male heir. His successor, Ernest Augustus, ordered the palace church to be closed for Catholic services at the beginning of 1680. Thereupon Steno went to Münster, where he acted as auxiliary to the excellent Bishop Ferdinand von Fürstenberg who, by a munificent missionary foundation, rendered most valuable service to the work of the propagation of the faith. At the same time the North German mission underwent reorganization: Innocent IX. had its development greatly at heart.¹ Fürstenberg retained the administration of the vicariates of Halberstadt, Bremen, Magdeburg, Schwerin and the territories of Mecklenburg, the rest being assigned to Steno.² After Fürstenberg's early death, on June 26th, 1683, Steno recovered the government of all the vicariates. He then migrated to Hamburg, but died soon after at Schwerin, [December 6th, 1686], where he had founded a Catholic mission. The zealous prelate had done his work up to the last, espited great difficulties. He was succeeded, in 1687, by the auxiliary Bishop of Hildesheim, Frederick von Tietzen, who laboured with the same zeal as his predecessor for a whole decade.³ From his report to Propaganda, it appears that within the territories of the two dioceses which passed to Brandenburg as a result of the Peace of Westphalia, there was still to be found, like oases in the desert, a comparatively large number of monasteries both of men and women.⁴

Innocent XI.'s bearing in the attempts to bring the German Protestants back to the Church by peaceful means requires special consideration. The whole matter of the Pope's attitude towards Protestantism became a burning question at the very beginning of the pontificate in consequence of the meeting

¹ Cf. the Briefs to Fürstenberg, in BERTHIER, I., 331, II., 31, 40.

² METZLER, *Apostol. Vikariate*, 55 seq. On Fürstenberg's missionary foundation, see *Hist. Jahrb.*, XXXVII., 622 seqq.

³ METZLER, *loc. cit.*, 61 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 69.

of the peace congress of Nymeguen. Innocent's predecessors had considered direct intervention inadmissible, because of Nymeguen being an entirely Protestant locality.¹ Innocent XI. did not go so far. He dispatched the nuncio in Vienna, Bevilacqua, to Nymeguen, though for his relations with the Protestants he inculcated on him the old stringent principles. The Archbishop of Ravenna, who had been at first chosen to represent the Holy See, had been instructed by Clement X. to base his conduct in this matter on the principles and the practice adopted by Chigi at the Congress of Münster, for it was necessary to avoid the appearance that they treated as brothers men who were the sworn enemies of the Church. However, he was to rise above all pettiness and susceptibility, which might cause him to run the risk of offending the heretics, repelling the Catholics and impeding the progress of the peace congress. In particular cases, prudence must temper zeal; for a boon so great as the peace of Europe, one could make concessions which, without so powerful a motive, might give scandal.² Bevilacqua's instructions were even stricter. In compliance with a decree of the Inquisition, he was to refrain from direct negotiations with the Protestant envoys. If relations were necessary in the interests of religion, he should use the Spanish ambassador as his intermediary.³ Bevilacqua was nevertheless not averse to exchanging the usual courtesies, but he learnt that England's representatives were sharply opposed to it, and that the other Protestants alleged that they were without instructions on the point. Accordingly Bevilacqua only announced his arrival to the Catholic delegates. When the envoys of Brandenburg, Denmark and Holland complained of his conduct, he left it to the Imperialists to defend him, and repeated his willingness to comply with the usual courtesies. Soon after this, a special decree of the Inquisition authorized him to deal with the

¹ Cf. above, p. 59.

² See the Instruction of February 20, 1676, in HILTEBRANDT, in *Quellen u. Forsch.*, XV., 366, n. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, 367, n. 4.

heretical envoys "whenever necessity or the public good demanded it".¹ But this was also the limit of the Pope's concessions. When the Emperor expressed the wish that the papal delegate to the Congress should also negotiate with the Protestant princes, the answer was a decided refusal, even though Bevilacqua supported the proposal. Innocent XI. represented to the Emperor that it did not become a papal nuncio to meddle with the affairs of Protestant princes openly and directly. When Leopold I. repeated his request, the Pope replied that he could depart neither from the attitude of his predecessors nor from the ancient discipline of the Church, which had never changed. The nuncio would only be allowed to interest himself in the affairs of the heretics if there was a proximate hope that some considerable advantage to the Catholic religion would be the result.² By this obviously honourable but timorous attitude, Innocent XI. let slip the opportunity of appearing at the congress in the rôle of a peacemaker. It was in keeping with this point of view that after the conclusion of peace, towards which Bevilacqua had loyally contributed, there ensued a solemn protest by the Pope against the confirmation of the Treaty of Westphalia in the instrument of the peace.³ Innocent himself did not believe that his protest would have the slightest effect; he was, however, anxious to avoid establishing a precedent, for as he wrote to Leopold I. and to Louis XIV., though by reason of his pastoral duty and after the example of his predecessor he had been obliged to utter a protest, he nevertheless did not disguise from himself the fact that it was necessary to take into account both the needs of the age and the advantages that would accrue to the whole of Christendom from the

¹ *Ibid.*, 368. Cf. above, p. 63.

² HILTEBRANDT, *loc. cit.*, 368-370. When, in 1686, the Duke of Brunswick came to Rome with his family, Innocent XI. was willing to grant him only a quite private audience, for which reason the visit was unsuccessful; see *Arch. stor. Lomb.*, 2nd series, VI. (1889), 40, 45.

³ LÜNIG, *Deutsches Reichs-Archiv.*, I., 1049; IMMICH, *Innozenz. XI.*, 13.

settlement.¹ Thus the Pope had been consistent in maintaining his standpoint without, however, jeopardizing the success of the work.²

A strong light is thrown upon Innocent XI.'s strict principles by his conduct in the matrimonial affairs of the Emperor Leopold I. and the Elector Max Emmanuel of Bavaria: here, as in his attitude towards the Greek schismatics,³ he reveals himself as an inflexible opponent of every kind of interconfessionalism.

When, after the death of his consort Claudia, on March 8th, 1676, there was question of the Emperor marrying again, various Protestant princesses were considered for the position of Empress, particularly Ulrika Eleonore, daughter of King Frederick III. of Denmark. The prospect of this alliance filled Innocent XI. with grave anxiety, all the more so as the princess was reported to be a woman of rare beauty and spirit. Accordingly, nuncio Bevilacqua was instructed as early as October 31st, 1676, to exert his influence against a marriage which would be something unheard of on the part of a Habsburg and which would bring with it the danger of the infiltration of heresy into Austria.⁴ However, the devout Leopold had no thought of marrying a Protestant; on the contrary, he chose a daughter of the Elector Philip William of Pfalz-Neuburg, who was in great favour with the Pope by reason of his Catholic sentiments. Innocent XI.'s satisfaction was great, and he gladly granted the necessary dispensation, in view of the too near kinship.⁵

A few years later it was announced that the Elector Max Emmanuel of Bavaria contemplated a matrimonial alliance with a Lutheran lady, viz. Eleonore, daughter of the Duke of Sachsen-Eisenach. As soon as this report came to his ears,

¹ BERTHIER, I., 241 *seq.*, 243 *seq.* Cf. above, p. 78.

² IMMICH, *loc. cit.*

³ See the Briefs of 1678 and 1679 against the toleration of Greek schismatic services and against the election of a schismatical Bishop, in BERTHIER, I., 174, 278 *seq.*

⁴ LEVINSON, *Nuntiaturberichte*, II., 560 *seqq.*, 685 *seq.*

⁵ BERTHIER, I., 23.

the nuncio in Vienna, Buonvisi, lost no time in opposing the project ; he made counter proposals and suggested an alliance with Maria Antonia, daughter of the Emperor Leopold. However, Max Emmanuel stuck to his plan and initiated negotiations in Rome,¹ but all hope of success was quashed by a Brief of August 16th, 1681, in which the Pope stated that in no circumstance would he grant a dispensation for a mixed marriage. The Jesuits of Munich had declared that the marriage was possible if the bride became a Catholic, but the Pope made it clear that he could not trust such a conversion, since it was well known that Eleonore shared her parents' and teachers' prejudices against the Catholic Church.² At the same time, the Pope appealed to Duke Max Philip of Bavaria, and to the Elector of Cologne, requesting them to support his endeavours.³ Thereupon Max Emmanuel gave up his project. The Pope's exhortation to Max Emmanuel towards the end of 1683,⁴ that he should marry soon, was complied with by him two years later, when he made the Archduchess Maria Antonia his wife. Innocent's efforts to prevent whatever might jeopardize the religious unity of Bavaria had the further important political consequence that Bavaria, until then closely allied to France, now went over to the Emperor's side.⁵

The movement of conversion which had begun among German Protestants about the middle of the seventeenth century, continued under Innocent XI. This was due to various causes, but one of the most influential ones was the painful contrast produced by the divisions among Protestants in the dogmatic sphere and the " venomous quarrels and wranglings " of the Protestant preachers on the one hand, and the dogmatic compactness of the Universal Church, as well as the splendid

¹ HEIGEL, in *Abhandl. der Münch. Akad.*, Hist. Kl., XIX. (1891), 20 *seqq.*

² *Ibid.*, 38, 108 *seq.* Cf. BERTHIER, I., 435 *seqq.* See also DUHR, III., 851.

³ BERTHIER, I., 437, 440.

⁴ *Ibid.*, II., 151.

⁵ HEIGEL, *loc. cit.*, 5, 40.

enthusiasm of its adherents on the other. A further motive lay in the fact that in the sphere of the arts and scholarship, the culture of the Catholic nations stood high above that of the Protestant ones.¹ Any educated person was bound to acknowledge that fact in the face of Mabillon's documentary researches, Bossuet's classical eloquence, the magnificent poetical works of Calderon and the sublime intuitions of Murillo. The Catholic parts of Germany also had a higher culture than the Protestant ones; one need only think of the splendid Baroque creations in Bavaria and Austria, the flourishing educational establishments of the German Jesuits² and such important popular writers as Abraham a Sancta Clara, Martin of Kochem and Leonard Goffine.³

It was in the nature of things that the superiority of Catholicism should be realized, in the first instance, by the upper classes, hence conversions continued to occur for the most part in these circles.

Innocent XI. showed how much he had at heart the conversion of heretics by his solicitude for the converts' hospice, which was transferred to the Borgo during his reign.⁴ As soon as he heard of any outstanding conversion, he never omitted to send a congratulatory Brief. Thus he exhorted Duchess Dorothy of Holstein to constancy,⁵ and to Count Arnold Mauritius William of Bentheim he expressed

¹ HILTEBRANDT, *Reunionsverhandlungen*, I.

² Cf. DUHR, III., 370 *seqq.*

³ On Abraham a Sancta Clara, cf. the monographs of KARAJAN (Vienna, 1867), SCHNELL (1876), and SEXTRO (Sigmaringen, 1896); on M. F. Kochem, see STAHL, in *Beiträge zur Literatur—u. Kulturgesch. des Rheinlandes*, II., Bonn, 1909; I. CHR. SCHULTE, *P. M. von Cochem*, Freiburg, 1910; W. KOSCH, *M. von Kochem*, M.-Gladbach, 1921; on Goffine, L. GOOVAERTS, *Écrivains, artistes et savants de l'ordre de Prémontré*, I., Bruxelles, 1899, 315; HUNDHAUSEN, in *Kirchenlexikon*, Freiburg, V.², 832.

⁴ Bull of April 22, 1686, *Bull.*, XIX., 680. Cf. **Avviso Marescotti* of April 24, 1685. *Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele*, Rome; MORONI, L., 16.

⁵ BERTHIER, I., 212 *seq.*

the hope that others, more especially his own subjects, would follow the Count's example, for he considered it to be the chief task of his pastoral office to bring back the wandering sheep into the fold of Christ.¹ The Pope wrote in similar strain to another German Count in whose territory two communities had spontaneously returned to the Church.²

The holy earnestness with which Innocent viewed such conversions appears from his attitude to the conversion of the Guelph Ernest Augustus, Protestant Bishop of Osnabrück. In April, 1678, the latter let it be known in Rome, through the Jesuit Pechenius, that he was prepared to return to the Catholic Church with his whole family, but he asked that a number of material advantages should first be guaranteed to himself and his family. The prospect of securing another powerful patron for the Church in North Germany, in addition to Duke Philip William of Neuburg, was all the more alluring as this would somehow neutralize the growing power of the Protestant Elector, Frederick William of Brandenburg. On the other hand, it was repugnant to Innocent's upright mind that "the sacred affair of a conversion" should be degraded to the level of a commercial transaction. His answer put it beyond a doubt that he would not and could not have anything to do with such a proposal.³ Ernest Augustus lost no time in seeking to obtain, by means of negotiations with the European Powers, that which he had chiefly hoped to obtain from the Pope by means of his conversion, viz. the permanent bestowal on himself of the temporal administration of the bishoprics of Osnabrück and Hildesheim. His attempt failed, thanks to the skilful counter-action of the papal nuncios. A fresh attempt on the part of the Guelph to get the Pope to consent at least to the secularization of Osnabrück, was equally unsuccessful.⁴

¹ *Ibid.*, II., 419.

² *Ibid.*, III., 449. Cf. *ibid.*, II., 45, to Baron Windischgrätz, who made objections to the rite of reception, from which, however, Innocent XI. did not think it fit to dispense.

³ HILTEBRANDT, *Reunionsverhandlungen*, 9 seq., 13 seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 16 seq., 26 seq.

Innocent was to have further occasion to busy himself with Ernest Augustus in connection with the efforts for reunion by the Franciscan Cristobal de Rojas y Spinola.¹

Sprung from an ancient Spanish family, Spinola was first employed in several diplomatic missions by Philip IV. and after 1668 by Leopold I. In 1668 he was named titular Bishop of Knin in Dalmatia. This strange man strongly felt the necessity of the reunion of the Protestants with the ancient Church. In 1661 he had endeavoured gradually to win over to the Catholic Church the Elector Frederick William of Brandenburg, by lending support to the latter's colonizing aspirations. His efforts were in vain,² but his failure by no means discouraged him. When in 1673 the Emperor sent him to the courts of the various German princes for the purpose of promoting the Turkish war, he renewed his conciliatory labours, which were mixed up with a vast plan for the reform of the Empire. In May 1674, he reported to Rome on his efforts on behalf of reunion.³ In the years that followed he eagerly pursued his task, negotiating at the courts of Dresden,

¹ More light has been thrown on Spinola by G. HASELBECK (in his essays in *Katholik*, 1913, I., 385 *seqq.*; II., 15 *seqq.*, and in *Franziskan. Studien*, I., 18 *seqq.*), and by HILTEBRANDT (*Reunionsverhandlungen*, 30 *seqq.*); the former judges Spinola somewhat too favourably, the latter too severely. Perhaps KNÖPFLER was right when he said that Spinola's irenic attempts honour his sentiments rather than his intelligence and sagacity (*Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, XXXV., 203). Cf. also the judgment of CALIXT, in *Unschuldige Nachrichten*, 1713, 380. In order to understand Spinola one must enter into the psychology of an incorrigible optimist. Unfortunately, Hildebrandt did not see the works of Haselbeck, where for the first time Hansiz' biography of Spinola, contained in *Cod.* 9310, pp. 136-202, of the National Library, Vienna, and also the manuscripts of Leibniz in the Hannover Library, were utilized. The Archives of the Roman Inquisition, inaccessible up to now, would, of course, throw the fullest light on the subject.

² Cf. HEYCK, in *Zeitschr. für gesch. des Oberrheins*, N.S., II., 129-200.

³ HILTEBRANDT, *Reunionsverhandlungen*, 42 *seq.*, 173 *seqq.*

Berlin, Hanover, and Heidelberg.¹ The Emperor, to whom a reunion of Catholics and Protestants meant a great deal in view of the war he had to wage on two fronts—viz. the Turks and the French—favoured Spinola in every possible way ; thus it came about that the latter's efforts were stamped from the first with a political rather than a religious character. To this was added the circumstance that Spinola lacked dogmatic lucidity, and that he faced the heavy task he had assumed with the best intentions under an emotional, rather than a rational impulse. The consequence was that his southern temperament saw successes where there were none. When he came to Rome in the first days of 1677, with an imperial letter of recommendation, his glowing enthusiasm led him to speak in such exaggerated terms that an impression was created that all the important Protestant princes of Germany were prepared to accept the main dogmas of the ancient Church.² Innocent was cautious enough to set up a commission consisting of Cardinals Cibo, Spinola, Albizzi, and three theologians, to study the whole question.³ At the same time he secretly sought information from nuncio Buonvisi in Vienna on the subject of Spinola's sensational reports. The nuncio, who before this had felt serious misgivings in regard to Spinola's immature schemes,⁴ replied on March 6th, 1678, with all the clearness that could have been wished for. He had always felt reluctant, he wrote, to discuss his plans for reunion with Spinola, as he considered them impossible of execution. After eight years spent in Germany he was only too well acquainted with the artful tricks of the heretics. They were in the habit of raising high hopes either for some worldly end or in order to secure recognition for one

¹ HASELBECK, 395 *seqq.* ; HILTEBRANDT, 45 *seq.*

² See the Instruction to Buonvisi of February 12, 1677, in HILTEBRANDT, 177 *seq.* From this document it appears that the statement of HASELBECK (399), which is based on HANSIZ, that Spinola did not arrive in Rome until September, 1677, is incorrect.

³ HASELBECK, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See his report to Cibo, October 10, 1677, in HILTEBRANDT, 51, n. 1.

of their tenets, by means of negotiations for reunion ; as for themselves, they conceded nothing, but only used the condescension of the Church to delude the unwise. If he transmitted to Rome all the suggestions made to him on this point at various times and places, all of which he eventually saw to be mere delusions, he would by now have earned a reputation for the most consummate irresponsibility and credulity with the Secretariate of State. But in spite of everything, since risks must be taken for a great stake, he had encouraged the Bishop in his undertaking and armed him with good advice, but his opinion was that Spinola indulged in extravagant hopes.¹

In spite of many misgivings, Rome was unwilling to drop Spinola altogether ; but he was given no formal commission, but a mere permission to treat with the Protestant princes, both concerning the Turkish war and the furtherance of the Catholic religion. This was the theme of a Brief to Spinola, dated April 20th, 1678, and the letters of recommendation to the Emperor, the nuncios of Vienna and Cologne and Duke John Frederick of Hanover, which he was provided at his own request.² To enable him to correspond unhindered with the Secretary of State, Spinola was given the usual cypher, but it was strongly impressed on him that he was not to negotiate in the Pope's name, but solely under some other pretext ; at the same time, the nuncios received instructions to see to it that that stipulation was observed.³

In the last day of April 1678, Spinola set out with all the joyous optimism of his trusting nature, on a journey that was to take him to most of the courts of the Empire. He first visited Vienna ; from there he went to Salzburg, Munich, Augsburg, Ulm, Nuremberg, Bamberg, Bayreuth, Heidelberg, Mayence, Frankfort, Kassel, Hanover, Wolfenbüttel, Celle, Osnabrück, Münster, Herford, ending at Halle and Dresden.

¹ TRENTA, *Buonvisi*, I., 371.

² BERTHIER, I., 167 *seq.*, 168 *seqq.* Cf. THEINER, *Gesch. der Rückkehr der Häuser Braunschweig und Sachsen*, Einsiedeln, 1843, Doc. I., 4.

³ TRENTA, I., 373 ; HILTEBRANDT, 188.

Those princes whom he could not visit in person because of the dangers of war or plague he addressed by letter. On his return to Vienna he sent a long letter in cypher to the Secretary of State. In this communication, dated May 28th, 1679, he declares that he had everywhere acted in accordance with the Pope's instructions, and that he had been successful everywhere, except at Kassel.¹ How little credence was given in Rome to the optimism of the sanguine reporter appears from the brief reply of the Secretary of State under date of July 1st, 1679. The Pope, we read, had read with great pleasure the account of his efforts on behalf of the Catholic religion and the conversion of certain princes; His Holiness was, however, of opinion that for the time being fervent prayers for God's blessing on Spinola's labours must not be omitted, but that it was necessary to wait for some sure token of a real desire on the part of these princes to embrace the Catholic religion, as experience had shown how often human interests led men to have recourse to lies and falsehoods in such matters. The Pope had commissioned him—the Secretary of State—to

¹ Reprint of the letter in HILTEBRANDT, 191 *seq.*, who, however, overlooked the fact that it had already been published by BOJANI (II., 4 *seq.*). On Spinola's Latin and German *report, which Hansiz has preserved in *Cod.* 9313, p. 15 *seqq.*, National Library, Vienna, *cf.* HASELBECK, 401. In his report Spinola tells us about the leaning of the Elector Frederic William of Brandenburg towards the Catholic Church, but the conclusions which he draws from what had been told him about his eventual conversion are false. In his political testament of 1661, the Elector speaks of the Catholic doctrine with the hatred of a true Calvinist; see KÜNTZEL and M. HASS, *Die politischen Testamente der Hohenzollern*, I., Leipzig, 1911, 44 *seqq.* In practice, as HILTEBRANDT (66) justly remarks, he followed a double policy: Defence of Protestant interests abroad—in 1685 he proclaims himself head of all the evangelical-reformed potentates—and toleration for the Catholics at home. In this, however, he only looked for political advantages. At the congress of Nymeguen he even wanted to confer on the Pope the office of a mediator in order to obtain possession, with his help, of Swedish Pomerania; see *ibid.*, 69.

express to the Bishop his particular appreciation of all he had done up till then, as well as his hope that the seed which his hands had scattered in the vineyard of the Lord would bear fruit.¹ On the same day the Secretary of State commanded the nuncio in Vienna to make confidential inquiries with the Emperor as to whether there was a real hope of the conversion of the Protestant princes. The Emperor's answer was very discouraging. The conversion of the Protestant princes, he told Buonvisi, was one of those things which were always thought easy, but were never carried into effect; he could not tell what hope there was for the future. As for Buonvisi himself, he thought that there was but little foundation for Spinola's report.

If the Pope surrendered to the Protestant princes whatever part of the Church's property had been saved from the general wreck, many of them would no doubt make profession of Catholicism with their lips, as the Palatine had done for the sake of Worms and Spiers.²

These rectifications proved decisive; for two and half years there was no further question of any negotiations for reunion. However, the tireless peacemaker would not rest. In 1682, with the approval of the Pope and the Emperor, he undertook another ten months' journey to the princely courts of Germany³ and again he sent in optimistic accounts of the results. But facts were against him. A memorial, addressed to the Duke of Brandenburg, which Spinola meant to serve as a basis of a disputation with the court theologians of Berlin, was received with open displeasure by the latter.⁴ A few concessions obtained by Spinola in Hanover were violently opposed by the preachers of Gotha and Dresden in the autumn of 1683. In these places they would not hear of the

¹ See HILTEBRANDT, 76 *seq.*

² See *ibid.*, 77 *seq.* The statement of HASELBECK (403), taken over from Hansiz, that the Pope had at that time granted extraordinary faculties to Spinola, is quite incorrect.

³ HASELBECK, 15 *seq.*; HILTEBRANDT, 81 *seq.*

⁴ H. LANDWEHR, *Die Kirchenpolitik Friedrich Wilhelms*, Berlin, 1894, 340 *seq.*

suggestion of voluntarily submitting once more to "the yoke of the Pope and of Antichrist". At Frankfort-on-the-Oder it was discovered that Spinola's proposals were identical with the decrees of Trent, hence irreconcilable with the Lutheran faith. The Landgravine Elisabeth Dorothea of Darmstadt wrote to warn friendly courts against Spinola's designs and got the theological Faculty of Giessen to condemn in severe terms "this godless syncretism". The Elector of Saxony forbade his theologians to indulge in private discussions with Spinola and urged the other princes to act in like manner.¹

Opposition to Spinola was not confined to the Protestants; it also came from the Catholics, though the latter reproached him with the exact opposite, namely that he had gone too far in his concessions to the Protestants. At Spinola's request, Leibnitz had entered into a correspondence with Bossuet in the summer of 1683, and had communicated to him certain writings dealing with the question, especially one by Abbot Molanus of Loccum. Bossuet praised these "pious plans" in the name of his sovereign, but in reality they were out of harmony with the aspirations of the friend of the Turks and the opponent of papal authority. The French monarch's plans of fresh conquests could but suffer should the work of reunion prove successful since Luther's work, viz. the rending of Germany's religious unity, was an essential element of the political weakness of the Empire. With the cunning peculiar to him, Louis intrigued in Rome itself. Of the efforts for reunion he made a pretext for the accusation that, with a view to winning back the German Protestants, the Pope was making concessions that were prejudicial to the Church.²

¹ HASELBECK, 16 *seq.*

² KLOPP, *Stuart*, III., 97 *seq.* "Christophe évêque de Tina à Msgr. l'évêque de Meaux présent à Paris d. le 25 Mars 1684" (original text; it therefore did not come into the hands of Bossuet): " *Le r. P. Nicolas Feiden Recollet c'est la personne à la quelle jay fie les propositions que j'espère de pouvoir persuader à plusieurs des Protestants avec la grâce de Dieu et d'un peu d'aplicacion e patience. Je vous suplie de satisfaire à votre parole de m'asister en cet afaire considérant c'et un efet de vos

This circumstance was another reason for Innocent XI. to observe the utmost caution. When Spinola came to Rome at the beginning of 1684 for the purpose of justifying himself,¹ the Pope had his whole work carefully examined once more. Unfortunately we have no information on the discussions which took place on this occasion, but the result lies before us in a Brief to the Emperor dated July 15th, 1684; from it we gather that no credence was given to the French accusations against Spinola but that it was also found impossible to adopt the latter's suggestions.² That questions of principle decided the issue is shown by the subsequent attitude of the Pope who, in the sequel also, took the utmost care not to get mixed up with Spinola's plans, as he was anxious not to compromise his authority by futile negotiations with the Protestants. On the other hand he put no obstacles in Spinola's way, since it was the duty of his office to do everything in his power to heal the religious rift, in fact Spinola

œuvres et instructions selon que je vous ay confessé autre fois et que vous avez veu par l'autre notable escriture dictée de ma bouche. Il ne convient pas de chanter encor la victoire et de faire le moindre bruit, mais de voir l'opinion d'aucuns grands et plus discrets théologiens d'Europe et particulièrement de la France pour scavoir mieux c'est qu'on pourra proposer à celuy qui doit donner les dernières décisions. Je vous prie donc de traiter avec for peu des docteurs et de n'abandonner pas vostre œuvre puis qu'elle peut magnifier la gloire de Dieu par toute monde, et de croire que je demeure éternellement, Mons., votre très obligé etc." (Feiden, *prov. Coloniae*, was Spinola's confessor; that is clear from a letter of Spinola to the Bishop of Plasencia, dated Rome, May 17, 1684). Archives of the Austrian Embassy at the Vatican (Vienna), I.

¹ On December 12, 1683, Spinola set out on his journey from Württemberg to Rome via Vienna, provided with a letter of recommendation from the Emperor, dated September 1, 1683, and accompanied by the Jesuit Wolff, whom he took as a witness of what had happened in Brandenburg. HASELBECK, 17.

² BERTHIER, II., 183. Hildebrandt overlooked this publication of the document and erroneously assigned the letter to the year 1683.

became Bishop of Wiener-Neustadt in March, 1686. However, the only reunion the Pope desired was a true and sincere one. Hence he continued to exhort Spinola to proceed cautiously, but for the rest he allowed him complete freedom of action.¹ Despite all dangers and failures, who could tell, Innocent observed, whether God's mercy would not finally grant the restoration of religious unity in Germany? ²

(2.)

For the Catholics of Holland the pontificate of Innocent XI. marked the opening of an ominous epoch.³ Since the beginning of the seventeenth century the Church had experienced a fresh revival in the seven united Provinces, though after the storms of the Dutch revolution Holland was reduced to being no more than a missionary territory. The six dioceses erected by Philip II. could not be maintained, and even in the ancient see of Utrecht the first Archbishop named by Spain, Schenk von Toutenburg, was also the last. His two successors never even got consecrated or installed in the see.⁴ In order to meet the most crying needs Gregory XIII. granted

¹ HILTEBRANDT, 87.

² Innocent expresses this thought already in his first Brief to Spinola, April 20, 1678; perhaps the "plenitudo temporis" has come now. BERTHIER, I., 168.

³ For what follows, cf. LUIGI MOZZI, *Storia delle rivoluzioni della chiesa d'Utrecht, libri cinque*, Vols. I.-III., Venice, 1787: [DUPAC DE BELLEGARDE], *Histoire abrégée de l'église métropolitaine d'Utrecht*, Utrecht, 1765; CORN. PAULUS HOYNCK VAN PAPENDRECHT, *Historia ecclesiae Ultraiectinae in Foederato Belgio, in qua ostenditur ordinaria sedis archiepiscopalis et capituli iura intercidisse*, Malines, 1725; *Batavia Sacra* (by FRANCISCUS HUGO VAN-HEUSSEN), Bruxelles-Utrecht, 1754 (first edition, 1714); PITRA, *La Hollande catholique*, Paris, 1850; F. NIPPOLD, *Die römisch-Katholische Kirche im Königreich der Niederlande*, Leipzig, 1877.

⁴ MOZZI, I., 50; [DUPAC], 76 seq.

extensive faculties to the Dutch priests¹ and in 1583 he appointed Sasbout Vosmeer Vicar Apostolic for the seven United Provinces.² Vosmeer had been Vicar-General of Utrecht since 1580³ and since 1592, as Vicar Apostolic, he had the supervision of all the missionaries in Holland. On the occasion of a journey to Rome in 1602 he received episcopal consecration as titular Archbishop of Philippi,⁴ for it was necessary to have a Bishop on Dutch soil because the suspicions of the Government were roused when candidates for the priesthood were ordained abroad.⁵ Vosmeer was at no time Archbishop of Utrecht; Archduke Albert indeed proposed him for the post, Clement VIII. is said to have allowed him to adopt the title,⁶ the Protestants, and later the Jansenists regarded him as such, but Vosmeer himself declares that he never styled himself Archbishop of Utrecht.⁷ Vosmeer's

¹ February 3, 1581, in EHSSES-MEISTER, *Kölner Nuntiatur*, I., 128; cf. nuncios Bonhomini and Frangipani, August 23, 1585, and September 10, 1587, in EHSSES, *Kölner Nuntiatur*, II., 40. After the erection of the nunciature of Brussels, that internuncio directed the Dutch mission ([DUPAC], 133, 145, etc.). On February 23, 1706, the nuncio of Cologne notifies the Dutch Catholics that he reassumes government (*ibid.*, 383). In 1712 the nuncio of Brussels takes over Holland again (*ibid.*, 427); shortly after he divides the jurisdiction with the nuncio of Cologne in such a way that penal affairs belong to Cologne and the granting of favours to Brussels (*ibid.*, 432).

² Della Torre gives this date in MOZZI, I., 60; DUPAC (70 *seq.*) observes that the title is given to Vosmeer unequivocally only in the documents of 1592 or 1601.

³ MOZZI, I., 54, where proofs for this date are given.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 71. Cf. the present work, Vol. XXIV., 3.

⁵ Cardinal Aldobrandini gives this reason in the Instruction to the Spanish nuncio, Caetani, September 20, 1592; cf. *Bullet. de la Comm. Royale d'hist.* (Acad. Royale de Belgique), LXXIII. (1904), 402.

⁶ MOZZI, I., 70, 74.

⁷ "Licet ab hæreticis habear et dicar Ultraiectensis, non assumpsi titulum Ultraiectensis, sed usus sum, ut sequitur: 'Dei et apostolicæ Sedis gratia Philippensis necnon Ultraiectensis

successors, too, were only Vicars Apostolic, exercising their authority in the name of the Pope and as his representatives, and using the titles of sees in lands that once were Catholic. Thus Rovenius [1614-51] became Archbishop of Philippi in 1620¹; della Torre, who became coadjutor to Rovenius in 1640, and eventually his successor, was styled Archbishop of Ephesus; Zacharias Mez, della Torre's coadjutor, who like him, died in 1651, was Archbishop of Tralles; Baldwin Catz (*obit* 1663) was Archbishop of Philippi; and John Neercassel (*ob.* 1686) Bishop of Castoria.

For a long time the trying situation of the Dutch mission was rendered even more difficult in consequence of oppression and persecution on the part of the Protestant rulers. The two first Vicars Apostolic, Vosmeer and Rovenius, had both to go into exile and the Catholics, of whom there remained large numbers, were subjected to unceasing persecution.² The victory of the strict Calvinists at the synod of Dordrecht in 1618 was all the more disastrous for them as, with the expiration of the Spanish-Dutch armistice, the penal laws against them were renewed and made even more stringent.³ However, though in 1608 the States General had entertained the hope that after one generation the Catholic religion would die out, they were mistaken,⁴ for the Catholics held staunchly to their faith.⁵

et Hollandiæ ac unitarum et nuper reductarum Transisulaniæ provinciarum vicarius apostolicus' " (in *Mozzi*, I., 76). From this title it may be seen how the misunderstanding arose, that he styled himself Archbishop of Utrecht. In 1624 the clergy of Utrecht themselves declared in a memorandum to the Bishops of Flanders: "Cum ecclesiæ provinciarum foederatarum suis ordinariis careant, visum fuit supremo Pastori, loco eorum ibidem constituere vicarium apostolicum, qui cum potestate delegata munia ordinariorum illis in provinciis obeat" (*ibid.*, 72).

¹ Cf. the present work, Vol. XXVI., 123, n. 3.

² *Mozzi*, I., 76, 122. Cf. the present work, Vol. XXVI., 120 *seq.*

³ Cf. the present work, Vol. XXVI., p. 128.

⁴ ALBERDINGK THIJM, in *Kirchenlex.*, Freiburg, IX.³, 373.

⁵ In 1592 Cardinal Aldobrandini bore witness that they exposed their goods and their lives to every danger by receiving the priests

Notwithstanding every kind of persecution the followers of the old religion were still very numerous. Cerri reckoned them at 300,000.¹ But Catholics continued to be excluded from all public offices; they were treated now more mildly, now more sternly² and had to buy mere toleration with heavy pecuniary sacrifices. It was hoped that at the peace negotiations of Nymeguen they would secure the right to practice their religion freely, a right from which they were entirely debarred in the seven Provinces; but they failed to obtain it notwithstanding the efforts of the Pope, the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain. One clause of the peace treaty held out some promise to the Catholics of Maastricht, but it was not kept.³ Public churches, distinguishable as such, were not tolerated in the seven old Provinces; Catholics had to be satisfied with churches whose appearance differed in no wise from that of private houses. At Amsterdam, where there were 25,000 Catholics,⁴ one of these "popish meeting places" remains to this day and only recently it was adapted as a kind of Catholic missionary museum.⁵ Nothing can give a more vivid impression of the

into their houses or visiting them in order to receive the sacraments. *Bullet. de la Comm. Royale d'hist.* (Acad. Royale de Belgique), LXXIII. (1904), 393.

¹ Cf. the present work, Vol. XX., 18; XXII., 100

² On the clemency of the authorities towards the Coadjutor Zacharias Mez, see his letter to Alexander VII., of February, 1660, in *MOZZI*, I., 128.

³ HUBERT, 268, 348 *seq.*, 360 *seq.* Cf. above, p. 77.

⁴ See the report of the travels of Pallavicini, nuncio of Cologne, 1676, in *Bijdragen en Mededeelingen v. h. Hist. Genootschap.*, XXXII., Amsterdam, 1911, 92, which says that "la maggior parte" is "assai fervida".

⁵ "Museum Amstelkring," Voorburgwal, 40. Here is also a collection of posters, caricatures and abusive writings directed against the Catholics; directed against the Pope and the Friars is the following lampoon written in French and Dutch: "Caricature. Renversement de la morale chrétienne pas les désordres du monachisme. . . . On le vend en Hollande chez les marchants librairs et images avec privelèges d'Innocent XI."

difficulties with which the Catholics of Holland had to contend in the practice of their faith than a visit to this hallowed spot which bears the name of *Onzen Lieven Heer op den Zolder* [Our good Lord of the corn store]. It was dedicated to St. Nicolas. No one would suspect that the house was a church for it looks very much like most of the houses of the burghers of Amsterdam. A large hall for religious gatherings was obtained by removing floors and ceilings and by narrow galleries round the four sides. One is instinctively reminded of the early Christians in the Catacombs. There are several exits giving on to different streets. In times of special risk the priest said Mass in the sacristy through the door of which he could be seen ; in an emergency it was enough to shut this door to hide the sacred function and the priest was able to escape by some back stairs. The pulpit of the church was so skilfully designed that it could be taken from beneath the altar table and erected in one minute and removed with equal rapidity.

Notwithstanding the religious fervour of the Dutch Catholics the dearth of priests made itself keenly felt.¹ To remedy this an appeal was made to Franciscans, Dominicans, Jesuits and other religious.² At a later date the number of secular priests rose so considerably that by 1665 there were four hundred of them.³ Under Bishop Neercassel there were so many candidates for the priesthood that Rome judged it necessary to order some restriction with a view to the elimination of the unfit.⁴ The Jesuits did excellent work,⁵ hence the anti-Catholic laws were particularly harsh in their regard ; in other ways also they had their fair share of the trials of

¹ In 1592 there were still 400 priests, in 1614 only 170 ; see [DUPAC], 183.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁴ MOZZI, I., 161.

⁵ ALBERDINGK THIJM, *loc. cit.* Cf. the present work, Vol. XXIV., 2 ; XXVI., 125. On the Jesuit missions, 1592-1701, see *Archief voor de Geschiedenis van het Aartsbisdom Utrecht*, 1877, 227 seqq., 254 seqq.

that era of persecution.¹ The number of Catholics, which had amounted to 200,000 under Vosmeer, had risen to over 400,000 by 1670; this increase was due to the return of many Protestants to the old religion.² For controversy with non-Catholics suitable laymen were also employed after they had been specially trained for such work.³ The catechizing of children was mostly done by the so-called *Klopjes*, that is, consecrated maidens, who lived for the most part in their own homes. Their activities were blessed with such important results that the spleen of the Protestants vented itself against them in not a few State edicts.⁴ A seminary erected at Cologne by Vosmeer, which Neercassel transferred to Louvain, ensured a constant supply of well trained priests.⁵ The territories of the States General in southern Holland, which had been gradually added by conquest to the original seven provinces, enjoyed freedom of religion, only public processions and similar functions being forbidden. From time to time indeed the old hatred would flare up momentarily, as in 1668, whilst the Elector of Münster was at war with Holland, but calm returned as soon as Rospigliosi, the internuncio at Brussels, gave an assurance that the Pope disapproved of the action of the Prince-Bishop.⁶ The revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 caused great excitement. In the Provinces of Gröningen, Oberyssel, Geldern, Zeeland, Utrecht, and especially in West Frisia, Catholic worship was suppressed and the priests were thrown into prison. More moderation was observed in the Province of Holland where the Jesuits alone became the butt of the public anger, as they were held responsible for France's measures against the Huguenots.⁷

¹ PONCELET, *La Compagnie de Jésus en Belgique*, s. l. e. d. [1907], 32; IUVENCIUS, l. 17, § 1, n. 21, p. 435; CORDARA, I., 98, n. 50, 151, n. 46, 370, n. 90; II., 55 *seq.*, 106, 201, 511.

² [DUPAC], 185 *seq.* In Amsterdam alone about 30,000; with the Catholics in the States General the number might perhaps be half a million. BLOCK, V., 377.

³ [DUPAC], 190 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 186-190.

⁵ MOZZI, I., 77, 193.

⁶ [DUPAC], 253.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 259 *seqq.*

On the whole, and notwithstanding an occasional outbreak of persecution, the Dutch mission made steady progress under Innocent XI., though conflicts between the Vicars Apostolic and the regulars, more especially the Jesuits, were a serious hindrance. According to Canon Law the Orders were only subject to episcopal authority on certain points, and even this dependence was doubtful in so far as the Netherlands were concerned, since the Vicars Apostolic were not invested with the full prerogatives of Bishops. On the other hand, the religious had taken charge of a number of parishes and as parish priests they were bound to forgo their immunity to some extent. In such a situation it was not easy to avoid all conflicts and differences of opinion. Agreements concluded in 1610, 1624, and 1652¹ unfortunately failed to restore peace. In 1670 Neercassel appealed to Rome, but though he had the support of Louis XIV. and other personages of eminence, not all his demands were complied with, though on some points he obtained a decision in his favour; in particular Cardinal Albizzi, that veteran opponent of the Jansenists, resisted the Dutch demands "like a lion".²

In view of prevailing circumstances, opposition to the Jesuits was almost necessarily bound to drive those who indulged in it into the camp of their enemies, the Jansenists. As a matter of fact nowhere did the new heresy strike deeper roots than in the Netherlands.³ The second Vicar Apostolic was a personal friend of Jansenius and eulogized his *Augustinus*,

¹ Cf. the present work, Vols. XXVI., 126; XXIX., 270. By the compromise of 1652, della Torre granted to the Jesuits by the "concessionnes Ephesinae" an extension of their sphere of action; see BLOCK, V., 328.

² [DUPAC], 228. The thirteen demands of Neercassel are also in *Theologische Quartalschr.*, Tübingen, 1826, 18.

³ "In no place did the masked Calvinism of Port-Royal exercise a more devastating influence than in this country. Elsewhere it went past, here it remains, here it is endemic" (PITRA, in NIPPOLD, 31). Of Dutch Calvinism "the starting-point is hatred of the Friars, its instrument the so-called Chapter of Utrecht, its fundamental spirit, avarice" (PITRA, *ibid.*, 29 seq.).

though this was previous to the prohibition of the book by Urban VIII.¹ From that time onward a certain attachment to Jansenism lingered on,² but it only appeared more clearly during the term of office of the Vicar Apostolic Neercassel.

John Neercassel,³ a native of Gorkum, entered Bérulle's Oratory; for a time he taught philosophy at Saumur and theology at Malines. The Vicar Apostolic, della Torre, charged him with the administration of the greater part of the district of Utrecht; he retained this position under the Vicar Apostolic Baldwin Catz. In 1663 he succeeded the latter, having been consecrated Bishop of Castoria the year before.

Bérulle's Oratory had the reputation of being a centre of Jansenism.⁴ Neercassel, at any rate, professed the most enthusiastic veneration for Port-Royal and the Jansenist leaders. For this reason it was a misfortune for the Dutch mission that it was precisely during his term of office that some of the chief personages of the sect sought a refuge in Holland. During that time these refugees gained such an ascendancy over the Dutch clergy that they brought about a complete change in the latter's state of mind. Thus the ground was prepared for a schism.⁵ The Vicar Apostolic

¹ MOZZI, I., 196 *seqq.* Cf. KNUIF-DE JONG, *Rovenius*, Utrecht, 1926.

² MOZZI, I., 201; RAPIN, *Mém.*, I., 84.

³ BATTEREL, III., 209-239; *cf.* II., 375; MOZZI, I., 126, 129, 143, 188. Numerous letters by him, mostly to Jansenists, in ARNAULD, *Œuvres*, II., *passim*, and IV., 155-184.

⁴ The internuncio of Flanders says on October 13, 1657, that the Oratorians of Brussels had the letter of the provincial reprinted in Holland; that they were in close communication with the French Oratorians and bought all that was printed in favour of the Jansenist doctrines. "Questi Padri dell'Oratorio sono per lo più pessimi Jansenisti." *Extracta e codice s. Inquisitionis continente acta anni 1657*, f. 1017.

⁵ The Vicar-General of the Archbishop of Malines and subsequent Bishop of Bruges, Van Susteren, who had to conduct the process against Quesnel, says: "Antequam illi famosi profugi

was largely responsible for this change. When Antoine Arnauld thought of fleeing to the Netherlands, Neercassel had a letter written "to this most holy man", to the effect that "he would be received like an angel from heaven", and he used the most exuberant language when Arnauld finally arrived.¹ To the Maurist Gerberon, who was forced to live out of France because of his Jansenist opinions, Neercassel assigned the parish of Rotterdam, one of the most important posts

e Gallia : Arnauld, du Vaucel, Gerberon, Quesnel et eis adhaerentes, in Hollandiam advenerint, . . . clerus illic erat Christi bonus odor, ac ipse et grex ipsi commissus unum corpus et unus spiritus . . . ; gloriae ducebant omnes, ab acatholicis Pontificii sive Papistae vocari. . . . At a tempore, quo viri illi profugi . . . vineam illam subintraverunt ac demoliti sunt," changed everything to the contrary. [FONTANA], *Constitutio Unigenitus theologica propugnata*, IV., Romae, 1724, 617 s.

¹ " Scripsit ad me D. Vivier, sanctissimum virum Dom Arnaldum, dum saevit tempestas, se in Hollandia velle a vento celare. Potes ei significare, quod ipsum tamquam angelum Dei [Gal., 4, 14] excipiemus " (Neercassel to Picqueri, dated February 8, 1680, in MOZZI, I., 204). " Virum, quem ob fidei integritatem, ob doctrinae altitudinem, ob variam reconditamque eruditionem, et praesertim ob mores ab omni fastu, ambitione et cupiditate alienissimos semper summa cum observantia colui, tandem . . . in aedibus meis accipere merui. Omnes, qui mecum sunt, se eius contubernio felices existimant. . . . Ecclesiastici, qui mihi cohabitant, pendent ab ore eius etc." (to Pontchâteau, dated July 17, 1686, in ARNAULD, *Œuvres*, IV., 156). Other remarks of Neercassel to Arnauld: " Sapientiam habes ut angelus Dei [2 Reg., 14, 20] (dated July 6, 1681, *ibid.* [71]); " Je me console en m'assurant que je suis in corde tuo ad convivendum et commoriendum [2 Cor., 7, 3] " (dated August 17, 1684, *ibid.*, 448). Cf. [DUPAC], 456: " M. Arnauld y avoit été reçu, en 1680, comme un ange de Dieu par M. de Neercassel. . . . Il y avoit alors près de 20 ans que ce prélat entretenoit déjà avec cet illustre persécuté un intime commerce de lettres. C'étoit par son canal et par celui de M. l'abbé de Pontchâteau que M. de Neercassel avoit contracté une union des plus cordiales avec tout ce qu'on appelle Messieurs de Port-Royal et avec les plus illustres évêques, qui leur étoient unis."

he disposed of.¹ Besides Arnauld, another Jansenist refugee, Quesnel, also exercised considerable influence on the Vicar Apostolic. Previous to his last tour of visitation he expressed to the author of the *Reflexions Morales* his regret² that on account of his absence he would not be able to show him all the attention that he would have wished to bestow on him. The two Jansenist leaders were part authors of a book by Neercassel which at the latter's death was prohibited by Rome until it should have been amended.³ Quesnel translated it into French, and in so doing applied his "Christian rhetoric", by which he meant the art of disguising the real ideas of the book in such wise that the censors could not get hold of them.⁴ Some of the appendices are from Arnauld's pen⁵ whilst some of the subject matter of the book is due to his inspiration.⁶

The death of Neercassel was the signal for the beginning of the nefarious activities of the so-called metropolitan Chapter of Utrecht. In Catholic days the Chapters of five Utrecht churches numbered together about one hundred and

¹ CH. FILLIÂTRE, *Gerberon Bénédictin Janséniste* in *Revue hist.*, CXLVI. (1924), 9.

² April 18, 1686, in MOZZI, I., 204.

³ REUSCH, II., 535; HURTER, IV.³, 414. Innocent XI. is supposed to have said that the book (on the administration of the Sacrament of Penance) was a very good one and the author a saint (ARNAULD, *loc. cit.*, II., 661; Du Vaucel to Neercassel, March 16, 1686, in *Acta et decreta secundae synodi prov. Ultraiecentensis*, 466, where eulogies of the book by Cardinal Grimaldi, Casoni, etc., are recorded; WENZELBURGER, in *Hist. Zeitschr.*, XXXIV. [1875], 257). Innocent XI., however, did not permit the free circulation of the book, hence MOZZI (I., 193), with good reason, questions the authenticity of the remark ascribed to the Pope.

⁴ Quesnel to Neercassel, January 1, 1684, in A. LE ROY, *Un Janséniste en exil: Corresp. de Pasquier Quesnel*, I., Paris 1909, 34. Cf. ALLARD, in *Studiën*, LIX. (1902), 214 *seqq.*

⁵ Neercassel to Arnauld, January 8, 1683, in ARNAULD, *Œuvres*, II., 184.

⁶ MOZZI, I., 192. Also something "ad Wallonii [= Du Vaucel] suggestionem" (ARNAULD, *loc. cit.*, 179).

forty Canons. Under the Republic the Chapters passed into Protestant hands and by 1633 there only remained some twenty Catholic Canons.¹ From these twenty Rovenius chose five and constituted them, together with a few other priests, into the so-called "Vicariate", that is, a council whose duty it was to assist the Vicar Apostolic in the discharge of his duties.² Della Torre conceived the idea of making this council a permanent institution,³ with power to add to its numbers by election. All the higher posts, including that of Vicar Apostolic, were to be reserved to its members. However, in consequence of della Torre's mental illness, Rome declared null and void all the dispositions made by him in the course of the last five years of his life, including the confirmation of the Vicariate⁴; in fact the very next confirmation by Neercassel does not even mention it.⁵

Up to this time it had never entered anyone's head, not even Neercassel's, to consider the Vicariate as a formal metropolitan Chapter enjoying the rights of such a body.⁶ After Neercassel's death it showed signs of a desire to claim such rights. The very first step on this path proved disastrous. In virtue of a papal Indult, Neercassel had appointed two pro-Vicars for the conduct of business in the event of his death; they were Codde for Utrecht, and Cousebant for Haarlem. Thirty-four days after Neercassel's death, and on its own authority, the Vicariate elected Codde as Vicar General, without considering that such an election can only be validly made within eight days of a Bishop's death; in addition it attributed to Codde powers such as even a properly constituted metropolitan Chapter could not have conferred.⁷

Twelve days after Neercassel's death the two self-styled Chapters of Utrecht and Haarlem met at Gonda and proposed

¹ Mozzi, I., 100, 105.

² The instrument of erection, November 9, 1633, *ibid.*, 114 *seq.*

³ Decree of July 9, 1658, *ibid.*, 130 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁵ April 17, 1667, *ibid.*, 185 *seqq.*

⁶ *Ibid.*, 186.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 205 *seqq.*

to Rome, for the post of Vicar Apostolic, Hugh Francis Van Heussen, a Canon of Utrecht ¹ whom Neercassel was wont to call his "Timothy" ² and whom he had desired as early as 1682 to have for his coadjutor. Arnauld did his utmost for him with his Roman friends Du Vaucel and Casoni ³ whilst the Dutch religious worked against him.⁴ His nomination met with opposition in Rome because he denied papal infallibility and his teaching offended in other respects also. Du Vaucel advised him to make a written profession of faith, not indeed in the infallibility of the Pope, but at least in that of the Holy See or the Roman Church. He hoped that Rome would overlook the fact that the inerrancy of the Roman See was not generally understood in the sense that it embraced every single occupant of that See.⁵ In the end Van Heussen was dropped, though the Cardinals were not at first unfavourably disposed towards him.⁶

As the delay in the appointment of a new head of the mission grew longer and longer, it was decided in Holland to send to Rome Theodore Cock for the purpose of hastening it. Though Cock saw Arnauld, Quesnel and Nicole whilst on his way, he was a man of upright character and in perfectly good faith in his attachment to Jansenist opinions and personalities.⁷ In Rome he very quickly won the goodwill of

¹ *Ibid.*, 216.

² "Car c'est le nom qu'il [Neercassel] avoit accoutumé de lui donner." Arnauld to Casoni, *Œuvres*, II., 676.

³ *Ibid.*, 674, 686, 696, 722, 763, 772.

⁴ MOZZI, I., 221 ss., 224.

⁵ Je ne sçai si dans les circonstances on est obligé de répondre d'une manière si claire et si précise, et si l'on ne peut pas se contenter de ne rien dire dans le fond qui soit contraire à la vérité, et au sentiment que l'on a, encore qu'on prévoie que ceux, à qui l'on parle, ne comprendront pas entièrement notre pensée, et qu'ils expliqueront nos paroles en un sens, qui favorisera l'opinion, dont ils sont prévenus" (Du Vaucel to Arnauld, 2 novembre, 1686, in MOZZI, I., 230 seq.). Arnauld is against the formula (to Du Vaucel, October 9, 1686, *Œuvres*, II., 722 seq.).

⁶ MOZZI, I., 227, 242.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 248.

leading circles, and since he declined the dignity of a Vicar Apostolic for himself, it was conferred on the Oratorian Peter Codde, at Cock's recommendation and on his responsibility. This choice, made by Cardinals Altieri, Ottoboni, Azzolini, Casanata, Howard and Colonna, was confirmed by a Brief of Innocent XI. dated October 9th, 1688, and on February 6th, 1689, Codde received episcopal consecration at the hands of the Archbishop of Malines.¹

It was an evil omen that this nomination was hailed with enthusiasm by the Dutch Jansenists,² and it was a far worse one that Codde refused to subscribe to the formula of Alexander VII. previous to his consecration. The nuncio for Flanders had had no instructions to demand it from him, so he did not insist.³ Like Neercassel, Codde was an Oratorian and as such he had studied under Jansenist teachers.⁴ Quesnel, who had come to know him early,⁵ described him after his (Codde's) death, as his most trusted and most illustrious friend in Holland.⁶ The consequences for the Dutch mission of the election of such a head, were to appear only under Innocent XI.'s successors.

(3.)

In England Catholics formed a by no means insignificant minority but, to Innocent XI.'s great sorrow,⁷ they could only practise their religion at grave peril to themselves although Charles II., and even more so his brother, the Duke of York,

¹ *Ibid.*, 250 *seq.*, 252.

² *Ibid.*, 253.

³ *Ibid.*, 257, 265.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 256. The Vicar Apostolic, De la Torre, was also an Oratorian; *cf.* BATTEREL, II., 483.

⁵ Quesnel to Du Breuil, August, 1690, in LE ROY, I., 157, to Cardinal Noris, in MOZZI, I., 256.

⁶ "le plus solide et le plus illustre ami que j'eusse en ce pays." Quesnel to his sister, December 20, 1710, in LE ROY, II., 311.

⁷ *Cf.* the correspondence in BOJANI, I., 191 *seqq.*

who became a Catholic in 1672, were well disposed towards them. In these circumstances the idea of the adherents of the old religion plotting against the King was utterly preposterous, yet a lying report that such a plot had been discovered met with willing credence on the part of the usually level-headed English public.¹ The fact that the author of the calumny, one Titus Oates, was hardly a man to inspire confidence, was readily overlooked. Beginning as an Anabaptist under Cromwell, Oates had become an Anglican minister at the Restoration; then, posing as a convert, he sought to find out the alleged secrets of the Jesuits but was expelled from their English College at Valladolid in 1677, and from that of St. Omer in 1678. Resolved to revenge himself on the Fathers, he came forward, in August 1678, with a statement that on April 27th he had assisted at a meeting of English Jesuits in a public house in the Strand in London, and that in this way he had come to know of a popish plot for the assassination of Charles II., the massacre of the Protestants and the restoration of the Pope's authority in England. In the course of his first interrogatory Oates became involved in so many contradictions that Charles II. declared he did not believe one word of his allegations. However, the worthless man was well served by an accident. A justice of the peace, Sir Edmundbury Godfrey, before whom Oates had sworn to the statements which the court had refused to take seriously, was murdered during the month of

¹ Cf., for what follows, LINGARD, XII., 129 *seqq.*; RANKE, *Engl. Gesch.*, V., 234, 250 *seqq.*; KLOPP, *Stuart*, II., 165 *seqq.*, 172 *seq.*, 181 *seq.*, 191 *seq.*; BROSCHE, *Gesch. Englands*, VII., 439 *seqq.*; J. POLLOCK, *The Popish Plot*, London, 1903 (also J. GERARD, in *The Month*, CII. [1903], 2-23, 132-143; A. ZIMMERMANN, *Das papistische Komplott in England und die Schreckensherrschaft der Whigs*, in *Wissensch. Beilage of the Germania*, Berlin, 1910, No. 16-17; *Hist. Zeitschr.*, CX., 157 *seqq.*; the acts of the provincial congregation of the Jesuits, May 4, 1678, in *The Month*, CII. (1903), 311-16; ABBOT, in *Engl. Hist. Rev.*, XXV, (1910), 126 *seq.*; SPILLMANN, *Die Blutzweigen aus den Tagen der Titus-Oates Verschwörung*, Freiburg, 1901.

October. Forthwith the cry went up that the authors of the deed were the papists and the Jesuits who were anxious to prevent an inquiry. A panic seized the capital for Oates, who had become the darling of the Whigs, was continually making fresh revelations. The houses of all Catholics were searched for weapons, troops were levied, women went so far as to hide daggers under their pillows so as to be prepared for the murderous papists.¹

In the midst of this excitement Parliament met on October 21st. Without any investigation both Houses agreed that the papists had conceived a diabolical plot, a plot that was still being hatched, its object being the assassination of the King and the uprooting of Protestantism. It was resolved that no one should have seat or vote in either the Upper or the Lower House unless he had first taken the oaths of allegiance and supremacy and declared in writing that he reprobated belief in transubstantiation, worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary and the Mass, as superstitious practices. It was with the utmost difficulty that the King's brother, the Duke of York, was excepted from the obligations of this bill. By this exclusion the main purpose of the whole law was nullified. However, thirty-one peers lost their seats in the Upper House when Charles II. gave his assent to the bill.

Meanwhile numerous arrests of Catholics had taken place, though all protested their innocence. Since according to the law of England, an accusation of high treason must be substantiated by two witnesses, it was necessary to find a second accuser. He was discovered in the person of William Bedloe who, as regards villainy, yielded in nothing to Oates.² Though his accusations were even more outrageous, they were accepted at their face value.²

What followed constitutes a shameful page in the history of England. As a result of a judicial procedure which was a mockery of all justice, a number of wholly innocent people were, within the space of four years, condemned to the ghastly

¹ See CAMPANA DE CAVELLI, I., 239.

² Opinion of BROSCH (VII., 441).

form of execution which the law inflicted on those guilty of treason. Among them were eleven Jesuits, three Franciscans, one Benedictine, four secular priests, several laymen, one of them being the aged Earl of Stafford. The number of Catholics thrown into prison amounted to two thousand.¹ The weak King did nothing to put a stop to these judicial murders, nor did he make any use of the prerogative of mercy because he had reason to fear a popular rising.

The last victim of the persecution occasioned by the odious calumnies of Titus Oates was Oliver Plunkett, Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of Ireland. This splendid prelate had already been obliged to flee in 1672, in consequence of the edicts of the viceroy Essex against Catholic priests, when he was forced to live in the utmost destitution. With the return of better days for the Catholic Church in Ireland, one of the main objects of his solicitude was the Irish Colleges on the Continent. He also successfully resisted the spread of Jansenism in Ireland. In 1679 he was cast into a Dublin gaol by the viceroy Ormond. In 1680 he was taken in chains to London where he was put on his trial on a trumped-up charge of treason and of having had dealings with France. All the efforts of Innocent XI., the Emperor Leopold and the Catholic ambassadors on his behalf, were in vain. Lying witnesses gave evidence against him and on their depositions he was condemned to death. The sentence was carried out on July 11th, 1681, the martyr being cut down from the gallows whilst still alive, his heart torn out and burnt before his eyes, after which he was beheaded. Plunkett met his death with the same calm and resignation to God's will as so many had done before him.²

¹ Cf. DE COURSON, *La persécution des catholiques en Angleterre*, Paris, 1898. Innocent XI. ordered prayers to be said in Rome for the persecuted English Catholics; see **Avvisi* of March 18 and May 27, 1679, Vat. Library.

² MORAN. *Life of O. Plunkett*, Dublin, 1895. Plunkett was beatified on May 23, 1930, on which occasion C. SALOTTI published a *Vita*, important for its new documents (Roma, 1920). On the

Charles II. successfully thwarted the designs of the Whigs who wished to exclude his brother from the succession ; hence after the King's unexpected death on February 6th, 1685, the latter succeeded him under the title of James II.¹ The new King was a fervent Catholic and did not disguise the fact. His ambition to liberate his co-religionists from the inhuman laws under which he himself had had to suffer was as praiseworthy as it was intelligible. However, as things were, such an aim demanded the utmost prudence and moderation,² qualities in which James II. was conspicuously lacking. Instead of taking into account the prejudices against the Catholic Church, the Holy See and the Jesuits, which were deeply ingrained in the minds of the majority of Englishmen, he seemed willing to provoke them unnecessarily. In

fate of the bones of Plunket, see the account of Cardinal Gasquet, in *Corriere d' Italia*, May 22, 1920.

¹ Charles II. was secretly a Catholic and he died a Catholic ; see *Civ. Catt.*, 5th series, VI. (1863), 388, 697 *seqq.* ; VII., 268, 415 *seqq.*, 671 *seqq.* Cf. CAMPANA DE CAVELLI, II., I *seqq.* ; BERTHIER, II., 239 ; RANKE, *Engl. Gesch.*, V.³, 369 *seq.* A. W. WARD also writes (*Dictionary of Nat. Biogr.*, X., 103) : " Charles II. died a professed Catholic. . . . Shortly after his marriage he sent Sir Richard Bellings to Rome, one of whose commissions was to propose to Pope Alexander VII. terms upon which the king and the nation should be reconciled to Rome." The nuncio of Brussels was allowed by Charles to visit London *incognito*. His report of 1670 to Propaganda is in LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 153 *seqq.* ZIMMERMANN (*Wissensch. Beilage der Germania*, 1910, No. 31) says : " Charles' conversion was a death-bed conversion ; therefore to regard it as an act of hypocrisy or insincerity is very rash."

² This was also the opinion of Bevilacqua, who had been sent to Nymeguen by Innocent XI., and who, before his departure, exhorted the Catholics " a vivere con modestia religiosa e veramente cattolica, se volevano rendere durabile la tolleranza che da' magistrati era loro promessa " ; see " *Relazione del trattato di pace conclusa a Nimvega da Msgr. Bevilacqua, Nunzio plenipotentiaro, presentata a N. S. P. Innocenzo XI.", *Barb.* 5176, Vatican Library.

this way his policy, the aim of which was to restore the ancient Church in England, became a danger and a disaster for her.¹

James II.'s absolutist tendencies were particularly unfortunate precisely from this point of view. Like Louis XIV., James II. identified the ideas of kingship and religion; in fact he considered them as an inseparable whole. This confusion spoilt all his efforts for the return of England to the ancient Church, and many means employed by him in furtherance of that end were similarly tainted. James had pledged his royal word that he would maintain the Church of England and the State in accordance with the existing Constitution. In course of time, however, it became increasingly clear that he attached a very different meaning to his words and that he was desirous of using his authority to rule after the manner of Louis XIV., in a wholly unconstitutional fashion. In virtue of his supremacy over the established Church he sought to bring it into harmony with his own ideas; even episcopal sees were bestowed on men who secretly professed Catholicism.² This action of the King had by no means the approval of all Catholics; he was supported only by an overzealous party which he trusted implicitly. The most eminent of these advisers were Edward Petre, a Jesuit originating from northern France, and the Earl of Sunderland.³ The voices of these men silenced those

¹ Cf. ZIMMERMANN, *Jakob II. und seine Bemühungen betreffs Wiederherstellung der Kath. Kirche in England* in *Röm. Quartalschr.*, XIX., 2 (1905), 58 *seqq.*

² See KLOPP, *Stuart*, III., 199 *seqq.*

³ E. Petre has, without doubt, been much calumniated and his correspondence with La Chaize is a forgery; see DUHR, in *Zeitschr. für Kath. Theol.*, X. (1886), 677 *seqq.*; XI. (1887), 25 *seqq.*, 209 *seqq.*, and *Jesuitenfabeln*, 167 *seqq.*; however, A. ZIMMERMANN, in the same periodical, XVIII. (1894), 382 *seqq.*, maintains that DUHR went too far in his defence of Petre and that the latter could not be cleared not only from the accusation of imprudence and inconsistency, but not even from the suspicion of unlawful ambition.

of sensible Catholics, both native and foreign, as well as those of the Spanish, the imperial and the Tuscan ambassadors. In vain also another Jesuit, Fr. Simons, raised a warning voice to the effect that the Church and the Chair of Peter could not allow evil to be done that good might come out of it.¹

Roman opinion on the subject may be gathered from a contemporary document, viz. an Instruction for a papal plenipotentiary in England, which reminds him that greater freedom for the ancient Church in England could only be obtained by means that were in harmony with the Gospel. What was wanted was the appointment of good Bishops and the formation of a good clergy which would have to be satisfied with mere toleration. The past had sufficiently shown that in England neither violence nor political influence would lead to the desired goal. Neither the secular nor the regular clergy must have much to do with the court, nor must they meddle with secular affairs; above all they must on no account create the impression that they intended to violate the constitution of the country.²

These views also inspired the policy of Innocent XI. His action remained throughout within the boundaries of moderation and prudence. The wish of James II. that the Catholics of England should have a Vicar Apostolic of their own was complied with on August 6th, 1685, by the nomination of John Leyburn, titular Bishop of Hadrumetum.³ The Pope likewise granted the King's wish for the dispatch of a

¹ KLOPP, *Stuart*, III., 200.

² See " *Ricordi da darsi ad un ministro pontificio e da suggerire da parte di Sua Santità alla Maestà del Re della Gran Bretagna ", in RANKE, *Engl. Gesch.*, VI.³, 151, who, however, does not give the source of the document.

³ See BERTHIER, II., 245. On January 30, 1688, Innocent XI. associated to Leyburn three other Vicars and Bishops " in partibus "; see MEJER, II., 48 *seq.* By the **Cifra* of November 26, 1687, Innocent explained his joy to nuncio Adda that the Vicar Apostolic had confirmed more than 23,000 of the faithful. *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 15, Pap. Sec. Archives.

confidential agent to London by appointing to the post Count Ferdinando d'Adda of Milan.¹ The latter was, however, instructed not to appear from the first as an ecclesiastic and still less as a papal nuncio, for this would have led at once to a conflict with English law, and would have been interpreted as a challenge to an excited population. Adda arrived in London on November 16th, 1685. He began by calling upon the Spanish ambassador, Pedro Ronquillo, and Bishop Leyburn, who took him at once into the King's presence. James agreed with the Pope that at first Adda should only appear as a distinguished foreigner who had come to study English life.² On January 5th, 1686, the Cardinal Secretary of State impressed on Adda that on no account must he pose as a papal nuncio; whether he should wear clerical or lay attire for the time being was left to his discretion.³ Adda, who promptly won the King's confidence, was not content with this modest rôle; his ambition was to obtain the status of an ambassador. In March, 1686, the Pope felt compelled to yield on this point,⁴ because in the meantime James II. had accredited an ambassador to Rome in the person of Lord Castlemaine. The choice of such a man is an example of the extraordinary ineptitude of the King; for though Castlemaine had endured imprisonment during the Titus Oates plot, his violent character alone rendered him singularly

¹ BERTHIER, II., 252. Cf. **Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 10-14 ("Lettere di Msg. Nunzio in Londra, 1685-1689"), 15 ("Cifve con Msg. d'Adda, Nunzio in Londra, dal 1685 a tutto il 1689"), 16 ("Registro di lettere scritte a Msg. Nunzio in Inghilterra, 1686, a 9 Aprile, 1689"), 17 ("Minute orig. di lettere scritte per la segret. di stato a Msg. d'Adda dal 1686 a tutto il 1689"), 20 ("Varia, 1679-1700"), Pap. Sec. Archives. Copies in British Museum, London. His reports were published from these by MACKINTOSH, *Hist. of the Revolution*, App.

² *Report of Adda, dated November 19, 1685, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 10, Pap. Sec. Archives; *letter of Adda, dated Milan, October 17, 1685, on his journey, *ibid.*

³ **Lettera* of Cibo to Adda, dated January 5, 1686, *ibid.*, 16.

⁴ **Lettera* of Cibo to Adda, dated March 23, 1686, *ibid.*

unfit for the rôle of a diplomatist. Moreover, as was pointed out by the French ambassador, the curse of ridicule handicapped the mission of a man whose name was so little known as far as he himself was concerned, but so very notorious on account of his wife, for as everybody knew, the latter had been Charles II.'s mistress, with the consent of her husband.¹ To a man of such strict moral principles as Innocent XI., such a personage could hardly be acceptable. The pomp displayed by Castlemaine who, however, in this respect acted on the King's orders,² likewise displeased the Pope. On top of everything Castlemaine, who had his first audience jointly with Cardinal Norfolk on April 19th, 1686,³ soon presented two petitions which, as the King knew from a letter of the Pope,⁴ were unacceptable to the Pontiff, namely the cardinalate for Rinaldo d'Este and the episcopal dignity for Fr. Petre.⁵ When the Pope refused Castlemaine became more and more insistent ; on July 26th he announced that if Rinaldo d'Este were not given the red hat he would have to take his departure.⁶ The Pope was in no wise perturbed by this announcement, though in September he deemed it expedient to comply with the request of the King of England as far as Este was concerned,⁷ but he would not hear of the elevation of Petre to the episcopal dignity. To do so, he repeatedly explained, would be to go against the rules of the Society of Jesus which had stood the test of experience ; these rules permitted its members to accept ecclesiastical dignity only by way of exception and at the express bidding of the Pope. He would never lend a

¹ KLOPP, *Stuart*, III., 123.

² BROSCII, *Engl. Gesch.*, VII., 521.

³ See the report in *Arch. stor. Lomb.*, 2nd series, VI. (1889), 39. Here (35) also on Castlemaine's arrival in Rome, April 13, 1686.

⁴ BERTHIER, II., 260.

⁵ *Letter of Cibo to Adda, dated May 25, 1686, *loc. cit.*

⁶ See **Cifra* al conte d'Adda, dated July 27, 1686, *ibid.*

⁷ See **Cifra* al conte d'Adda, dated September 17, 1686, *ibid.* Cf. above, p. 419.

hand to such a breach of discipline and he had refused a similar request by King Sobieski of Poland.¹

In James' own interest the Pope also at first declined a further demand of the King, namely Adda's elevation to the full rank of a nuncio. For a hundred years, he explained, the English people had not seen a papal nuncio; in view of the excitement prevailing throughout the land, the presence of such a personage would raise a storm against the King,² but as both Castlemaine and Adda kept reverting to the matter, Innocent XI. announced towards the end of 1686 that the nomination of the nuncio would follow as soon as Castlemaine should have been publicly received as English ambassador.³ This solemn function took place on January 8th, 1687. Castlemaine drove to the Vatican with great pomp and was received in public audience as ambassador of James II., King of England, Scotland, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith.⁴ Already in October, 1686, this peculiar diplomatist had been tactless enough, at the audience in which he thanked the Pope for having granted the purple to d'Este, to renew

¹ Cf. *Cifra al conte d'Adda, dated October 27, 1686, *loc. cit.* The negative reply to Sobieski with regard to Fr. Vota, of August 10, 1680, in BERTHIER, II., 285.

² *Letter of Cibo to Adda of June 22, 1686, *loc. cit.*

³ *Letter of Cibo to Adda of December 7, 1686, *ibid.* Adda's nomination as nuncio extraordinary was made only on May 24, 1687 (BERTHIER, II., 351). Adda, now Archbishop of Amasia, was received in solemn audience by the King in July, 1687 (*cf.* RANKE, VIII., 286), and honoured with great ostentation, a circumstance that was bound to rouse protestant prejudice; see KLOPP, III., 320 *seq.*

⁴ Cf. the rare essay of GIOV. MICHELE WRIT, adorned with copperplate engravings, by Arn. van Westerhout: *Ragguaglio della solenne comparsa fatta in Roma gli otto di Gennaio 1687 dall'Ill. et Ecc. signor Conte di Castelmaine, ambasciatore straordinario della Sagra real Maestà di Giacomo secondo Re d'Inghilterra, Scozia, Francia et Ibernia, difensore della fede, alla S. S. apostolica in andare pubblicamente all'udienza della S. di N. S. Papa Innocenzo XI., Roma (Ercole), 1687.*

the request for a mitre for Petre, a request that was of course in vain.¹ He now began to renew his demand for this favour in his private audiences.² The Pope told him that he could not possibly depart from his principles in this matter. If the King proposed some other priest he would be very willing to comply with his request. Castlemaine repeated his demand in February.³ At the end of March he even took the liberty of addressing reproaches to the Head of the Church, upon which the Pope observed with some heat that he must refrain from again mentioning the matter.⁴ Even this did not stop him. In April Castlemaine imagined that he might attain his end by threatening to break off diplomatic relations. He drew up a memorial full of reproaches against the Pope who never gratified any of the wishes of his sovereign; all he could do would be to go home, after which the nuncio would also have to leave London. This threat produced no effect whatever. On April 26th, 1687, the importunate petitioner was told that if the King considered that Adda's presence no longer served a useful purpose, Adda would take his departure, but only after first declaring that it was solely in answer to a formal request on the part of James II. that the Pope had dispatched and accredited him as nuncio.⁵ A separate memorial was drawn up to refute Castlemaine's assertions that the Pope had granted to other princes favours which he refused to James II. The opinion of the Cardinal Secretary of State on Castlemaine's ill-starred document was to the effect that the writer was lacking both in experience

¹ *Letter of Cibo to Adda, October 12, 1686, *Nunziat. d'Inghilterra*, 16, Pap. Sec. Archives.

² *Letter of Cibo to Adda, January 14, 1687, *ibid.*

³ **Cifra* al D'Adda of February 27, 1687, *ibid.*

⁴ **Cifra* al D'Adda of March 25, 1687, *ibid.*

⁵ " *S. Stà vuole che ella venendo il caso che il Re non mostrasse di gradire la sua residenza costì, si dichiari prima che la Stà Sua l'ha inviata, trattenuta e promossa al grado di Nuntio in cotesto regno coll'unico motivo di compiacere al desiderio et all'istanza di S. Mtà, e poi ch'ella si ritiri di cotesta corte." *Cifra* of April 26, 1687, *ibid.*

and judgment.¹ Nor was that all. The Cardinal clearly establishes the fact that the Pope had never given Castlemaine as much as "the shadow of a hope" that his request on behalf of Fr. Petre would be granted; if Castlemaine asserted the contrary he affirmed what was not true.²

Meanwhile, James II. himself had come to realize that the appointment of a diplomatic representative had been a great mistake. After Castlemaine's recall he made another appointment in the person of John Lytcott, but the latter's status was merely that of an agent.³ He was instructed to offer excuses for Castlemaine's memorial, but at the same time to renew the demand for Petre's elevation to the episcopate. The Pope replied that he would forget the memorial but the renewed demand for Petre encountered the same obstacles, for at no time had an ecclesiastical dignity been conferred on a Jesuit at the request of a secular prince.⁴ Though it seems incredible, documentary evidence exists to show that the King, who was as obstinate as he was inconsiderate, nevertheless continued his fruitless efforts on behalf of Petre.⁵ In the autumn of 1687 he even conceived the notion of securing, not an episcopal see, but a Cardinal's hat for Petre.⁶ When this request was also rejected the King is said to have gone so far as to observe that one might be a good Roman Catholic whilst doing without the Holy See.⁷ At the same time he made

¹ **Cifra* al D'Adda of June 28, 1687, *ibid.*

² **Cifra* al D'Adda of June 7, 1687, *ibid.*

³ Cf. BERTHIER, II., 352.

⁴ *Letter of Cibo to Adda of August 16, 1687, *loc. cit.*, 20, where also is the *Letter of James II. to Innocent XI. (for Petre), June 16, 1687. Cf. the Brief of August 16, 1687, in BERTHIER, II., 359.

⁵ **Cifra* al D'Adda of December 6, 1687, *loc. cit.* Cf. BERTHIER, II., 378.

⁶ Cf. **Cifra* al D'Adda of November 1, 1687, *loc. cit.*

⁷ See CAMPANA DE CAVELLI, II., 148. ZIMMERMANN (*Röm. Quartalschr.*, XIX., 2, 80) remarks very aptly that in his views on the relations between Church and State, James II. was much more Gallican than ultramontane.

it his business to honour Petre by other means. On November 11th, 1687, the Jesuit was made the King's confidant and a member of the Privy Council.¹ Among the many preposterous means adopted by the purblind monarch with a view to promoting Catholicism in England, this was assuredly the most foolish of all. As the King's confidant, Petre was in a position to influence directly all ecclesiastical appointments in England, and as a member of the Privy Council he played a decisive part in the secular and ecclesiastical government of the country. Even those ambassadors who were most favourably disposed towards the King did not approve this arrangement. The Emperor's representative wrote that the King's action was all the more lacking in prudence as the very name of Jesuit was an abomination to Englishmen who now feared nothing less than utter ruin both for their persons and their property.² The Tuscan envoy made similar reports on the excitement and fear prevailing among people of every class and degree. In this connexion it is interesting to learn that English Catholics also lamented the excessive zeal of the King; they too believed that James II. aimed at the same despotism as that practised by Louis XIV., which no English Catholic would countenance.³

That the King had before him the example of France, whose chief ministers were also Cardinals, is proved by the obstinacy with which he sought to obtain the purple for Petre. As the Holy See would not yield on this point he made a veritable scene to the papal nuncio at the beginning of 1688. The Pope's offer to raise some other Englishman to the cardinalate was rejected with the remark that in the whole Kingdom there was no more suitable candidate than Petre.⁴

¹ CAMPANA DE CAVELLI, II., 150.

² KLOPP, *Stuart*, III., 397 *seq.*

³ See Teriesi's reports in CAMPANA DE CAVELLI, II., 153 *seq.*

⁴ See Sarotti's letters of January 2 and 9, 1688, in BROSCHE, *Engl. Gesch.*, VII., 523. On February 14, 1688, Innocent XI. had again to give a refusal to James II. with regard to Fr. Petre; BERTHIER, II., 388.

For all that, James refused to follow the latter's advice when, in a most weighty affair, Petre counselled mildness instead of severity.¹ Heedless of the representations of thoughtful Catholics who declared they preferred toleration guaranteed by statute to a privileged but illegal and precarious position,² James made use, in April 1688, of the dispensing power which he had already exercised the year before, in virtue of which he suspended all penal laws in the religious sphere. At the same time he commanded all Anglican clergymen to read this declaration from the pulpit on May 20th. Seven Bishops, headed by Sancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate, protested that they could not comply with such a command since the royal declaration was based on the dispensing power which Parliament had described as illegal. As they remained obstinate James ordered criminal proceedings to be taken against them, notwithstanding the efforts of Petre and Sunderland to dissuade him from such a step. There followed an agitation such as London had not witnessed for a long time, the excitement growing steadily whilst the trial was in progress. The result was the acquittal of the Bishops and a serious defeat for the King. The Dissenters, whom James II. had won over to his side for a short period by his toleration, now also went over to his opponents.³ Too late the unhappy monarch regretted his mistake in not granting an amnesty on the occasion of the birth of an heir to the crown on July 1st, 1688.⁴ By that time the Stuarts were lost. The day after the acquittal of the seven Bishops seven noblemen, both Whigs and Tories, invited William of Orange, the Protestant husband of James' Protestant daughter Mary, who had until

¹ KLOPP, *Stuart*, IV., 27.

² Bonrepaux' report in MACAULAY, III., 75.

³ BROSCHE, *Engl. Gesch.*, VII., 536 *seqq.*, 547 *seqq.*

⁴ KLOPP, IV., 51, and ZIMMERMANN, in *Röm. Quartalschr.*, XIX., 2, 73. The Pope's congratulations in BERTHIER, II., 399, 403, 411. *Discourse of Innocent XI. in the consistory of July 12, 1688, on the birth of the Prince of Wales in *Acta consist.*, Vatican Library.

then been the heiress presumptive to the throne, to come over and assume the government of the realm, nineteenth-twentieths of whose inhabitants were dissatisfied and eager for a change.¹

In vain did James II. seek to avert the peril at the last moment by concessions to the Anglican Church. No one would believe a man who had broken his royal word. On November 15th, 1688, William of Orange landed in Tor Bay and on December 28th he made his entry into London. James escaped to France.

The fact that in October, 1688, Innocent XI. accepted James II.'s mediation² in his dispute with Louis XIV.,³ though he had at first declined the offer, has been interpreted as a cleverly calculated diplomatic manœuvre on the part of the Pope. It was said that the Pope had only consented to accept the offer in order to attest before the whole world his love of peace, whilst he had an intimate conviction that nothing whatever would come of it on account of the impending upheaval in England.⁴ This interpretation is based on the surmise that at least Innocent's advisers, if not he himself, knew by then of the designs of William of Orange, and that they had been let into his secrets.⁵ Two letters of Cardinal D'Estrées to Louvois and Louis XIV.

¹ KLOPP, IV., 54 *seq.*

² The offer was brought by Lord Thomas Howard, nephew of Cardinal Norfolk, when he handed over his credentials on August 3, 1686 (see *Lettera al D'Adda, August 3, 1688, Pap. Sec. Archives; report of Cardinal Pio, August 6, 1688, in KLOPP, IV., 499 *seq.*), but he ruined his mission to the Pope by interceding in favour of Fürstenberg; see KLOPP, IV., 92 *seq.* Cf. also RANKE, VI.³, 154 *seq.*

³ BERTHIER, II., 416.

⁴ BROSCH, *Kirchenstaat*, I., 444 *seq.*

⁵ This opinion, held with the greatest conviction, especially by RANKE (*Päpste*, III., 116 *seq.*), prevailed for a long time and was last defended by BROSCH (*Kirchenstaat*, I., 444 *seq.*, and *Engl. Gesch.*, VII., 524, 557 *seq.*).

of December 18th, 1687, and June 29th, 1688,¹ have long been quoted as documentary evidence; they were accepted even by reputable historians, although they refer to events which occurred at a much later date. More recent research has proved up to the hilt, by internal and external evidence, that both accounts are gross forgeries.² This disposes of the only support for the Curia's alleged understanding with

¹ Published for the first time by DALRYMPLE, *Memoirs of Great Britain and Ireland*, London, 1771 (App. to Vol. I.), 2, 239 seq., reprinted by GRIMOARD, in *Œuvres de Louis XIV.*, Vol. VI., Paris, 1806, 497 seqq.

² KLOPP (*Stuart*, IV., 497 seqq.) and GÉRIN (in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX. [1876], 427 seqq.) examined the matter simultaneously and independently. It is difficult to understand how Ranke could give credit to such patent forgeries and draw from them the following far-reaching conclusions: "A marvellous tangle! It was at the court of Rome that the threads of an intricate combination had to meet, which had for its aim and object to save Protestantism in western Europe from the last great danger which threatened it, that is to win over for ever to its side the English Crown" (*Päpste*, III., 117). Even as late as 1892 BROSCHE (*Engl. Gesch.*, VII., 558), admired the "profound truth" contained in this utterance of Ranke and made it his own, although the forgery of the two letters had been proved to be quite certain already in 1876. IMMICH, on the contrary, says: "The support of Orange by the Curia is nothing else than a legend invented by the French. Innocent neither knew of his enterprise nor favoured it" (p. 106). Recently GUSTAV ROLOFF (*Der Papst in der letzten grossen Krisis des Protestantismus: Preuss. Jahrbücher*, CLVI. (1914), 269-284), ascribed to Innocent an important rôle in the preparation of the enterprise of Orange which led to the downfall of James II., when basing himself on a statement by Pufendorf, he traced it back to its sources. According to this an utterance of the Pope, disapproving the religious policy of James II., moved the wavering Emperor to renew his alliance with the States General. That Innocent XI. (in accordance with his conception of the religious policy of James II.) expressed his disapproval not publicly, but as Roloff admits, only to his intimate friends, is quite possible, and it is also probable that such an utterance may have influenced the decision of the Emperor. But when

Holland's greatest statesman.¹ The truth is that both the Pope and Louis XIV.² as well as many contemporaries were at first completely in the dark as to William's real designs which the latter took the utmost care to conceal up to the last moment.³ When at last they became more and more evident, Adda reported that James II. had taken every precaution against a Dutch attack, but this assurance only quieted the Pope for a short time.⁴ At the beginning of November his anxiety for the fate of James II. became

Roloff draws the further conclusion: that Innocent XI., by his utterance, intended the furtherance of the Orange enterprise "because he did not consider the recovery of England an adequate compensation for the loss of the obedience of France, and because he regarded the downfall of James as a triumph over the ecclesiastical aspirations of Louis and, therefore, over the Gallican and ecclesiastico-national tendencies," intentions are ascribed to the Pope, for which there is not the slightest warrant and which are contrary to the Pope's character. The Pope would never have supported a Calvinist prince against a Catholic ruler. The contradiction is further proved by Innocent's conduct after the fall of James II. If the Pope had played the decisive rôle which Roloff ascribes to him, he would have been a hypocrite, for at the beginning of November, 1688, he ordered special prayers to be said for James II., then in danger, and on February 7, 1689, he lamented his downfall in a consistory (see above, p. 469). "The momentous decision" which, according to Roloff, Innocent XI. is supposed to have made "with a clear vision of the situation, and fully conscious of his high responsibility", is an unproven assertion. Cf. DANCKELMANN in *Quellen u. Forsch. aus ital. Archiven*, XVIII. (1926), 311 *seqq.*, according to whom it is clear from the sources "that there can be no question of the Pope being cognizant of the Orange expedition which he utterly disapproved" (*ibid.*, 331).

¹ Thus IMMICH (103), who also shows that what BROSCHE quotes from the reports of the Venetian ambassador, Lando, in support of his opinion, proves nothing.

² Cf. GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, XX., 457.

³ See MAZURE, *Hist. de la révolution de 1688 en Angleterre*, III., 52. Cf. MACKINTOSH, II., 164.

⁴ See IMMICH, 104 and 105.

such that he ordered public prayers for him in all the churches and religious houses of Rome.¹ After the catastrophe he expressed his sincere sympathy with the Stuarts in Briefs dated February 1st, 1689, in which he strove to comfort the royal couple in their misfortune.² At a consistory on February 7th he lamented James' expulsion from his kingdom and urged the Cardinals to pray that God would restore to the King, who was sincerely attached to the Catholic faith, the inheritance of which the Protestants had robbed him.³ On the other hand the Pope was in no position to lend material assistance to that end, though Colonel Porter, James' envoy, made a request to that effect in the spring of 1689. The Pope told the King's representative that he needed all his resources for the defence of the States of the Church against Louis XIV. who threatened him more seriously than ever

¹ **Avviso Marescotti* of November 6, 1688: "Ha la S. Stà ordinato universali orazioni a tutte le chiese e monasterii di Roma ad effetto d'implorar la divina assistenza al Re d'Inghilterra nelle presenti commozioni di quel regno." Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

² See BERTHIER, II., 427 *seqq.*

³ A hitherto unknown consistorial discourse of Innocent XI. furnishes a fresh proof that the Pope was in no wise in touch with Orange, neither did he, as RANKE (III., 117) thinks, following a French opinion, undeniably join an opposition which rested in great part on Protestant strength and support. It reads: " *Venerabiles Fratres. Cum pro egregio zelo vestro in catholica causa promovenda eam iuvare non praetermittitis, non sine ingenti maerore atque molestia audietis, quae circa eam in Anglia nuper acciderunt: cum sane dolor intimus animum Nostrum perculerit, audita carissimi in Chr. f. n. Jacobi M. Brit. regis expulsione, plane nullum dubium est, animos quoque vestros ingenti dolore corripandos fore. Ex Gallia siquidem allatum est nuntium litteris Mutinam conscriptis, quo pacto rex a militibus proditus ac a suis derelictus intempesta nocte clam se surripiens aufugere coactus sit, conscensaque navi cum regina coniuge et ipsius regis filio, Deo fidelis sui iustitiam protegente, plurimis quae obviae fuerunt difficultatibus marisque procellis superatis ad Galliae littora incolumis appulerit; sic enim Dominator excelsus

before. In his blindness James II. had charged Porter¹ to demand, in addition to a subsidy, that the Pope should become reconciled to Louis XIV. as a preliminary condition. Thus Innocent XI. was expected to bow to the will of the all-powerful monarch at the very time when Lavardin, surrounded with armed men and smitten with excommunication, was defying the Head of the Church in his own capital. Porter's audience could not but be of a painful nature. It became still more painful when Porter observed that the world would think that the Holy Father sided with the Protestants, as the latter already boasted. Small wonder that after such a remark the Pope put an end to further discussion by dismissing the envoy.² In spite of every

super regnum omne imperium suum exercet, et cui voluerit dat illud. Emicuit profecto admirabilis regis constantia infracta semper inter tot calamitates et angustias, hostibus pariter et suis in extremam eiusdem perniciem concurrentibus ac etiam illis dilabentibus, quos cum, iustitia prius exigente, vinculis obstrinxerit, evincente mox regia clementia, benigne exceperit, nulla beneficiorum memoria commovit. Tam praeclari regis virtus maximum sane decus atque splendorem affert catholicae religioni, cui sceptrum et regnum posthabenda non dubitavit, ut illam vel cum tanta iactura inconcusse illibateque servaret. Verum, carissimi, f. n. Ludovicus rex christ^{mus} regem ipsum, reginam regiamque prolem, insignem simul pietatem ac benevolentiam contestatus, omni cultu ac regia munificentia exceperit. Illuc quoque, ven. fratres, archiep. Amasiae Nuntius Noster singulari Dei beneficio se contulit, ut regis Angliae voluntati obsequeretur, qui eum apud se habere voluit." There follows an exhortation to prayer, "ut protegat [Deus] ex alto causam suam et ut restituere dignetur praereptam regi sibi fideli ab hostibus nominis sui haereditatem." At the end Cardinals "D'Estrées Gallus, Estensis protector Angliae" and "De Norfolkia Anglus", thanked the Pope "de honorificentissimis verbis prolatis erga duos illos meritissimos reges". *Acta consist.*, Vatican Library.

¹ See the Instruction in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, XX., 476 seq.

² Cf. the *Report of April 16, 1689, already quoted from KLOPP (*Stuart*, IV., 412), State Archives, Vienna. *Ibid.*, the *Report (which has escaped KLOPP's notice) of Jakob Emerik to the

sympathy with the unfortunate King, a feeling to which he gave utterance in yet another Brief, dated May 3rd,¹ the Pontiff could not fail to perceive one of the main causes of James' misfortunes. When Cardinal d'Este once more begged for a subsidy for James II., the Pope explained that it was impossible for him to lend assistance so long as France threatened him with an invasion of the States of the Church. Whilst renewing the expression of his grief over the catastrophe that had so suddenly and unexpectedly overwhelmed the King of England, the Pope did not hide from the Cardinal what he considered to be the real cause of the calamity, namely, James II.'s close alliance with Louis XIV. and his ambition to emulate him.² The same thought is found in a cartoon propagated from Holland and bearing the title *Flight of the Papacy from England*. It shows James II. with his wife and son riding in a dogcart driven by Fr. Petre and preceded by Louis XIV. in harlequin attire and mounted

Emperor Leopold, dated April 23, 1689, on Porter's disappointment when he failed to obtain a subsidy. "Ma la colpa è stata anche sua, perchè si poteva valere di motivi più rispettosi per ottenergli da S. St^a e non dirgli in faccia che il mondo lo haverebbe giudicato che aderisse ai protestanti conforme già questi andavano cantando ne'loro propri paesi." In spite of this, Innocent XI. wrote to James on April 14, 1689, with the utmost consideration, that on February 24 he had received the King's letter through Porter; that the mediation between the Christian princes there demanded was more to be desired than to be hoped for, because their dissensions were too great. However, he would do his utmost (BERTHIER, II., 440 *seq.*). D'Estrées received a sharp reply when he observed: "che non possono gli heretici non prender animo dal non dare S. St^a soccorso al Re d'Inghilterra, mentre i medesimi lo hanno già preso dalla guerra mossa da S. M^{tà} Christ. contro l'Imperatore." Cifra al Nuntio di Germania del 30 aprile 1689, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 209, Pap. Sec. Arch.

¹ In this reply to James II.'s letter of March 16, 1689, where he reports his landing in Ireland, the Pope expresses the hope that the King will regain his other kingdoms from there.

² See PUFENDORF, II., 1; KLOPP, IV., 413.

on a bear, whilst in the background Friars are seen in full flight.¹

(4.)

Innocent XI. had ascended the throne of Peter as a robust man of sixty-eight, though as early as 1676 we hear of symptoms of kidney trouble.² In 1678 we learn that excessive fasting and the cares of office, by causing depression and frequent bouts of sleeplessness, proved a heavy tax on his strength.³ Latterly his anxieties assumed even more alarming proportions. In conjunction with his peculiar manner of life (he allowed himself neither exercise nor relaxation), these were bound to prove injurious. Consequently, his state of health frequently left much to be desired. There was talk of another conclave early in his pontificate; yet Innocent XI. was destined to rule for thirteen years. From 1682 onwards he had chronic attacks of gout which often confined him to his bed and still oftener to his room in which an almost unbearable heat was maintained⁴; but so robust was the Pontiff's constitution that when he entered his seventy-fifth year in May, 1685, people wondered at his activity.⁵ In spite of many representations he would not give up his extraordinary manner of life. When in the spring of 1685 he was informed of the death of Cardinal Altieri's mother at the age of eighty-six, after she had been confined to her bed for fifteen years,

¹ *De vlugt van 't Pausdom uit Engeland*, etching of 1689 or 1690, in the style of R. de Hooghes; see DRUGULIN, *Bilderatlas*, 3330.

² See the French reports in MICHAUD, I., 71 *seq.*

³ See the **Avvisi* of April 16 and May 21, 1678, Vat. Library.

⁴ See, besides the reports in MICHAUD, I., 73 *seqq.*, also Cardinal Pio's reports of January 30, 1683, February 12, March 11, and April 1, 1684; January 3 and March 31, 1685, State Archives, Vienna; **Avvisi Marescotti* of June 1 and December 30, 1684, January 20, March 10, 24 and 31, 1685, Vittorio Emanuele Library, Rome.

⁵ See **Avviso Marescotti* of May 26, 1685, *ibid.*

he observed that this case showed that one could live without leaving one's room.¹ In April and December 1686, and in the spring and summer of 1687, Innocent suffered from repeated attacks of gout. With the best of wills he often found it impossible to apply himself to affairs.² From July, 1686, to July, 1687, he was unable to take part in the sittings of the Inquisition.³ In the course of the eventful year 1688, the Pope's condition improved so much, in spite of many excitements, that it was thought he would continue to reign for some time,⁴ but this proved a delusion.

On April 19th, 1689, Queen Christine died, not long after making up her quarrel with the Pope. This gifted woman, who had been so long the centre of the literary life of Rome,⁵ looked death in the face with a courage worthy of a daughter of so renowned a captain. She made her confession and received the Last Sacraments with every mark of sincere piety. She named Cardinal Azzolini her heir and gave instructions for a very simple funeral, but the Pope, who had forgiven everything to that remarkable woman, ordered a most pompous funeral at his own expense. The whole College of Cardinals took part in the obsequies and the burial took place in St. Peter's where, as a rule, only Popes and Cardinal archpriests were buried, and where only one other woman rests, namely Countess Matilda of Tuscany.⁶

¹ See Cardinal Pio's *report of April 20, 1686, State Archives, Vienna.

² See besides MICHAUD, I., 80 *seqq.* Cardinal Pio's *reports of April 9 and December 11, 1686, State Archives, Vienna, and the **Avvisi Marescotti* of April 8, August 30 and December 20, 1687, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

³ DUDON, *Molinos*, 203 *seqq.*

⁴ Cf. the **Avvisi Marescotti* of May 22, June 17 and August 14, 1688 (*loc. cit.*). Cardinal Pio's *reports of July 14 and August 14, 1688, and the **Avviso* of July 18, 1688, State Archives, Vienna.

⁵ GRAUERT, II., 309 *seq.*

⁶ Besides the sources used by GRAUERT (II., 393 *seqq.*) and RICCI (*Vita barocca*, Roma, 1912, 45 *seqq.*) cf. also the **Avvisi Marescotti* of April 16 and 23, 1683 (with the remark about

Innocent XI. was soon to follow the Queen. In June 1689, a fresh attack of gout confined him to bed. A fever ensued, but his condition improved once again, though only to get worse in July.¹ His great age—he was seventy-nine—lack of appetite, depression and other infirmities boded no good.² His feet began to swell, in spite of incisions.³ The sick man himself saw that the end was at hand and in order fitly to prepare for it, he refused to have anything to do with affairs. Hence all efforts to induce him to proceed to a creation of Cardinals were in vain; in vain also the Spanish ambassador, acting on behalf of the Emperor Leopold, prayed for a dispensation for the election of the Archduke Joseph, who was not yet seventeen, as King of the Romans. The Pope's answer was that in his present condition he could only busy himself with the salvation of his soul.⁴ Latterly even the Cardinal Secretary was no longer received in audience. Livio Odescalchi was only admitted for a few moments when he heard some grave words concerning the vanity of the world.⁵ Besides his physician, the celebrated Lancisi, the Pope's confessor alone was admitted to the sick-room. In view of Innocent's strong constitution his entourage was not yet willing to give up all hope of another recovery.⁶ The most celebrated German scholar of the period, Leibnitz, who happened to be in Rome at the time, though a Protestant, warmly expressed his sympathy in poetic form.⁷ The illness

Christina's body: "Haveva una mascara d'argento massiccia sopra la faccia, giachè la sua carne si era guasta, benchè inbalsamata"), Vittorio Emanuele Library, Rome, and the **Avviso* of April 23, 1689, State Archives, Vienna.

¹ See, besides LIPPI, 178, and MICHAUD, I., 84, the **Cifra* al card. Ranucci, of July 5, 1689, *Nunziat. di Francia*, 177, Pap. Sec. Archives.

² **Avviso* of July 2, 1689, State Archives, Vienna.

³ **Avviso* of July 16, 1689, *ibid.* Cf. COLOMBO, 47 *seq.*

⁴ See Count De Gubernatis' reports in COLOMBO, 48.

⁵ See *Vita* of L. Marracci, in LIPPI-BERTHIER, 255. Cf. MICHAUD, I., 372.

⁶ See **Avviso* of July 16, 1689, *loc. cit.*

⁷ Cf. *Zeitschr. für Niedersachsen*, 1901, 243.

was protracted ; a slight improvement at the beginning of August was not maintained.¹ On August 8th the Pontiff's condition became so serious that he was given Holy Viaticum with the customary solemnity.² On August 10th he asked for Extreme Unction. During the night several religious watched by his side ; in the morning he sent for the Grand Penitentiary, Cardinal Colloredo, to receive from him absolution *in articulo mortis*.³ The sick Pontiff was fully conscious but could only speak with great difficulty. He expressed regret at his inability to receive the other Cardinals, sent them his blessing and begged them to forgive him his failings. He refused to listen to Colloredo when the latter suggested that he should abolish the tax on flour which the people detested. Such things, he observed, could not be done away with in a hurry ; moreover he left the Apostolic Camera in so excellent a condition that his successor would have no difficulty in granting this relief. Soon the Pope's condition became so much worse that Cardinal Colloredo began the prayers for the dying in which Innocent endeavoured to join. He kissed the crucifix, repeated Pius V.'s words : " Lord, increase the pain, but also increase my patience," recited a few verses of the psalms⁴ and declared that he trusted in the Passion of Christ and the intercession of the Blessed Virgin. He also begged forgiveness of his servants and had the Creed read to him. After an agony of six hours he breathed forth his noble soul on the morning of August 12th.⁵ It is

¹ **Cifra* al card. Ranucci of August 2, 1689, *loc. cit.*

² See LIPPI, 180.

³ Cf. for what follows **Relazione del card. Colloredo sulla morte di Innocenzo XI.*, in Monte Cassino Library, used by LIPPI, 181. Cf. *ibid.*, 254 *seq.* Marracci's account and the description of the physician, G. Lancisi (cf. ZAPPOLI, *Illustr. in busti d. medici celebri*, Roma, 1686, 113 *seq.*), in his *Opera*, Venetiis, 1739.

⁴ Thus the passage : " Quoniam tu, Domine, singulariter in spe constituisti me." Ps. 4, 10.

⁵ According to Cardinal Colloredo's report the agony began " a 16 hore ", and death occurred " 22¼ hore in giorno di venerdì "

recorded that at the same hour two arches of the Colosseum collapsed.¹

The autopsy revealed two large stones in the kidneys. When the body was transferred from the Quirinal to St. Peter's, so great a crowd flocked together, despite torrential rain, as had not been seen since memory of man. In his lifetime the "Lombard" Innocent XI. had not been popular with the Roman people by reason of his stern reforms, his parsimony and his habitual isolation, and he had been the object of a good deal of ingratitude and misunderstanding.² Now the realization of the loss expressed itself with elemental force. Everyone was eager to snatch some relic of the deceased and the Swiss Guards experienced great difficulty in restraining the multitude. Already there were rumours of miracles wrought by Innocent XI.³ The panegyric of the dead Pontiff was delivered by the learned Emanuel Schelstrate, a man famous for his works on Christian antiquity. Innocent XI. had summoned this valiant defender of the papal prerogatives against the Gallican clergy of France from Antwerp to Rome and had made him custodian of the Vatican Library.⁴ Even

(Monte Cassino Library). Cf. the **Avviso* of August 12, 1689, State Archives, Vienna.

¹ **Avviso Marescotti* of August 13, 1689, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome. In a Latin poem in *Cod. Glauburg*, 31, Municipal Library, Frankfurt a. M., reference is made to this coincidence: "eadem hora tres fornices Colossaei ruunt."

² Cf. RANKE, III., 202*-203* who, after examining a *Memoriale del 1680 al Papa Innocenzo XI. circa il governo e gli aggravii*, remarks: "Who would believe it? Scarcely has the Pope given ear to the incessant complaints about nepotism and abolishes it, when it is immediately called back again." Rank libels are the "**Ode satirica per la morte d'Innocenzo XI.*" and the sonnet "**Vita e miracoli di Papa Innocenzo XI. defunto,*" in *MS. Glauburg* 31, Municipal Library, Frankfurt a. M.

³ See **Avviso Marescotti* of August 20, 1689, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele, Rome. Cf. LIPPI, 201 *seq.*

⁴ See letters of Schelstrate in *Spicil. Vatic.*, 133 *seqq.* Other **Original* letters of his, from 1683 to 1691, in *Cod.*, XIII., A 66, National Library, Naples. On Schelstrate cf. HURTER, IV.³

more weighty than the encomiums of this funeral oration is the testimony of the Venetian Giovanni Lando, who had long resided in Rome where he had been constantly in relation with the Pope and all the prominent personalities of the city. This is what he wrote immediately after the death of Innocent XI. : " The Pope was truly possessed, in a high degree, of the best and holiest qualities, viz. lofty zeal, piety, and constancy. His extreme conscientiousness, combined as it was with a tendency to sternness, gave one the impression that compassion and kindness agreed but little with his character. He clung tenaciously to his rights and was excessively strict in their application. He was strongly attracted to strange and peculiar opinions. Singular also was his heroic restraint where his own family was concerned, for he kept his nephew in the position of a private person, not suffering him to meddle with the conduct of affairs, nor even to solicit favours for others. The Pope loved goodness even as he detested applause ; he distrusted others, hence he was all the more obstinate in clinging to his own decisions." ¹

Innocent XI.'s last resting place is in St. Peter's. Livio Odescalchi saw to the erection of a worthy monument for which the aged Carlo Maratta and the young Frenchman Pierre Etienne Monnot submitted plans. Livio chose Monnot's design which was on the lines of Algardi's monument of Leo XI. Monnot skilfully transformed Algardi's scheme into a harmonious unity by the introduction of two seated allegorical figures, viz. Religion and Justice.² The marble relief under the statue of the Pope represents the deliverance of Vienna from the Turks ; the figures are in archaic costume.

550 seq. *Ottob.* 3059 (Vatican Library) has several essays on the history of the Popes, dedicated to Innocent XI.

¹ *Dispatch of August 12, 1689, State Archives, Venice, translated (into German) by BROSCHE (I., 446).

² SOBOTKA in *Jahrb. der preuss. Kunstsamml.*, XXXV. (1914), 22 seqq. ; BRINCKMANN, *Barockskulptur*, II., 269 seq. ; ID., *Barockbozzetti italienischer Bildhauer*, Frankfurt, 1923, 144 seq., on a first design of Monnot in a *bozzetto* of the National Museum, Florence.

The sarcophagus rests on two lions. The monument bears the date 1700.¹

The high esteem in which the memory of the Pope continued to be held in Rome ² is shown by the journal of Jean Dumont who writes that everybody was loud in the praise of Innocent's virtues. Even Protestants and Jews, however hostile they might be towards the Holy See, joined in this encomium. "As a matter of fact," Dumont continues, "his whole life was but one long chain of exemplary actions. From the day of his election, September 21st, 1676, to that of his death, he was ever seen exclusively bent on fulfilling the duties of his office, removing abuses, visiting hospitals, relieving the poor. No sooner had he assumed the tiara than he took a step such as no previous Pope had dared to attempt, namely the suppression of nepotism. Parsimonious, nay miserly, where his own person was concerned, he was liberal for the common good. To the Emperor and to Venice he gave his whole-hearted support against the Turks. To him the Emperor owed it that Vienna kept up its resistance and was eventually relieved. He defended the rights and privileges of the Church with a vigour which by itself alone gives him a claim to the admiration of all."³

¹ Cf. MELCHIORRI, *Guida di Roma*, Roma, 1834, 194. Prince B. Odescalchi's essay on the tomb of Innocent XI. in his *Impressioni di storia e d'arte* (Roma, 1896) appeared in German in Fleischer's *Deutsche Revue*, XXVII. (1902).

² The **Avviso Marescotti* of July 1, 1690, reports: "Essendo così grande il concorso del popolo, che andava al sepolcro d'Innocenzo XI. a levare delli calcinacci per divotione, si è cominciato il steccato per racchiuderlo." (Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Roma). **Avviso* of December 16, 1690: "La Congregazione di S. Officio ha dato ad esaminare 10 miraculi della s. mem. d'Innocenzo XI. ad effetto di formarne poi il processo per la sua beatificatione, e giornalmente si sentono gratie maravigliose, che si ricevono per la sua intercessione," *ibid.*

³ J. DUMONT, *Voyages en Rome, en Italie etc.* (1699), I., 287. Cf. also the poem in *Cod.*, M. 13., Boncompagni Archives, Rome, the **Poema in laudem Innocentii XI. Andreae Penciis in Cod.*,

Accordingly, when steps were taken under Clement XI. towards Innocent XI.'s beatification, the proposal met with general approval. These efforts were continued under Clement XII. and Benedict XIV., but they proved abortive, mainly owing to the opposition of the French Government.¹ This hostility has penetrated even into the world of letters and greatly influenced official history. It took French historians a long time to arrive at an equitable judgment of Innocent XI.² German Protestants paid homage to the merits of the Pontiff at a much earlier date and did not hesitate to acknowledge his lofty aspirations,³ but only the most recent historians have

O. 117, n. 3, Vallicelliana Library, Rome, and the poems in *MS. Glauburg*, 31, Municipal Library, Frankfurt a. M. In one of these poems he is called: "Tutor dell'uno e l'altro Austriaco regno, | Terror del Franco, espugnator del Trace"; another says: "Morto è Innocenzo e tal mori qual visse: | Saggio, santo, pietoso, invito e forte."

¹ Cf. *Anal. iuris pontif.*, XX. (1881), 36 *seqq.*; *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VII., 2012 *seq.*; MAURER, *Kollonitsch*, 237; DE HEECKEREN, *Lettres de Benoît*, XIV., vol. I., 162 *seq.* The Original Acts of the process of beatification, of which some extracts are given in *Anal. iuris pontif.*, XI. (1872), 127-327, in BERTHIER and LIPPI (*passim*), are in the Archives of the Congregation of Rites, Rome; copies in Bibl. Magliobecchi, Florence (*MS. d. Bibl. monastice*) and in the Bibl. Fabroniana, Pistoia, *Cod.* 24. Innocent XII. caused investigations to be made into the miracles of Innocent XI.; see *Diario* of March 4, 1696, in *Studi e docum.*, IX., 196, *cf.* 205.

² GÉRIN has done splendid work with his essays in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XVI., XX., XXIII., XXIV., XXXIII., XXXIX., all based on profound documentary research.

³ SCHRÖCKH (*Kirchengesch.*, VI., 333) calls Innocent XI. one of the most worthy Popes. RANKE also (III., 111 *seqq.*), and even BROSCH (I., 440 *seqq.*) give a just appreciation of him. RANKE says that the papacy appears in him "in its most praiseworthy capacity, that of peaceful mediator". HERMELINCK (III., 305) calls him one of the best Popes. ZÖPFFEL-BENRATH (in Herzog-Hauck's *Realenzykl.*, IX.³, 148) characterize him as "one of the most ideal figures of the history of the Popes, one

thrown full light upon his figure.¹ Only now is it possible to perceive clearly the motives that prompted his actions and policy. Even if at times he fell a victim to fatal mistakes and errors, there is no doubt that he ever strove for the best, and at no time did he have recourse to unlawful means.²

Whilst as a strict, just, and practical temporal ruler Innocent XI. strongly reminds us of Sixtus V., his ecclesiastical activity recalls the personality of Pius V. Like the latter, his moral conduct was blameless. Whilst he laboured with burning zeal for the improvement of the conduct of priests and people, he was also an intrepid champion of the rights of the Church and ever ready for any sacrifice in the defence of Christendom against Islam. In the splendid successes achieved in the Turkish war he played a most considerable, and indeed a decisive part, whilst his unwearied efforts on behalf of peace between the Christian Powers and their union for a joint struggle against the traditional enemy, which constituted the real corner-stone of his policy,³ will always draw a luminous halo round his personality. No less credit is due to Innocent XI.

who defended the rights of the Church with energy, moderation and dignity, a pure soul, a personality that executed vast plans and high ideals by honourable means”.

¹ IMMICH especially deserves great credit for his monograph published in 1900 and based on a thorough study of the Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Paris. The same material was made use of by E. MICHAUD, an old-catholic professor at Berne, of whom Immich says very aptly that he utilized the valuable reports of the French embassy “without criticism and without the faintest notion of a scientific method, hence he drew a caricature of the character and the government of the Pope”. Immich shows how the lack of criticism on the part of Michaud is sometimes almost comical, so that his work is of value only in so far as it gives extracts from the diplomatic correspondence, which extracts, however, must be used judiciously.

² “As a prince of the Church,” says BROSCH (I., 441), “he is to be compared with Adrian VI.—a Pope-gentleman who committed errors and mistakes, but not one bad action.”

³ See IMMICH, I, 25, 34 *seq.*, 68 *seq.*, 110.

for the intrepid courage and the tenacious perseverance with which he defended the independence of the Holy See and its prerogatives against Louis XIV. when the latter sought to reduce the papacy, like all the other Powers, to the rank of a vassal. It was not hostility towards France that led to the conflicts which filled almost his entire pontificate; that conflict was inevitable in consequence of the State absolutism of the *Roi Soleil*. Whilst all the States of Europe trembled before the mighty ruler of France, Innocent XI. defended the liberty of the Church "with admirable constancy"¹ and with a determination recalling Gregory VII. In so doing he also indirectly defended the independence of Europe from the French monarch's plans of universal domination.

The Pope likewise laboured for Europe's independence with his great policy, pursued up to his last breath, of uniting the Christian Powers for the purpose of meeting Islam's supreme attack. He was not to blame if here also he found himself in open opposition to Louis XIV. who desired to have a strong and victorious Turkey as an ally against the Emperor. If the Emperor enjoyed Innocent's strong support, so much so that Vienna, Germany's advanced post, was held, and Hungary was recovered for Christian civilization, that policy was not prompted by one-sided prejudice in favour of the House of Habsburg, for in this also the Pope was actuated by what he felt was a religious duty. The natural sequel of his intervention on behalf of Leopold I. was the consolidation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and the shifting of its centre of gravity into the region of the Danube.² These events constitute the historical significance of his pontificate, a pontificate by far the most important and glorious of the second half of the seventeenth century.

¹ IMMICH's opinion (106).

² Cf. IMMICH, 110 *seq.*, and BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 3.

ALEXANDER VIII. 1689-1691.

INNOCENT XII. 1691-1700.

CHAPTER I.

PONTIFICATE OF ALEXANDER VIII., 1689-1691.

(1.)

DURING Innocent XI.'s reign of thirteen years, fifty-two Cardinals died¹ and only forty-three new creations had taken place, so that the Sacred College counted no more than sixty-two members. Of these sixty-two, ten were unable to be present in Rome.² Of the remaining fifty-two electors, four had received the red hat from Innocent X.; they were Cibo, Ottoboni, Barberini and Maidaichini; three others had received it from Clement IX., namely Bouillon, Cerri and Acciaioli. Most of the electors owed their dignity either to Alexander VII. or to the last two Popes. Under Alexander the following eight Cardinals were created: Chigi, Bichi, Franzoni, Altieri, Gregorio Barbarigo, Conti, Giulio Spinola, Delfino. Ten owed their nomination to Clement X., viz.

¹ See the names in GUARNACCI, I., 303 *seq.*

² Le Camus vainly begged Louis XIV. for permission to make the journey (MICHAUD, *Alexandre VIII. et le Duc de Chaulnes*, Berne, 1888, 22), Ranuzzi died on the journey, September 27, Buonvisi remained in Vienna, Portocarrero, Lancastre, Durazzo, Radziejowski and Salazar remained at home, Goës arrived too late. The **Avviso Marescotti* of August 27 says: "Per veder la struttura del conclave vi concorse non solo tutta Roma, ma anco tutto il paese vicino, et per certo è che a' tempi nostri mai se è veduta tanta folla" (Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome). Plan of the conclave in *Barb.*, XLIX., 48, Vatican Library. **Poesie satiriche pel conclave in morte d'Innocenzo XI.*, National Library, Florence, Cl. VII., n. 348.

Carpegna, D'Estrées, Bonsi, Orsini, Colonna, Nerli, Casanata, Marescotti, Spada and Norfolk. The remaining twenty-seven owed their elevation to the Church's supreme senate to the late Pope. They were Giambattista Spinola, Pignatelli, Buonvisi, Mellini, Visconti, Capizucchi, Brancati, De Angelis, Pallavicini, Antonio Barbarigo, Ciceri, Kollonitsch, Petrucci, Fürstenberg, Dönhoff, Aguirre, Colloredo, Carafa, Sanchetti, Ginetti, Pamfili, Corsi, Negroni, Astalli, Cavalieri, Medici and Este.

By birth D'Estrées and Bouillon were French whilst Kollonitsch and Fürstenberg were Germans, though the latter's sentiments were entirely French.¹ To them must be added the Pole Dönhoff, the Englishman Norfolk and the Spaniard Aguirre. The remaining forty-seven were Italians, seventeen originating from the Papal States, six from Genoa, seven from Tuscany, five from Venice and one from Lucca. Innocent XI.'s Cardinals constituted the strongest party, but since that Pope had dispensed with a Cardinal nephew, they lacked a leader and their unity was further weakened by the fact that under the name of "Zelanti" a group broke away from the main body. This section, acting in the spirit of Innocent XI., announced its intention of electing the worthiest candidate regardless of political interests. They were Cardinals Ottoboni, Orsini, Carafa, Casanata, Colloredo, the younger Barbarigo, Nerli, Ciceri and Pignatelli.²

¹ " *Prognostica epigrammatica ex nomine ominosa de cardinalibus ad pontificatum adspirantibus " say of Fürstenberg :

Gallus es an Teuto ?

Teuto nec Gallus es ?

Quid ? Nihil, ergo mane.

Cod., Xc., 569, State Library, Berlin.

² See the **Memorandum* drawn up before the opening of the conclave, probably by Cardinal Medici (PETRUCELLI, III., 316 *seq.*), on the parties in the Sacred College, Campello Archives, Spoleto, *MS.* 92, p. 31 *seq.* These Cardinals are here described as " Volanti di coscienza ". Pompeo Scarlatti in his *report to Leopold I., September 3, 1689, calls them " *fazione di Dio* " (State Archives, Vienna). Observations on the state of the parties

The older party leaders, Chigi and Altieri, aware of the small number of their followers, united their forces and they were joined by Pamfili and Astalli, together with Medici who, as representing the Emperor and the King of Spain, drew along with him Cardinals Kollonitsch and Aguirre. D'Estrées, France's plenipotentiary, had the support of Maidalchini, Bouillon, Bonsi and Fürstenberg.¹

In view of the war which had turned one half of Europe into a battlefield, the attitude of the new Pope was bound to be of considerable importance; hence the Great Powers tried very hard to influence the election. D'Estrées represented the interests of France, but the aged Duc de Chaulnes and the Marquis de Torcy were joined to him as Louis XIV.'s trusted confidants.² Spain also had two representatives, namely Cardinal Medici, and its ambassador, the Marchese de Cogolludo. It was a new departure on the part of the Habsburgs when, on this occasion, they abandoned the reserve they had hitherto observed. Cardinal Medici was not enough for the Emperor Leopold; hence he appointed Prince Antony Liechtenstein as his envoy extraordinary with mission to look after his interests.³ Yet despite these measures the representatives of the princes were not to have any decisive influence on the conclave which opened on the evening of August 23rd.⁴

and on the characters of the Cardinals are found in three *memorials preserved in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, quoted by BISCHOFFSHAUSEN (10 *seqq.*).

¹ Cf. WAHRMUND, 160. In the above quoted *memorandum of the Campello Archives Cardinal D'Este appears as "Francesce certo".

² See EISLER, 168; GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 138 *seq.*; DUBRUEL, in *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XV. (1914), 288 *seqq.*, 297 *seqq.*, 302.

³ See WAHRMUND, 161 *seq.*; BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 5 *seqq.*, 15 *seqq.*; DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 495 *seqq.* The Emperor's instructions to Kollonitsch, September 7, 1689, in MAURER, 237 *seq.*

⁴ Besides the printed report, *C. nclave fatto per la sede vacante d'Innocenzo*, XI., Colonia, 1690, there are numerous reports in

The scrutinies of the first fortnight yielded no result as many of the electors were slow in arriving.¹ After the failure of the candidature of the Roman 'Capizucchi, Gregorio Barbarigo,² one of the worthiest members of the Sacred College, seemed for a time to have good prospects. When Prince Liechtenstein arrived in Rome on September 20th the streets of the city were full of the report that Barbarigo had in fact been elected.³ But it was soon learned that he had begged the Cardinals to refrain from voting for him.⁴

The French Cardinals, Bouillon, Bonsi and Fürstenberg were impatiently awaited. They arrived on September 23rd, together with the Duc de Chaulnes.⁵ As the Cardinals manuscript, collected by EISLER (143). In the **Istoria del conclave*, dedicated to Cardinal Ottoboni which EISLER quotes from a copy of the Pap. Sec. Archives (*Miscell.*, XI., 133, p. 1 *seqq.*), the name of the author is also missing in *Vat.* 10173, but it is given in a **MS.* which I bought at the sale of the Corvisieri collection. There it is expressly said "copiato dall' originale che è da Msg. Urbano Giorii". A very detailed report of all the ballots in C. CASSINA, **Diario, Vat.* 8390, Vatican Library. A Collection of the scrutinies in *Barb.* 4439 and *Vat.* 8228, *ibid.* On the hardships of the conclave, see Cibo's letters to his brother, October 8 and 22, 1689, in MUSSI, 10.

¹ See **Avvisi Marescotti* of August 27, September 3 and 17, 1689, *Bibl. Vitt. Emanuele*, Rome. According to the exact statement in *Barb.* 4439, there were at the first scrutiny on August 24, "praesentes 29, aegroti absentes a scrutinio 2, absentes a Curia . . ." On August 31, the proportion was 43-1-16, on September 22, 48-2-12, *Vat. Library*.

² *Cf.* Vol. XXXI., p. 131. Nevertheless there appeared at that time a spiteful **satire* against Barbarigo; see *Ottob.* 3160, *Vatican Library*.

³ See the reports in BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 29 *seqq.* *Cf.* MICHAUD, *Alexandre*, VIII., 23, 33.

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti* of September 24, 1689, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Not as late as the 27th, as WAHRMUND says (164), quoting *Conclave di Alessandro*, VIII., 61. Giorio (**Istoria del conclave*) gives expressly September 23 (*Pap. Sec. Arch.*, *loc. cit.*). With this agree also the **ballot lists* in *Barb.* 4439, which say, on September 23: "Praesentes 48, aegroti absentes a scrutinio 3, absentes a

demanded from Chaulnes that he should give up the freedom of the quarter, and negotiations on the subject had begun, the French Cardinals only entered the conclave on September 27th.¹ Liechtenstein, who raised no claims such as those of Chaulnes, had been received in solemn audience at the door of the conclave on September 29th. Chaulnes was received on October 2nd.² But by this time the conclave had already taken a decisive turn.³

From the first Cardinal Pietro Ottoboni was universally looked upon as the worthiest candidate for the tiara.⁴ The influential and experienced Chigi had had him in mind from the very beginning of the conclave, but it was necessary to proceed with caution as Ottoboni had many opponents for the simple reason that he was a Venetian. However, the powerful party of the "zelanti" was for him and Chigi succeeded in winning over Medici, and in the end Altieri also. The Emperor would have preferred some other candidate, and Louis XIV. had at first declined Ottoboni, but both Liechtenstein and the French were eventually forced to bow to the *fait accompli*. As the price of his consent to Ottoboni's election Louis had insisted that the candidate and his nephew should bind themselves to confirm the Gallican Bishops unconditionally, to receive Lavardin as ambassador and to open negotiations on the question of the freedom of the quarter. Cardinal Ottoboni's nephew, a young man of twenty-two, was unwise enough to make promises to Chaulnes in regard to the elevation to the cardinalate of the Bishop of Beauvais, the

Curia 9; absentes in Urbe a conclavi": Bouillon, Bonsi e Fürstenberg.

¹ 27 septembre: "Praesentes in conclavi 50, aegroti absentes a scrutinio 3, absentes a Curia 9, absens a conclavi in Urbe Spinola," *loc. cit.*

² Cf. PETRUCCELLI, III., 333; BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 34 *seqq.*

³ The well-informed author of *Avvisi Marescotti* *reports 1° Octobre 1689: "Si dice quasi che conclusa la prattica per Ottoboni, non aspettandosi che il concorso de' Francesi." Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

⁴ See the evidence in BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 41.

confirmation of Bishops, and the removal of Casoni, who was odious to the French. Cardinal Ottoboni himself, on the other hand, would not hear of such a transaction. To the French Cardinals he observed that he desired a settlement of the disputes with France, but without injuring either his honour or his conscience.¹ But it would seem that the promoters of his candidature gave a guarantee that these very general assurances would assume a more definite shape.² D'Estrées desired a binding promise but was obliged to give way after receipt of a command in writing from Chaulnes.³ Thus it came about that on the evening of October 6th, Cardinal Ottoboni secured the votes of all the Cardinals present in conclave.⁴

The new Pope hesitated for a moment whether to take the name of Urban or Alexander. A sense of gratitude towards Flavio Chigi, to whom he chiefly owed his rise, prevailed, though his career in Rome had begun under Urban VIII.; he accordingly took the name of Alexander VIII.⁵

Though the fifteenth century had seen three Venetian Popes, two centuries had gone by since a son of the City of the Lagoons had obtained the tiara; hence it is easy to understand that the Republic of St. Mark indulged in splendid celebrations,⁶ and dispatched to Rome an extraordinary

¹ GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 140 seqq. Cf. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, who adduces further evidence which makes it quite clear that Ottoboni did not purchase his election by promises to Louis XIV.

² BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 47.

³ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 144.

⁴ *GIORIO, *loc. cit.* According to *Barb. 4439 there were at the election: Praesentes in conclavi 49 [not 51, as say BISCHOFFSHAUSEN (*loc. cit.*) and DUBRUEL (*loc. cit.*, 511)], aegroti in conclavi 0, absentes a Curia 8 [in the meantime Ranuzzi had also died], absentes a conclavi in Urbe Spinola et Negronus, aegroti in domibus suis." Ottoboni had "vota 19, accessus 29". Biblioteca Vaticana.

⁵ *Giorio, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Relazione delle stupendissime feste e fuochi fatti nell'inclita città di Venezia per l'esaltazione dell'em. P. Ottoboni, etc., Venezia, 1689.*

embassy consisting of eight nobles, for the purpose of congratulating the new Pope.¹

According to some historians the family of the Ottoboni came from Padua; according to others from Dalmatia. About forty years previously it had been admitted into the Venetian nobility.² Pietro Ottoboni was born at Venice on April 22nd, 1610. He read law at Padua, and as a youth of twenty went to Rome where he followed the customary prelatical career.³ Urban VIII. began by naming him a referendary of both *segnaturas*, after which he made him successively governor of Terni, Rieti and Spoleto, and in 1643 an auditor of the Rota.⁴ His excellent ten years' service in the latter capacity was rewarded by Innocent X. with the purple, on February 19th, 1652.⁵ With a view to improving Ottoboni's financial situation the Pope granted to him in 1654 the see of Brescia⁶ which he held for ten years.⁷ During

¹ BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Relazioni, Roma, II.*, 408.

² Cf. LITTA, *Famiglie*, f. 43. On the coat of arms, see PASINI FRASSONI, *Armorial*, 46.

³ GUARNACCI, I., 314 *seqq.*

⁴ November 13, 1643, says Ottoboni in his **Diario, Ottob.* 1073, Vatican Library.

⁵ Cf. Vol. XXX., p. 188. "Nullis meis exigentibus meritis divina favente gratia et benignitate S. D. N. Innocentii X. et instantia ser. reipublicae Venetae" [did he obtain his nomination], says Ottoboni in his **Diario, loc. cit.*

⁶ "Cresce ogni giorno il cardinale Ottoboni nel concetto della corte, essendo un compitissimo signorè di tratto cortese, di parole affettuose, pieno di lettere e d'una disinvoltura nel negotio, che si cattiva l'affetto di chiunque ha occasione di trattar seco; essendo negli ultimi mesi del pontificato di Innocenzo vacata la chiesa di Brescia, ne fu provveduto dal Papa, e n'havea gran bisogno, havendo la sua casa per la compra della nobiltà e per la di lui promotione al cardinalato fatte spese considerabilissime." Relatione del Marchese Nerli, *Barb.* 5191, p. 149^b. *seq.*, Vat. Library. *Ibid.*, *Ottob.* 3249/51 **Lettere scritte dal card. P. Ottoboni, vescovo di Brescia, a Pier Francesco Pavonio suo agente in Roma.*

⁷ UGHELLI, IV., 566. NOVAES (XI., 79) says erroneously that Ottoboni had also been for some time Bishop of Torcello.

that period he energetically opposed certain heretical movements.¹ At the Curia the Cardinal's prestige rose steadily. He was admired not only for his extensive knowledge, but also for his charm and the naturalness and spontaneity of his manner. As *Datarius* under Clement IX., Ottoboni created an excellent impression by his habit of promptly dispatching business.² His sense of law and order led him to join the *Squadrone volante*, and as early as 1667 he was looked upon as its candidate for the supreme dignity.³ Under Innocent XI. he enjoyed considerable influence and the Pope did not resent his frankness. The French, who under Clement IX. had spoken of him in high terms,⁴ could not now sufficiently blame him for having taken the part of Innocent XI. in the latter's disputes with Louis XIV. On the other hand, even Cardinal D'Estrées had to admit that in his dealings with France, Ottoboni had been led by no spirit of cabal or partisanship, but solely by the principles of Canon Law.⁵ Ottoboni likewise excelled in the knowledge of Moral Theology. The width of his interests is further attested by his remarkable library, to which manuscripts and rare printed books were constantly being added.⁶ Learned, blameless in his conduct, exceedingly prudent, he was regarded as one of the ablest, best informed and worthiest members of the Sacred College.⁷ Shadows in the portrait were his greed

¹ BERNINI, *Heretici*, IV., 723 *seqq.* *Ibid.*, 726, on the marble bust of Alexander VIII. in the duomo of Brescia.

² "Ancora adesso la Dataria lo sospira. Era sbrigativo," says P. A. Pancetti, **Descrizione della vita di molti Pontefici* (Alexander VI. to Clement XI.), completed 1713, p. 163^v, *Cod. ital.*, 93, State Library, Munich.

³ See the report in GÉRIN, *Louis XIV.*, Vol. II., 204.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 207, 243, 296.

⁵ GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX., 145.

⁶ SICKEL, *Röm. Berichte*, IV., 32.

⁷ **Scriptura politica* of 1689, in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, and in State Archives, Vienna, translated by DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 512 *seq.* Also SCARLATTI, in his **Discorso preparativo*, Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna; see BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 42. Cardinal Pio's **report* of April 6, 1686, State Archives, Vienna. *Cf.* also

for money, and connected with it, his inordinate attachment to his relations.¹ In another respect also he stood in marked contrast with his predecessor. Whereas the latter had been exceedingly strict, secretive and reticent, Alexander's kindness rendered him accessible to everyone; liberal of his favours—in keeping with the manner of the Venetians—he was prodigal of courteous speeches. Notwithstanding his great age his carriage was distinguished and erect, his countenance open and cheerful, his manner gentle, and he showed the utmost friendliness to everyone he encountered.² Against the diplomatists he upheld tenaciously whatever he knew to be right, though in so doing he endeavoured to avoid all unnecessary asperity.³ Despite his eighty years he still presented an imposing appearance; his beautiful countenance, manly and bearded, is admirably recalled by the statue over his tomb in St. Peter's.⁴ In mind also he was still extraordinarily fresh and alert.⁵ He rose at dawn and at once applied himself to business with the utmost zest. He attended personally to all important affairs, so that he seemed to be his own tireless minister. In this he was helped by his great skill

**Avviso Marescotti*, January 19, 1686 (" il primo soggetto habbia oggi la corte di Roma "), Bibl. Vitt. Emanuele, Rome.

¹ See the *memorials quoted in previous note. Cf. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 42, and DUBRUEL, 513.

² Report of Girol. Lando in BAROZZI-BERCHET, Roma, II., 435, Liechtenstein's report in BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 90, and **Relazione del pontificato di P. Alessandro VIII. dal Abate Cornacchia, segret. del barone de Vit*, in *Urb.* 1706, p. 316, Vatican Library.

³ Chaulnes, in GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 163.

⁴ Portrait of P. SCHENCK in his *Konst toneel*, Amsterdam, and in GUARNACCI, I., 313. A contemporary marble bust from Rome, now in the Municipal Museum, Frankfurt a. M., Liebighaus, Nr. 332; a bronze bust by one of Bernini's pupils in London; see C. DRURY and E. FORTNUM, *Catalogue of the Bronzes in the South Kensington Museum*, London, 1876, 7-8. The statue of Alexander VIII. in Urbino was saved in 1798, because the Archbishop changed it into a Saint; see GARAVANI, *Urbino e il suo territorio nel periodo francese II.*, Urbino, 1907, 77.

⁵ *SCARLATTI, *loc. cit.*

and rare ease in mastering circumstances.¹ He wished to see everything, but no one was allowed to know anything of his personal concerns. He accordingly refused to appoint new honorary chamberlains, because he was unwilling to have spies about him. For the same reason he entrusted the tidying of his rooms to a servant who could neither read nor write.²

The new Pope soon became very popular with the Romans. The marvellous *girandola* on the day of his coronation³ and the triumphal arches on the occasion of his taking possession of the Lateran,⁴ won him the affection of a people ever eager for new spectacles. The populace was also delighted by the Pope's frequent public appearances and by his occasional informal drives in the city.⁵ When he finally eased the burden of taxation,⁶ introduced a more liberal policy in the grain trade,⁷ and undertook various measures for the welfare of

¹ " *S. Stà è indefessa nell'operare, sente tutto, risolve tutto e ordina tutto senza molto travaglio avendo una grandissima comprensiva facilità et esecuzione " (report of November, 1689, Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna). Cf. Cardinal Goës' *report of October 16, 1689, State Archives, Vienna.

² **Avviso Marescotti*, October 18, 1689, Bibl. Vitt. Em., Rome; *Report of R. Pallavicini, December 31, 1689, State Arch., Vienna; Report of the Duke of Chaulnes, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX., 150. As BISCHOFFSHAUSEN justly remarks (93) there can be no question of a collateral reign, as Liechtenstein would have it.

³ " *La girandola è stata la più numerosa e bella che a' tempi nostri sia mai stata veduta." *Avviso Marescotti*, October 22, 1689, *loc. cit.*

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti*, October 29, 1689, *ibid.* Cf. CANCELLIERI, *Possessi*, 303 *seqq.*

⁵ Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, December 17, 1689, and June 17, 1690, *loc. cit.*

⁶ **Avviso Marescotti*, November 26, 1689, *ibid.* Cf. *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 192; BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 60, n. 13. BROSCHE (I., 447), observes that the loss of 200,000 scudi by the reduction of taxes did not disturb the equilibrium of the budget.

⁷ See BENIGNI, 64 *seqq.* On the edict here mentioned for the destruction of moles, see F. M. NIGRISOLI, *Lettera nella quale si*

the city,¹ the joy of the people knew no bounds. A medal was struck in his honour extolling him as the restorer of public welfare.² For the Romans this included the revival of the carnival³ and the public performance of operas,

considera l'invasione fatta da' topi nella Campagna di Roma l'anno 1690, Ferrara, 1693.

¹ Care for the cleaning of the streets: **Avviso Marescotti*, October 18, 1689, *loc. cit.*; precaution against the plague: **Avviso Marescotti*, January 13, 1690, *ibid.* Cf. Decrees on the plague, January 4, 8 and 9, 1690, in *Editti*, V., 61, p. 416 *seq.*, Pap. Sec. Archives.

² See BENIGNI, *loc. cit.* A contemporary account says: "Alli 16 Febbraio 1691 morì Alessandro ottavo con gran dispiacere e danno della città di Roma per il suo breve pontificato, perchè se più campava, haveva destinato a far molte cose a pro del pubblico e sollevamento del popolo. Gli artisti nel breve corso del suo pontificato tutti lavoravano, e se ne vedde segni evidenti del loro guadagno nel Monte della Pietà, nel quale nel detto tempo furono riscossi la maggior parte delli pegni che vi erano, inditio manifesto che nel detto pontificato correva del denaro" (PASOLINI, *Documenti*, 39). Nevertheless, Alexander VIII. also, especially after his death, was made the butt of bitter satires and abusive writings. Very widely disseminated in manuscript is the **Confessione di P. Alessandro VIII. fatta al suo confessore il P. Giuseppe Gesuita negli ultimi estremi della sua vita*, quoted by RANKE, III., 206, *according to a "MS. Rom.", and justly refuted as contrary to the truth: Rome, *Barb.* LXI., 1, *Ottob.* 3165, p. 264, Vat. Lib., and *Bolognetti*, 275, Pap. Sec. Archives; Frankfurt a. M., Municipal Library, *MS. Glauburg*, 31; Vienna, State Library, 6351, p. 179 *seqq.*; a copy bought in Rome, 1902, in my possession. An **Epitaphium satiricum* in *Ottob.* 3160, p. 21, *loc. cit.* Rather more against Cardinal Ottoboni is a **Canzone* in Bibl. L. Benveduti, Gubbio. But we have also poems in favour of Alexander VIII. and his nephews, especially in **Ottob.* 1725; cf. PASOLINI, *Documenti*, 91 *seqq.*, 97 *seqq.* "Privilegi, esenzioni e grazie concesse da Alessandro VIII. alli soldati e milizie dello Stato ecclesiastico," published by F. Sabatini in *Nuova Antologia*, 3 Series, IV. (1883), Nr. 31-41.

³ See **Avviso Marescotti*, January 7 and February 11, 1690, *loc. cit.* Cf. CLEMENTI, *Carnevale*, 540 *seqq.*

but this last concession was only granted after some hesitation.¹

The severe, serious character which the ascetic Innocent XI. had stamped on Roman life was greatly weakened by the revival of nepotism.² No sooner was he elected than Alexander VIII. summoned his relatives from Venice to Rome, and since in view of his great age he could not promise himself a long reign, he provided them as quickly as possible with offices and wealth. His great-nephew Pietro Ottoboni had scarcely donned the dress of a prelate when he was given the wealthy abbey of Chiaravalle.³ On November 7th he became a Cardinal and ruling nephew, *nipote padrone*. In the consistory Colloredo recalled the fact that Charles Borromeo had also received the purple when no older than Pietro.⁴ But Pietro Ottoboni did not turn out another Charles Borromeo. He was given the office of a *Soprintendente Generale* of the papal States, and that of vice-chancellor.⁵ To this were added rich benefices, and in the following year, the legation of Avignon. But high as the nephew's revenues were, 50,000 scudi a year, or 70,000 according to some,⁶ they were very far from meeting his requirements. We seem taken back once more to the period of the Renaissance when we read of the treasures of silver, tapestries, pictures, antique objects, rare books and manuscripts which the Cardinal collected in the Cancelleria.⁷ The conduct of the pleasure-loving

¹ Cf. **Avvisi Marescotti*, December 9, 23 and 30, 1690, *loc. cit.*

² " *Hora si vede un' altra Roma," writes R. Pallavicini already on November 26, 1689, State Archives, Vienna.

³ **Avviso Marescotti*, October 22, 1689, *loc. cit.*

⁴ **Acta consist.*, Vatican Library.

⁵ Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, November 12, 1689, *loc. cit.*, and the report in BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 55.

⁶ PANCETTI, **Vita dei Pontefici* (see above, p. 532, n. 2), and BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 56.

⁷ **Avviso Marescotti*, February 11, 1690, *loc. cit.*; CICOGLIA, *Iscriz. Venez.*, V., 631 *seqq.* Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, June 3, 1690: " Il cardinale Ottoboni ha comprati li famosi arazzi della fu Regina di Suetia, presi prima da gl'imperiali nel sacco di

young man was so little in keeping with his ecclesiastical state that the Pope was obliged to remonstrate.¹ Affairs interested him much less than his hobbies. He was a patron of literary men, to whom, as for instance to Montfaucon, he gave free access to his manuscript treasures.² He was also a supporter of the stage and of music.³ He is the author of an opera entitled *Columbus* which was performed in the theatre of Tor di Nona during the carnival of 1691, but according to the Marquis de Coulanges, it met with a cold reception.⁴ Of the Secretariate of State, Pietro Ottoboni merely held the title. The management of affairs was supposed to be in the hands of Monsignore Rubini, the son of one of the Pope's sisters and Bishop of Vicenza, who was also given the legation of Avignon⁵; but in point of fact Alexander VIII. was his own Secretary of State.⁶

Mantova, e poi da Gustavo Adolfo padre di detta Regina nel sacco di Praga, come anco la famosa libreria della medesima, havendone consegnato molti libri alla Biblioteca Vaticana, la quale di quelli era priva, havendone gl'altri uniti alla propria" (*loc. cit.*). A tapestry representing the Holy Family which belonged to Cardinal Ottoboni, is still preserved in the Vatican.

¹ Cf. *Report of R. Pallavicini, November 26, 1689, State Archives, Vienna, and *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX., 149.

² Cf. COZZA-LUZI, *Codices MSS. graeci Ottob. Vatic. Bibl.*, Romae, 1893, LIV. seq.

³ " *Amatore di musica, poesia e di allegrezze," writes R. Pallavicini to Leopold I., October 15, 1689, State Arch., Vienna.

⁴ The passage from the *Mémoires de M. de Coulanges* (Paris, 1820), which give many an interesting, historical and cultural detail about the life in Rome at that time, is printed in ADEMOLLO, *Teatri*, 182 seq.

⁵ See the report in BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 56. Franc. Maria Spinola was the secretary of the *Brevia ad principes* (Papal Secret Archives).

⁶ Cf. **Vita critica de' cardinali*, 1696 (Bibl. Liechtenstein, Vienna), which draws a very unfavourable picture of Rubini; as he had nothing to do he gave himself up to a very worldly life. R. Pallavicini *reports on November 26, 1689, Ottoboni, Chigi and Medici are the most influential Cardinals, but the Pope,

Antonio Ottoboni, father of the Cardinal nephew, was made General of the Church and Commander of the papal troops.¹ He was just as fond of pleasure as his son. On the last day of the carnival of 1690 he gave a splendid ball in the theatre of Tor di Nona after the manner of his native Venice. This "festina" as it was called, was a quite new spectacle for Rome.²

Another nephew, Marco Antonio, a hunchback,³ was made inspector in chief of the naval fortifications and the fleet of the Pontifical States. For him the Pope bought, out of his private means,⁴ at the price of 170,000 scudi, the Duchy of Fiano, and on October 14th, 1690, he married him to Tarquinia Colonna, a great-niece of Cardinal Altieri.⁵ For his residence Marco was assigned the Palazzo Ludovisi in the Corso.⁶ At this time the Ottoboni entered into relations of kinship with yet another Roman family when the Pope's great-niece, Cornelia Zeno, by adoption an Ottoboni, was married to the

"superiore a tutti, non si lascia facilmente disporre." State Archives, Vienna.

¹ **Avviso Marescotti*, December 3, 1689, *loc. cit.*

² See ADEMOLLO, *Teatri*, 179 *seq.*

³ In his *report of November 26, 1689, *loc. cit.*, R. Pallavicini calls him "gobbo e zoppo".

⁴ Cf. PASOLINI, *Documenti*, 47.

⁵ See C. CASSINA, **Diario*, in *Vat.* 8390, Vatican Library; BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 143 *seq.*

⁶ See **Avviso Marescotti*, December 2, 1690: "Con molta sollecitudine si va risarcendo il Palazzo Ludovisio del principe D. Marco Ottoboni, credesi per portarvisi in breve ad habitare in un quarto del medesimo senza alcuno incomodo delle fabbriche. Si è disegnato di far gettare a terra alcune case, che guardano al Pio Luogo de' Letterati nel Corso, per farvi una nova piazza, sollecitandosi intanto la riunione d'alcune acque smarrite, per nobilitarlo maggiormente con bellissime fontane." Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome. *Ibid.*, in **Avviso* of November 19, 1689, there is a note which is very interesting for the history of architecture in Rome: "Resta quasi terminata la facciata del nuovo Palazzo Mazzarini al Corso che riesce delle più belle e sontuose fabbriche di Roma."

Prince of Palestrina.¹ For the rest, no more than the other nepotistic Popes, Alexander VIII. was not spared manifold annoyances on the part of his nephews.² The Pope also made generous provision for his familiars. In allusion to his great age he was wont to say, in his own jovial way: "Let us make haste as much as possible for already the twenty-third hour has struck."³

The French ambassador, the Duc de Chaulnes, sought to exploit Alexander VIII.'s great attachment to his kinsfolk to the advantage of his own sovereign, but he was soon made to feel that the Pope was very independent and did not suffer his relatives to influence his government.⁴ For all that, nepotism was bound to cast its shadow more than once upon the pontificate of Alexander VIII.

(2.)

However much the great European Powers fought each other on the field of battle, they had made common cause in the conclave of 1689 for the election of Cardinal Ottoboni; hence the new Pope was able to express his thanks at one and the same time to the Emperor and to the Kings of Spain and France,⁵ and by reason of the co-operation of Cardinal Norfolk, a similar letter was sent to James II. of England.⁶

It looked as if the fate of the Catholic religion in England were also connected with the fate of that unhappy monarch.

¹ See BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 145 *seq.*

² Cf. *ibid.*, 121 *seq.*

³ "Affrettiamo al possibile, perchè sono sonate le 23 hore" (**Avviso Marescotti*, November 12, 1689, *loc. cit.*). Another version in PANCETTI, *loc. cit.*

⁴ See the reports in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 148, 150, 152.

⁵ See **Lettere di proprio pugno scritte da Alessandro VIII.*, all dated October 16, 1689, *Arm.*, 45, t. 41, p. 158 *seq.*, Papal Secret Archives.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 161. Reply of James II., November 26, 1689, from Dublin, in PUFENDORF, III., 45; cf. also KLOPP, V., 12.

Accordingly Alexander VIII. set up a Congregation of Cardinals to deal with English matters ; at the same time it was also charged to find means for the restoration of the peace of Christendom.¹ With James II.'s request for money the Pope neither could nor would comply, for he was convinced that a Stuart restoration could not be brought about by force of arms ; more could be hoped, so he thought, from a general peace.² But intervention by the Pope could only prove successful if he gave proof of the utmost impartiality. For this reason the above-mentioned letters of thanks were couched in such general terms that it was impossible to discover in them any trace of a preference for any one of the warring nations.

However studiously Alexander VIII. observed, from the very beginning of his reign, the strictest impartiality towards the Powers,³ he could not suppress his love for his native city with which he had always been closely linked.⁴ Hence it was a particular satisfaction to him to be able to proceed to the canonization of a countryman of his, namely, Laurence Giustiniani, whom he raised to the altar at the same time as John of Sahagun, Pascal Baylon, John of God and John Capistran.⁵

In view of the Pope's friendly feelings towards Venice the ambassador of the Republic of St. Mark, Girolamo Lando,

¹ **Avviso Marescotti*, October 18, 1689, Bibl. Vitt. Em., Rome.

² See KLOPP, V., 14. Cf. *Brief of December 27, 1689, to the English Queen, *Brevia Alexandri VIII.*, Pap. Sec. Arch.

³ BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 91.

⁴ Cf. the rich *correspondence in *Ottob.* 3269, 3270, 3272-3282, Vatican Library.

⁵ The canonizations were decided upon on August 23, 1689 ; cf. *Acta consist.*, Vatican Library. The celebrations took place on October 16, 1690 ; **Avviso Marescotti* of October 21, 1690, *loc. cit.*, and *Brief to Venice, October 21, 1690, *Brevia*, Pap. Sec. Archives. On the new Saints, see NOVAES, XI., 94 seq. The precious paliotto used on this occasion and presented to S. Peter's by the Pope, is one of the most beautiful of the kind preserved in the treasury of St. Peter's.

easily obtained from him a substantial aid for the Republic's war against Morea. By suppressing an abbey the Pope granted a considerable subsidy¹; he also allowed troops to be levied in the States of the Church, a circumstance that occasioned some troubles there.² Moreover he put at the disposal of Venice a force of 1,500 soldiers and a number of galleys, at a cost of 100,000 scudi,³ and sought to obtain help from the Genoese.⁴ In April 1690, he sent to the Doge, Francesco Morosini, a hat and sword blessed by himself.⁵ In the fulness of his joy over the victories of the Venetians the Pope declared in a letter of December 28th, 1690, that their undertaking against the enemy of Christendom was so worthy of praise that all his favours seemed small to him.⁶

In his very first letter the Pope had paid a well-deserved tribute to the Emperor for what the latter had accomplished in the war against the Turks, and not long after he congratulated him again on his triumphs.⁷ However, the brilliant progress of the imperial arms roused the jealousy of the Venetians and as a result of their insinuations Alexander VIII. was far less generous in his subsidies to the Emperor than his great predecessor had been. But in this matter the Pope's action was also influenced by the consideration which he felt he must use towards France.⁸

Alexander VIII. realized from the first that there was no more important problem awaiting solution by him than the

¹ Cf. BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 61, 63.

² Cf. **Avvisi Marescotti*, January 7 and 29, 1690, *loc. cit.*; BROSCHE, I., 448 *seqq.* A more detailed description in **Relazione del Abbate Cornacchia, Urb.* 1706, p. 316 *seq.*, Vatican Library. Cf. also the reports quoted by BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, p. 96.

³ See besides BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, *loc. cit.*, NOVAES, XI., 92 *seq.*; GUGLIEMOTTI, 149 *seqq.*

⁴ *Briefs to Genoa of March 11, May 13 and September 2, 1690, *Brevia*, Pap. Sec. Archives.

⁵ *Brief of April 8, 1690, *ibid.* Cf. GUARNACCI, I., 318.

⁶ *Brief of April 8, 1690, *loc. cit.*

⁷ *Brief of October 22, 1689, *ibid.*

⁸ BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 59 *seqq.*, 63 *seqq.*

restoration of ecclesiastical peace in France where the number of Bishops not confirmed by the Holy See was constantly growing. The Pope's efforts to remedy this state of things were aided by the circumstance that Louis XIV., who had suffered a moral defeat through the inflexibility of Innocent XI., had been forced into a defensive attitude by the "Grand Alliance". Alexander clearly realized the situation; hence, though ever most conciliatory, he took a firm stand towards the King of France when in the very first days of his pontificate, he demanded the restoration of Avignon and the renunciation of the freedom of the quarter. On the latter point Louis proved accommodating, because he hoped that the Pope would yield on the question of the Bishops, if he on his part refrained from constantly trespassing on the secular rights of the Holy See.¹ But this was only a partial expiation of the enormous encroachments committed against Innocent XI. The most important thing of all, the restoration of the Church's jurisdiction, was still lacking, and on this point Alexander VIII. was not prepared to yield; he was bound, so he declared, to defend the rights of the Church even at the cost of his life.² On secondary questions he made a few concessions, and he also sought to encourage the peaceful dispositions of the King by abandoning the great attachment to the Emperor which had characterized Innocent XI. But on the main question he remained unyielding. Before confirming the French Bishops he insisted on a formal recantation on their part of the errors professed by them in 1682. On his part Louis XIV. would only allow letters declaring their devotion without any express withdrawal of the Gallican Articles.³ All subsequent negotiations substantially turned round this difference of opinion.

How anxious the Pope was for a settlement of the ecclesiastical troubles in France was shown by the surprising

¹ GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XX., 153 seqq.

² Liechtenstein's report of October 28, 1689, in KLOPP, V., 13.

³ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 158 seqq.; KLOPP, V., 17 seq., 331.

step taken by him at the creation of Cardinals at the beginning of 1690. At a consistory held on February 13th, 1690, the following prelates received the red hat: the Florentine Bernardino Panciatici, papal Datarius; the Neapolitan Jacopo Cantelmi, at the time nuncio extraordinary at Augsburg for the coronation of the newly elected King of the Romans, Archduke Joseph¹; the Milanese Ferdinand d'Adda, nuncio to James II. under Innocent XI.; Luigi Omodei, nephew of the Cardinal of the same name and likewise a Milanese; the learned Gian Francesco Albani of Urbino, Secretary of Briefs since October 1688; the Siense Carlo Bichi, an old friend of the Pope; the Venetian Giambattista Rubini and finally the Genoese Giambattista Costaguti, Dean of the Apostolic Camera, the Treasurer Giuseppe Renato Imperiali and the Governor of Rome, Francesco del Giudice.² To these ten Italians Alexander added the Frenchman Toussaint de Forbin Janson, Bishop of Beauvais.³ The elevation of this man, for which Louis XIV. had striven for years, took place regardless of the protests of the Emperor who saw an enemy in Forbin, and without Leopold I. being given another vote in the College of Cardinals. The consequence

¹ Cantelmi was at Augsburg since the beginning of 1690; see HILTEBRANDT, *Reunionsverhandlungen*, 103. The news of the election of Joseph as King reached Rome on February 4, 1690 (BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 96). In a consistory of March 6, the Pope communicated the news to the Cardinals, at the same time extolling the merits of Leopold I. in repelling the Turks. *Acta consist.*, Vatican Library.

² **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*; **Avviso Marescotti*, February 18, 1690, *loc. cit.* On the new Cardinals, see GUARNACCI, I., 326 *seqq.* (with portraits), NOVAES, XI., 89 *seqq.*, and numerous details in **Vita critica de' cardinali*, 1696, Liechtenstein Library, Vienna. On Imperiali, *cf.* also MARCHESI BUONACCORSI, 479 *seqq.*

³ Alexander VIII. announced to Louis XIV. Forbin's nomination by *Brief of February 18, 1690. On the same day Franc. Trevisanus, the bearer of the red hat, was recommended by *Briefs to the nobles of France and to Madame de Maintenon. *Brevia*, Pap. Sec. Archives.

was that Cardinal von Goës, together with Medici and the two Spanish Cardinals, stayed away from the consistory by way of protest. The Pope's action was inspired by higher considerations¹; for the sake of the re-establishment of ecclesiastical peace in France he gave way on a personal question even though in so doing he had to override a justifiable wish of the court of Vienna, though one that it was not absolutely necessary to gratify. There can be no doubt that Alexander had not the slightest intention of offending the Emperor. Notwithstanding the pressure of the French, he had put off the nomination until after December and had only carried it out after Medici, the Cardinal Protector of the German and Spanish nations, as well as the ambassador of the Spanish Habsburgs, had declared that they had no objection to make.² All the same we can understand that the Emperor should have considered it a disadvantage that the increased French influence in the Sacred College should not have been neutralized.³

With the nomination of Forbin, which Innocent XI. had steadily refused to consider, Alexander VIII. went to the extreme limit of conciliation with Louis XIV., for Forbin had taken part in the Assembly of 1682. Louis XIV., on the other hand, showed but little gratitude. His previous retreat is explained by the fact that in 1689 the Grand Alliance had forced him into a defensive position. Now he had once more taken the offensive and by so doing had won undeniable successes. So the Pope was made to feel once more the arrogance of former days. Not satisfied with the fact that by Forbin's nomination Alexander had given remarkable proof of his love of peace as well as of his independence of the wishes of the

¹ **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.* The nomination was not made "improvisamente", as Liechtenstein says in his **Diaries* (Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna).

² BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 97 *seqq.*, 177. Cf. " *Discorso se il vescovo di Boves creato cardinale da Alessandro VIII. meritava l'opposizione fattagli dal cardinale Colloredo col suo voto nel publico consistoro," Pap. Sec. Archives, III., 20, p. 239.

³ BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 102 *seqq.*

Emperor, and that one who had taken part in the Assembly of 1682 now wore the purple, Louis taxed the Pope with partiality because at the creation of Cardinals he had included some Spanish subjects. On top of everything Louis soon afterwards designated the Archbishop of Paris, De Harlay, who had presided at the Assembly of 1682, as his next Crown Cardinal, though there was not even a vacancy in the Sacred College.¹ He also ordered the French Jesuits to make themselves independent of their General.² There was nothing to show that he intended to keep the promise made on the occasion of the surrender of Avignon, namely that he would return the guns he had removed, and set at liberty the imprisoned Bishop of Vaison³; nor could there be any doubt that it was his intention to uphold the Gallican Articles of 1682. At the same time, he sought to break up the Grand Alliance by sowing discord between the Emperor and his Protestant allies. To this purpose he sought to make even the Head of the Church subservient. Soon after Alexander's elevation he tried to persuade the Pope that the tremendous struggle between himself and the Grand Alliance was a real "war of religion" conducted by the House of Austria and its Protestant allies against the Church's "elder son" and the exiled Catholic King of England.⁴ However, the Pope saw through the schemes of the powerful ruler on the Seine; he saw perfectly well the purpose of the King's request that the Pope should negotiate an armistice with the Emperor "for the protection of the Catholic faith", and he refused for the time being to accede to such a prayer. Most of the Cardinals likewise refused to share the French view that there was question of a war of religion, though they were of opinion that the Pope should mediate for an armistice on condition that France surrendered all her conquests.⁵ On July 8th, 1690,

¹ GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 170.

² *Ibid.*, 171 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 176 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 161 *seq.*

⁵ See SYLVIVS, III., 62; KLOPP, V., 14 *seq.*; BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 159.

the Pope issued Briefs to both parties, exhorting them to make peace,¹ though he foresaw that his words would fall on deaf ears. In an allocution to the Cardinals he put this question to them: "How shall we act? Each crown has its own particular motives and such as lie outside the sphere in which the Church can make her influence felt. On the other hand, I cannot fail to see that in view of the strength of both parties, either the one or the other is bound to realize the necessity of peace. I raise my eyes and hands to heaven; I come to this decision and to that; but as soon as I have done so, I fail to see how it can be carried into effect: gigantic obstacles tower up before me. France declines to give way in the slightest degree; she trusts in war and refuses all satisfaction to others until after the conclusion of peace. The Emperor and Spain would have succumbed had they not had recourse to the Alliance, and though a league with Protestant Powers is fraught with many drawbacks, it is a necessary evil which those two Powers were compelled to resort to in view of the manifold and unforeseen perils by which they were beset."²

In the course of the constantly renewed discussions for the withdrawal of the Gallican Articles of 1682, the Pope insisted on first consulting the Cardinals, notwithstanding the opposition of the French. After the rejections by the Cardinals of a proposal by Louis XIV., another was at length drawn up in July which satisfied both parties. When the Abbé de Polignac took the new project to Versailles, it looked as if the conclusion of religious peace in France were close at hand.³ But this time also the Pope was destined to be disappointed, and the thwarting of his hope was largely the work of a Prince of the Church who owed the purple to Alexander's indulgence, viz. Cardinal Forbin Janson. Knowing that in this extremely able and skilful man he possessed an

¹ Text of the *Briefs to the Emperor and the Kings of France and Spain in *Brevia*, Pap. Sec. Archives. Cf. also **Acta consist.*, Vatican Library.

² KLOPP, V., 16.

³ GÉRIN, in *Rev. des quest. hist.*, XXII., 177 seq.

entirely willing tool, the King ordered the Cardinal, who was going to Rome to receive the red hat, to remain there for the purpose of keeping an eye on the more accommodating Duke de Chaulnes.¹ Forbin reached Rome on July 2nd, 1690, when Cardinal Ottoboni took him at once by a secret staircase of the Quirinal, into the Pope's presence.² The Pontiff received the Cardinal most graciously; he imposed the red hat on him at the consistory of July 6th.³ The more clearly Forbin saw the Pope's determination to settle the disputes with France, the more obstinately he insisted on the Gallican demands. In this he was but the interpreter of his master's intentions. Louis XIV. rejected the draft of a compromise which Chaulnes had accepted, recalled Cardinal Bouillon, who also held moderate views, and entrusted everything to Janson.⁴

In these circumstances, Alexander VIII. could only take the sharper measures already prepared by Innocent XI. On June 30th a Constitution had been drawn up which, though it did not directly condemn the teaching of the Assembly of Bishops of 1682, nevertheless declared its decisions on that teaching and the dispositions for its execution to have been issued without authority and as such to be null and void. This Constitution was now signed and the representatives of France were informed that its publication was unavoidable.⁵ Though Forbin's and Chaulnes' answer took the form of threats, Alexander VIII. made yet another personal appeal to Louis XIV. as well as to Madame de Maintenon who exercised considerable influence over the King.⁶ The autograph letter of December 18th, 1690, in which he once more besought the King to restore peace to the Church of France, failed to touch the obstinate monarch. The Pope had only a short

¹ *Ibid.*, 183.

² Cf. **Diario* of C. Cassina, in *Vat.* 8390, Vatican Library.

³ **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*

⁴ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 184 *seq.*, 188.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 202, and M. D'ANGELO, *Luigi XIV. e la S. Sede*, 25.

⁶ Brief to Mad. de Maintenon, December 29, 1690, in *Brevia*, Pap. Sec. Archives. Cf. LANGLOIS, in *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, 1929, 62.

time to live when Louis XIV.'s answer, dated January 8th, 1691, reached him. The King's letter crushed all hopes of peace. Shortly before this the Pope had authorized the French nuncio, Francesco Niccolini, to declare that a compromise was only possible on the basis of the proposal agreed upon with Chaulnes in the summer of 1690.¹

Whilst the Pope was thus indefatigably working for such a consummation, his relations with the Emperor had increasingly deteriorated. To the initial misunderstanding caused by the creation of Cardinals of February 13th, 1690, there was added another caused by the appointment of a new nuncio to Vienna,² and as a third there was Alexander's reserve in granting subsidies for the war against the Turks. Since May 1690, there was a threat of a formal rupture between Vienna and Rome,³ but when on October 28th news arrived in the Eternal City of the fall of Belgrad, the Pope was greatly concerned. He ordered not only prayers and processions to implore the divine help but likewise gave instructions for the immediate dispatch to Vienna of 100,000 florins.⁴ But this help came too late and the sum granted was

¹ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 197 *seqq.* The *Instruction to Niccolini, dated January 13, 1691, in *Cod.* 38, A. 30, p. 179 *seq.*, Corsini Library, Rome, has now been published by M. D'ANGELO, *loc. cit.*, 55 *seqq.*, from a manuscript of the Bibl. Casanatense, Rome.

² See the detailed account in BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 104 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 119 *seq.*, 129 *seq.*

⁴ “*Sorpreso et agitato l'animo del Papa dall'infausta notizia della perdita di Belgrado, si crede nell'obbligo indispensabile d'accorrere possibilmente con tutti li mezzi divini et humani al riparo di maggiori minacciate iatture. Spedì però la sera di sabato espresso alla corte di Vienna la scritta rimessa di 100^m fiorini, et pubblicata per li tre giorni susseguenti un indulgenza in forma di giubileo [he had the Blessed Sacrament exposed in S. Maria Maggiore and went there himself on foot] con tutte le dimostrazioni maggiori di compuntione, devotione e zelo.” So also for three days in S. Prassede, amid a very great concourse of people. The Pope was overcome by the news and by his exertions, .

only a remnant of the tax imposed by Innocent XI. on ecclesiastical revenues in Spanish territories, but which had not been hitherto handed over.¹ On the imperial side a comparison was made between what Innocent XI. had given and the contrast was bound to be greatly to Alexander's disadvantage.² But, naturally enough, the Pope's first preoccupation was to effect a compromise with France and the difficulty of his position was quickly seen, for Louis XIV. complained at once that Alexander VIII. gave proof of partisanship when he lent help to the Emperor, the ally of Protestant princes, "against France rather than against the Turks."³

A further deterioration of relations with Leopold I. was occasioned by Alexander's third and last nomination of Cardinals on November 13th, 1690, when, regardless of the wishes of the Emperor, Francesco Barberini and Lorenzo Altieri obtained the purple.⁴ The decisive factor in the choice of these two prelates was their kinship with the papal nephews.⁵

Vienna had long hesitated to have recourse to strong measures but now it was decided, on November 29th, that the Emperor's representative, Prince Liechtenstein, should leave Rome without a farewell audience; Cardinal Goës, in view of the prospect of a conclave in the near future, was to remain there, but was forbidden to have anything to do with the Curia; the *chargé d'affaires* of the Vienna nunciature was to be forbidden to have any relations with the imperial court and the Government, and Leopold I. was to send a protest to the

so could not attend the functions that followed. *Avviso Marescotti*, November 8, 1690, Bibl. Vitt. Emanuele, Rome.

¹ See BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 155.

² *Ibid.*

³ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 193 *seqq.*

⁴ **Acta consist.*, Vatican Library; GUARNACCI, I., 371 *seq.*; NOVAES, XI., 91 *seq.*; MARCHESI BUONACCORSI, 544 *seqq.* (on Altieri). " *Composizioni fatte in Palestrina da diversi autori " on the occasion of Fr. Barberini's nomination to the cardinalate in *Barb.* XLIV., 225, Vat. Library.

⁵ BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 142 *seqq.*

Sacred College.¹ None of these resolutions were carried into effect because the Pope fell gravely ill in January 1691.

As late as November 11th, 1690, it was reported from Rome that the aged Head of the Church enjoyed the best of health. The greatest difficulty was that he would not consider his age but insisted on devoting himself with undiminished zeal to the affairs of Christendom, in particular to bringing about a compromise with France.² In point of fact, Alexander VIII. had never spared himself and even as an old man he still worked with the energy of youth.³ But at last his strength was spent. On January 8th, 1691, he held a consistory⁴; eight days later he was compelled to take to his bed owing to erysipelas in one leg.⁵ At first all hope was not given up,⁶ but on January 22nd the condition of the invalid became grave⁷ and the celebrated surgeon Gambarà of Padua

¹ *Ibid.*, 167 *seqq.* In Rome the excitement was no less than in Vienna. On December 2, 1690, the Secretary of State wrote to the Uditore, Franc. Tucci, in Vienna: “*Tutta l’industria et opera de’ ministri cesarei in questa corte non tende ad altro se non che ad accender fuoco ed a multiplicar inventioni costà, onde se ne cumulino fra ambedue le parti i dissapori. Ed è assai verisimile, anzi si tien per fermo da’ più sensati che fintanto che i predetti vi si tratterrano, non sia per comporsi alcuna differenza, nè farsi cosa di buono. Per questa medesima ragione si è allontanato dai medesimi e di quà il sigr. cardinale de Medici, che non poteva e non voleva accomodarsi alle loro massime e risoluzioni, etc.” *Nunziat. di Germania*, 216, p. 15, Pap. Sec. Archives. The Pope was against the erection of a new electorate for Hannover; Ernest Augustus would only have been supported if he had carried out his intention of passing over to the Catholic Church (HILTEBRANDT, *Reunionsverhandlungen*, 101 *seqq.*). Alexander VIII., like Innocent XII., judged Spinola’s efforts for reunion (see above, p. 477) more favourably than Innocent XI. (HILTEBRANDT, 89 *seqq.*).

² **Avviso Marescotti*, November 11, 1690, Bibl. Vitt. Em., Rome.

³ See the report in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 199. ⁴ **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*

⁵ Cf. **Diario in Barb.* 4683, p. 4 *seq.*, Vatican Library.

⁶ **Avviso Marescotti*, January 20, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁷ GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 200.

was sent for.¹ However, gangrene set in² so that on January 29th the Pontiff's condition became hopeless. Alexander VIII. received the information with absolute calm and fullest resignation to God's will.³ He summoned to his death-bed the twelve Cardinals to whom he had entrusted the task of settling the French dispute. All came, except Cibo who had been taken ill.⁴ In their presence, and in presence of two prelates and two protonotaries acting as witnesses, with a firm voice and holding a crucifix in his hand, he solemnly declared that he felt convinced that if he had been raised to the supreme dignity, it was solely because he had been a faithful adviser to his predecessor and because he had always urged and encouraged the latter to defend the prerogatives of the Holy See in the disputes with France. He knew quite well what it was the Sacred College had expected from him, namely that he should carry into effect the counsels he had himself given, that he should uphold what had been done by Innocent XI. and defend those rights with the same zeal. As a matter of fact he had always striven to compose these disputes, whilst always safe-guarding the rights of the Holy See by compelling the French Bishops to condemn all that had been done at their assembly. Since he had failed to secure this, he felt bound to give the Sacred College the satisfaction which it expected from him. This he would do by communicating to them the text of a Brief which had been drawn up during the reign of Innocent XI. and repeatedly studied in the Congregation of Cardinals. The Pope then ordered the Brief to be read to the gathering.⁵

¹ **Avviso Marescotti*, January 29, 1691, *loc. cit.*

² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*

³ **Avviso Marescotti*, February 3, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁴ According to the **Avviso Marescotti* of February 3, 1691, they were (besides Cibo): Chigi, Altieri, Carpegna, Colonna, Nerli, Casanata, Marescotti, Capizucchi, Brancati, Panciatici e Astalli.

⁵ See Forbin's report to Louis XIV., February 10, 1691, in GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 201 *seq.* Cf. Lando's dispatch in BROSCHE, I., 450, who misunderstands the document.

After Cardinal Altieri had read the Brief, dated August 4th, 1690,¹ the Pope lamented the state of Europe and the power of the Turks which benefited by the dissensions among the Christian Princes. Whenever he had pleaded for peace neither the Austrians nor the French listened to his words. After exhorting them to choose a worthy successor he gave the Cardinals his blessing and dismissed them.²

As late as January 30th, Alexander VIII. dictated a letter to Louis XIV. In it he said that, being about to give an account to God and conscious of his duty, he declared null and void all the measures taken in France in contravention of the prerogatives of the Church and the authority of the Holy See. Whilst communicating this to the King he besought him to conduct himself at last as became the eldest son of the Church.³

From now onward the dying Pontiff gave all his attention to spiritual things but received nearly all the Cardinals. After devoutly receiving Holy Viaticum and Extreme Unction he expired on February 1st, 1691, aged 81 years.⁴

Contrary to what was believed at one time, the Brief of the dying Pontiff did not contain a dogmatic condemnation of the Gallican Articles but merely stated, and this with great emphasis, that the Declaration of 1682 and its approval by the King as well as the edict on the *régale*, were null and void in law⁵; in other words, the Brief did not intend to be a pronouncement on the doctrine of the four Articles, it only declared that the Assembly of 1682 had no authority to set

¹ Printed in *Bull. XX.*, 67 *seqq.*, and in *Coll. Lac.*, I., 831 *seq.*

² **Avviso Marescotti*, February 3, 1691, *loc. cit.* Cf. the note from Boncompagni Archives in PASOLINI, *Documenti*, 44 *seq.*

³ BERNINI, *Heretici*, 737.

⁴ “*Verso le 22 hore,” says Liechtenstein in his Diary, *loc. cit.* Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, February 3, 1691, *loc. cit.* and **Relazione dell' autopsia del cadavere di P. Alessandro VIII. fatta 2 Febr. 1691 da Ipp. Magnani, chirurgo del Palazzo*, in Vat. 8229, Vatican Library.

⁵ DUBRUEL, in *Dict. apologétique de la foi cath.*, II., Paris, 1924, 266 *seq.*

up the four propositions, so that its decision was invalid in law. Even so the Brief did its work : alarmed and perturbed, the French in Rome at once despatched a courier to Paris¹ ; they saw that the Brief struck at the very heart of Louis XIV.'s ecclesiastico-political aspirations.

By this supreme act of his, Alexander VIII. showed himself a worthy successor of Innocent XI. Both pursued the same end, namely, the restoration of the rights of the Church ; the one did so by inflexible resistance, the other by extreme conciliation, whilst always safe-guarding the prerogatives of the Holy See.² Louis XIV. deemed it prudent to submit in silence to the quashing of his edicts, though the Gallicans pressed him for counter-measures.³ This was a first success. It may be said that to the dying Pontiff is due the credit of having paved the way for the ultimate triumph of the Holy See in this matter,⁴ and that herein lies the significance of his short pontificate. This Brief is a far worthier monument to Alexander VIII. than the sumptuous sepulchre with which the Cardinal nephew sought to perpetuate the memory of his great uncle.⁵ The name of the Ottoboni Pope likewise lives

¹ Besides the reports of the imperialists quoted by BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 172, n. 50, see also **Avviso Marescotti*, February 3, 1691 (*loc. cit.*) : " Tal inaspettata risoluzione e dichiarazione della S. S., sicome riempì di confusione li Francesi, mandandone questo ambasciatore un corriere in Francia, così produsse un gran stupore alla corte, venendo da tutti inalzata con elogi."

² BISCHOFFSHAUSEN, 178 *seqq.*

³ *Cf.* PHILLIPS, 388 *seqq.*

⁴ Opinion of BISCHOFFSHAUSEN (182 *seqq.*).

⁵ The monument erected in the left aisle of St. Peter's, which was executed in 1725 from a design of Count Enrico di San Martino is rich with marble, alabaster and gold. The bronze statue of the Pope, by Giuseppe Bertosi, is an excellent piece of work ; less well done are the marble statues of Religion and Prudence and the canonization of five saints in relief, by Angelo de' Rossi (*cf.* BERGNER, 103 ; SOBOTKA, in *Jahrb. der preuss. Kunstsamml.*, 1914, 42). The inscription in GUARNACCI, I., 320, and FORCELLA, VI., 171. **Ristretto delle spese fatte dal card. Ottoboni nel deposito*

in the world of learning, thanks to the donation by him of manuscripts to the Archives and the Library of the Vatican to which he assigned part of Queen Christine's treasures acquired by him.¹ Through Benedict XIV. the whole of the rich collection of the Scandinavian Queen was eventually acquired for the Vatican.

During the pontificate of Alexander VIII. there arose an association having for its aim the furthering of literary activity. On January 24th, 1656, Queen Christine of Sweden founded an Academy for the discussion of questions of ethics.² On October 5th, 1690, its members formed themselves into an association which made it its mission to watch over the

d' Alessandro VIII., in *Vat.* 7483, p. 226 *seqq.*, Vat. Library. *Report on the translation of the body to the new tomb, dated Rome, February 20, 1706, in *Ottob.* 1288, p. 160, *ibid.* Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, February 20, 1706, *loc. cit.* For the history of art the following **Avvisi Marescotti* are of interest.: July 29, 1690: "È uscito ordine del cardinale Vicario, che li pittori non possino far quadro di sorte alcuna da esporsi nelle chiese, se prima non sarà approvato da S. E., e ciò d'ordine pontificio per oviare alli scandali delle pitture indecenti nelle chiese." 5 November 1690: "Con l'occasione della capella, che s'è tenuta questa mattina dal S. Collegio per la festa di S. Carlo, s'è scoperto il bel quadro all'altare maggiore di smisurata grandezza, che viene stimata la più bell'opera di quante n'habbia fatte fin'ora il famoso Carlo Maratti Romano. Voleva il cardinale Vicario far coprire il nudo d'un angelo, ma il pittore se gl'è opposto." Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

¹ Cf. GUARNACCI, I., 384; GRAUERT, II., 404, 435; BLUME, III., 351; DUDIK, *Forschungen in Schweden*, 121; PFLUGK-HARTUNG, *Iter italicum*, 142 *seqq.*; CARINI, *Bibl. Vaticana*, 91 *seqq.*; COZZA-LUZZI, *Cod. MSS. graeci Ottoboniani Vaticanae Bibl.*, Romae, 1893, XV., XXVII. *seq.*, LII. *seq.*; SICKEL, *Römische Berichte*, IV., 32 *seqq.* Alexander VIII. bought for his own library the Altemps library with the famous *Pontificale* which found its way to the Vaticana through Benedict XIV.; see *Codices Vaticani selecti*, III.: *Miniature, Pontificale Ottobonianum*, *Cod. Ottob.*, 501, Vatican Library.

² Cf. Vol. XXXI., p. 72.

purity of the native tongue. The new Academy aimed at avoiding all bombast and the cultivation of a simple and natural style; it accordingly called itself "Arcadia" after the pastoral land of classical antiquity of the same name. The idea proved popular: within a few years similar societies all over Italy became affiliated to the Roman Academy. Alexander VIII. himself became a member and his example was followed by his successors up to recent times. Among the fourteen original founders the best known names are those of Crescimbeni (*obit* 1728), author of an esteemed work on popular poetry, Gravina (*ob.* 1718), Zappi (*ob.* 1719); the future Cardinal Tournon was also one of them. Other celebrated Academicians at a subsequent period were Ciampini, Fabretti, the archæologist Buonaroti, Cardinal Noris, Bianchini, and in the sphere of natural sciences, Malpighi, Lancisi, Viviani, Redi and Magalotti. Among the poets of the Academy mention must be made of Filicaja and Cardinal Polignac. One Academician even obtained the honour of beatification, namely the able liturgist Francesco Maria Tommasi.¹

(3.)

Alexander VIII. made a pronouncement not only on Gallicanism, but likewise on certain questions in the sphere of Moral Theology and on Jansenism.

¹ ISIDORO CARINI, *L'Arcadia dal 1690 al 1890, Memorie storiche*, Roma, 1891; *Albo offerto dagli Arcadi a S. S. Pio X. loro Pastore massimo nei due giubilei sacerdotale ed episcopale 1908-1909*, Roma, 1909; there V. GRAZIOLI treats of Bosco Parrasio, A. MONACI of biblioteca d'Arcadia, V. PRINZIVALLI of the nuova Pinacoteca Vaticana, S. SALVATINI of the Pinacoteca d'Arcadia. On Sergardi and his attacks on Gravina, see LÁNCZY, in *Ungarische Revue*, XV. (1895), 147 *seqq.* Vico and Muratori also belonged to the colonies of the Arcadia outside Rome (*ibid.*, 146). On the Academy's place of assembly, see NIBBY, II., 167. Inscriptions there of Alexander VIII., Benedict XIII., Pius VI., etc., in FORCELLA, XIII., 532 *seq.*

After the condemnation by Innocent XI. of 65 propositions which in the province of moral teaching, stretched the boundaries of duty too far in favour of liberty, the opponents of the Jansenists demanded that the excessive severity of the latter should also be examined in Rome. Innocent consented to such an examination but he was obliged to leave the final judgment to his successor.¹

However, before pronouncing on the Jansenist propositions submitted to him, Alexander VIII. issued a decision on two theses which originated in the camp of their adversaries. More than once the proposition that the love of God consists in keeping His commandments, had been exaggerated to such a point that there were those who maintained that it was not necessary to make a formal act of the love of God during the whole of one's life. A bachelor of the Jesuit College of Pont-à-Mousson had revived this error, though amid the protests of the Jesuits. Alexander VIII. condemned it once more on August 24th, 1690,² together with a second proposition which caused far greater stir, namely, the so-called philosophical sin. Long ago theologians had asked themselves whether every sin, seeing that it is a transgression of the law of God, was an offence against God even on the part of one who, through no fault of his, does not know the true God or who does not think of Him whilst committing a sinful act. Certain theses put up in 1686 by the Jesuit Musnier at Dijon and by a Belgian Jesuit in 1690, as exercises in disputation, seemed to maintain, or at least not to exclude, the possibility and actual existence of "philosophical" sins. Arnauld took up the matter and in five publications³ denounced the new heresy to the Pope and the Bishops, the princes and the authorities. The Jesuits were forced by their principles, he asserted, to assume that an immense number of sins were

¹ Cf. above, p. 433.

² LE BACHELET nel *Dict. de théol. cath.*, I. (1903), 749-751; DENZINGER, n. 1289 seq.; [D'AVRIGNY], III., 336-342; D. BOUHOURS, *Sentiment des Jésuites touchant le péché philosophique*, Paris, 1690; SOMMERVOGEL, V., 288, 1470 seqq.

³ *Œuvres*, XXXI., 1-397.

committed which were not “ theological ” sins, that is, sins that offend God and deserve everlasting punishment. The accusation was not just even in regard to Musnier for, as the latter explicitly explained, his thesis was only conditional—all he meant to say was that *if* there was such a thing as inculpable ignorance of God, there might be a transgression of the right order which would be no offence against God, hence it would be a purely “ philosophical ” sin. However, the Dijon thesis was misleading ; it was accordingly very properly condemned by Alexander VIII. who thereby asserted an important truth which is repeatedly stated in Holy Writ and receives confirmation from the most recent ethnological observation, namely that despite their motley pantheon, even the pagans are able to acquire sufficient knowledge of the true God. Meanwhile, the dispute concerning philosophical sin had had a very wide repercussion. The Jansenists made it a pretext for satirical songs against the Jesuits which were soon sung in the streets,¹ to say nothing of the controversial writings on the subject.²

This measure against certain isolated excesses of the opponents of the Jansenists was followed, at the end of 1690, by a long-planned step against the Jansenists themselves.³ Though the Pope expressly condemned only 31 out of the 96 propositions which had been incriminated under Innocent XI., his silence in this respect by no means implies approval. The first 15 propositions concern doctrines conforming to Jansenist mentality, doctrines which the latter’s friends still hoped to save despite Innocent XI.’s condemnation of the

¹ [D’AVRIGNY], III., 341.

² SOMMERVOGEL, V., 1470-1473 ; *cf.* 288.

³ LE BACHELET, *loc. cit.*, 751-763 ; DENZINGER, n. 1291-1321 ; [D’AVRIGNY], III., 342-350. An **Avviso Marescotti* of August 12, 1690, says : Thursday “ in Piazza di S. Lorenzo in Lucina per esser festa di detto Santo fu abbrugiato artificiosamente Diogine dentro la botte, alludendo alla pena meritata dall’inventore del peccato filosofico, contro del quale in breve uscirà rigoroso decreto ”. Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome. *Cf.* BERNINI, IV., 728 *seqq.*

five propositions. There followed eight propositions directed against Arnauld's book on frequent Communion; they refute the teaching on the reception of the Sacrament of Penance and the Eucharist on which Arnauld's book is based, though they are not expressly mentioned, as well as kindred opinions on penance and confession. The last of the 31 propositions which declares Urban VIII.'s Bull against Jansenius' book to be authentic, is also aimed at Arnauld, for the latter had impugned its genuineness, whilst the two preceding ones condemn certain Gallican attacks on the doctrine of papal infallibility and exaggerated statements on the importance of St. Augustine. The five remaining propositions (Nos. 24–28), deal with the cult of the Blessed Virgin, the veneration of images and the intention required from the ministers of the Sacraments. One of the condemned propositions (No. 3) is connected with the controversy about probabilism; it declares that it is wrong to say that it is unlawful to follow a probable opinion even when it possesses the highest degree of probability.¹

For the Jansenists the condemnation of the 31 propositions was a severe blow. They sought to ward it off by representing the condemnation as equivocal or by asserting that it was surreptitious and only hit theses that were taught by no one.² However, the names of the theologians to whom each proposition must be ascribed are accurately known. Gerberon describes the decree of condemnation as a shame for the Holy Office and a blot on the pontificate of Alexander VIII. After Alexander's death, Du Vaucel wrote to Quesnel that he had been unable to make up his mind to attend the funeral service for the Pope; Quesnel was not the only one to consider the deceased Pontiff an excommunicate.³ Arnauld also gave

¹ The proposition is ascribed to John Sinnich, theologian, of Louvain. Cf. FR. DEININGER, *J. Sinnich*, Düsseldorf, 1928, 196 *seqq.*

² ARNAULD, *Difficultés proposées à M. Steyaert, Vicaire Apostolique de Bois-le-Duc* [*Œuvres*, XXV., 178; LE BACHELET, *loc. cit.*, 751, 762.

³ [D'AVRIGNY], III., 348 *seq.*

vent to his resentment but justified it by Alexander's nepotism.¹

Quietism, which had played an important rôle under Innocent XI.,² was not completely extinct under his successor and we still hear of arrests for such opinions.³ Cardinal Petrucci, at whose trial Alexander VIII., as Cardinal Ottoboni, had pronounced a severe sentence, was relegated by him to his diocese of Iesi.⁴

An important intervention by Alexander VIII. in the development of the Chinese missions was probably not uninfluenced by the Jansenist movement in France. By a Bull of April 10th, 1690, he erected the diocese of Nanking and by another of August 10th, that of Peking.⁵ This step was to be fraught with important consequences, one that seemed to foreshadow a break with the policy hitherto favoured. Alexander VIII.'s immediate predecessors had endeavoured to free themselves from the Portuguese patronage by appointing for China Vicars Apostolic instead of Bishops. Now the Pope once more erected real dioceses, once again expressly subjecting them, in the Bulls of erection, to the patronage of the Portuguese, thereby recognizing the latter's rights which had never been abolished. It was probably no mere coincidence that the first Bishop of Peking, Bernardino della Chiesa, was chosen not from the ranks of the French secular clergy, like Pallu and others, but from one of the Orders, viz. the Franciscans. The question was, therefore, one of a return to an earlier practice; the consequences of so important a step were not long in making themselves felt.

Alexander VIII. also sought to further the missions by addressing formal letters to individual potentates in whose

¹ "Pape qui s'est rendu l'opprobre du S. Siège et l'exécration de tous les gens de bien, par le scandaleux renouvellement qu'il a fait du népotisme." Letter of January 26, 1694, *Œuvres*, III., 733.

² Cf. above, p. 442 *seqq.*

³ **Avviso Marescotti*, June 3, 1690, *loc. cit.*

⁴ DUDON, *Molinos*, 247. Cf. above, p. 454 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ius pontif.*, II., 122 ff., 125 ff.; Novaes, XI., 100.

territory the heralds of the faith were carrying out their task. Thus on July 24th, 1690, he sent a Brief to the Emperor of the Tartars and the Chinese. He thanked him for his kindness to the Jesuits of which he had heard from Claude Philip Grimaldi, and recommended to him the bearer of the letter, Francesco Maria Spinola and his companions.¹ A Brief dated May 27th, 1690, reminded the Shah of Persia of the privileges which his father had granted to the Christians in Armenia.² When one of the Caucasian princes adopted the Christian faith, he informed the Pope of the fact. On December 30th, 1690, Alexander VIII. wrote to testify his satisfaction, at the same time expressing the hope that God would also enlighten the prince's subjects; concord with other princes would greatly contribute to such a result.³

¹ *Illustr. et potentiss. utriusque Tatariae et Sinarum imperatori. Brevia, Papal Sec. Arch.; Synopsis actorum, 412. Innocent XII. confirmed this decree, *ibid.*, 414.

² “*Privilegia quae rex parens tuus christianis in Armenia indulsit.” Papal Sec. Arch., *loc. cit.*

³ *To “Barzinus princeps in Iberia,” *ibid.*

CHAPTER II.

INNOCENT XII

THE CONCLAVE OF 1691—ANTECEDENTS AND FIRST MEASURES OF THE NEW POPE—REFORMS IN THE PAPAL STATES— BUILDING ACTIVITY IN ROME.

THE conclave, the doors of which were closed on the evening of February 12th, 1691, was destined to be the longest of the whole 17th century.¹ The College of Cardinals had its full complement of 70 members, yet on the first day only 38 were present. But their numbers soon rose. On February 19th there were 44 whilst 61 took part in the last vote.²

¹ Much more valuable than the conclavists' reports gathered together by EISLER (*Vetorecht*, 143 *seq.*) are the ambassadors' reports, partly in PETRUCELLI, III., the imperial ones in WAHRMUND, 289 *seqq.* I also made use of **Avvisi Marescotti* (Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele), and of the *reports of a very well informed agent which I discovered in the Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, *fasc.*, 24. Accurate *lists of scrutinies by Card. Astalli in *Vat.* 8229–8230, and by Card. Barberini in *Barb.* 4444 and 4445 (here also a plan of the conclave), *Vat. Lib.*

² 13 February, 1° scrutinio: "praes. 38, abs. a Curia 27, abs. ab urbe 5"; 2° scrutinio: "praes. 40."

14 February, 1° scrutinio: praes. 40. 2° scrutinio: praes. 42.

18 February: praes. 43.

19 February: praes. 44.

27 February: praes. 46.

1° March: praes. 47.

11 March: praes. 48.

12 March: praes. 50.

13 March: praes. 51.

18 March: praes. 53.

21 March: praes. 57.

24 March: "praes. 57, abs. a Curia 10."

Notwithstanding the shortness of the pontificate just concluded, the composition of the Sacred College had undergone a marked change; it had been reduced by the death of two Cardinals, namely, Cerri and Cavalieri¹ and increased by 14 new creations. The grouping of the parties had likewise shifted, though the French and the Spanish-Imperial party—the latter again under the nominal leadership of Cardinal Medici—stood once more face to face. French interests were in the hands of Cardinal D'Estrées who was to have also the support of Cardinal Forbin and the Duke de Chaulnes.²

The Spanish and Imperial Cardinals allied themselves with Chigi and the Cardinals of Innocent XI., among whom, however, the "Zelanti" formed a separate group under the leadership of Colloredo. Barberini and the French joined Alexander VIII.'s Cardinals, captained by Ottoboni and Cardinal Altieri.

No one party was completely united: Cardinal Goës distrusted Medici and Prince Liechtenstein the Marchese Cogolludo. Forbin, D'Estrées, and Bouillon, as well as Chaulnes, were unable to agree among themselves, however much they strove to hide the fact. In these circumstances it is impossible to give definite numbers for the various parties, but the group Medici, Chigi, Odescalchi was stronger than the D'Estrées, Ottoboni, Altieri one. Both commanded enough votes for an exclusion.³

28 March: praes. 61.

6 April: praes. 63.

17 April: praes. 62.

13 June: praes. 61.

**Cod. Barb. cif.* A **Diario* of the conclave by Angelo Peretti in *Ottob.* 490, Vat. Lib. The following died during the conclave: Bichi, G. Spinola and Capizuchi, whilst Portocarrero, Lancastre, Radziejowski and Fürstenberg did not come to Rome.

¹ GUARNACCI, I., 404.

² WAHRMUND, 167.

³ *Id.*, 167.

Everybody foresaw a lengthy conclave¹ though no one suspected that it would last a full five months. During the whole of that time the struggle of the parties was centred round the candidature of Cardinal Gregorio Barbarigo, Bishop of Padua. By common consent Barbarigo was one of the most outstanding figures in the Church's supreme Senate.² He was reputed a most worthy candidate even before he entered the conclave³; immediately after him people also mentioned the names of Marescotti, Casanata, Pignatelli, Buonvisi, Visconti, Ciceri, Cibo, and Barberini.⁴

Barbarigo's elevation was proposed by the Oratorian Cardinal Colloredo, the leader of the "Zelanti", who was supported by Chigi. No one could deny Barbarigo's excellent qualities. Though most affable in his manner he had very strict principles, in particular the abolition of nepotism could be confidently hoped for as a result of his elevation.⁵ It was probably for this reason that Altieri and Ottoboni opposed him from the beginning. The Hispano-Imperial Cardinals were still awaiting their instructions and Forbin would not act before the arrival of the French Cardinals. Thus for a long time everything remained in suspense.

A report of De la Torre, imperial ambassador at Venice, was destined to prove fatal to Barbarigo's candidature, for though he could not deny the excellent qualities of the Venetian prelate, he described him as so completely prejudiced in

¹ " *L'apparenze sono che il conclave debbia esser molto longo per le debolezze delle fattione e per le discordie de' Spagnuoli e Francesi " (*Avviso Marescotti* of February 17, 1691, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele. Charles II. of Spain was greatly mistaken when he anticipated a short conclave, *cf.* his *letter to Cogolludo, dated Madrid, March 5, 1691, Archives of Spanish Embassy, Rome, I., 28.

² *Cf.* Vol. XXXI., p. 131.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of February 17 and March 3, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁴ **Avvisi Marescotti* of February 24, March 3, 10 and 24, 1691, *ibid.*

⁵ **Memoria* on the *papabili*, 1691, Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

favour of France that Louis XIV. himself was not a better Frenchman than Barbarigo.¹ On the other hand, from another quarter it was pointed out to Leopold I. that a man of such exceptional piety was sure to follow in the footsteps of Innocent XI. Though Barbarigo was a native of Venice, he did not share the sentiments of the Venetians, nor was there any ground for fearing that he would show himself a partisan of France, for so holy a man would bestow equal affection on all. If Barbarigo disapproved of the Emperor's league with the Protestants and lamented the fall of James II., this was by no means due to partiality towards France but to his great zeal for the Catholic faith. Hence the Emperor should refrain from excluding Barbarigo.²

However, these representations failed to get a hearing in Vienna. The instructions for which Prince Liechtenstein had prayed were forwarded to him on May 4th. They were to the effect that Barbarigo's election would not be to His Majesty's liking, hence it must be prevented at all cost though in the measure in which this was possible; no direct action was to be taken against him and the Emperor's command was only to be made known in the event of extreme danger.³

The embarrassment into which the imperialists were thrown by these directions was all the greater as the secret had not been kept. Whilst they publicly denied the existence of an exclusion, they immediately sent the courier back to Vienna with a request for further instructions. The information with which the messenger was charged laid stress on the fact that by reason of his excellent qualities Barbarigo was held in high esteem by the Cardinals; that it would be difficult to prevent his elevation by secret means, whilst a formal

¹ **Relazione* for Leopold I., dated Venice, February 17, 1691, State Arch., Vienna. Cf. WAHRMUND, 170, 289. See also **Riflessioni veridiche per le quali non si può da' ministri Austriaci venire all' elezione del card. Barbarigo*. Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

² **Memoria* of 1691, *loc. cit.*

³ WAHRMUND, 171, 289.

exclusion would not only create a very bad impression, but would give particular offence to the party of the "Zelanti". Yet the imperial party could not do without the "Zelanti" and Chigi, for its weakness was such that it could neither bring about the triumph of a candidate of its own, nor prevent the election of another. Should an open exclusion by the imperialists be overridden and Barbarigo be elected against their will, everybody would consider the event as an obvious defeat and as a tremendous blow to the Emperor's authority.¹

In the interval before the courier's return the French Cardinals Bouillon, D'Estrées, Bonsi, Le Camus, and Spinola arrived on March 25th. They entered the conclave on the evening of the 27th² when they soon took the side of Altieri and Ottoboni, Barbarigo's opponents.³

The anxiously awaited courier returned from Vienna on April 14th, but as the gates of Rome were shut for fear of the plague, he was only able to enter the city on the following

¹ *Ibid.*, 171 *seqq.* Though Barbarigo's exclusion was never officially proclaimed during the conclave, its influence was nevertheless so decisive that the "right" of exclusion obtained its definitive form at the time, and that in the sense that this "right", in the form of an exclusion, was henceforth fully established and in that form it was thereafter exercised; see EISLER, 175. For a juridical appreciation of the right of exclusion, *cf.* GIETL, in *Hist. Jahrb.*, XVI., 76. The King of Spain, however, from motives of conscience, would have nothing to do with the exclusion on this occasion; see the Instruction for Card. Salazar in WAHRMUND, 298 *seqq.*

² **Cod. Barb.* 4444, Vat. Lib. The **Avviso Marescotti* of March 31, 1691, says of the arrival of the French: "La quantità del popolo, che concorse per le strade e piazze a vederli, fu incredibile. In più luoghi della città gridò la plebe dietro le loro carrozze con tali voci: Fateci un Papa Romano, et essi salutando cortesemente e facendo distribuire larghe elemosine a' poveri si condussero alla clausura." Biblioteca Vittorio Emanuele, Rome.

³ *Cf.* the *report of an agent, April 18, 1691, Liechtenstein Arch., Vienna. Louis XIV. forbade Card. Bouillon to vote for Barbarigo; see REYSSIÉ, 71.

morning.¹ He was the bearer of two imperial autograph letters to Cardinal Goës: the first, which might be made public, approved the conduct hitherto observed by the imperialist party and declared that His Majesty had no thought of excluding Barbarigo; the second letter, which was to be kept secret, expressed a wish that Barbarigo should not be elected, but the odium of the exclusion should be diverted from the Emperor—Altieri and Ottoboni, or Spain, being made to bear the responsibility of the failure of his candidature.²

This time the secret was so well kept that the "Zelanti" felt they might proceed to the election of their favourite candidate. But their own zeal proved fatal to Barbarigo.³ Whilst the announcement of the latter's election was generally awaited in the city,⁴ his old opponents, Altieri and Ottoboni, prepared to oppose it to the utmost; they achieved one great success in that the French definitely went over to their side.⁵

It was a curious situation. The French made no mystery of the fact that, as far as they were concerned, neither they nor their sovereign had anything against Barbarigo, but that out of consideration for their allies they were bound to make a stand against him. It was even rumoured that the French, through Le Camus, had proposed certain agreements to Barbarigo but that the latter had declined to enter into negotiations of this kind.⁶ The imperialists tried, though in vain, to bind Barbarigo by particular pacts, but this action was disapproved by Charles II. of Spain from conscientious

¹ *Report of an agent, April 15, 1691, *loc. cit.*

² WAHRMUND, 173, 294 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 174, 296.

⁴ See Liechtenstein's *Diary in Liechtenstein Arch. Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, April 21, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁵ WAHRMUND, 174.

⁶ Besides Card. Medici's report of April 21, 1691, in WAHRMUND, 298, that also of *an agent, April 16, 1691, in Liechtenstein Arch., Vienna.

motives.¹ No command for an exclusion had come from Madrid; nevertheless the Spanish ambassador Cogolludo continued his intrigues against Barbarigo, for he hated the Cardinal, as did the Viceroy of Milan and other representatives of the King of Spain in Italy.² But, in spite of all, the "Zelanti" continued their support of Barbarigo even when the latter declared that, for higher motives, he did not wish to be elected.³

In order to extricate themselves from the labyrinth into which they had got,⁴ the electors put forward all sorts of candidates. By the end of April, Pignatelli's name was seriously mentioned and his elevation advocated.⁵ A report of May 20th says that if the choice were to fall on one of the older Cardinals, Pignatelli would be the best; he had scarcely

¹ " *Pero en el punto de pedir condiciones al card. Barberigo ordino positivamente, no sigais al embaxador Cesareo preveniendole francamente no contribuireis con vuestros oficios en esta parte por oponerse a mi consciencia." Charles II.'s Instructions in cypher to Cogolludo, Madrid, June 7, 1691, Arch. of Spanish Embassy, Rome.

² Besides WAHRMUND, 174, *cf.* *report of an agent, April 16, 1691, *loc. cit.*

³ *Cf.* **Avvisi Marescotti* of May 5 and 12, 1691, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele. " *È cosa terribile nelle occorrenze presenti non habbino i zelanti qualche pietà della christianità e vogliano più tosto vederla esposta alla sua rovina, che rimoversi del loro favore per Barbarigo. È veramente da temer che di questa fazione non provenghi un giorno qualche scisma nella chiesa di Dio." Report of an agent, April 21, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁴ " *Questo è un chaos difficile a risolvere, un labirinto è difficile ad uscirne." Report of the agent, June 19, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁵ See **Avvisi Marescotti* of April 28, May 5 and 19, 1691, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, and the *reports of the agent, of May 14, 17, 18, 19, 1691, Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna. Pignatelli received 2 votes on February 14; after that he had mostly 1 or none at all; later on he had, both in votes and *accessi*: March 29, 4 and 3; March 30, 3 and 7; March 31, 2 and 2; April 17, 6 and 4; April 23, 4 and 10; in June mostly 8-9 votes. **Cod. Barb. cit.*, Vat. Lib.

any relations and had refused to enter into any pact with anyone. For that very reason many people thought that he would fail.¹ In May the confusion was even greater. It was said that votes had been cast for men who were not even members of the Sacred College—as, for instance, the Abbot of St. Gall, Sfondrati, for Casoni and for the Procurator of the Penitenziaria, Girolamo Berti. This was interpreted as an answer to those Frenchmen who were not ashamed to vote for Forbin.²

There can be no doubt that at this time Altieri still cherished the hope of winning the tiara for himself, though Chigi and the “Zelanti” would not hear of him.³ About the middle of May and the beginning of June, Pignatelli was once more seriously spoken of.⁴ At this time the imperialists were greatly alarmed by a certain action in favour of Panciatici.⁵ The candidatures of Cibo, Delfino, and Visconti were also once

¹ *Report of the agent, May 20, 1691, *loc. cit.* Cf. **Avviso Marescotti*, May 26, 1691: “Colla seconda parlata fatta da due cardinali francesi al cardinale Pignatelli palesarono le condizioni pretese sottoscritte da lui, prima di venir all'elettione del Papato, e gli fu detto ricercandolo a voce, che dovesse elegere per 1° ministro uno dipendente della Francia, e questi era il cardinale Altieri, ed in 2° luogo, che sottoscrivesse il negotio tanto scabroso delle Regalie e rivocasse tutte le propositioni decise contro la Francia ultimamente da Alessandro VIII., ma fu tutto ricusato dal medemo Pignatelli.” *Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele*, Rome.

² Cf. the agent's *report of May 27, 1691, *loc. cit.* **Avvisi Marescotti* of May 26, June 2 and 9, 1691, *loc. cit.* In the *lists of the scrutinies in *Barb.* 4444/45, and in *Vat.* 8229/30, votes given to persons not members of the Sacred College are not recorded. Forbin received several votes on May 25, 26, 29, 30, 31 and on June 1 and 2.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of May 19, June 2 and 9, 1691, *loc. cit.*, and the *report of the agent of June 5, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁴ “*E cosa mirabile, ieri si parlò di Cibo e Delfino, et oggi ritorna sul tavoliere Pignatelli.” Report of the agent, June 6, 1691.

⁵ *Report of the agent, June 11, 1691, *loc. cit.*

more put forward¹ and from the middle of June that of Acciaiuoli also, on whose behalf Medici exerted himself in secret, though in vain, for the Hispano-Imperial party rejected him, though they acted with consideration.²

As so often happened during prolonged vacancies of the papal throne, all sorts of disturbances and acts of violence occurred in the Eternal City. Following the example of the ambassadors, the great Roman nobles had surrounded themselves in their palaces with armed men who frequently came into sanguinary conflicts with the police force of the city.³ In these circumstances the prolongation of the conclave—it was calculated that since 1305 there had not been one of such length⁴—became more and more irksome. The pessimists gave it as their opinion that the Cardinals would spend the whole of the summer in conclave. A number of them had fallen sick. Whilst the rising heat of summer rendered life within the restricted space of the conclave more and more insupportable,⁵ the electors began to consider once more the candidature of Pignatelli. In the last week of June it was said that he had been elected,⁶ but the rumour was premature. At the beginning of July arrangements were made for a general Communion at S. Maria del Popolo and S. Maria in Trastevere in which many people took part.⁷ These prayers were at last answered: on July 11th a decision in favour of Pignatelli was arrived at. As one of Innocent XI.'s Cardinals, he could not be rejected by the "Zelanti" nor as a Neapolitan by the Spanish-Imperial party. Chigi won over Ottoboni whilst Altieri negotiated

¹ *Report of the agent, June 15, 1691, *ibid.* Cf. **Avvisi Marescotti* of June 2 and 9, 1691, *loc. cit.*

² **Avviso Marescotti*, June 16, 1691, *ibid.*, and the *report of the agent, June 30, 1691, *loc. cit.* Cf. WAHRMUND, 175.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of June 2 and 16, 1691, *loc. cit.*; BROSCHE, I., 450 *seq.*

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti*, June 30, 1691, *loc. cit.* Cf. also Liechtenstein's *Diary in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

⁵ **Avviso Marescotti* of June 23, 1691, *loc. cit.*

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ **Avviso Marescotti*, July 7, 1691, *loc. cit.*

with the French.¹ The universal weariness, the terrible heat and the troubles in the city served Pignatelli no less than the realization that Barbarigo could not succeed and Acciaïoli even less so. Cantelmi and Giudice were said to have been the chief promoters of Pignatelli's election. Up to the last the French offered so obstinate a resistance that in the night of July 11th-12th everything was in jeopardy. But at length they too gave way. The negotiations lasted until dawn. Only six "Zelanti" obstinately stuck to Barbarigo even now. At noon, on July 12th, 53 out of 61 votes were cast in favour of Pignatelli.²

¹ WAHRMUND, 176.

² " *Il motivo, che sia stata accelerata e quasi d'improvviso nello spatio d'una sola notte conclusa una tal elettione, viene attribuito alla stanchezza de' cardinali ed a' patimenti che si vedevano hormai insoffribili, gli caldi non più intesi di tanta forza, alli frequenti disturbi ed assassinamenti, che si sentivano seguire nella città senza valere alcun rimedio, ed all'impossibilità, che si osservava della riuscita del cardinale Barbarigo e molto meno d'Acciaïoli, ed alla lunghezza, che havrebbe seco portata la pratica per altri soggetti. Li principali promotori di quest'elettione dicesi essere stati li cardinali Candelmi e del Giudice, che hanno tirati seco li Ottoboniani, Alteriani, come anco li zelanti, che hanno tirati gl'Innocentiani, Imperiali e Spagnoli. Li Francesi e Chigi si mostrarono alquanto duri a concludere, onde il trattato della notte precedente al giovedì fu due volte rotto, ma veduta poi la piena di tutto il Collegio, restò concluso alle 7 hore, e nello scrutinio di giovedì mattina terminato con 53 voti delli 61 " (**Avviso Marescotti*, July 14, 1691, *loc. cit.*). Cf. the **Diario in Barb.*, LI., 58, Vat. Lib., and **Lettera de' card. Francesi*, with marginal notes by Liechtenstein, in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna. The 297th scrutiny on July 11, 1691, yielded (votes and accessi): " Alt. 2/2, Boul. 1/2, Barb. 7/6, de Comit. 2/1, de Carp. 4, Bons. 2/1, Marisc. 3/3, Pign. 3/1, Le Camus 2/1, Coll. 6/11, Panc. 7/2, Costag. 2/1, Alb. 1/4, nemini 16, praes. 59 "; the 298th scrutiny, July 12 (" praes. 61, abs. a Curia 4, abs. a conclavi 2 ") : " Cibo 1, de Alt. 1, Barb. 6, Pign. 53 ; 'nemini' nulli notantur, quia non fuit factus accessus, sed electio sequuta est per solum scrutinium, quod est primum exemplum post emanatam bullam Gregorii XV." *Barb.*, *loc. cit.*, Vat. Lib.

Out of gratitude towards Innocent XI., his great benefactor, the new Pope took the name of Innocent XII. In Rome, where the memory of that great Pontiff was still held in high esteem, this was looked upon as a happy omen.¹

Antonio Pignatelli is the last South-Italian Pope.² He was born on 13th March, 1615, in the Basilicata, in one of the castles of his father Francesco, Prince of Minervino, and was baptized in the parish church of Spinazzola.³ His was an old family, of Lombard origin it was said,⁴ and divided into several branches. Such was the esteem it enjoyed that Francesco was raised to the dignity of a Spanish grandee. Antonio was educated at the Roman College of the Jesuits. There he was called Angelo Pignatelli, by reason of the great purity of his life.⁵ After obtaining the doctorate in both laws,

¹ *Liechtenstein's Diary, *loc. cit.*

² Cf. the account of D. Contarini in BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Relazioni, Roma*, II., 434 *seqq.*; *Copia della lettera scritta dalli cardinali Francesi al Re dandoli parte dell'elettione al pontificato del cardinale Pignatelli, with additions and corrections in Liechtenstein's own hand, in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna; GUARNACCI, I., 390 *seq.*; NOVAES, X., 107 *seq.*

³ The extract of the Baptismal Register is printed in *Catalogo di libri stampati et manoscritti riguardanti Innocenzo XII., raccolti e posseduti dal principe D. Diego Pignatelli di Cavaniglia*, Roma, 1902, V.

⁴ Cf. C. DE LELLIS, *Delle famiglie nobili di Napoli*, II. (1663), 88 *seqq.*; NOVAES, XI., 106 *seq.* Pasquino exercised his wit in allusion to the coat-of-arms (three pots; see PASINI FRASSONI, 46). The **Avviso Marescotti* of July 14, 1691, comments thus: "Pasquino hieri mattina fu trovato con 3 pignatte in testa col motto: Sono stato cinque mesi a far trè pignatte." Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

⁵ " *Relatione della corte Romana composta da un personaggio per servizio del Marchese Clem. Vitelli, ambasciatore straordinario ad Innocenzo XII., per il Gran Duca di Toscana Cosimo III.," in *Cod.* 467 of the Library at Einsiedeln. According to *Cod. Mollian.*, 205, of the State Library, Munich, its author is Count Orazio d'Elce. The same *report, partly under d'Elce's name. also in Papal Sec. Arch., *Borghese*, IV., 296; Vat. Lib., *Vat.*

he entered the Roman prelatore under Urban VIII. and was made vice-legate of Urbino. At the end of 1646 Innocent X. sent him as Inquisitor to Malta where he did good work up till February 1649.¹ He then became Governor of Viterbo. In the autumn of 1652 he was given, together with the title of Archbishop of Larissa, the nunciature of Florence which he held for a period of eight years.² In May 1660, Alexander VII. sent him as nuncio to Poland and in March 1668, Clement IX. entrusted him with the nunciature at the imperial court of Vienna.³ As a rule this important post was a stepping-stone to the cardinalate but Clement IX. died at the very moment when Pignatelli might have expected this reward of his labours. The Secretary of State of the new Pope—Clement X.—recalled him because of his intimate relations with the Cardinals of the *squadron volante* and had him nominated to the see of Lecce.⁴ Pignatelli accepted this misfortune with

7440, p. 45 *seqq.*, Urb. 1631, *Ottob.*, 2686, *Rossiana*, XI., 51; Bibl. Casanat., Rome, *Cod. N. I.*, 18; Bibl. Pignatelli, Rome; Bibl. de la ville, Avignon, l-h; Bibl., Monte Cassino, *Cod.* 667 Q, 683 R; Bibl. Communale, Perugia, *Cod. I.*, 63; State Library, Vienna, *Cod.* 6539; Archiepiscopal Library, Capua; Bibl. Classense, Ravenna.

¹ See P. PICCOLOMINI, *Corrispondenza tra la corte di Roma e l'Inquisitore di Malta durante la guerra di Candia*, Firenze, 1908, 15 *seqq.*

² Pignatelli's *reports in *Nunziat. di Firenze*, 33-41, Papal Sec. Arch. Instructions to him only from 1655, *ibid.*, 197.

³ Cf. KARTTUNEN, *Nonc. Apost.*, 256; Pignatelli's *reports from Poland in *Nunziat. di Polonia*, 70-81, Papal Sec. Arch.; *Instructions for him, *ibid.*, 180-2, 193-4. For his work at the imperial court, see **Nunziat. di Vienna*, 184-6, 457-8, *ibid.*

⁴ Liechtenstein says so expressly in the above-mentioned (p. 571, n. 2) marginal notes to the "Lettera de' card. Francesi". D. Contarini (*loc. cit.*, 435) wrongly places the recall in Clement IX.'s reign and has him recalled once more by Altieri. RANKE (III., 207*) accordingly assumes that Altieri wished to make good a wrong done either by himself or another by making Pignatelli *Maestro di Camera* to his uncle. But Liechtenstein writes: "Clemente X. ch'era buonissimo signore, compassionandolo

perfect resignation to God's will.¹ At last, Clement X. put an end to his banishment and on the recommendation of the Cardinals of the *Squadron volante*, the Cardinal of Hesse and the Emperor,² he granted to Pignatelli the post of Secretary of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars in June 1673, to which was added, in July 1675, the important office of *Maestro di Camera*.³ Innocent XI. retained him in this position and when he came to realize his worth, he lavished his favours on him.⁴ His reception into the Sacred College on September 1st, 1681,⁵ was followed by the grant of the see of Faenza and his nomination as legate of Bologna. At the death of Caracciolo, Pignatelli succeeded him in the archiepiscopal see of Naples. His government there has been described as the golden age of the diocese.⁶ His piety is attested by what he did to further devotion to the most Holy Sacrament of the altar.⁷ He had previously

strepitò tanto con il cardinale Altieri, che s'era reso arbitro del pontificato, che lo fece tornar a Roma contro sua voglia." On June 17, 1673, Mocenigo *reports Pignatelli's appointment as "segretario della Congregazione dei vescovi e regolari", with the remark that Pignatelli had been sent to Lecce "per lo stretto vincolo d'amicizia che tiene con li cardinali dello squadron volante doppo d'essersi esercitato in quattro Nunciature con infinita lode del valor suo, et hora chiamato a quella carica per intercessione de' medesimi". The nomination as *Maestro di Camera* is *announced by Mocenigo on June 4, 1675; this time also he describes Pignatelli as "soggetto degno certamente et meritevole per le condizioni sue personali et per haver servito la S. Sede Apost. per molti anni nelle Nunciature". *Barb.* 4449, Vat. Lib.

¹ Cf. D. Contarini, *loc. cit.*

² *Liechtenstein, *loc. cit.*

³ See above, p. 572, n. 4.

⁴ "E quanto la fortuna lo haveva per innanzi strapazzato, altrettanto volle dopo favorire." PANCETTI, *Vita de' pontefici*, *Cod. ital.* 93, National Library, Munich.

⁵ See above, p. 414.

⁶ D'ALOE, *Storia della chiesa di Napoli*, II., Napoli, 1873, 243.

⁷ DE SANTI, *L'orazione delle Quarant'ore*, Roma, 1919, 259.

distinguished himself by his great liberality towards those in need, so much so that he was considered a poor Cardinal.¹ He now spent all the abundant resources at his command in the service of charity.² At the conclave which followed the death of Innocent XI. there was talk of him, but he had no serious prospects for it was deemed unthinkable that the French would ever vote for a Neapolitan,³ whilst on the other hand it was thought that the Spaniards would be loath to see in the chair of Peter a scion of one of the most powerful families of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.⁴

Though 76 years of age Innocent XII. still presented a handsome and even stately appearance. He had a striking head, a lofty forehead, lively dark eyes, and an affable expression.⁵ Like all his predecessors since Julius II., with the exception of Leo X. and Adrian VI., he grew a beard, a fashion which was abandoned after him.⁶

¹ *Card. Pio's letter of January 24, 1682, State Arch., Vienna.

² Cf. the *notes on Innocent XII.'s antecedents in Liechtenstein Arch., I., No. 3277.

³ D. Contarini, *loc. cit.*, 435 *seq.*

⁴ “ *Scrittura politica sopra il conclave da farsi dopo la morte d’Innocenzo XI.,” Liechtenstein Arch. Pignatelli's election came as “ molto inaspettata dalla corte ”, Odoardo Cibo writes on July 14, 1691, in MUSSI, II.

⁵ GUARNACCI, I., 400. “ *È un huomo assai ben fatto, di statura giusta e più tosto grande che piccolo, di bel aspetto con aria assai amena ” (*Copia di lettere de' cardinali Francesi, loc. cit.*). “ *È sempre stato di una bellissima apparenza, grande complesso bianco, gioviale con occhio negro, fronte spatiosa e bocca ridente ” (*Relatione, etc., in the library of Einsiedeln*).

⁶ In his palace at Rome, Prince D. Diego Pignatelli di Cavaniglia has a portrait of Pignatelli as a Cardinal by J. B. Gaulli, known as Baciccia, and a very fine marble bust by a pupil of Bernini, both reproduced in the *Catalogo* mentioned in Vol. XXXI., p. 12, n. 1. Other busts of the Pope in the Palazzo Pignatelli, Naples, in St. Michael's chapel of the hospice of the same name, in Trinità della Missione, in S. Pudenziana, S. Cecilia in Trastevere and in S. Giovanni e Paolo, Rome—the latter by Pietro Bracci (see v. DOMARUS, II). An oil painting of small value recalls the

The attention with which everyone, especially the diplomatists, watched the first steps of the new Pope, was all the more tense as he had not lived in Rome for a considerable time, so that there was some mystery about his political views. Interest was mainly concentrated on the question as to who would become Secretary of State. On July 14th this important office was entrusted to Cardinal Fabrizio Spada, a former French nuncio and an intimate friend of Cardinal Altieri. Innocent XII. maintained Cardinal Panciatici at the Dataria whilst Cardinal Albani remained Secretary of Secret Briefs and Mario Spinola Secretary of Briefs to Princes. The Secretariate of the Cypher was given to an old friend of the Pope, Vincenzo Ricci, who had already been in his service; Ansalvo Ansaldi became Auditor, Agostino Fabroni Secretary of Memorials, Giuseppe Sagripanti Subdatary, Ercole Visconti *Maggiordomo* and Baldassare Cenci *Maestro di Camera*.²

The Pope was very independent,³ hence all Spada had to do was to carry out his directions. Panciatici was given a very free hand in the bestowal of benefices, a privilege of which he made a most arbitrary use. Albani acted more in

Pope's name in his native place, Spinazzola. Innocent XII.'s portraits by Ludovico David (orig. in Villa Albani), Giovanni Maria Morandi, G. B. Lenardi, Sebastiano Corbellini and Carlo Maratta appeared in contemporary engravings; see the *Catalogo*. To these must be added an engraving by Thomassin (half-length); see DRUGULIN, *Porträtkatalog*, Leipzig, 1860, No. 9831.

¹ This is shown by the contradictory nature of the judgments on his political attitude in the *Lettera de' card. Francesi and in Liechtenstein's *rectifications; the latter insists that Pignatelli had always been on good terms with Spain and Austria.

² See *Liechtenstein's final report addressed to Leopold I., *loc. cit.*, I., Nr. 3339. Innocent XII. established January 1 as the first day of the year in place of March 25. The Bull on the subject is missing; probably the order was given only by word of mouth or by a Brief to the Dataria; see LÖHE, in *Sitzungsberichten der Münchener Akad.*, 1881, I., 388.

³ “*Ogni cosa vuol fare da se solo.” *Relatione in Einsiedeln Lib.*

accordance with the Pope's wishes. Ansaldi, Sagripanti, and Cenci were regarded as favouring the French, Ricci as inclining towards the Emperor. The splendid Cardinal Casanata, the founder of the famous library of the same name, was held in the highest esteem by Innocent XII. In purely ecclesiastical questions Casanata's influence was generally decisive.¹ The Pope, who never obstinately stuck to his own opinion, also frequently took the advice of Cardinals Colloredo and Noris.²

The favourable impression created by this distribution of offices was strengthened by the care with which Innocent XII. refrained from every form of favouritism towards his relatives,³ nor did he confirm Alexander VIII.'s nephews in their offices. He was eager to imitate as much as possible the Pope whose name he had adopted, but with this difference, that he avoided the peculiarities and the hardness for which Innocent XI. has been blamed.⁴ Thus he frequently showed himself to the people and granted to all free access to his person. Besides the private audiences, he held on the Monday of each week, and subsequently every other week, public audiences of two hours' duration to which everyone was admitted. On these occasions it was chiefly legal matters that were laid before the Pontiff and in order to deal with them more satisfactorily, he appointed an advocate of the poor who was present at the audience. Even though not every question was settled as rapidly as the petitioners would have wished, these public audiences had this good result that complaints could be made to the Pope in person, and that by this means a check was put on the officials.⁵ His popularity

¹ Liechtenstein's final report, *loc. cit.* Cf. D. Contarini, *loc. cit.*, 44^o *seq.*

² **Relatione*, Einsiedeln.

³ His brother had died leaving no heirs, a sister was in the convent of the Sapienza at Naples.

⁴ D. Contarini, 436. Cf. **Avviso Marescotti* of July 14, 1691, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

⁵ D. Contarini, *loc. cit.* Cf. **Avvisi Marescotti* of August 11 and 25 and December 22, 1691, February 16, May 24 and July 19,

was greatly enhanced by the fact that he imposed no fresh taxes and conversed with the greatest affability with the men and women of the people.¹

In the measure in which this was possible, Innocent XII. continued as Pope the manner of life he had followed as a Cardinal. He rose early: hence he also ate early. He took no siesta but it frequently happened that after meals he was overcome by sleep as he sat in his chair. So long as he could get on without them, he would have nothing to do with physicians, but in times of sickness he appreciated their services.²

At the end of August 1691, Innocent XII. hurt himself so grievously by an unfortunate fall that his death was thought to be at hand. For a whole year and eight months he was unable to say Mass. But his skilful physician, the celebrated Marcello Malpighi of Bologna, succeeded in gradually restoring the Pontiff to health, though from this time onwards he was compelled to walk with a stick.³ After his recovery Innocent XII. devoted all his energy to the discharge of business, his one thought being that of serving the Church and the poor.⁴ He could not personally see to everything and for many things he had to rely on his officials who all too often studied their own interests. This gave rise to many complaints: people even regretted that the Pope had no nephew who would be personally interested in his reputation.⁵

1692, *loc. cit.* According to the *Relatione* (Einsiedeln) the aged Pontiff continued these exhausting audiences up to the fifth year of his pontificate.

¹ Cf. **Relatione*, Einsiedeln.

² **Ibid.*

³ *Diario*, ed. Campello, VIII., 175 *seq.*, 177 *seq.*, 179; IX., 62; D. Contarini, *loc. cit.*, 437. For Malpighi, cf. *Catalogo de' libri e MSS. del Pr. Pignatelli*, 68.

⁴ D. Contarini, *loc. cit.*

⁵ To this refer the **Scritture* of 1695 in the Bibl. Pignatelli, Rome (*Catalogo*, 80), the " *Lettera sopra il malgoverno delli ministri nel pontificato di Innocenzo XII.", Campello Archives, and *Cod. A E*, XI., 73, of the Library of S. Pietro in Vincoli,

But it was generally recognized that Innocent XII. would have equalled the Popes of the primitive Church could he have acted as he wished to, for he was of irreproachable morals, conscientious, utterly unselfish, independent of his relatives and inexhaustible in his charity towards the poor.¹ We have an eloquent witness to his charity in the vast building called Ospizio di S. Michele on the Ripa Grande. The site had been originally occupied by an orphanage for boys founded in 1684 by Tommaso Odescalchi and administered by Livio Odescalchi. In 1693 Innocent XII. took over the institution from Livio and enlarged it so much that instead of 30 boys, 300 could be accommodated and taught a trade.² At the close of 1692 the Pope set aside the vast Lateran palace for the reception of persons unable to work.³ He provided large sums for this object and the number of men, women and orphan girls accommodated there rose to 5,000.⁴ Both institutions were united with Sixtus V.'s Hospice of the Poor near Ponte Sisto, and with the foundlings' asylum founded by Leonardo Cerusio near S. Silvestro in Capite.⁵ This united

Rome, as well as **Memoriale satirico*, in *Cod. Bolognetti*, 60, Papal Sec. Arch., and Campello Archives. In the latter copy critical notes have been added on the margin; they are often most appropriate, as when the writer declares that his only aim was to bring to light the tricks of the Pope's counsellors: "Il zelo mascherato non si deve chiamare verità sincera."

¹ D. Contarini, *loc. cit.*, 437 *seq.*

² Cf. *Diario*, ed. Campello, IX., 73, 75; FORCELLA, XI., 508 *seq.*; *Il quarto libro del nuovo teatro delli palazzi in prospettiva di Roma moderna dato a luce sotto Innocenzo XII. da ALESS. SPECCHI* (1699) tav. 35; A. TOSTI, *Relaz. dell'origine e progresso dell'Ospedale Ap. di S. Michele*, Roma, 1832 (new edit., 1835). Cf. G. VAI, *Relazione del Pio Istituto di S. Michele a Ripa*, Roma, 1779.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of November 1, 8 and 29 and December 6, 1692, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

⁴ *Diario* Campello, IX., 59; D. Contarini, 439; poem by L. Frizon quoted by NOVAES, XI., 116, n. a.

⁵ Bull. of May 23, 1693, in *Bull.*, XX., 524; cf. 546.

Apostolic Hospice, over which three Cardinals were charged to watch, was so near Innocent XII.'s heart, that people complained that it caused him to forget all else. The vast sums which other Popes were wont to spend on their nephews, were bestowed on the poor whom Innocent described as his nephews.¹ These Institutions, which he frequently visited and which he remembered in his will,² did not exhaust the Pope's solicitude. He annually spent the sum of 140,000 scudi on destitute poor and necessitous persons.³ One of the motives which inspired the buildings erected by him in Rome was the desire to provide work for these people.⁴ Yet, notwithstanding all his efforts, he failed to stamp out Rome's old plague, mendicancy.⁵

In other spheres also the Pope was not uniformly successful with his reforms, innovations and economic dispositions in the Papal States. On all sides he was impeded by various prejudices, parochial narrowness and petty conventions. Thus, to give but one example, when he tried to regulate the waters of the Romagna, he encountered difficulties almost past belief in consequence of a quarrel between the people of Bologna and those of Ferrara.⁶ His attempt to drain the Pontine Marshes

¹ **Avviso Marescotti* of January 10, 1693, *loc. cit.*

² **Diario, passim*; NOVAES, XI., 118.

³ Cf. " **Diarium Romani itineris PP. Lucae et Iodoci* [Müller] capitular. S. Galli, 1699-1701," in *Cod.* 465, p. 193, Einsiedeln Library. Cf. MOREL, *Gesch. der Schulen von Einsiedeln* (1855), 20.

⁴ PANCETTI, **Vita de' pontefici, Cod. ital.*, 93, State Library, Munich.

⁵ Cf. C. BAST. PIAZZA, *La mendicizia provveduta nella città di Roma coll'Ospizio pubblico fondato da Innocenzo XII.*, Roma, 1693.

⁶ BROSCHE, I., 453 *seqq.* Cf. *Diario*, ed. Campello, VIII., 192; *Relazione dello stato presente delle acque che infestano le tre provincie di Romagna, Ferrara e Bologna, con il parere sopra i rimedi proposti, fatta al Papa Innocenzo XII.*, Bologna, 1715 (signed by Card. Ferd. d'Adda and Card. Franc. Barberini). See also Ignazio Ucelli's collection of *writings and documents on the subject

likewise failed.¹ But however great the obstacles, the Pope did not lose heart but displayed an energy to which even his declared enemies must pay homage.²

With regard to the corn policy, Innocent XII. followed in the steps of his predecessors³ and with a view to furthering the corn trade he paid particular attention to the harbours of Civitavecchia and Nettuno. No Pope, since the days of Sixtus V., had done so much for Civitavecchia as he did. He confirmed and further extended the privileges of the city as a free port, encouraged the erection of new buildings and began the construction of a magnificent aqueduct. In May 1696, against the advice of his physicians, he undertook a journey to Civitavecchia. This was an event inasmuch as for a century no Pope had visited the port. Though he had wished to make the journey with apostolic simplicity, several Cardinals and a great number of persons belonging to the court came to escort him. Carlo Fontana explained to the Pope the new aqueduct which was to prove a great boon for the town.⁴

In April 1687, Innocent XII. also visited the harbour of Nettuno and Porto d'Anzio. However, Fontana's plan, which would have made use of the old harbour of Nero, was too costly; accordingly the work was entrusted to Alberto Zinagli who was to disappoint the aged Pope most

in *Barb.* XLVIII., 130, Vat. Lib. *Ibid.*, “*Scrittura contro la diversione del Reno in Po grande,” presented to Card. Barberini in April, 1693.

¹ NICOLAI, *De' bonificamenti delle terre Pontine*, Roma, 1800, 146 seq. Cf. *Diario*, ed. Campello, XIII., 391; *project of the Dutchman Cornelius Mejer for draining the swamps, in *Miscell. Clem.*, XI., t. 17, Papal Sec. Arch.

² BROSCH, I., 452.

³ BENIGNI, 66 seqq.

⁴ CALISSE, 469 seqq. Numerous views on details in **Avvisi Marescotti*, 1692–1698, *loc. cit.* See also “*Viaggio d’Innocenzo XII. a Civitavecchia”, in *Cod. Bolognetti*, 199, Papal Sec. Arch. *Ibid.*, 175; “*Discorso del baron Mercurio Bonaventura sopra la restaurazione del molo e porto di Civitavecchia.”

grievously¹ for the new harbour proved exceedingly costly, were it only for the reason that the south winds constantly silted it up.²

The Pope's efforts to improve the well-being of his subjects were at times also frustrated by the elements, such as abnormal weather conditions,³ an inundation of the Tiber in January 1695,⁴ followed by an epidemic of typhoid in the low-lying districts of the city,⁵ as well as earthquakes.⁶ These

¹ ADEMOLLO, *Anzio e Nettuno dal secolo decimosesto al decimootavo*, Roma 1886, 34 seqq. TOMASSETTI, *Campagna*, II., 336 seqq. Here also many details are to be found in **Avvisi Marescotti* and the **Diario d'Innocenzo XII.*, published by Count Campello. Cf. also " *Ranonto del viaggio d' Innocenzo XII. da Roma a Nettuno 1697 ", in *Cod. F.* 39, Boncompagni Archives; " *Lettera di M. G. Lippi," in *Vat.* 8622, p. 226 seq.; " *Relazione del Porto d'Anzio " in *Urb.* 1735, p. 377 seq., *Vat. Lib.* Card. Pamfilii was twice named "superintend. portus Antii" in 1700; see *Bull.*, XX., 934. " *Pianta del nuovo porto di Porto d'Anzio," State Archives, Rome.

² **Avviso* of February 7, 1699, Liechtenstein Archives, fasc. 18.

³ In January 1694, the cold was such as had not been known for 30 years, with a fall of snow quite unusual for Rome (*Diario*, IX., 79); torrential rain from October 1694, till January 1695 (*ibid.*, 195).

⁴ *Ibid.*, X., 195. Cf. *Nuova Antologia*, 4 series, CXVIII. (1905), 322 seq.; also the following rare works: CARLO FONTANA (*cav. architetto*), *Discorso sopra le cause delle inondazioni del Tevere antiche e moderne a danno della città di Roma e dell'insussistente passonata fatta avanti la Villa di Papa Giulio III. per riparo della Via Flaminia, dedicato all'Ill. e Rev. Sig. Mons. L. Corsini arciv. di Nicomedia e tesor. gen. della Sant. di N. S. Papa Innocenzo XII.*, Roma, Rev. Cam. Ap., 1696, e: FRANCESCO MARIA ONORATI, *Apologia per la passonata fatta sopra il Tevere fuori di Porta del Popolo in difesa della Strada Flaminia con la direzione del Signor Cornelio Meyer famoso ingegnere Olandese. All'E^{no} et R^m, Pr. il sig. card. Giov. Franc. Albano segr. de' Brevi di N. S.*, Roma, 1698.

⁵ Summer of 1695; cf. *Diario*, X., 202 seq.

⁶ *Ibid.*, IX., 200; XII., 387; XIV., 185.

catastrophes brought into fullest light the Pope's liberality as well as his solicitude for the mitigation of the calamity.¹

On the other hand Innocent XII. was also able to register some notable successes. Thus he succeeded in restricting the pernicious sale of offices² without loss to the public exchequer. In view of the close connexion of these two things it required courage and determination to deal with an abuse which, whilst it was most damaging to the reputation of the Holy See and to the cause for which it stood, was also exceedingly profitable to the Apostolic coffers. Thus a post of a clerk of the Camera cost about 64,000 scudi. The consequence was that only rich men had access to high ecclesiastical dignities. People were amazed when Innocent XII. reimbursed on a single occasion the price of twelve such clericatures, amounting to over a million, and they admired him for thus stripping money of its power and once more opening to merit the possibility of attaining to high positions.³ The loss caused by the impossibility of buying these and other posts⁴ was made good by him not by imposing fresh taxes, but by reducing his household expenses, for which he only provided 78,000 scudi annually, that is less than what Leo X. used to spend on his table alone.⁵ As early as the summer of 1692

¹ *Ibid.*, X., 196, 200, 203; **Bandi*, in *Editto*, V., 61, Papal Sec. Arch.

² Cf. *a report in French, Liechtenstein Arch., *fasc.* 2, Vienna.

³ *Diario*, VIII., 192; D. Contarini, 438.

⁴ *Bull.*, XX., 473, 829.

⁵ BROSCHE, I., 454 *seq.* In the *report in Liechtenstein Arch., mentioned above, n. 2, we read: "Il [Innocent XII.] dit dernièrement à un sien confident qu'il a apporté de Naples 7000 ducats et que de cette somme qu'il fait les fraix de sa nourriture, qu'il ne dépense pas plus de 3 jules par jour, et mesme dimanche dernier il ne dépensa que 27 baiocques, et que le bonnet qu'il porte est fait de retaille du P. Alexandre VIII." As a corrective to Liechtenstein's assertion that the Pope was a heavy eater, D'Elce's opinion may be quoted here: "È parco nel mangiare e molto più nel bere." *Relatione* in the Library of Einsiedeln.

Domenico Contarini calculated that the Pope had saved and laid aside close on two million scudi.¹

Innocent also attempted to put an end to the luxury in clothes which had made great progress in Rome, especially among the upper classes, but here he encountered insuperable obstacles.² His stern action against public immorality in Rome met with better success.³ At first he did not interfere with theatrical representations but a certain comedy introduced from France moved him to take very stern action in 1697. In spite of the opposition of some of the Cardinals of the Congregation of reform, such as Carpegna and Imperiali, he ordered the demolition, during the summer, of the theatre Tor di Nona but recently erected at the cost of 100,000 scudi. This action was universally resented; it was the signal for a crop of venomous satires. During the carnival of 1698 at least private representations of comedies were tolerated but in 1699 they were once more forbidden.⁴

Like Innocent XI., on whom he modelled his conduct, the Pope saw to it that all transgressions were vigorously punished, regardless of the person of the offender. In order to make sure that justice was administered impartially he forbade the judges to accept presents and since in the provinces the judges kept for themselves part of the fines, he deprived the

¹ D. Contarini, 444.

² **Avvisi Marescotti* of February 13 and November 6, 1694, *loc. cit.*; *Diario*, X., 191 *seq.*; “*Scrittura con li capitoli di prammatica sopra la moderazione del lusso, d. 1694, Ott., 21,” *Cod. ital.*, 190, p. 245 *seqq.*, State Lib., Munich. *Ibid.*, 244 *seqq.*: “*Nomi dei deputati della Congregation sopra il suddetto.”

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of March 6 and October 2, 1694; reports of 1692, 1694 and 1697, in MAES, *Curiosità Romane*, I. (1885), 150, 154; PANCETTI, **Vita de' pontefici*, in *Cod. ital.*, 93, State Lib., Munich. An edict of 1696 against banditry in COPPI, *Sul brigantaggio dell' Italia media*, Roma, 1867, 17 *seq.*

⁴ ADEMOLLO, *Teatri*, 186 *seqq.*, 194 *seqq.* Cf. **“Notizie della demolizione del Teatro di Tor di Nona”* (with pasquinades), in *Vat.* 8518, p. 100 *seq.*, Vat. Lib.

provincial governors of the right of pardon.¹ In other ways also his reform of judicial administration resulted in some remarkable improvements, thus the course of instances was better regulated and simplified through the suppression of several extraordinary private tribunals, whilst fees were reduced.² In order to make the tribunals easier of approach the Pope was resolved to gather them all in one large building, thus taking up once more an idea of Julius II., Sixtus V. and Alexander VII. To this end he decided on the completion of the palace on Monte Citorio which Bernini had begun by order of Innocent X.

Accordingly Carlo Fontana submitted in October 1694, a plan which, had it been carried out, would have enriched Rome with a building as beautiful as it would have been vast, whilst it would also have proved a happy solution of the traffic problem in the centre of the city. The palace was to have comprised a main central court and three secondary courts; in front of it there was to be a semicircular *piazza* with porticoes adorned with an antique column of Antoninus recently found in the nearby garden of the Lazarists.³ One insuperable obstacle to the full execution of the project was the question of the cost. Fontana's estimate of 250,000 scudi was far too low for even that part of the scheme which was actually carried out cost half a million.⁴ This cannot surprise

¹ BROSCHE, I., 468.

² *Bull.*, XX., 448 *seq.*, 461; **Editti*, in *Bandi*, V., 46, Papal Sec. Arch.; NOVAES, X., 122 *seq.*; *cf.* also *Gli archivi ital.*, VI. (1919), 204 *seq.*

³ MISCIATELLI, in *Vita d'arte*, IV. (1909), 336 *seqq.*

⁴ C. FONTANA, *Discorso sopra l'antico monte Citorio . . . con l'istoria di ciò che è occorso nel innalzamento del nuovo edificio della Curia Romana*, Roma, 1708. *Cf.* MISCIATELLI, *loc. cit.*; *L'Arte*, II. (1899), 278. **Avviso Marescotti* of November 20, 1694 (*loc. cit.*), says: "Il Papa ha ordinato, che si formi il modello della Piazza, che in forma di semicircolo intende di fare avanti il Palazzo di Monte Citorio, ma riflettendo che il gettito delle case e la compra de' siti arrivi alla somma di 50^m sc., si dubita non se ne farà altro." On December 8 the Pope approved the model

the spectator who has before his eyes the Curia Innocenziana on Monte Citorio which, with its magnificent façade, is one

and the demolition of houses began on the following day; see *Diario*, X., 139. On December 11 a second **Avviso Marescotti* says: "Resta ordinato il gettito delle case dirimpetto al detto Palazzo sino alla strada, che conduce alla chiesa dell'Orfanelli, affine di formare una bella Piazza avanti del medesimo, attorno alla quale dovranno esser delle botteghe et habitazioni per li notari a comodo maggiore della Curia. Intanto era stato portato al Papa un disegno di far una Piazza sontuosissima e la più bella che fosse in questa città, con far trasportare avanti detto Palazzo la Colonna Traiana, tra la quale e quella Antoniana ivi vicina doveva sorgere un grand'obelisco servendo di base un scoglio, da cui in varie bocche havrebbe sgorgata l'acqua di Trevi, il cui fonte doveva esser colà trasferito, ma bello era il pensiero tralasciato per la gravezza della spesa." On December 14 it was decided to lay out the great *piazza* in front of Monte Citorio (*Diario*, X., 193). An **Avviso Marescotti* of December 25 says: This week "gran gettita, essendosi aperta in tal modo una gran Piazza, che fa maggiormente spiccare la magnificenza di quel vasto e nobil edifitio, che si accrescerà di vantaggio e si riddurrà alla forma del primo disegno". To this end the Pope incorporated in it S. Biagio in exchange for which the Somaschans were given S. Niccolò a' Cesarini. An **Avviso* of January 1, 1695, reports progress of the work on the *piazza* in front of Monte Citorio "che para un incantesimo"; January 29, 1695, demolition of houses was still in progress, but work on the palace is stopped owing to the cold; it proceeds during the summer, and further plans are made (July 16), but by October 8 they appear to have been abandoned. On November 26 another 100 workmen are engaged for the "lavori della fabrica di Monte Citorio". On January 7, 1696, we read: On Sunday the Pope went to the Gesù, "visitò la fabrica di Monte Citorio, della quale si vanno perfettionando li lavori, afinchè senza dilatione possino andarvi ad habitare l'auditore et il tesoriere della Camera." On April 7, 1697, the auditor took possession of his residence "nel Palazzo di Monte Citorio, ove restano sospesi del tutto i lavori che vi si facevano per conto della Camera, ma vi si alzonno alcune case di particolari attorno quel palazzo". The "impresa di Civitavecchia va lentamente", evidently for lack of money; and no wonder that

of the greatest creations of late baroque.¹ The progress of the work led to the disappearance of several swampy gardens, thus rendering the locality once more wholesome.² April, 1695, witnessed the blessing of the new bell which was to give the signal, each day, for the opening of the tribunals.³ In 1696 the Pope erected a magnificent fountain in the court of the palace of justice for which use was made of a basin of oriental granite which had been found at Porto.⁴ The ground floor provided accommodation for the officials and the chancelleries of the civil tribunal, the first story, for the tribunals of the first instance and the rooms of the *Uditore della Camera*, whilst the second floor was reserved for the Cardinal Camerlengo and the treasurers who also had their chancelleries there.

A spacious *piazza* was laid out in front of the Curia Innocenziana and a street opened from there in the direction of the Campo Marzio. The construction of another new street in the direction of de Piazza di Pietra, was connected with the new customs house (*Dogana di Terra*) which was being erected under the direction of Fontana in the neighbourhood of the Corso for reasons of traffic. In this work use was made of eleven columns from the so-called temple of Neptune. Near the hospice of S. Michele the *Dogana di Mare* was erected by Matteo de Rossi at Innocent XII.'s own expense for sea-borne goods.⁵ In 1696 a new corn store was built

money gave out for according to the *Diario*, X., 204, up to October, 1696, 500,000 scudi had been spent on the "fabbrica di Monte Citorio". *Avviso Marescotti*, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

¹ See *Il quarto libro . . . da A. Specchi tav. 31*. Inscription in FORCELLA, XIII., 184.

² PLATNER, I., 106.

³ *Diario*, X., 198.

⁴ **Avvisi Marescotti* of May 26, July 7 and 21, 1696, *loc. cit.*

⁵ **Fabriche fatte fare da Innocenzo XII.*, *Urb.* 1665, p. 175 *seq.*, Vat. Lib. Cf. A. SPECCHI, *loc. cit.*, *tav.* 33 and 34. The *Gazzetta di Foligno*, 1695, No. 28, reports on July 12, 1695: "Sua Beatitudine ha dato la commissione agli architetti di far formare da scultori 11 statue di travertino per collocarle nella sommità

near S. Spirito,¹ whilst an ordinance of 1692 aimed at a better upkeep of all the streets of the city.²

Innocent XII. ordered the construction of a new carriage road to the Capitol which was called *Via delle tre pile*, after the arms of the Pignatelli. A colossal marble statue of the Pope was erected in the Curia Innocenziana. At the close of the 18th century this monument of a ruler who had done so much for Rome and who was most popular there,³ fell a victim to French vandalism.⁴

Carlo Fontana was the principal architect during the whole of the pontificate, but he complained bitterly of inadequate payment. However, the Pope sought to indemnify him in other ways; on his son Gasparo he bestowed a benefice and at the beginning of 1697 Carlo himself was knighted and in March of the same year he became first architect of St. Peter's.⁵ Fontana designed the sepulchre of Queen Christine in the right aisle of St. Peter's; it was the Pope's wish that this monument should be sumptuously adorned.⁶ Not far

della Dogana di terra a Piazza di Pietra, che hormai si scorge ridotto a buon porto, che per questo vien divulgato; le medeme denoteranno le 11 provincie, che possiede la Sede Apostolica." Cf. MAES, *Curiosità Romane*, II., Roma, 1885, 61; also TITI, *Descrizione*, 358.

¹ According to an inscription restored by Pius VI., Innocent XII. undertook restorations at S. Spirito de' Napolitani (FORCELLA, VII., 333), and on the fountain in front of S. Maria in Trastevere (*ibid.*, XIII., 111).

² *Bull.*, XIII., 479; *Diario*, VIII., 195.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti*, December 8, 1691, March 8, April 12, July 6, 1692, *loc. cit.*; *Diario*, VIII., 175, 187, 193, 195; IX., 75; also " *Relatione di corte Romana, Einsiedeln Library ", referred to on p. 574, n. 5.

⁴ STEINMANN, *Die Plünderung Roms durch Bonaparte*, 35. RODOCONACHI'S statement (*Capitole*, 131) that a statue had been erected on the Capitol in honour of Innocent XII., is inaccurate.

⁵ A son of Bernini was assistant architect; see **Avviso Marescotti* of March 30, 1679, *loc. cit.*, also the documents in *Repertorium für Kunstwiss.*, XXXII., 251 *seqq.*

⁶ " *Ha il Papa assegnato 6000 scudi al cav. Fontana architetto

from there, near the Blessed Sacrament chapel, he prepared his own resting place as early as 1692, but for this he desired a very plain sarcophagus.¹ The first chapel of the left aisle of the basilica of St. Peter was turned into a baptistry according to plans drawn up by Fontana.² For a baptismal basin, use was made of the enormous porphyry lid, the biggest of all the antique ones, which according to an unsupported tradition, came from the sepulchral chamber of the Mausoleum of Hadrian and had subsequently adorned the tomb of the Emperor Otto II.³ Carlo Fontana also designed the bronze decorations whilst the altar-piece, the Baptism of Christ, was painted by Carlo Maratta.⁴ The rearrangement of the chapel, which the Pope inspected at the beginning of 1696 and again in October 1697,⁵ was only completed in 1698, as we learn from an inscription.⁶ On the clock tower of the Quirinal, Innocent XII.'s favourite residence, he placed in 1697, below the clock dial, a large mosaic of the Madonna for which Maratta also furnished the design.⁷ In the same year he gave orders for the transfer to the Quirinal of the cartoons of

per il monumento, che ha ordinato d'inalzarsi a memoria della Regina di Suetia in S. Pietro a somiglianza di quello della Contessa Matilde." **Avviso Marescotti*, November 17, 1696, *loc. cit.*

¹ **Avviso Marescotti* of November 22, 1692, *ibid.*

² According to the **Avviso Marescotti* of June 20 and 27, 1693, the Pope deemed Fontana's first plan too costly.

³ *Diario*, X., 197, mentions the finding of this grave.

⁴ **Criticism of the picture* written on July 15, 1699, *Vat.* 8622, p. 418 *seqq.*, *Vat. Library*; **reply*, *ibid.*, p. 422 *seq.*

⁵ **Avvisi Marescotti* of January 21, 1696, and October 16, 1697, *loc. cit.*

⁶ FORCELLA, VI., 163 (where Innocent XII. must be read, not XI.), and C. FONTANA, *Descrizione della cappella del fonte battesimale nella Basilica Vaticana*, Roma, 1697.

⁷ **Avviso Marescotti*, July 13, 1697: "D'ordine di N. S. è stata posta sotto l'orologio del Palazzo pontificio al Quirinale una bellissima immagine della Madonna tutta di musaico," and July 20, 1697: "Adornandosi con cornice di marmo spicca molto la Madonna di musaico ricavata dal disegno del celebre Maratti collocata sotto l'orologio del Quirinale," *loc. cit.*

Pietro Cortona and Maratta which had been carried out in mosaic at St. Peter's.¹ In the Vatican he provided for the preservation of the frescoes of Raphael and Michelangelo by appointing Maratta guardian.² Some further plans of Innocent XII. were not carried out, such as that for a special building for the conclave,³ the completion of the colonnade of St. Peter's according to a design from the period of Alexander VII.⁴ and a new fish-market in the neighbourhood of the Ghetto.⁵ The most valuable work of art with which Rome was enriched during the pontificate of Innocent XII. was the sumptuous altar of St. Ignatius in the left lateral aisle of the Gesù, by the Jesuit lay brother Andrea Pozzo, which is said to have cost 200,000 scudi.⁶ For the new principal façade of the Lateran the Pope provided 40,000 scudi in 1699,⁷ but he did not live to see the beginning of the work.

By the end of Innocent XII.'s pontificate the inhabited

¹ **Avviso Marescotti* of March 16, 1697, *ibid.*

² BELLORI, III., 211 *seq.*

³ **Avviso Marescotti* of May 31, 1692, where other projects are likewise mentioned. Cf. **Avviso* of September 6, 1692, *ibid.* In the *draft for an election capitulation (1691) we read: "Finalmente si giuri di dar principio nel primo mese del pontificato alla fabbrica d'un conclave nuovo che almeno con ponte levatoio in qualche guisa si congionga alla basilica di S. Pietro"; Liechtenstein Arch., Vienna.

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti* of November 29, 1692, *loc. cit.*

⁵ *Gazzetta di Foligno*, April 28, 1695, No. 17.

⁶ Completed in July, 1697; see *Diario*, XI., 110. Cf. BERTOLLOTTI, *Artisti Subalpini*, 209 *seqq.*, *Artisti Sicil.*, 165 *seqq.*

⁷ "On Sunday, Card. Pamfili took possession of the Lateran, 'ove si è cominciato a portare il materiale per la facciata con disegno moderno, onde non serviranno in gran parte li fondamenti, e N. S. ha dato 40^m scudi per tal effetto, e 20^m sono stati sborsati dal suddetto Pamfili, et il fine di S. B. di farlo arciprete di quella basilica è stato, acciò il principe di lui fratello contribuisca anch'esso qualche cosa, mentre detti fondamenti sono stati fabricati da Innocenzo X. loro zio, volendovi di spesa da 100^m scudi.' **Avviso Marescotti*, May 2, 1699, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome.

part of the Eternal City had approximately reached the proportions which it retained up till the 'seventies of the nineteenth century. With regard to the repartition of the various classes of the population, great changes had occurred by comparison with the period of the Renaissance. The Leonine city had completely lost the splendour which had surrounded it at the time of the Medici Popes. This was in part due to the fact that more than one Pope, as for instance Innocent XII., preferred the Quirinal to the Vatican as a place of residence. The traffic in the Banchi had subsided to a considerable degree and the Via Giulia had already become the quiet street which it is at this day. Trastevere was inhabited by small craftsmen, vine-dressers and gardeners, whilst the Monti were occupied by the middle classes. The houses of the upper classes were scattered all over the Campo Marzio, from Via dei Coronari and Monte Giordano towards the theatre of Marcellus, the Capitol and the Quirinal as far as Piazza San Carlo in the Corso.¹ The population of the city, which in 1601 numbered 131,634 souls, without counting the Jews, had shrunk somewhat during the preceding years but had begun to rise again in 1697 and in 1699 amounted to 135,089. This number included 42 Bishops, 2,687 priests, 3,650 religious men and 1,947 nuns.² The rise which occurred in 1700 was only a passing one³; it was connected with the

¹ REUMONT, III., 2, 819. The following magnificent work is of interest: *Les restes de l'ancienne Rome recherchez avec soin, mesurez, dessinez sur les lieux et gravez par feu* BONAVENTURE D'OVERBEKE *sous les Pontificats d'Innocent XI., d'Alexandre VIII. et d'Innocent XI.*, 3 vols., La Haye, 1763.

² *Studi e docum.*, XII., 182. The Jews (10,000) and foreign heretics are not included; see *Diario*, XIV., 187. A " *Ragguaglio delle famiglie più antiche e più nobili Romane " at the time of Innocent XII., in *Cod. ital.*, 124, p. 67 *seqq.* of State Lib., Munich.

³ 149,447 souls. Interesting from the point of view of the history of civilization is a MS. given to the *Vaticana* by Marchese MacSwiney in 1909: " *Habiti soliti ad usare nella corte Romana, delineati da F. Angelo Maria da Bologna, Min. osserv., per uso della libreria del convento Nunciata di Bologna.*" Drawings

celebration of the jubilee which formed a worthy termination to Innocent XII.'s religious activities.

Pilgrims and strangers visited Rome in great numbers even during the course of ordinary years. Among them there were many non-Catholics, though fewer came from Germany than from England where, as in France, journeys to Italy became fashionable at an early date. Accordingly French and English travel books show a much profounder understanding of Rome than the German ones.¹

Jacques Spon, a physician of Lyons, who visited Italy and the East in 1674-6, shows a preference for ancient inscriptions, though he does justice to many other attractions of Rome. A man would have to be very badly treated by nature, he writes, who would not find satisfaction there in some one sphere; there the scholar has at his disposal rich libraries, the lover of music the finest concerts, the art connoisseur the most magnificent works of the various ages, the lover of nature paradisiacal gardens, and those addicted to the practice of devotion are provided with churches, relics and processions for the whole of their life.²

The cultural importance of Rome is emphasized in *Voyage d'Italie*, a book very much read at one time, by Misson who visited Italy in 1688.³ The Englishman, Richard Lascelles [1660], also gives proof of intelligent interest in the city's works of art, in fact Rome so affected him that he exclaimed on leaving: "Anyone who has seen Rome once wishes to see it again!" Joseph Addison, who visited Italy in 1699, when he

in water colours of the period of Innocent XII.; headed by a sonnet: "È un gran teatro la corte Romana."

¹ Cf. NOACK, *Deutsches Leben in Rom*, 20 seqq., who shows that to a very large extent educated circles in Germany gradually began to take a lively interest in Rome and its artistic treasures only as a result of SANDRART'S *Teutsche Academie der edlen Bau, Bild und Mahlereikunst* (Nürnberg, 1675).

² NOACK, *loc. cit.*, 21.

³ On Innocent XII., see MISSON, 78; LABAT, *Voyages en Espagne et Italie*, III., Amsterdam, 1731, 63 seqq., 183 seqq.

made a lengthy stay in Rome, was chiefly interested in the antiquities of the city.¹ Also deserving of notice are the Italian travel notes of the Swedish naturalist and theologian Olof Celsius² and many an interesting detail on conditions in Rome may be found in a still unpublished dissertation on interior decoration by the man who built the castle of Stockholm, Count Nicodemus Tessin.³

At one time foreigners lived by preference in the Borgo and in the quarters adjoining the Tiber; now they elected to dwell east of the Piazza S. Carlo, as far as the slopes of the Pincio. This shows most clearly the shifting of the central point of the city, which began in 1550⁴ and continued as a result of the building activity on the Monti initiated by Sixtus V., and the erection of a second residence on the Quirinal.⁵ Originally it was the artists who favoured the quiet streets dominated by the Pincio and Trinità de' Monti. Paul Bril, Rubens, Elsheimer, Sandrart, Claude Lorrain, Poussin, Swanevelt, lived in the streets of Croce, Babuino and Margutta.⁶ In course of time most of the foreigners, especially the wealthier ones, came to prefer the district round the piazza beneath SS. Trinità de' Monti and the Piazza di Spagna.⁷ Hotels and furnished apartments arose there in great numbers. Their very names reveal the strong French element among these strangers: for instance the "Crown of France" in the Via Condotti and "The Three Lilies" near

¹ NOACK, *loc. cit.* Cf. FRIEDLÄNDER, in *Deutsche Rundschau*, 1876.

² O. CELSIUS, *Diarium öfver sin resa i Italien azen 1697 och 1698*, Göteborg, 1909.

³ N. TESSIN, **Traité de la décoration intérieure (1717)*. Original in Lib. of Stockholm Academy of Art, copy in Royal Library, *ibid.* For Tessin, see O. SIRÉN, *Nicodemus Tessin*, Stockholm, 1915.

⁴ Cf. PASTOR, *Rom zu Ende der Renaissance*, 90.

⁵ Cf. our data, Vol. XXII., p. 302.

⁶ Cf. NOACK, 52, 356. Cf. BERTOLOTTI, *Artisti Belgi e Olandesi a Roma nei secoli xvi e xvii*, Firenze, 1880.

⁷ To-day both are called Piazza di Spagna.

S. Andrea della Fratte. The most select lodgings were the Hotel of "The Three Kings" at the entrance to the Via Babuino and the "Albergo Monte d'Oro" whose stately baroque façade adorns the Piazza di Spagna [No. 9] to this day.¹ When the King of Denmark's third son came to Rome in the autumn of 1698 he rented the whole house. The Pope paid much attention to this prince² but he paid even greater honour to the widow of Sobieski when she retired to Rome after the collapse of her political aspirations.³ Maria Casimira arrived in the Eternal City *incognita* on March 24, 1699, and lodged for a time at the palace of Livio Odescalchi in the Corso. Her aged father, Henri de la Grange, for whom she had obtained the red hat under Innocent XII., also came to reside there. The Pope, who had previously made arrangements, in most liberal fashion, for the journey of the Polish Queen, received her at the Quirinal on March 26.⁴

The northern Queen henceforth played a considerable rôle in Roman society together with Marie Anne de la Trémoille,⁵ "Princesse des Ursins". As was to be expected in view of the character of the period, there was no lack of disputes on questions of etiquette.⁶ At a later date the Queen took up

¹ NOACK, 52.

² *Diario*, XIV., 180.

³ On the Queen's stay, lasting up till 1714, cf. CANCELLIERI, *Mercato*, 193 *seqq.*; NOACK, 354; GROTTANELLI, *Una regina di Polonia a Roma*, Firenze, 1888. For memorials of the Sobieski family in Rome, cf. REUMONT, in *Allg. Zeitung*, 1883, No. 296; M. WALISZEWSKI, *Marie de la Grange d'Arquien, Reine de Pologne; femme de Sobieski*, 1641-1716, Paris, 1898; G. ANGELINI, *I Sobiesky e gli Stuards in Roma*, Roma, 1883; *Nuova Antologia*, August, 1908.

⁴ *Diario*, XIV., 183-5. Cf. **Barb.*, LX., 22, p. 18 *seqq.*, Vat. Lib.

⁵ Wife of Flavio Orsini, Duke of Bracciano, from 1675-1698. On her position in Rome, cf. REUMONT, III., 2, 810 *seq.*; FR. COMBES, *La princesse des Ursins. Essay sur sa vie et son caractère politique*, Paris, 1858.

⁶ GROTTANELLI, c. 7.

residence in the Casino Torres on the Pincio, which she connected with the house of Zuccari by means of an arch crossing the street. It was her intention to found a convent in the latter house. The Polish eagle on the Casa Zuccari recalls to this day the memory of her stay there. Maria Casimira was also admitted into the literary society of the Arcadia founded in 1690, which since 1693 held its meetings in the Farnese gardens on the Palatine.¹ However, the widow of the King of Poland was no match for the highly educated, splendidly endowed daughter of Gustavus Adolphus. This inspired an epigram in which there was much play on words ; it ended with the verse : " I came to Rome a Christian but not a Christina " (Venni a Roma Christiana, non Christina).² Maria Casimira was most devout, hence she wished to end her days in the performance of works of charity in that Eternal City which has always been the refuge of such of the great ones as had finished playing their part on the stage of the world.

¹ BONI, in *Bollet. d'arte*, 1914, 370 *seqq.* On the Arcadia, to which I shall revert under Clement XI., *cf.* above, p. 554, *seq.*

² CANCELLERI, *loc. cit.*, 193.

CHAPTER III.

COMPROMISE WITH FRANCE—DECISIONS IN THE JANSENIST AND QUIETIST CONTROVERSIES—THE STRUGGLE AGAINST PROBABILISM—ABOLITION OF NEPOTISM—CREATION OF CARDINALS—THE MISSIONS AND THE QUESTION OF THE RITES.

(1.)

THE solemn declaration of nullity of the Gallican resolutions of 1682 which Alexander VIII. had pronounced on his death-bed, paved his successor's way towards an agreement since the question of principle was now decided. On all other points concessions could be made.¹ These both Innocent XII. and his advisers were disposed to grant and since in view of the internal and external situation, Louis XIV. could not but desire an end of the strife, it became possible for the Pope and Cardinals D'Estrées, Bonsi and Forbin to lay down the basis for a compromise. The first question was to arrive at an agreement as to the form of the satisfaction which the members of the Assembly of 1682 would have to make. This question once satisfactorily solved, the King would inform the Pope that he had revoked the obligation to teach the four Articles, after which the preconization of the Bishops would follow.²

¹ DUBRUEL, *La provision des évêchés français après la réconciliation des cours de France et de Rome sous Innocent XII. Mémoire de l'auditeur du Pape et autres documents inédits*, in *Rev. d'hist. de l'Église de France*, II. (1911), 43 *seqq.*, 302 *seqq.* Ansaldi's *memorial in *Vat.* 8643, p. 345 *seqq.*, is supplemented by Card. D'Estrées' *Memoirs*, published by GÉRIN, in the 2nd ed. of his *Recherches*, Paris, 1870, 617 *seqq.* See also LOYSON, *L'assemblée du clergé de France de 1682*, Paris, 1878.

² GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 624.

Cardinal Forbin pressed the Pope to content himself with a declaration couched in the most general terms possible. He even threatened with denunciation of the concordat. Innocent remained firm; he insisted on an explicit declaration, for in this matter, he said, he could not act otherwise than his predecessors.¹ But the French stuck no less obstinately to their view so that there was reason to fear a breakdown of the negotiations. But at this point Louis XIV., in view of his arduous struggle against the Powers arrayed against him in the Grand Alliance, decided to yield to the Holy See on an important point. This he did when he empowered those Bishops-designate who had not been members of the Assembly of 1682, to seek confirmation from the Pope. To this Innocent XII. agreed.² Nevertheless some of the Cardinals, more particularly the Spaniard Aguirre, a man well known for his publication of the Acts of the Spanish Councils and as a writer against the four Articles, drew attention to the fact that in the decree on the nomination to the vacant sees it would be necessary to make a reservation forbidding the Bishops of southern France to consent in any way whatever to a further extension of the right of *régale*.³ Innocent decided to take these representations into account. In his allocution in the consistory for the preconization of the Bishops, he expressly reserved the rights of the Holy See and forbade the new Bishops all direct or indirect recognition of the right of *régale*. The French then gave an assurance that their sovereign would not fail to publish the promised letter revoking the obligation of teaching the

¹ KLOPP, V., 332.

² PHILLIPS, *Regalienrecht*, 405 seq., 410.

³ DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*, 43; PHILLIPS, *loc. cit.*, 411 seq. Cf. *Alcune ragioni che fanno vedere che nel medesimo tempo che s'aggiusterà l'affare delle bolle per li vescovi di Francia, sia necessario aggiustare quello della Regalia,* Archives of Spanish Embassy, Rome; on the other hand: " *Discorso se convenghi ad Innocenzo XII. d'aggiustare con la Francia separatamente le provisioni delle chiese vacanti in quel regno e poi l'affare sopra la Regalia, e si conclude de no (Ottobre, 1691), Papal Sec. Arch., III., 22, p. 117 seqq.

four propositions of 1682. Upon this declaration a beginning was made in the consistory of January 9, 1692, with the preconization of those Bishops who had not assisted at the Assembly of 1682. The papal allocution explicitly stated that the preconizations were not to be considered as an indirect approval of the *régale*. The Pope's concluding words, namely that he would steadfastly stand for the independence of the Church and the authority of the Holy See, as his predecessors Innocent XI. and Alexander VII. had done, left no room for doubt as to the papal standpoint.¹ But now the French Government refused to admit the Bulls which forbade the recognition of the *régale*. However, Innocent XII. found a way out of this difficulty also: he yielded as to the manner but upheld the thing itself when he maintained the prohibition, not by means of Bulls but by appropriate Briefs which the nuncio was instructed to put into the hands of the Bishops.²

In a consistory of January 21, 1692, more French Bishops were preconized. On this occasion Cardinal Casanata raised some objections. Cardinals Goës and Aguirre were likewise of opinion that they should wait for Louis XIV.'s letter. Thereupon Cardinal Forbin spoke of a hostile opposition. Aguirre replied that such a thing was far from him—that he would have spoken in exactly the same terms if there had been question of Spanish Bishops.³ At the preconization of Tristan de la Baume de Suze to the archiepiscopal see of Aux. on February 4, Aguirre objected because the latter had not resided in his diocese of Tarbes for fifteen years though he had not asked for a dispensation from that duty.⁴ At the

ALX

¹ *Acta consist., Barb. 2899, Vat. Lib. The allocution there, which Phillips (413) thought had not yet been published, in SFONDRATI, *Regale sacerdotium*, 132, and FEA, *Nullità*, 62. Cf. the *Brief to Louis XIV., January 12, 1692, *Epist.*, Innocentii XII., Papal Sec. Arch.

² DUBRUEL, 44.

³ *Acta consist., loc. cit. Cf. the *Briefs to "Car. Gasp. Gugl. de Ventimille de Luc, elect. Massiliens., elect. Nemausens.," etc., of January 21, 1692, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ *Acta consist., loc. cit.

consistory of March 10, 1692, there occurred even livelier altercations. Colloredo and Aguirre insisted that Louis XIV. should be made to revoke his edict in support of the four Articles. D'Estrées and Forbin gave heated answers. D'Estrées objected to Aguirre, the Protector of the Kingdom of Naples, that Spain upheld the *Monarchia Sicula*. The Pope was eventually forced to put an end to the dispute.¹ In the next consistory, on March 24, he exhorted the Cardinals to moderation and to avoid interruptions.² At the preconization of the Bishop of Tournai on May 5, the latter was expressly forbidden to recognize the right of *régale* in any way whatsoever.³

After the consistory of July 7, at which a great number of Bishops who had not taken part in the Assembly of 1682, were preconized,⁴ a decision concerning those who had subscribed the four Articles became increasingly urgent, but as before no agreement on the text of the letter to be addressed by them to the Pope could be arrived at.⁵

Four of the Bishops-designate had taken part in the conference of Bishops held in 1688 under the presidency of the Archbishop of Paris so that they had incurred the censures to which, in the Roman view, those are liable who appeal from the Pope to a General Council. A way out of this difficulty was found by the Paris nuncio Cavallerini who, in June 1692, had succeeded Niccolini who had died on 4 February.⁶ This consisted in demanding from the Bishops concerned a declaration that in 1682 they had had no intention of appealing to a Council, that they had only wished to express approval of the action of their sovereign. In view of this declaration Innocent

¹ *Ibid.*; **Avviso Marescotti* of March 15, 1692, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele. Cf. the *Briefs "Electis Claramont., Tullens., Eugolismens., Baionnens.," Papal Sec. Arch.

² **Acta consist.* On this day *Briefs were dispatched to "Electis Tarbiens., Grass., Ambianens.," etc., Papal Sec. Arch.

³ **Ibid.*

⁴ *Briefs "Electis Electens., Lodov., Trecorens., Diens.," etc., Papal Sec. Arch.

⁵ PHILLIPS, 415 *seqq.*

⁶ KARTTUNEN, 238, 252.

XII. was able to preconize the Bishops in question on October 6th and 15th.¹

A particularly delicate matter was the filling of the see of Pamiers, for it seemed impossible to dissociate a decision on the dispute of the *régale* from such a measure.² But the greatest difficulty of all was the devising of a formula of submission for the participants in the Assembly of 1682. The French displayed the utmost ingenuity in drawing up formulas so worded as to be capable of an interpretation very different from an unconditional revocation of the Gallican Articles. On the other hand Innocent XII. and his advisers, Cardinals Spada, Albani and Panciatici,³ were not to be moved from their determination to demand an explicit, unconditional renunciation of articles that could not be reconciled with Catholic teaching. Mere apologies they rejected. Thus things remained for a considerable time. In July 1693, the situation looked hopeless. The Pope's auditor Ansaldi did his utmost, though in vain, to discover a formula acceptable to both parties. At last a formula was found to which the French Cardinals gave their assent. The Abbé De La Trémoille took the draft to Versailles.⁴

Resolved as he was to continue a war which demanded the greatest sacrifices, Louis XIV. was bound to ask himself whether this was possible whilst his people were suffering from want and at the same time troubled in conscience. So at last he made up his mind to yield.⁵ On September 14th he

¹ **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*

² DUBRUEL, 45.

³ **Avvisi Marescotti* of March 29 and May 24, 1692, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

⁴ KLOPP, V., 336 *seqq.*; GÉRIN, *loc. cit.*, 652 *seq.*; PHILLIPS, 423 *seqq.*; DUBRUEL, *loc. cit.*

⁵ KLOPP, VI., 223 *seqq.* In his *report of August 28, 1693, Liechtenstein draws attention to the battle of Neerwinden (July 24, 1693), when the French were unable to exploit their costly victory: "La battaglia di Fiandra ha prodotto i suoi effetti anche in quella corte, perchè dubitando i Francesi che le loro cose prendessero colà piuttosto sinistra che buona piega, e

informed the Pope that he had given the necessary orders so that the prescriptions of his edict of March 22nd, 1682, on the subject of the declaration of the French clergy, should not be enforced in future.¹ On the same day every single participant in the Assembly of 1682 addressed an apology to the Pope. "Nothing grieves me so much," they said, "as the fact that whilst the Church flourishes so happily, my own situation seems to have excluded me in some way from the favour of your Holiness' predecessors. Hence I declare that all that may be considered as having been decided in that Assembly concerning the power of the Church and the authority of the Pope, I consider as not decided and as not to be decided. Furthermore I hold as not determined all that might be considered as having been determined to the detriment of the rights of the Church; on the contrary I declare myself ready for the most complete submission to your Holiness."² For it was never my intention to do anything detrimental to the Church, on the contrary, I protest my sincerest submission to your Holiness."³

regolandosi Roma dagli accidenti di fuori, hanno i cardinali francesi stimato bene di stringere l'accomodamento delle note differenze, come gli è riuscito. Martedì notte, 25 del corrente, fu spedito dal cardinale de Forbin il suo segretario alla corte con l'ultimazione del trattato." Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

¹ SFONDRATI, *loc. cit.*, 735; ROSKOVÁNY, *Monum.*, I., 215; *Collectio Lacensis.*, I., 835; ARTAUD, *Hist. de Pie VII.*, 2 vols.³, 171. The view that Louis XIV.'s letter was not authentic and a Jansenist forgery has already been refuted by RANKE (III., 119, n. 1), though he overlooked the fact that Artaud, whom he quotes on the same page, saw the original in the Papal Sec. Arch. in 1825, though Napoleon was said to have burnt it (ARTAUD, *loc. cit.*). The original has been rediscovered by Mgr. Mercati (*Rev. des Sciences relig.*, 1926, 305). It is in good condition and now marked AA, Arm. I.-XVIII., 430. Cf. DUBRUEL, *En plein conflit*, 119 seq.

² This refers to the right of *régale*; see PHILIPPSON, *Ludwig, XIV.*, 329.

³ GÉRIN, 450 seq.; *Spicil. Vat.*, I. (1890), 141 seq.; KLOPP, V., 226; *Collectio Lacensis*, I., 835.

After the arrival in Rome of these important documents the Pope called a consistory for October 5th, 1693, at which he informed the Cardinals of Louis XIV.'s repeal of his previous order enforcing the teaching of the four Articles and of the apologies of the Bishops. With regard to the right of *régale* he promised to take appropriate precautions. This was followed by the preconization of eight Bishops. At a consistory held on October 12th some more French Bishops were preconized¹ after which D'Estrées offered solemn thanks and left for France.² In his place Forbin proposed at the consistory of October 26th, 1693, that the remaining vacant sees in France should be filled; the Pope thereupon confirmed the candidates proposed. With a view to doing honour to France Innocent XII. himself made a proposal for the primatial see of Lyons and for the see of Condom for which the King had named the auditor of the Rota D'Hervault, who had done good work in bringing about the compromise. To these two prelates the usual tax was remitted in its entirety. Huet, the Dauphin's tutor, was the object of a similar favour. The others also, in consideration of France's need in consequence of the war, were granted as great a reduction of the tax as was practicable.³

Thus the main point of the long-drawn dispute with France was at last cleared out of the way. However, the success of the Holy See was not complete for the extension of the right of *régale* remained,⁴ nor did Louis XIV. revoke the declaration of 1682 but only the edict for its execution, which imposed the four Articles on Bishops and professors and made them an obligatory subject of teaching. No prohibition to teach the four Gallican Articles was issued, on the contrary the

¹ **Acta consist.*, Vat. Lib.

² *Ibid.* Cf. the *Briefs to the nine Bishops, October 12, 1693, Papal Sec. Arch. *Ibid.*, the *Brief of October 13, 1693, expressing the Pope's satisfaction at the royal order of September 14, 1693, commanding that the decrees of the edict of March 22, 1682, "non servari debeant."

³ DUBRUEL, 45. Cf. BERNINO, *Eresie*, IV., 739 seq.

⁴ PHILLIPS, 440, 443 seq.

Archbishop of Paris informed the professors of the Sorbonne in the name of the King that they were free to do so or to leave it alone ; however, the Dean of the Faculty would not refuse henceforth to approve the theses of licentiates which did not contain the articles of 1682.¹

It cannot be denied that certain expressions in the letter of the Bishops to the Pope were equivocal and this circumstance led some people to conclude that there was no retraction at all.² Innocent XII. undoubtedly considered

¹ KLOPP, VI., 227 *seqq.* A return was made to the state of affairs before 1682, says PHILIPPSON (*loc. cit.*, 330).

² PHILLIPS, 430. As against this a modern historian no less hostile to the papacy than Phillips writes: "The friends of Gallicanism point to the last of the propositions quoted. The Bishops say that it had not been their intention to take a fresh decision nor to injure the churches of Southern France ; hence—they argue—neither has a decision been taken nor any harm been done to those churches ; so there is nothing to retract. But their words do not bear such a construction, especially when the context is taken into account. What would be the meaning of previous statements expressing great sorrow, viz. the Bishops' regret for all that had displeased the Pope in the decisions of the Assembly ? in which all innovations are declared null and void. If nothing had been decreed this long passage would not have been needed. The language, it is true, is as obscure as possible, so as to spare the feelings of the sixteen, and because it is the result of two years' discussions. If these sentences have any meaning at all it is this : 'We had no intention to arrive at a new decision or one hurtful to the Church ; if this has, nevertheless, happened in matters that displeased Your Holiness and your predecessors, we take it all back.' The fact that subsequently the Gallicans, on the basis of an artfully twisted text, asserted that there had been no withdrawal, proves nothing, for what could not theological subtlety and power of interpretation have achieved ? Here there is a precise statement : 'that which could be considered as decided' not 'that which might have been !' This alone can be said : not the whole French Church has taken back the famous four Articles, only 16 Bishops have made a retraction, and not even an exact and particular one, but merely a general one." PHILIPPSON, 329 *seqq.*

the letter as a recantation though the French immediately denied this.¹ But they could not undo the fact that the participants in the Assembly of 1682 had been obliged, with the approval of the Government, to address an abject apology to the Pope which contained at least a general recantation.² In any case the imminent peril of a schism in France was removed and Louis XIV.'s retreat undoubtedly constituted a considerable moral victory for the Holy See.³ "It was no small matter," says a historian, "when a monarch who defied powerful coalitions, at a sign of whom the whole of the clergy of his realm bowed in abject servility, renounced, at the Pope's bidding, the unconditional execution of principles which he had at one time solemnly proclaimed to be the very soul of his policy. Louis did not go to Canossa, but he made his pliant Bishops take that road."⁴

The impression in Europe was great, even among the Calvinists of Holland, with whom the political aspect of the affair naturally weighed the most.⁵

¹ " *Queruntur Galli, quod S. Sanctitas de litteris a reprobis episcopis Gallicis propter comitia ab eisdem a. 1682 habita sermonem faciens has retractatorias dixerit, quod nullatenus Galli admittere volebant." Liechtenstein to Leopold I., October 10, 1693, Liechtenstein Arch., Vienna.

² HOLTSMANN (*Französische Verfassungsgesch.*, Munich, 1910, 451), surely, goes too far when he speaks of a turning-point in the Gallican movement for several of those who subscribed did not abandon the contents of the four Articles, though they dropped the declaration. Cf. HERGENRÖTHER, IV.⁵, 33.

³ This is granted even by PHILLIPS (441).

⁴ Opinion of BROSCHE (I., 451-2). If Brosche, like RANKE (III., 120), insists that "the Roman See maintained itself not by its own strength at all, but merely as the result of a powerful political coalition", it must be stated that in the conflict with Louis XIV. no Pope abandoned his principles. The "political coalition", no doubt, compelled the King to give way to the Pope, but this negative effect is assuredly not to be put on the same level with the positive attitude of the papacy, based on its own strength.

⁵ KLOPP, VI., 227.

(2.)

In the course of his efforts for the settlement of the ecclesiastico-political dispute with France, Innocent XII. was likewise obliged to deal with the Jansenist controversy. A number of the followers of Jansenius had escaped from France to Holland and Belgium where they had secured a footing at the University of Louvain. The Belgian Bishops watched the development of things with considerable concern. With a view to cutting short the invasion of the innovators, they had insisted, since the beginning of 1692, on their subscribing the formula prescribed by Alexander VII., the explicit recognition of *veritas facti*, that is, the formal rejection of Jansenius' five propositions and that in the sense in which they were taught by Jansenius.¹ Against this measure the Jansenists of Flanders defended themselves not only by means of various writings, but they also addressed to the Roman Inquisition a humble petition in which the situation was described from their point of view. The Congregation somewhat precipitately forbade the Bishops every kind of innovation in connexion with this affair.² This step was all

¹ SCHILL, *Konstitution Unigenitus*, 24; **Cod. Vat.* 7405, f. 27 (Vat. Lib.), there, f. 123-9, a *letter of the Archbishop of Malines, of August 9, 1692, on Jansenism in Flanders: Papal decrees are scorned, the Mons New Testament is read everywhere, even in convents of nuns, the Church's infallibility in judging of the sense of a book is openly denied; the Sacraments are neglected and Indulgences contemned. "Huc spectat infinita libellorum multitudo quos ianseniano toxico scatentes non latino tantum idiomate, sed etiam vernaculo conscriptos quotidie novos ubique disseminant. Hos salibus suis et sermonis elegantia ita condiunt, ut avidè passim legantur et plausum referant." For the space of eighteen years the Jansenist advisers of my predecessor, Berghes, "optimi et nulla præditi scientia antistitis bonitate et auctoritate abutentes" have thrown everything into confusion. The same MS. has many *documents dealing with the dispute.

² " *Li Giansenisti di Fiandra havendo fatta una consulta, chiamativi anche quelli del paese di Liegi e d'Olanda comincia-

the more surprising as the Bishops had not even been consulted. Hence they appealed to the Pope who in a Brief of September 27th, 1692, promised to subject the matter to mature examination.¹ To this end he repeatedly convened the Cardinals of the Inquisition but even at an extraordinary sitting, which was also the last, at the Convent of the Minerva, they failed to reach a unanimous decision.²

rono a far stampare molti libelli infamatorii contro i vescovi, et intanto con una supplica molto umile in apparenza ricorsero alla s. Congregazione del S. Officio, lamentandosi molto delle turbolenze insorte per quella cagione in Fiandra e della vesazione fatta a loro senza ragione, et subito ottennero dalla detta Congregazione un decreto, per il quale si comandò alli vescovi di tralasciare quelle novità." Thus the "Riflessioni sopra il formulario de' vescovi di Fiandra", Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

¹ *Brief to the Archbishop of Malines, Humbert William-Precipiano, September 27, 1692, Papal Sec. Arch.

² The **Riflessioni* in the Liechtenstein Archives have the following: "Alcuni dicevano che li vescovi di Fiandra non dovevano esigere il formolario d'Alessandro VII., molto meno le addizioni, stante che il formolario concernendo la Francia sola non si doveva stendere ad altri paesi senza licenza della S. Sede, e che non aspetterà a quei vescovi di fare nè di esigere simili addizioni. Altri asserivano che tal licenza era superflua, mentre li vescovi ponno mettere in esecuzione le costituzioni apostoliche, particolarmente quando sono dogmatiche e perpetue, senza ricorrere alla Sede Apost., e che ponno dare il pabolo che stimano il più salutare alla loro grege, della quale essi sono tenuti di render conto a Dio, sostenendo che sono maggiori l'inconvenienti che potranno nascere dal non uso del formolario e delle addizioni che dall'uso o tolleranza di esso. Et altri finalmente riflettevano che li Francesi, non riconoscendo l'infallibilità del Papa nelle questioni de iure, paiono di voler secondare l'istanze de' vescovi di Fiandra premendo a maggior segno che si pubblicino dalla Sede Apost. tali risoluzioni non solo in iure, ma anche in fatto, per accendere in quelle parti qualche grand'incendio e pescare così in acqua torbida nella congiuntura dei tempi presenti, e però vi sono alcuni zelanti che vorrebbero che si trattasse questo negotio dopo la pace universale, ma si deve temere di dar in questo modo ansa

Professor Jean Libert Hennebel had been in residence in Rome, as representative of Louvain University, since November 17th, 1693. Somewhat later he was joined there by the Augustinian Bernard Desirant who represented the Bishops.¹ The activities of the able Hennebel resulted in a notable success: on January 28th, 1694, after prolonged discussions, a decree of the Inquisition was drawn up, followed, on February 6th, by a Papal Brief forbidding every addition to the "traditional formula". The Bishops were instructed to content themselves with a sincere subscription to the five propositions without distinction, limitation or declaration, in the *immediate and literal sense of the words*, as previous Popes had ordered it to be subscribed.² In a submissive letter to the Pope dated March 24th, 1694,³ the University of Louvain promised to observe the prohibition laid down towards the end of the above-mentioned Brief, of all further discussions on the meaning of the five propositions and the formula. The decree also forbade the labelling with the odious name of Jansenist of anyone who repudiated the five propositions.

Already the Jansenists imagined that with this Brief they had at last the means of saving Jansenius' name and book from official censure. The new decision, they claimed, only demanded the repudiation of the five propositions without any mention of Jansenius' name: it only demanded the repudiation of these propositions in their immediate, literal sense, but this immediate, literal sense was not found in Jansenius, hence the new ordinance corrected former papal

al Giansenismo di maggiormente radicarsi. Onde si sente che la S. Congregazione non habbia presa alcuna positiva risoluzione."

¹ These dates are based on **Riflessioni, loc. cit.* On Hennebel, cf. WERNER, *Fr. Suarez*, I., 333; HURTER, IV.³, 725 (cf. 389); LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 98 seqq.; *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VI., 2148; on Désirant, *ibid.*, IV., 627.

² To the Archbishop of Malines, the Bishops of Bruges, Ghent, Roermond, in D'ARGENTRÉ, III., 2, 390; BERNINO, IV., 742; SCHILL, 25.

³ Printed by LÄMMER, *loc. cit.*, 99 seqq.

decrees. Thereupon the Belgian Bishops made a second appeal to Rome from where they received a decree dated November 25th, 1696, which for clearness left nothing to be desired. In it Innocent XII. explicitly confirmed the decree of Alexander VII. in its full extent and empowered the Bishops to take canonical proceedings against whosoever contravened it by any external act. For the rest the Bishops were told to be satisfied with the simple acceptance of the formula without inquiring into the interior intention of individual signatories since the Church did not judge of these things.¹

Another decision on a doctrinal conflict was concerned with quietistic opinions² which were apparently being revived in France, though in an attenuated form.³

Jeanne Marie Bouvier de la Motte, better known under the name of her husband Guyon,⁴ after the death of the latter in 1676, when she was but twenty-eight years of age, had given herself entirely to a life of piety and good works, but a disorderly imagination and the wrong direction of her spiritual guide, Lacombe, who accompanied her on all her journeys, led her astray. Malicious reports about her relations with Lacombe

¹ D'ARGENTRÉ, III., 2, 392; BERNINO, IV., 743 *seq.*; SCHILL, 25 *seq.* The Brief, dated November 24, 1694, "Litteras," in D'Argentré and Hardouin (XI., c. 158), is dated November 25, 1696, a°, 6°, in the *Epist.* of the Papal Sec. Arch.

² Cf. above, p. 442 *seq.*

³ H. CHÉROT, *Le Quiétisme en Bourgogne*, in *Études*, LXXXV. (1900), *seq.*; H. WATRIGANT, *Un disciple obstiné du sémi-quiétisme guyonien à Rouen, 1700-4*, in *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, XVIII. (1922), 61-78.

⁴ GUERRIER, *Madame Guyon*, Paris, 1881; GOMBAULT, *Madame Guyon*, in *Rev. de Lille*, 1910; her *Apologie*, annotée par Bossuet, in *Documents d'hist.*, 1910, 284, 304; *Le procès de Madame Guyon*, in *Rev. Fénelon*, 1910, Juin; A. LARGENT in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VI., 1997-2006. The chief source for the story of French quietism is a number of letters, documents in the *Correspondance* of Fénelon (Vols. IX. and X., Paris, 1851), and in Bossuet's *Correspondance* (ed. Urbain and Levesque, Vols. VIII.-XI., Paris, 1914-17. Cf. PAQUIER, *Qu'est ce que le Quiétisme?* Paris, 1910.

led to the arrest of both in Paris. Lacombe did not recover his freedom and died insane in 1699, whereas her eight months' imprisonment affected Madame Guyon's good name so very little that after her liberation, ladies of the highest social rank, such as the Duchesses of Charost, Beauvilliers, Chevreuse and Montemart, entered into intimate relations with the gifted woman and spoke of her as a Saint. Madame de Maintenon also came under her spell. At the educational establishment which she had opened at Saint-Cyr, the manuscript notes of Madame Guyon, with their alleged visions, prophecies and miracles, passed from hand to hand until Godet de Marais, Bishop of Chartres, having heard of these writings, raised a warning voice. This frightened Madame de Maintenon who thereupon sought the advice of the Superior of the Sulpicians, Tronson, and that of Bourdaloue, who both took an unfavourable view of the writings.

In point of fact the writings of the new prophetess were anything but unexceptionable. The Church's asceticism knows no other path towards Christian perfection than the lengthy and weary labour of self-denial. Yet time and again in the course of history teachers have arisen who promised the attainment of that lofty goal at much less cost and as it were at one bound. Madame Guyon was one of them. According to her, perfection consists in an uninterrupted act of contemplation and love of God. Once this act of divine love exists, man has done all that it is in his power to do for his perfection. This act continues of its own accord until it is expressly revoked. The soul need no longer trouble about any other virtuous acts, for they are all included in this act of charity. As a matter of fact man should refrain from all personal striving after perfection as the effort only troubles his repose in God. Nor should he allow himself to be disquieted either by fear or hope ; on the contrary he should be perfectly indifferent, even with regard to his eternal salvation. In contemplative prayer a reasoned consideration of the attributes of God or the life of Christ is not to be recommended.¹

¹ LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, 1998.

These views met with approval. Five editions of a small tract by Madame Guyon entitled *A brief and very easy method of prayer*, were sold within the space of a few months. At Châlons-sur-Saone and at Dijon quietism caused a stir. At Seurre, in the diocese of Besançon, a curé of the name of Robert publicly declared that Molinos had been wrongly condemned; that Innocent XI., who was no man of prayer, had condemned what he did not understand.¹ Two Doctors of the Sorbonne, Bornat and Bureau, were banished in 1688 when they were found to be adherents of the new quietist sect.²

Whither the refusal of self-discipline in the interior life could lead had been demonstrated in appalling fashion by the case of Molinos, yet it was precisely one of the finest characters of contemporary France who allowed himself to be strongly influenced by Madame Guyon.³ Fénelon⁴ considered the prophetess as a kind of Saint.⁵ It seemed to him that she

¹ CHÉROT, LXXXV., 614, 618; *Freiburger Kirchenlex.*, X., 690, art. *Quillot*. Cf. BOSSUET, *Correspondance*, XI., *App.*, I.² 377-399. Fénelon also says in his letter to Innocent XII. (see below, p. 613, n. 1): "Quietistarum dogma nefandum ac perfectionis speciem prae se ferens, in varias Galliarum partes necnon et in Belgio ut cancer serpebat" (*Œuvres*, IX., Paris, 1852, 142). On August 2, 1697, he writes to the Pope that he had written the *Maximes des Saints* "ad confutandos Quietistarum errores et ad discernendas sanctorum ascetarum sententias" (*ibid.*, 184).

² Per essere stati scoperti sequaci della nuova setta di Quietisti. Nunciature report of February 2, 1688, in LANGLOIS, *Rev. d'hist. ecclés.*, 1929, 54.

³ MAURICE MASSON, *Fénelon et Madame Guyon*, Paris, 1907; H. BREMOND, *Apologie pour Fénelon*, Paris, 1910. On the authenticity of the correspondence between Fénelon and Mad. Guyon, see LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, 1999. Cf. M. J. DENIS, *Quietisme, Fénelon et Bossuet*, in *Mém. de l'Acad. nat. des sciences, arts et belles lettres de Caen*, 1914.

⁴ Monographs by BRAUSSET (1808), DE BROGLIE (1884), Jannet (1892), MAHRENHOLTZ (1913). E. JOVY, *Fénelon inédit d'après les documents de Pistoie*, Vitry-le-François, 1917.

⁵ LARGENT, in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, V., 2144.

had an extraordinary experience in all that appertains to the interior life ; accordingly he shut his eyes to the fact that she possessed neither learning nor wisdom and that her writings actually contained things worthy of ecclesiastical censure. When he saw the storm gathering about Madame Guyon, he sought to help her. He induced her to submit her writings to the judgment of Bossuet, for at this time Fénelon was paying to the Bishop of Meaux an almost excessive tribute of admiration.¹ Accordingly Madame Guyon submitted her writings to Bossuet, who definitely condemned the quietism that lurked in them, on the ground that the theology of the Church knows no state of perfection in which one no longer asks anything of God, or returns thanks to Him. Let Madame Guyon rid herself of her presumption and make no account of her visions and similar things. For the rest he treated the prophetess with fatherly kindness in the hope that she would allow herself to be taught.

Madame Guyon, however, was not satisfied. She felt that all Bossuet's objections were simply due to the fact that he knew nothing of mysticism² and she demanded a commission of laymen and ecclesiastics—of laymen to judge of her moral conduct and of ecclesiastics to examine her teaching. Now there was no question of her moral rectitude, hence she was only granted an ecclesiastical commission which, at her own request, consisted of Bossuet, Noailles, Bishop of Châlons, and Tronson. These held a number of conferences at the country house of the Sulpicians at Issy between July 16th, 1694, and March 10th, 1695, as a result of which they formulated in thirty propositions the Church's teaching as opposed to quietism.³ Bossuet

¹ Fénelon to Bossuet, on July 28, 1694 (FÉNELON, *Œuvres*, X., 29) : *Je suis dans vos mains comme un petit enfant*, etc. In like terms, in the letter of December 16, 1694 (*ibid.*, 49). Letter of January 26, 1695 : *Traitez-moi comme un petit écolier* (*ibid.*, 53).

² F. BRUNETIÈRE, *Nouvelles études critiques*, Paris, 1882, 64.

³ Printed in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, V., 2146 seqq. On the conferences of Issy, cf. LEVESQUE, in *Rev. Bossuet*, 1906, 176 seqq., 204 seqq. ;

published the articles of Issy in a pastoral letter in which the writings of Molinos, Malaval and Lacombe were expressly condemned together with some of Madame Guyon's, though without her name being mentioned. In a similiar pastoral by Noailles Madame Guyon was not mentioned by name. In an earlier condemnation the Archbishop of Paris had used no such consideration. In his stern ordinance Godet de Marais condemned sixty-three propositions drawn from the writings of Lacombe and Madame Guyon. On December 27th, 1695, the hapless prophetess was once more arrested as she refused to submit and it was only on October 16th, 1696, that she was allowed to leave Vincennes. She confessed her errors in writing and promised to allow herself to be guided in future by the Archbishop of Paris. Even after her liberation she remained under surveillance, but at length she was allowed to retire to Blois where she died on June 9th, 1717. The opening sentence of her will is a profession of the Catholic faith.¹ Among Protestants her writings are held in esteem even at this day.²

From the first Fénelon felt hit by the suspicion of which Madame Guyon was the object. Even before the first discussions at Issy he drew up a number of memorials in her defence. He hoped to avert an unfavourable judgment since it appeared to him that the teaching of his client was covered by the writings of Clement of Alexandria, Cassian and Francis de Sales. But he protested his readiness to submit to the judgment of the conference of Issy.

He was soon to learn that the members of the conference of Issy took a very different view of Madame Guyon than he had imagined. This realization became even more painful for him when Madame de Maintenon laid before the judges the letters which Fénelon had written to her as her spiritual director: a number of passages in these letters were taken exception to and these the accused sought to defend or to

ALB. CHÉREL, *Explication des articles d'Issy*, Paris, 1915; P. DUDON, in *Rev. d'ascétique et de mystique*, 1928, 263 seqq.

¹ LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, VI., 2004.

² BRUNETIÈRE, 63.

correct.¹ However, he failed to win over the conference to his views. When after the preliminary conferences of Issy, in July and August, 1694, the judges again met there in November and December, there was placed before them a memorial in which Bossuet refuted page by page Fénelon's account of the teaching of Clement of Alexandria.² So determined were they in their rejection of the new opinions that, contrary to their first intention, they declined to discuss the matter at all.

This did not affect Fénelon's resolution to submit. He complied with Bossuet's request that he should expound his opinions more fully in writing.³ The memorial he wrote to that effect seemed to dispose of every difficulty hence, on February 4th, 1695, Fénelon was raised to the archiepiscopal see of Cambrai. When the Issy articles were handed to him he was at first speechless with astonishment, but promptly announced his willingness to subscribe to them.

However, he did not subscribe for the moment, on the contrary he presented counter-proposals in which not a few of the original thirty articles were differently formulated and three new ones added. At the same time he renewed his promise to subscribe; if his modifications proved unacceptable, he would submit at least out of obedience and with the regret that the articles were so imperfect. But even now he stuck to his view on certain points, in fact he secured the acceptance of many of the modifications proposed by him, as well as the addition of a further three articles to the thirty, to which Noailles added a thirty-fourth.

¹ LANGLOIS, in *Rev. d'hist littér. de la France*, XXXV. (1928), 354 *seqq.*

² *Traditions des nouveaux mystiques* (DUDON, *loc. cit.*, 161 *seqq.*). On the work, *Le gnostique de saint (sic!) Clément d'Alexandrie*, which Bossuet refutes, being by Fénelon, see DUDON, *loc. cit.*

³ On this so-called Confession of Fénelon, *cf.* DUDON in *Recherches de science relig.*, 1927; *ID.*, *Mém. inédit de Fénelon sur l'état passif*, *ibid.*, 1929, 97-121; *ID.*, *D'une prétendue tradition secrète de la vie spirit. des parfaits*. *ibid.*, 1928, 594-614.

Concord between Bossuet and Fénelon seemed now re-established. Both subscribed to the thirty-four articles, both rejected the writings of Madame Guyon.¹ With his own hand Bossuet gave episcopal consecration to his one-time opponent on July 10th, 1695. When Bossuet compiled a book on various questions raised by quietism,² Fénelon promised to give his approval so as to furnish a tangible proof of the newly established concord. No cause of future controversy seemed to remain. But when Bossuet submitted his book the unexpected happened, for the new Archbishop of Cambrai refused his approbation, and he did so even though it was easy to foresee that he would forfeit the favour both of the King and of Madame de Maintenon and that, in spite of his repudiation of Madame Guyon's writings, he would be represented as a supporter of quietism. Now in public opinion quietism was inseparable from the abominations brought to light by the trial of Molinos.³

What is the explanation of this strange conduct? ⁴ Fénelon himself seems to indicate his chief motive when referring to his rupture with Bossuet and the consequences that ensued from it, when he writes ⁵: "I set out for Cambrai," and thus into banishment from court: "I have sacrificed all human and worldly considerations for a doctrinal point which I held to be true." This point had momentarily cropped up during the conferences of Issy without leaving a trace in the

¹ In his letter of June 20, 1698, to Innocent XII. (*Œuvres*, IX., 443), Fénelon says: "Semper et palam dixi, duos libros, quos solos novi, nempe, 'Moyen court' etc. et 'le Cantique', censura dignos esse in sensu obvio et naturali. . . . Unde constat me nunquam neque ulla ratione libros excusasse" (*cf.* p. 479 *seq.*). See also the letter of December 13, 1698, to Innocent XII., *ibid.*, 618 *seqq.*

² *Instruction pastorale sur les états d'oraison* (*Œuvres*, ed. LACHAT, XVIII.).

³ STÉPHANE HARENT in *Études*, CXXVII. (1911), 493 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Première lettre à un de ses amis*, 3 août, 1697, *Œuvres*, II., 283. *Cf.* HARENT, *loc. cit.*, 495.

thirty-four articles; it was connected with the highest Christian virtue of charity or the love of God. In the conclusion of his pastoral letter on the degrees of prayer, Bossuet had hinted at another work in which he intended to prove from the Scriptures and the Fathers that even charity could never be wholly disinterested, that the desire for happiness was a necessary motive of all our actions, hence the love of God which did not proceed from such a motive was but self-deception and presumption of so unnatural a kind as to bring piety into disrepute.¹ On the other hand Fénelon saw in these assertions a devaluation of the highest Christian virtue. There was nothing he was not prepared to do or to suffer to prevent this devaluation, he wrote.² Moreover, in consequence of the ill-judged zeal of his friends, a book of his was published at that very moment, namely the much discussed *Explanation of the Maxims of the Saints on the Interior Life*.³ Fénelon, accordingly, refused the promised approbation of Bossuet's book, fully prepared as he was to take the consequences. These were soon to be seen.⁴ At the Issy conferences the question of the disinterested love of God had only been lightly touched upon and Fénelon had dissociated himself from Madame Guyon's writings even though he retained a high regard for her person. On the other hand

¹ The voice of Nature and that of Christianity agree that "qu'on veut être heureux et qu'on ne peut pas ne pas le vouloir, ni s'arracher ce motif dans aucune des actions que la raison peut produire. . . . C'est donc une illusion d'ôter à l'amour de Dieu le motif de nous rendre heureux. Instruction past. sur les états d'oraison", LIV., 10, n. 29.

² "Il n'a rien que je ne veuille faire et souffrir pour résister à ceux qui ont entrepris de décrier cette doctrine" [of disinterested love]. Deuxième lettre à un de ses amis, *Œuvres*, II., 285. Cf. HARENT, *loc. cit.*, 497.

³ "Explication des maximes des Saints sur la vie intérieure."

⁴ On the dispute between Bossuet and Fénelon, cf. CROUSLÉ (Paris, 1894); DELMONT (Lyons, 1896); BAUMGARTNER, *Weltliteratur*, V., 413 *seqq.*; WEINAND, in *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, IV.², 1333 *seq.*

Bossuet saw in Fénelon's work a fresh assertion of the propositions lately condemned, which he considered extremely dangerous for two reasons: one was that they were entirely based upon alleged illuminations and inspirations, thus constituting private judgment or opinion the arbiter in religious matters, after the manner of the Protestants; the other was that Fénelon spoke of a secret tradition among the mystics. Now Catholicism knows no other tradition in religious questions except the general tradition of the Church. Bossuet was unsparing in his attacks upon his former friend, "the Montanus of the new Priscilla," as he described him in an offensive allusion to one of the oldest incidents in the story of heresy.¹ Other things also Fénelon had to endure. He was banished from court and lost his post of tutor to the Dauphin. Some of his assistants, together with some of the nuns of Saint-Cyr, were also hit by the King's wrath. With the King's approval a declaration which Bossuet, Noailles and Godet de Marais drew up against Fénelon as the result of some conferences at the palace of the Archbishop of Paris, was handed to nuncio Delfino on August 6th, 1697, and spread throughout the country.

However, Fénelon did not lose heart, on the contrary, he defended himself against Bossuet's attacks in over a dozen publications. The contest between the two Bishops, which caused a sensation throughout the whole of France, went on for over a year and a half. A worldly epoch may indeed have deemed the subject matter of the quarrel too lofty or too abstruse, but the well-known philosopher Malebranche and the Maurist François Lamy, the famous preacher Bourdaloue and the founder of the Trappists, De Rancé, took sides in the dispute. Even Leibnitz studied what he called the "riddle"

¹ "Si je mollissais dans une querelle où il y va de toute la religion, ou si j'affectais des délicatesses, on ne m'entendrait pas, et je trahirais la cause que je dois défendre" (Bossuet to his nephew, November 18, 1697, *Corresp.*, IX., 28). "Enfin l'Église est terriblement menacée," he wrote on August 4, 1698, to Noailles (*ibid.*, X., 104).

of disinterested love.¹ In Paris sermons were preached against the new teaching,² and echoes of the Bishops' contest reached even the salons of aristocrat ladies. "No learned contest," wrote Madame de Sévigné's daughter, "was more important and more easy to understand, or was more within the sphere of the intelligence or the heart, which is the natural judge in such a matter."³

When the three Bishops' manifesto against Fénelon became public, the latter's reply took the form of a "Letter to a Friend" which circulated throughout France and in an Italian translation in Rome also. On April 27th, 1697, he submitted his teaching to the Pope⁴ with the following expression of submission: "Your mission it is, Holy Father, to give judgment, mine to hearken to and to venerate in you Peter still living and speaking and ever unfailing in his faith."⁵ The King refused him leave to go to Rome in person.⁶ In an autograph letter⁷ Louis requested the Pope to give judgment in Fénelon's affair.

¹ LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, 2152. Leibnitz spoke at this time of the "enigme de l'amour désintéressé (opinion on Fénelon in *Correspondance de Bossuet*, IX., 425). In February 1697, De Rancé wrote of Bossuet: "Je ne doute point que tous les gens de bien ne se joignent à lui, et que son parti ne soit celui de l'Église" (*ibid.*, VII., 506).

² H. CHÉROT, *Études*, LXXXVI. (1901), 50.

³ GRISSELLE, *Études*, CXX. (1909), 701.

⁴ *Œuvres de Fénelon*, IX., Paris, 1851, 144 *seqq.*; the Pope's reply, June 11, 1697, *ibid.*, 159.

⁵ "Tuum est iudicare, Sanctissime Pater, meum vero in Te Petrum, cuius fides nunquam deficiet, viventem et loquentem audire et revereri" (*ibid.*, 142). In the letter of recommendation for his Roman agent, Chanterac, he says: "Argue, emenda, corripe, damna; hoc totum patris, hoc totum filio gratum" (*ibid.*, 185).

⁶ Fénelon to Innocent XII., August 2, 1697, *Œuvres*, IX., 184.

⁷ July 26, 1697, *ibid.*, 175; BOSSUET, *Correspondance*, VIII., 520; the Pope's reply, September 10, 1697, *ibid.*, 521.

Thus the Roman authorities were faced with a question which, by reason of its bearing on the Christian life, could not be taken lightly but whose solution was particularly difficult on account of existing circumstances. At a later date theologians came to the conclusion that neither of the disputants had truth completely on his side.¹ There was question here of two of the sublimest Christian virtues, hope and charity. Hope honours God by tending towards Him as man's sovereign Good in the possession of which his mind and heart can alone find satisfaction and happiness. Charity clings to God as to the sovereign Good, an abyss of wisdom, goodness and beauty. Now Bossuet exaggerated the importance of hope at the expense of charity, whilst Fénelon so exalted the disinterestedness of charity as to minimize the value of hope. Bossuet, as a result of a too rigid interpretation of St. Augustine, thought that the desire of personal happiness gave the impulse to every movement of the will, hence even the love of God must have for its motive the desire of personal happiness.² Fénelon thought that in the Saints charity reached such heights as to eliminate every personal consideration not only in particular actions, but in the whole of their interior life. Accordingly in those who had reached perfection, hope no longer played any part at all. In this he went too far for hope is a duty of the Christian and since by bestowing happiness on man God at the same time increases His own glory, nothing prevents us from striving after eternal happiness when we view it as ministering to God's glory. Viewed in this light hope also is disinterested after its own fashion.³

No fault was found in Rome with Bossuet's teaching. For the rest he is far from consistent in upholding his fundamental principle, for occasionally he admits the disinterestedness of charity.⁴ After the hasty publication of his book, Fénelon soon realized that it was necessary to attenuate or to define

¹ HARENT, in *Études*, CXXVII. (1911), 178 *seqq.*; NISIUS, in *Zeitschr. für Kath. Theol.*, 1884, 508 *seqq.*, 645 *seqq.*; J. PRUNER, in *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, VII.², 1988.

² HARENT, *loc. cit.*, 484-493.

³ *Ibid.*, 495-500, 745 *seqq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 497 *seq.*

more accurately more than one of his statements ; accordingly he prepared a second edition.¹ He also submitted, on the quiet, explanations of many of his statements to the Roman authorities. Though Louis XIV. and Madame Maintenon were strongly opposed to him, and though Bossuet's nephew, the future Jansenist Bishop of Troyes, as representative of his uncle, persecuted the Archbishop of Cambrai with real passion,² Fénelon's position was far from hopeless at first. Cardinal Bouillon worked so zealously in Rome on his behalf, as to incur Louis XIV.'s disgrace.³ In sixty-four sittings, lasting from six to seven hours each, and under the presidency of Cardinals Noris and Ferrari, a vast number of polemical writings, and in particular thirty-seven propositions from the book *The Maxims of the Saints* were examined between October 12th, 1697, and October, 1698, when five out of the ten reports submitted were in favour of Fénelon.⁴ On the

¹ The revised edition was published by ALBERT CHÉREL, Paris, 1911.

² On November 25, 1698, he wrote to his uncle about Fénelon : " C'est une bête féroce qu'il faut poursuivre pour l'honneur de l'épiscopat et de la vérité jusqu'à ce qu'on l'ait désarmé et mis hors d'état de ne plus faire aucun mal." Of Fénelon's book he says : " Pour moi, je n'y trouve que le caractère d'un charlatan, d'un déclamateur et du plus dangereux de tous les hommes (BOSSUET, *Correspondance*, X., 316). VERLAQUE (*Lettres de Louis XIV. au cardinal De Bouillon*, Paris, 1884, *Avertissement* in REYSSIE, 99), says : " Il est impossible de ne pas attribuer à sa fatale influence l'excès de véhémence et d'amertume qui est venu se mêler aux controverses de deux grands évêques." On an adventure said to have befallen the younger Bossuet in Rome, cf. E. GRISELLE, in *Rev. d'hist. et de littérat. relig.*, VII. (1902), 385 seqq., VIII. (1903), 49 seqq., 209 seqq.

³ F. REYSSIE, *Le cardinal Bourbon* (1647-1715), Paris, 1899, 98 seqq.

⁴ LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, 2154 ; FÉNELON, *Œuvres*, IX., 508. A memorial in favour of Fénelon by the Jesuit Alfaro, is printed in *Anal. iur. pontif.*, XX., 654-709. On the opinion of the Congregation of theologians, cf. *ibid.*, 328 seqq., 407 seqq., IX., 810 ; DUDON, *Molinos*, 243.

other hand, the Pope, not wishing the controversy to remain undecided, entrusted the whole affair to the Inquisition. At the end of thirty-seven sittings the Cardinals of that tribunal of the faith pronounced twenty-three propositions out of the thirty-seven that had been submitted to their judgment, to be blameworthy.

Even now Fénelon's friends endeavoured to save him by praying that there should be no formal condemnation but a simple statement, in short propositions, of what was to be thought in the matter.¹ On hearing of this plan Louis XIV. wrote a threatening letter for which Bossuet had lent his pen. His Majesty, it said, had learnt with amazement of a proposal which would stultify all the previous deliberations. The King was not willing to allow a fresh schism to arise at a time when he was doing his best to stifle Calvinism. If the affair was further drawn out, he would know what to do and would take suitable steps.²

These threats were superfluous. When the letter reached Rome, Fénelon's twenty-three propositions had been condemned by papal judgment, on March 12th, 1699.³

Fénelon submitted. He was informed of the Roman decision

¹ These 12 *canones* are printed in Fénelon's *Œuvres*, IX., 731 n.

² BOSSUET, *Correspondance*, XI., 436.

³ DENZINGER, *Enchir.*, n. 1327. On individual propositions, cf. *Anal. iur. pontif.*, I., 1342 (after Terzago of Narni, 1764); [P. H. PHELIPPEAUX], *Rélations de l'origine, du progrès et de la condamnation du Quiétisme répandu en France*, s. l., 1732. Cf. FÉNELON, *Œuvres*, X., 64 *seqq.*; A. GRIVEAU, *Étude sur la condamnation du livre des Maximes des saints*, Paris, 1878. A treatise by Bossuet, probably drawn up for the Roman Congregation: *De Quietismo in Gallia refutato*, in *Annales de St. Louis II.* (1897), 8 *seqq.* The materials for the Brief against Fénelon are among the papers of Card. Noris in **Cod. B.* 7, 12, p. 265 *seqq.*, Bibl. Angelica, Rome. Cf. LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 102. *Briefs to Louis XIV., March 31 and April 28, 1699, in Papal Sec. Arch. *Laudatory Briefs, May 4 and 12, 1699, to Fénelon, after his submission, in *Epist.*, *ibid.*

on March 25th, feast of the Annunciation of the Blessed Virgin. That same day he went into the pulpit to preach on the submission due to the Church and to Providence.¹ He announced his submission to his diocese in a pastoral letter.² Fourteen years later he wrote to Clement XI. who, as Cardinal Albani, had had a share in the decree of condemnation, that he had himself forestalled all the Bishops, and even his opponents, in condemning his own writings, and in so doing he had taken no notice of the fact that the papal decree was not in accordance with the practice of Parliament, nor had he attempted, after the fashion of the Jansenists, to draw a distinction between right and fact.³ When the Jansenist Gerberon offered to defend him, he replied: "I would rather die than in any way defend a book which, out of docility towards the Holy See, I have condemned without reservation and from the bottom of my heart."⁴

To this standpoint Fénelon remained faithful, though he felt it very much that Bossuet's error was not included in the condemnation. He also felt that he had stated his opinion badly and thereby occasioned these steps against his book. However, he agreed that the propositions rejected by Rome deserved condemnation when taken in their literal sense, hence he was resolved to let the matter be and not to utter another word in self-defence.⁵

This was not the only ecclesiastical controversy submitted to the Pope. The celebrated historian, the Bollandist Daniel Papebroch, Henschen's collaborator in that gigantic work, the *Acta Sanctorum*, was attacked by the Carmelites for calling

¹ News of this soon reached even Rome. Chanterac (Fénelon's agent in Rome), April 18, 1699, *Œuvres*, X., 8.

² *Œuvres*, II., 410 seq.

³ Epistola, II., ad Clementem, XI., *ibid.*, X., 52.

⁴ Letter of December 3, 1701, *ibid.*, X., 52.

⁵ For this reason Fénelon's sincerity has been repeatedly questioned in the sequel (LARGENT, *loc. cit.*, 2157). In a memorandum found after his death, he endeavours to prove "qu'il n'a voulu ni enseigner ni approuver aucune des erreurs condamnées dans son livre". *Œuvres*, X., 345.

in question the foundation of their Order by the prophet Elias. Papebroch was able to invoke authorities such as Baronius and Bellarmine, but historical criticism was then so little developed that the Carmelites saw a great crime in this challenge to the tradition of their Order. At length, in 1691, they appealed to the Pope himself and denounced Papebroch to the Spanish Inquisition on the ground of heresy. Rome proceeded with its traditional caution and initiated a thorough investigation. Not so Spain where the local Inquisition was soon ready with its judgment. On November 14th, 1693, the fourteen volumes of the *Acta Sanctorum* edited by Papebroch were put on the Index on the ground that they contained a denial of the foundation of the Carmelite Order by the prophet Elias. In Rome, on the other hand, the Carmelites not only failed to obtain the condemnation of the Bollandists, but a number of scholars, Noris among them, took up their defence. The Emperor Leopold I. also intervened with the Pope in favour of the *Acta Sanctorum*.¹ But the attacks continued. At length the Pope put an end to the interminable controversy by imposing silence, in November, 1698, on both parties, until the Holy See should have pronounced in the matter.² In the same way, when at the beginning of 1697 Bossuet, Noailles and other French Bishops protested against Cardinal Sfondrati's book on predestination,³ the Pope withheld his decision.⁴

Like his predecessors, Innocent XII. also had occasion to intervene in several controversies in the sphere of Moral Theology. Innocent XI. had put Tirso Gonzalez, a missionary and professor of theology, at the head of the Jesuit Order,

¹ Innocent XII. replied to the Emperor in a *Brief of March 17, 1696: "Non omittemus rem diligenter discutere, illud decreturi, quod expedire in Domino iudicabimus." *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

² *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, II.², 1967 *seqq.*; REUSCH, *Index*, II., 268 *seq.*; SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, I., 1655 *seq.*; *Bull.*, XX., 863.

³ *Brief to Bossuet, Noailles and some other Bishops, March 6, 1697, *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁴ *Dict. de théol. cath.*, VII., 2014.

with a view to putting an end to the complaints about the infiltration of lax moral teaching into the Society of Jesus. Gonzalez, in fact, seriously applied himself to the execution of this task.¹ The last General Congregation of the Order had left all Jesuits free to write in defence of the stricter moral system, but at the end of four years not one of them had made use of the permission. So Gonzalez decided to take up his pen himself for, as he wrote on one occasion, he felt bound, under pain of grave sin, to prevent probabilism from becoming the official teaching of the Order,² but the General's Assistants protested against it, even to the Pope himself. Gonzalez had had his book secretly printed at Dillingen, but the entire edition remained at Dillingen and fell into oblivion.⁴ It would seem that only one solitary copy of Gonzalez' first book against probabilism escaped the general wreck.⁵

Meanwhile the General stuck to his plan and, for the time being, also to his book against probabilism, but his Assistants likewise continued to object. In addition to these yet another powerful opponent rose against the General of the Order.

In Lent of the year 1692 the celebrated preacher Paul Segneri came to Rome to preach the Lenten sermons. Segneri was held in high esteem by Innocent XII. It would seem that Gonzalez had hoped to win over the popular preacher to his views for he submitted to him his writings on the burning question. Segneri, however, represented to him⁶ that a General's duty was to rule, not to write books. If Gonzalez was anxious to prevent his subjects from holding lax views in the sphere of Moral Theology, he need only warn those who

¹ DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, *Moralstreitigkeiten*, 1889; ASTRÁIN, VI., 240 *seqq.*; B. DUHR, *Gesch. der Jesuiten*, III., 8 *seqq.*

² ASTRÁIN, VI., 239.

³ *Tractatus succinctus de recto usu opinionum probabilium* (p. 587 in 8°), introduction of 72 pp., *ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 244-250; DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, I., 152, 156; II., 150 n., 8, 9.

⁵ Found in S. Isidro, Madrid, by ASTRÁIN, *cf. id.*, VI., 320.

⁶ Segneri's memorial of June 8, 1692, in DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, II., 99 *seqq.*

wrote on the subject, as his predecessors had done, and to instruct the censors of books not to pass opinions that were too lenient. He would never be able to displace by means of a book advocating an entirely novel opinion, a view which had been held in high esteem for so many centuries and which the Roman Curia followed in hundreds of cases ; on the contrary the book planned by him would have such consequences for the General and the Order that he, Segneri, would rather die than live to witness them, seeing that the General granted what was but a Jansenist calumny, namely that lax opinions actually prevailed in the Society. By such an admission the General would alienate the hearts of his subjects. As it was, rumours of the dissensions between the highest Superior of the Order and its members had reached the public, to the no small injury of the Society. The friends of the Jesuits complained of the General whilst their enemies approved him. What would not happen when the unfortunate book appeared in print and attacks upon it came from all parts of Europe, even from the Jesuits themselves ! Hence he prayed the General to submit to the judgment of so many in this matter ; if he did this, Segneri added with a point of malice, he would at any rate be acting in accordance with the more probable opinion.

Under Segneri's influence a settlement of the tiresome dispute was sought along new lines. According to the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus its various Provinces are bound to send a delegate to Rome every three years for the purpose of joint deliberation. One such Congregation of delegates was precisely due in November 1693. It was not the duty of this assembly to sit in judgment on books ; its purpose was rather to decide, in conjunction with the Assistants and the General, whether it was necessary to call a General Congregation. However, in view of the unusual situation, the Assistants decided to submit their dispute with the General to the Congregation of the Procurators and, by the advice of Segneri, Innocent XII. gave his approval to the plan.¹ Thus the affair was shelved for a whole year.

¹ June 14, 1692, ASTRÁIN, VI., 255.

Gonzalez was not idle during the respite, for he had a conviction that it was his bounden duty to quash probabilism in the Order, and in this he displayed such zeal that in the end the Assistants could think of nothing better than to appeal to the Pope against the General. Gonzalez, they complained,¹ was spreading real libels against the Order, did not comply with its Constitutions, disputed its right to summon a General Congregation, sought the intervention of secular princes, neglected the business of government for the sake of literary work and libelled his Assistants. As a matter of fact a number of pamphlets were circulated, composed either by Gonzalez himself or by friends of his, for the purpose of making propaganda in his favour.

Far more serious was the fact that Gonzalez set in motion the courts of Vienna and Madrid in his support—the question positively became an affair of State. Gonzalez appealed to the Austrian Provincial Voglmeyer and to the Jesuit Frederick Wolff in Vienna, with a view to obtaining, through the Emperor's intervention, a papal ordinance in favour of his book so that it might appear before the opening of the Congregation of the Procurators; as a matter of fact on August 1st, 1693, the General was in a position to express his thanks for the intervention of the Emperor and the Empress and that of the latter's sister, the Queen of Spain.² In the spring of 1693, the imperial ambassador in Rome had advised the General to refrain from publishing his book, but as a result of Gonzalez' expostulations, the Emperor changed his mind, though in September of the same year he contented himself with exhorting the General and the Assistants to concord.³

The intervention of Charles II. of Spain was fraught with weightier consequences. Through the Jesuit Rector of

¹ In EUS. ERANISTE, VI., xciv *seq.*

² DUHR, III., 10 *seq.*

³ DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, II., 211. The two imperial letters in EUS. ERANISTE, VI., lxxxvi. and lxxxix. Gonzalez' reply of November 21, 1692 (*sic.*!), *ibid.*, xci. *seq.*; the reply of the Assistants, November 3, 1693, in DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, II., 118.

Salamanca, Gregorio Sarmiento, who was connected with the most aristocratic families, Gonzalez represented to the court that Spain's honour demanded that the King should intervene on his behalf in Rome, as the difficulties raised against his book were all due to the French Cardinals.¹ Sarmiento, however, was opposed by the Jesuits of Madrid who sought to restrain the King from meddling with the affair,² but when, at Gonzalez' request, Cardinal Aguirre also wrote to Charles II.,³ and the Spanish ambassador in Rome, the Duke of Medinaceli gave his support to this request for the royal protection for a Spanish subject,⁴ the King issued an important edict on July 8th, 1693. The decree takes up an accusation made by Aguirre and Medinaceli, but for which there exists no other proof, to the effect that there was question of deposing the General or of giving him a Vicar. To this end an effort would be made to choose as delegates for the next Congregation only opponents of Gonzalez who, with a view to the removal of the General, would vote in favour of a General Congregation. The Viceroys of Naples, Sicily and Sardinia, the Governor of Milan and the rest of the royal officials, were accordingly instructed to make the King's mind known to the Procurators. As for Gonzalez' book, Medinaceli was not to interfere but to content himself with protecting the person of the General.⁵

Gonzalez was but little satisfied with this decree. What he had hoped for from Madrid was a private letter to the Pope expressing the wish that Innocent XII. should reserve to himself any decision in the matter. The General's secretary, Estrix, was made to draw up a formal apology for him which

¹ Gonzalez to Sarmiento, February 28, March 28, June 20, 1693, in ASTRÁIN, VI., 263 *seq.*

² Sarmiento's replies, *ibid.*, 264 *seqq.*

³ April 26, 1693, *ibid.*, 267 *seq.*

⁴ Also of April 26, 1693, *ibid.*, 269 *seq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 272. The rumour of the removal of the General was spread by Dutch newspapers; it was also spread by other means in 1693, though according to Astráin (VI., 271) "sin niungun fundamento en la realidad".

was then laid before the Pope.¹ The royal decree nevertheless meant an initial triumph for Gonzalez, and in October it was followed by a second. In his opinion the instigator of every step taken by the Assistants was the Jesuit Juan de Caneda. Accordingly both Cardinal Aguirre and Medinaceli requested the King to order his removal from Rome. Medinaceli thereupon commanded Caneda to leave the Eternal City. Thus, because of a book, Spain interfered with the Pope's sovereign rights! The affair caused a great sensation. Already previously to this, Innocent XII. had strongly resented an order of the Spanish Government to the effect that the elections of the Procurators should be watched. After this new encroachment, through Caneda's banishment, he sent for the Spanish ambassador and took him to task for this measure. In a letter dated August 2nd he instructed the Spanish nuncio to restrain the court of Madrid from further encroachments and to find out whether it would not be possible to remove Gonzalez from Rome by giving him an episcopal see somewhere in Spain. However, there was no vacant see anywhere except that of Salsona and for this there could be no question of Gonzalez, seeing that he was not an Aragonese.² Like the Pope, the Jesuits of Madrid intervened at court on behalf of Caneda. Seven of their number presented a memorial to the King in defence of the Assistants, a step for which they drew on themselves a sharp rebuke from Gonzalez.³ Not only the Jesuits of Madrid, but the Assistants of the General also did all they could in Rome to procure Caneda's recall, but all in vain. On this point also Gonzalez triumphed.

Yet a third victory, the most important of all, was reserved to Gonzalez. In June 1693, the Pope allowed him to print a new book of his against probabilism, provided the report of the censors proved favourable. Thus the prohibition to print the book before the meeting of the Congregation of Procurators was apparently raised. Gonzalez had previously taken some

¹ ASTRAIN, VI., 274.

² *Ibid.*, 279 *seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 281-299.

steps in this sense. He had sent a short summary of the new edition on which he was keen, to various Provinces of the Order and he spoke about it to the Cardinals to whom he explained the situation in his own way. Thereupon Cardinals Cibo and Laurea appealed to the Pope on his behalf, though in vain: they were no match for Segneri. Bernini, an assessor of the Inquisition, was more successful. At a sitting of the Holy Office the latter expressed his fear that the Inquisition, which was overburdened as it was, would also be saddled with Gonzalez' affair. It was accordingly decided to present a memorial to the Pope and Bernini spoke to him in support of it in presence of Cardinal Spada who had been completely won over by Gonzalez, specially after the latter's insistence on the fact that Innocent XI. had been greatly in favour of the strict views. On this occasion also Innocent XII. would not at first hear of Gonzalez' new book being published, but ended by yielding. From the ten theologians named by Gonzalez and the eight designated by the Assistants the Pope chose as censors the Spaniard Carreño whom both parties favoured, the German Zingnis named by Gonzalez and the Frenchman Semery whom he had not designated.¹ We only know the judgment of the German censor; he criticized a great number of details which were cut out when the book came to be printed. The three censors raised no difficulty against the book as a whole and they allowed it to appear under the name of its author which, as a matter of fact, it would have been impossible to keep secret. Lastly the Master of the Palace had the work examined by two non-Jesuit censors, a Carmelite and a Cistercian, who showed greater severity than the author's brothers in religion, striking out much and expressing themselves unfavourably on it.²

The Assistants were of opinion that the permission to have the book examined did not authorize him to have it printed previous to the meeting of the Congregation of Procurators. In a memorial they expressed an earnest wish that the work

¹ *Ibid.*, 316-321.

² DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, I., 202 *seqq.*

should appear under the name of some other Jesuit, for otherwise Gonzalez would feel bound to reply in person to his critics,¹ thus once more taking up much time that should be devoted to the government of the Order.

One month after Innocent XII.'s permission to print the book Gonzalez was to enjoy yet another triumph. On looking through the papers which had passed through his hands as Secretary of State, Cardinal Cibo came across a letter of Gonzalez mentioning the fact that the Inquisition was dealing with his affair. Cibo had a search made at the Holy Office with the result that the authentic decree of June 26th, 1680, on probabilism was found. This decree allowed the Jesuits to write on the stricter moral system though they were not forbidden to defend probabilism. The decree had fallen into complete oblivion.² Gonzalez now had it dispatched to all the Provinces of the Order.³

Whilst the much examined book was going through the press, the Congregation of Procurators met in November 1693. What was thought in Rome became manifest already at the beginning of April 1693, on the occasion of the election of a Procurator for the Roman Province: out of forty-two electors, thirty-three gave their votes to Segneri, the opponent of the General, whilst thirty-four gave it as their opinion that a General Congregation was necessary.⁴ The Province of Naples arrived at a similar decision. Elsewhere, on the other hand, opinion was mostly against the convocation of a General Congregation.⁵ Gonzalez, who was particularly anxious that there should be no such assembly, pointed out in a circular to the Provincials⁶ that a meeting of this kind was due in any case in 1696 since, according to a disposition of Innocent X., the General Congregation must be convened every ninth

¹ *Ibid.*, 205 *seqq.*

² ASTRÁIN, VI., 321 *seq.*

³ DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, I., 198.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 213.

⁶ "Synopsis enarrationis magis amplae," in EUS. ERANISTE, VI., App., pp. xxvi-lxiii, xlix *seq.* Cf. ASTRÁIN, VI., 301 *seqq.*

year, hence there was no object in convoking it at once, and in existing circumstances the summoning of the Congregation would be considered as an admission of laxism by the Order. On the other hand, in a memorial to the Procurators,¹ the Assistants stressed the fact that the necessity of holding the proposed assembly was obvious. Internal dissensions, scandal without, characterized the situation of the Order; only a General Congregation could apply a remedy to such a state of affairs; the attempt to circumscribe its freedom by means of royal letters, etc., only made its convocation still more necessary as the dispute between the General and the Assistants could not be settled in any other way. Of Gonzalez as a ruler the memorial draws a by no means flattering picture: he lacked prudence and experience in the business of government, was rash, obstinate, violent and bestowed on his books the affection he owed to his subjects.

In November the twenty-six Procurators of the Provinces together with the five Assistants and the General who personally disposed of two votes, met in the Congregation of the Procurators. At the voting of November 19th, seventeen out of the thirty-three votes were cast in favour of a General Congregation, sixteen being cast against it.²

At first none of those assembled had any doubt that the convocation of the General Congregation had thus been validly decided since for a valid resolution only a relative majority was required, viz. one vote above half the votes cast. However, on the very evening of that day the Secretary Estrix discovered that the seventeen votes of the majority did not constitute one vote above one half since the half of thirty-three is sixteen and a half, so that seventeen votes only represented half a vote beyond one half. At first no importance was attached

¹ In DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, II., 131-7.

² Extract from the minutes of the Congregation in ASTRÁIN, VI., 306. Some nunciature reports from Vienna, published by A. KOCH, in *Theol. Quartalschr.*, LXXXVII. (1905), 95-111, show that the Emperor was dissatisfied with the procurators' decision on the ground that it would injure the prestige of the Order, hence that of religion also.

to the discovery.¹ Only after a few days, when many of the Procurators had left for their respective Provinces, Estrix once more expounded his scruple, with Gonzalez' approval. The validity of the Procurators' decision, he said, was at the very least doubtful, but the decision of such a doubt belonged to him as General. There now began a controversy which lasted six months.² The defenders of the decision based themselves on the fact that both Gonzalez himself and the Congregation had held it to be valid,³ and when it was registered and sealed the minority had given its tacit consent. If in virtue of his moral principles the General felt justified in opposing the decision, that fact threw an ominous light on those principles and showed that, despite every appearance of strictness, they brought an element of arbitrariness into moral decisions, thereby opening the door to laxism.⁴

Innocent XII., who had been informed of these difficulties on November 30th, 1693, ordered, on June 16th, 1694, that the case should be closely examined by a commission of five Cardinals.⁵ A week later Gonzalez represented to the Pope that papal Bulls empowered the General to solve difficulties concerning the Constitutions of his Order. However, Innocent XII. refused to listen to him on the ground that in the present instance the General was a party to the dispute and had dragged the secular princes into the affair.⁶ Gonzalez felt that he must solve the difficulty at least as a private theologian, if not as General. The Assistants endeavoured to dissuade him, but in spite of their opposition he expounded his views on the question in a memorial of twenty-one pages in-folio.⁷ It became necessary to defer the decision of the Cardinals for

¹ ASTRÁIN, I., 307.

² DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, I., 228 *seq.*

³ Thus SEGNERI, *ibid.*, II., 308 *seq.* Cf. BRUNACCI'S Memorial, *ibid.*, 141-8.

⁴ BRUNACCI, *ibid.*, 147; LA CHAIZE, *ibid.*, I., 229.

⁵ Panciatici, Albani, Spada, Carpegna, Marescotti. BRUNACCI, *loc. cit.*, 142, n. 6.

⁶ ASTRÁIN, VI., 310 *seq.*

⁷ *Ibid.*, 311-313.

about a week, perhaps because Gonzalez had not completed his memorial. At last on August 3rd, 1694, they decided by a majority of one, that the validity of the Procurators' decision was not proven so that the General Congregation was not to be convened¹: Gonzalez had triumphed.

Segneri writes that Innocent XII. told him that he had refrained from opposing the Cardinals' decision out of consideration for the courts of Madrid and Vienna.² As a matter of fact in December 1693, the Emperor Leopold informed the Vienna nuncio of his displeasure with the resolution of the Congregation of Procurators which brought to light, to the great joy of the Protestants, the dissensions within the Society of Jesus. It was rumoured that the King of Spain would forbid his subjects to attend the General Congregation and suggest to the Emperor to issue a similar prohibition. Now if the King of France, it was said, also refused to allow the Jesuits to go to the General Congregation, there would be a schism in the Order, its strong constitution, which rested on the monarchial power of the General, would be loosened and the damage done would be irreparable in time to come.³

Meanwhile, in February 1694, though much mutilated by the censors, Gonzalez' book appeared in print.⁴ In October of the previous year, shortly before the Congregation of the Procurators, the longed-for hour had struck for him when he was able to hand over the manuscript to the printers. The book created an enormous sensation; within one year twelve editions were published.⁵ However, this success was due to curiosity, not to the intrinsic value of the work, as is shown by the fact that after the first year up to the 19th century, it was never reprinted. Refutations appeared very

¹ *Ibid.*, 313 *seqq.*; *Synopsis actorum*, II., 418.

² DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, I., 231.

³ Jesuit's letter of December 19, 1693, *ibid.*, II., 120 *seq.*

⁴ "Fundamentum theologiae moralis, id est tractatus de recto usu opinionum probabilium etc.," analysis and critique in ASTRÁIN, VI., 323-334.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 322 *seq.*

quickly, one being from the pen of Segneri, but these only circulated in manuscript. The German Christoph Rassler, the father of equiprobabilism, wrote a detailed refutation to which, however, the Jesuit censors in Rome refused their *imprimatur*; only after Gonzalez' death, in 1713, was Rassler able to expound his views.¹

The year 1696 was now approaching when, by the terms of a decree of Innocent X., the General Congregation had to be held. As was to be expected, the assemblies at which the delegates for the General Congregation were elected, gave directions to their representatives concerning the General's right to publish books on his own authority and the irregularities caused within recent years by appeals to secular princes. The General Congregation was likewise requested to forbid for a time the publication of all writings for or against the General's opinions on questions of Moral Theology.² When the delegates presented themselves before the Pope they were earnestly exhorted to preserve peace and concord.³ The Congregation complied with this wish and agreed to the proposal to exclude from their deliberations the previous painful incidents and to consign them to oblivion.⁴ For the same reason no notice was taken of the request of the Assistants that the accusations made against them should be looked into.⁵ By the terms of the decree of Innocent X. each General Congregation was bound to choose new Assistants, so the old ones left the field without having been justified.

It was, of course, necessary to decide the question whether the Congregation of Procurators could decree the holding of a General Congregation by a simple majority of votes. It was accordingly decreed that for such a decision a majority of three would be required. Another decree touches on the burning question of probabilism. It declares that the Society

¹ *Ibid.*, 335-9.

² *Ibid.*, 342 *seqq.*; DÖLLINGER-REUSCH, II., 201 *seqq.*, 205 *seq.*, 207.

³ "Recedant vetera, nova sint omnia," he said, quoting a well-known hymn, ASTRÁIN, VI., 345.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 348 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 346 *seq.*

of Jesus abhorred doctrinal innovations, especially in the sphere of morals. A list of lax opinions was to be drawn up, but before being finally approved, it was to be submitted for examination to the various Provinces. The latter resolution was never carried into effect, probably because the work had already been done by Alexander VII. and Innocent XI. when these Popes condemned certain propositions.

Gonzalez stuck to his opinions until his death which occurred in 1705. In the very last years of his life he wrote yet another book against probabilism which he requested his Assistants to publish after his death. In a memorial of 1702¹ he sought to influence the new Pope, Clement XI., in favour of his opinions. Little did he suspect that by this time the man destined to deal probabiliorism its death blow, viz. Alphonsus Liguori, was already born.

During the period between the death of Innocent XII. and the election of his successor, a fresh offensive against probabilism occurred in France. In 1682 Bossuet had not succeeded in carrying into effect his plan for the condemnation by the Assembly of the French Clergy not only of a series of lax moral theses, but of probabilism itself.² At the Assembly of 1700, encouraged, perhaps by Gonzalez' book, he took up his plan once more. In a memorial to the King he explained that the French Church was threatened by two opposite evils, viz. by Jansenism which was once more raising its head, and by a lax Moral Theology, hence, together with Maurice Le Tellier, Archbishop of Rheims, and Noailles, Archbishop of Paris, he prayed the King to allow the Assembly of the Clergy to make a stand against both these tendencies.³

¹ " Libellus suplex oblatuſ SS. D. N. Clementi XI. pro incoluinitate Societatis Jeſu," in EUS. ERANISTE, V., App., p. lxxiv-lxxvii.

² One list contained 140 propositions to be condemned by the Assembly of 1682 (BOSSUET, *Œuvres*, ed. Lebel, Paris, 1845, IV., 537 *seqq.*). The second part of the decree (*ibid.*, 550-574) was to oppose the true to the false teaching; it includes ch. II: " De regula morum et probabilitate."

³ BAUSSET-FEDER, II., 2; A. M. P. INGOLD, *Bossuet et le Jansénisme*, Paris, 1897, 29-34.

That Jansenism was preparing for a fresh onslaught became soon evident under the government of the new Pope. It was otherwise with probabilism. The Jesuit Daniel was the only man who, within the preceding decade, had dared to publish in France a few writings in its support and even he confessed that within the last thirty years a complete revulsion had taken place in theological teaching and that the fundamental principle of probabilism, which at one time had been universally accepted, was now being violently combatted.¹ It is true that the manuals of Moral Theology of a previous epoch were still in use and new editions of them were still being published abroad and even in France.² Moreover the principles of a rigorist morality proved impossible of application in actual life and in the cure of souls. Cardinal Le Camus, a friend of the Jansenists and, consequently, of rigorism too, admitted that he would need two or three hundred years to get round his diocese if he wished to administer the Sacraments of Penance and Confirmation in accordance with the principles of Arnauld and the Jansenists. These gentlemen demanded that a penitent should be tried for a whole year before giving him absolution. This might perhaps be done by a priest who had but two or three penitents, but the thing was out of the question for a whole diocese.³ This explains how it was that Bossuet, notwithstanding the fact that probabilism was on the decline, could write in 1682⁴ that, despite all the steps taken by Alexander VII. and Innocent XI., next to nothing would be done if probabilism was allowed as much as to breathe, for in that case it would soon regain the upper hand. Accordingly Bossuet thought the moment had come for dealing the hated teaching the heavy blow so long planned. He drew up another list of 127 propositions for which he meant to obtain

¹ DEGERT, 444.

² BUSENBAUM'S *Medulla theologiae moralis*, for instance, between 1659-1690, came out in at least 13 editions at Lyons, one in Paris, in 1669, one at Besançon in 1673, and one at Toulouse in 1700. SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque*, II., 445 *seqq.*

³ DEGERT, 453.

⁴ To Dirois, July 13, 1682, *Correspondance*, II., 314.

solemn condemnation by an Assembly of the French clergy.¹ The first four of these propositions were not concerned with an attack on a lax moral teaching, but with Jansenism. They condemned the oft-stated opinion that Jansenism had no real existence, that it was a mere phantom, a figment of the imagination. This was followed by the rejection of two theses on grace. The remaining propositions were meant to brand certain blameworthy moral doctrines. Most of these had already been condemned by the Popes. On the whole the decree as planned was merely a collection of condemnations pronounced by Alexander VII. and Innocent XI. now arranged in categories. A fresh condemnation was nevertheless deemed necessary for, in the Gallican view, papal judgments only became intangible through the assent of the Bishops. Lastly, after the 127 propositions, there followed a condemnation, by the Assembly, of the fundamental principle of probabilism itself.² The catalogue of condemned propositions was followed by some further explanations which dealt once more in detail with probabilism.³ The whole concluded with an address by the Assembly to the whole of the clergy, warning it of the dangers of the dreaded doctrine.⁴ With a view to obtaining the King's leave for the discussions, Bossuet added to his memorial to the King a few drastic samples of lax teaching. Thereupon Louis XIV. gave the Bishop leave to take action against it in the Assembly of the Clergy.⁵

The Assembly of 1700 was only one of the so-called "Small" Assemblies. It consisted of sixteen Bishops and of as many simple priests, and on Bossuet's own admission, the latter

¹ List of the propositions: *Censura ac declaratio conventus generalis cleri gallicani* in BOSSUET, *Œuvres*, IV., 588-608.

² Quietism was also touched upon at the Assembly (Fénelon to Cardinal Gabrielli, September 22, 1700, *Œuvres*, X., 46-8). The Assembly refrained from dealing with Sfondrati's affair on the ground that it was Rome's concern; thus the preliminary address to the Bishops (*ibid.*).

³ DEGERT, 399-403.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 404-8.

⁵ BAUSSET-FEDER, II., 3 *seq.*

were among the least learned of the clergy.¹ For all that Bossuet got his way only with difficulty. The Archbishop of Auch, Anne de la Baume de Suze, deemed it both useless and dangerous to revive old quarrels and in this he had the support of six Bishops. The condemnation of the 127 propositions, the additional explanations and the warning to the clergy were only passed by a majority of two or three votes.²

The influence of the Assembly of 1700 was nevertheless enormous. The chief opponent of probabilism in the eighteenth century, the Dominican Concina, describes it as one of the best attended and most solemn national councils ever held in France,³ and he styles its members "most learned" and "most holy" Fathers. A Theatine who had intended to defend probabilism, changed his mind when he heard of the decision of 1700. The Jesuit whose counsel had guided Bossuet's opponent in the Assembly, the Archbishop of Auch, also no longer dared to propound his opinions. Even the French Jesuits no longer dared openly to advocate probabilism; their most celebrated moralist in the eighteenth century, Antoine, whose textbook maintained itself from 1726 for a period of forty years and which under Benedict XIV. became the manual at Propaganda, combats it expressly. The same is true of the other Orders and Congregations up to the nineteenth century.⁴

At the Assembly of 1700 Bossuet had repeatedly referred to Tirso Gonzalez,⁵ hence it was the latter's influence that had encouraged him to act as he did.

(3.)

In the story of the Catholic reform movement, Innocent XII.'s name will always be mentioned with honour by reason of the radical measures taken by him against nepotism.

¹ DEGERT, 445.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*, 446.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 446-452.

⁵ BOSSUET, *Œuvres*, VII., 341, 350.

Seemingly abolished by Innocent XI., the old evil revived again under Alexander VIII. Innocent XII. resolved to root it up finally.

Already in the conclave of 1691 there was question of demanding the restriction of nepotism by means of a papal Constitution.¹ The new Pope took up the matter seriously. Exhaustive consultations by theologians and jurists were held; these established the fact that Paul V.'s nephews had received 260,000 scudi, those of Urban VIII. 1,700,000, those of Innocent X. 1,400,000, those of Alexander VII. 900,000, those of Clement X. 1,200,000 and those of Alexander VIII. 700,000 scudi, from the Apostolic Camera alone, to which must be added the revenues of the *Dataria* and the income derived from various vacant offices.² Innocent XII. insisted on counter-measures being taken. About the middle of June 1692, it was reported that a first draft of a Bull for the abolition of nepotism had been communicated to the Cardinals and that several of them had expressed their opposition to it.³ The Bull was from the pen of Cardinal Albani,⁴ but Cardinal Panciatici and the Subdatarius Sagripanti had also concurred in the drafting. Sagripanti dealt with the Cardinals opposed to the measure, especially with Altieri and Ottoboni.⁵ Innocent overcame all opposition and in the end all the Cardinals subscribed to the Bull which bore the date of June 22nd, 1692.

¹ “*Discorso del card. Franzone,” MS. bought by me in Rome in 1908. From this it appears that Innocent XI.'s drafts for a Constitution against nepotism were preserved by Card. Albani: “Le di cui minute mandò prae manibus de’ ssri. cardinali et sono tuttavìa appresso del sigr. cardinale Albani.” They were in his possession because he was their principal author; see below, n. 4.

² *Note in French, undated, in the Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

³ **Avviso Marescotti*, June 14, 1692, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele; Contarini's dispatches in BROSCH, I., 452.

⁴ LAFITAU, *Vie de Clément XI.*, Vol. I., 35.

⁵ **Avviso Marescotti*, June 21, 1692, *loc. cit.* Cf. Liechtenstein's *report of June 14, 1692, *loc. cit.*

It forbade the Popes to enrich their relatives in any way, whatsoever with the goods of the Church. Necessitous relatives were to be treated like any other poor. A number of offices and titles, such as those of a *Gonfaloniere* and Captain-General of the Church, which until then had mostly fallen to the nephews, together with large incomes, were suppressed and their revival forbidden; only in a case of necessity were they to be entrusted to able and deserving men, regardless of the relatives, but with moderate revenues. If, by reason of his qualities, a relative of the Pope was raised to the purple, his revenues must not exceed 12,000 scudi. The Bull was to be sworn to in every conclave by all the Cardinals and by the Pope himself.¹

This step of the Pope was received with the utmost satisfaction not only in Rome² but throughout the whole Catholic world. It made a lasting impression even on many Protestants.³ The Bull of June 22nd, 1692, proved so effective that it may be said that thereafter nepotism was only a memory.⁴

This great reforming measure of Innocent XII. was accompanied by various efforts for the betterment of the clergy, both secular and regular. In this the Pope, in the words of Orazio d'Elce, displayed the zeal of an Elias.⁵ In the very first days of his pontificate he undertook the reform of the Penitenziaria⁶ and the Dataria.⁷ This was followed by a visitation of the clergy of Rome which began on January 11th,

¹ *Bull.*, XX., 440 *seq.*

² **Avviso Marescotti*, July 5, 1692, *loc. cit.*

³ BERNINO, *Eresie*, I., 433, 501; NOVAES, XI., 114; *Civ. Catt.*, 7 series, II. (1886), 400 *seqq.*; REUMONT, III., 2, 640. The statement that the Protestants had raised a statue in the Pope's honour at Wittenberg, is a fable.

⁴ DÖLLINGER, *Kirchengesch.*, 529; *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, IX., 2, 142; I. MÜLLER, *Nepotismus theologice expensus, quando nepotismus sub Innocentio XII. abolitus fuit* (sine loco), 1692.

⁵ D'ELCE, **Relatione*, Convent Library, Einsiedeln.

⁶ *Bull.*, XX., 450.

⁷ **Avviso Marescotti*, November 29, 1692, *loc. cit.*

1693, and was relentlessly carried out by the strict Oratorian Cardinal Colloredo.¹ The priests of Rome were not only commanded to wear the cassock, they were also forbidden to wear a wig.² This measure, perhaps a somewhat petty one, provoked the sarcastic remark that the Pope was beginning the reform of the Church not in the members only but in the head also. Some of the other measures were exceedingly salutary ones: thus the Roman Canons were subjected to the duty of residence³ and all the priests of the Eternal City were commanded to make the spiritual exercises twice a year.⁴ Innocent XII. accordingly favoured the priests of the Mission founded by St. Vincent de Paul, in whose Roman houses near the Curia Innocenziana all candidates for Holy Orders in Rome were obliged to prepare themselves for ordination by a retreat of ten days by the terms of an ordinance of Alexander VII.⁵ A Constitution of September 22nd, 1695, forbade all previous conventions in the collation of bishoprics and monasteries.⁶ This ordinance hit in particular the election capitulations which were customary in Germany, though it failed to do away with them altogether.⁷ To promote the veneration of the Most Holy Eucharist, the Pope introduced in Rome a particularly solemn manner of accompanying it, as he had done as Archbishop of Naples.⁸ Inclined as he was

¹ *Bull.*, XX., 494 *seq.*, 497, 501, 502, 503, 507, 509. Cf. **Cod.*, I., 52 and 59, in *Bibl. Vallicelliana*, Rome. In this visitation the Pope was guided by the example of Clement VIII., whom he regarded as the greatest Pope; see Liechtenstein's *report of October 11, 1692, *loc. cit.* He announced the visitation at the consistory of October 6, 1692. **Acta consist.*, Vat. Lib.

² **Avvisi Marescotti*, November 24, 1692, and December 12, 1693, *Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele*, *Diario*, IX., 83.

³ *Ibid.*, 59.

⁴ *Ibid.*, XI., 101.

⁵ PLATNER, III., 3, 334 *seq.*; FORCELLA, XII., 69.

⁶ *Bull.*, XX., 716.

⁷ L. BRUGGAIER, *Die Wahlkapitulationen der Bischöfe und Reichsfürsten von Eichstätt 1259-1790*, Freiburg, 1915.

⁸ *Diario*, ed. CAMPELLO, IX., 85, 187; NOVAES, XI., 161. Cf. GIUSEPPE SOLIMENO (di Trani), *Il triennio dell'istoria eucaristica, cioè quanto in Roma et altrove si è operato dal 1695 fin la*

by nature to peace and compromise, he did his best to avoid politico-ecclesiastical conflicts with the princes, or to compose them where they arose,¹ but when there was question of the welfare of souls, as for instance in the appointment of Bishops, he had no thought of yielding.²

With a view to furthering the preaching of the word of God Innocent XII., in 1691, named the Jesuit Paul Segneri preacher of the Apostolic Palace.³ During twenty-seven years Segneri had achieved wonderful triumphs as a popular preacher over a large part of the Italian peninsula.⁴ When this devoted priest, whose Lenten sermons have made him a classic of Italian pulpit eloquence, died on December 9th, 1694, the Pope's grief was great. Segneri was succeeded as palace preacher by the Jesuit Valle who was himself replaced in 1698 by the Capuchin Casini.⁵

The reform of the Orders also greatly preoccupied the Pope. To this end a special Congregation was set up in November,

1698 d'accrescimento alla venerazione più divota e più solenne del ss. Viatico, Roma, 1699. NOVAES gives the ordinances concerning the cult of the Saints (XI., III seq., 125 seqq., 131 seq., 146 seq., 155 seqq., 173).

¹ D'ELCE, **Relatione*, Einsiedeln.

² Cf. the grounds given for a refusal in the case of a cousin of the Queen of Spain in **Cifra al Nunzio di Spagna*, March 23, 1698, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 170, p. 227 seq., Papal Sec. Arch.

³ *Diario*, VIII., 197.

⁴ G. MASSEI, *Vita di P. Segneri*, Foligno, 1702; SACCANI, *La missione del P. Paolo Segneri, in Cadelbosco Sopra nel 1676*, Reggio (Emilia), 1891; REUMONT, *Toscana*, I., 447; A. TONONI, *Missioni del p. P. Segneri nei ducati di Piacenza e Parma*, Firenze, 1895; CASOLI, in *Brixia Sacra*, I., (1910/11); *Civ. Catt.*, 1902, I., 142 seq.; BAUMGARTNER, *Wellliteratur*, VI., 485 seq.; BULGARELLI, *P. Segneri e la diocesi di Modigliana*, Saluzzo, 1908; S. VENTI, *Le condizioni dell'oratoria sacra nel Seicento*, Milano-Roma-Napoli, 1916. Segneri's influence was also felt in Germany; cf. SCHÜLLER, *Die Entwicklung der Volksmissionen in Hist.-polit. Blätter*, CLXXI. (1923), 324.

⁵ *Diario*, ed. CAMPELLO, VIII., 198, IX., 63, XII., 390, XIV., 180.

1694.¹ In December new decrees were issued concerning the noviciate.² In some Orders the Pope's efforts to restore the observance, met with strong opposition. As the Religious claimed that they had not bound themselves to observe the primitive Rule, but the Rule as observed at the time of their entrance, the Pope saw himself compelled to desist from his plan. But he ordered that in future only such candidates should be admitted, as were prepared to bind themselves to observe the reforms prescribed for the Order in question. But this also gave rise to great difficulties so that Fabroni, to whom the Pope had entrusted this matter, designated for the noviciate special monasteries in which the Rule had to be observed in its primitive strictness.³

Innocent XII. put off for a considerable time the nomination of new Cardinals⁴; his first promotion only took place on December 12th, 1695.⁵ It met with general satisfaction in Rome.⁶ Only one of the new Cardinals owed his elevation to

¹ **Cod. ital.*, 190, p. 250, Staatsbibl., Munich. Cf. *Diario*, X., 191, 198; *Catalogo de' libri e MSS. del Pr. Pignatelli*, 27.

² *Biglietto d. segr. dei memoriali nel *Cod. ital.*, 190, p. 232 *seqq.*, *loc. cit.*

³ NOVAES, XI., 130. *Ibid.*, 121 *seqq.*, on the confirmation of rules of Orders and Institutes by Innocent XII. Cf. also EBNER, J. G. *Seidenbusch*, Cologne, 1891, 55 *seqq.*

⁴ According to Noris the Pope hesitated as he did not want to name Noailles (*Studi e docum.*, XI., 327). The **Avviso Marescotti* of December 31, 1695 (Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele) reports: "Il debolissimo numero di solo sette porporati rimasto alle funzioni della notte natalitia del 1694 ha dato motivo quest'anno al Pontefice, a fare la nuova promotione avanti questo Natale, per non havere a rimanere scandalizzato come nell'antecedente." Card. Este had laid aside the purple on March 21, 1695, in order that he might continue his family; see **Acta consist.*, Vat. Lib.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.* Cf. GUARNACCI, I., 405 *seqq.* (with portraits); NOVAES, XI., 138 *seqq.* Numerous details on the newly appointed are in "Relatione d'Elce" (*supra*, p. 582, n. 5), and in "Vita critica de' cardinali", etc., Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

⁶ **Avviso Marescotti* of December 24, 1695, and *Diario*, X.,

princely recommendation, namely Henri de la Grange, Sobieski's father-in-law. Three others had distinguished themselves in diplomacy, viz. the Bolognese Sebastiano Antonio Tanara, internuncio at Brussels from 1685 to 1687, then nuncio at Cologne (1687-1690), at Lisbon (1690-2) and since 1692 at the imperial court of Vienna¹; Giovanni Cavallerini had been nuncio in Paris since 1692 and the Milanese Federigo Caccia at Madrid since 1693.² Then came the Archbishop of Bologne, Jacopo Boncompagni,³ and the ascetical Bishop of Fano, Taddeo Luigi del Verme.⁴

The Pope's old friend, the Dominican Tommaso Maria Ferrari,⁵ the Governor of Rome Giambattista Spinola and the Subdatarius Sagripanti had long been in personal relations with the Pontiff. Learning distinguished the Veronese Enrico Noris, an Augustinian, librarian of the Vaticana since 1692,⁶

206. A *hymn on the promotion by Don Palidio pedagogo Clabro, in *Ottob.* 3179, n. 35, Vat. Lib.

¹ KARTTUNEN, 263.

² *Ibid.*, 263, 238. Cf: *Relazione della morte del card. Cavallerini accaduta in Roma l'anno 1699, del Padre P. Andrea Borelli Barnabita," in *Cod.* F. 34 of Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

³ There is rich material for his life in Boncompagni Arch.: **Cod.* E. 110-119: "Lettere scritte al G. Boncompagni; E 12 and 112: Mem. della legazione alla regina sposa del Re de' Romani, 1699; M. 13: Orat. et carmina in laudem I. Boncompagni."

⁴ "Esemplare degli ecclesiastici" the **Vita critica* styles him; Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

⁵ D. CONCHINA, *Vita Th. M. Ferrarii O.P. card.*, Romae, 1755.

⁶ The works of E. Noris (*ob.* February 22, 1704) were published by the Brothers Ballerini, in 4 vols., at Verona, 1729-1733; a fifth volume (Mantua, 1741) contains 204 letters. On the *letters in the Bibl. Angelica, cf. PÉLISSIER, in *Studi e docum.*, XI., 35 *seqq.*, 253 *seqq.*; NARDUCCI, *Cat. bibl. Angel.*, 390 *seqq.* Cf. *ibid.*, *passim*, other writings of Noris from which LÄMMER (*Zur Kirchengesch.*, 96 *seq.*, and *Melet.*, 422 *seqq.*) gave extracts. For Noris' life and writings, see *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, IX.², 497 *seqq.*; HURTER, II.², 827 *seqq.*; *N. Arch. Veneto*, VII. (1904), 126 *seqq.*; JEMOLO, 137-141; PELISSIER, *Le card. H. de Noris et sa correspondance*,

and the learned and devout Benedictine Celestine Sfondrati, a scion of a noble family of Milan, since 1687 Abbot of St. Gall, a prominent literary protagonist of the rights of the Holy See and of Catholic teaching as against the Gallicans and the Jansenists.¹ The auditor of the Rota, Dominico Tarugi, was an able jurist.

At the first promotion two Cardinals were retained *in petto*, at the second, that of July 22nd, 1697, one other such reservation was made.² All those named at the second creation owed the purple to princely recommendation, with the result that nearly every nation got its Cardinal: Portugal, the Archbishop of Lisbon, Louis de Sousa; Venice, Giorgio Cornaro, since 1692 nuncio in Portugal; France, Pierre Armand de Cambout de Coislin, Bishop of Orleans; Spain, the Toledo Canon Alfonso Aguilar de Córdoba, and the Emperor the Venetian Vincenzo Grimani who had rendered him valuable services during the negotiations with Savoy.³

Rome, 1890; *Giorn. stor. d. lett. ital.*, XLIII., 184. A magnificent marble bust of the Card. is at S. Agostino, Rome. In the “*Vita critica de’ cardinali del a. 1696” Noris is thus characterized: “è discreto, allegro, molto faceto, huomo da conversazione, tutto alieno da scrupoli,” which he proved by opposing the demolition of the theatre of Tor di Nona. “*Minchiona li cardinali Colloredo e Ferrari come a lui ex diametro antipatici di genio” (*ibid.*).

¹ On C. Sfondrati (born 1644, *ob.* September 4, 1696), *cf.* *Freib. Kirchenlex.*, XI.², 235 *seq.*; *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, XXXIV., 120 *seqq.*; HURTER, II.², 378 *seqq.*, 509, 593; J. V. ARX, *Gesch. von St. Gallen*, III., 207 *seqq.*; EGGER, *Jubiläums-Erinnerungen an Kard. Sfondrato*, St. Gallen, 1896; A. SCHEIWILER, in *Monatsrosen des Schweizer Studentenvereins*, 1890, 402 *seqq.*, 441 *seqq.*, 521 *seqq.*, 577 *seqq.*, and in *Schweiz. Rundschau*, XXI. (1921), No. 3. Dr. Scheiwiler is at work on a large biography of Sfondrato whose diary and correspondence (11 vols.) are preserved in the Monastery Archives of St. Gallen.

² **Acta consist. Vat. Lib.*

³ *Ibid.*, where we read that even before Card. Bouillon had ended his “*votum*”, the Pope pronounced the creation, in consequence of which all the other Cardinals refrained from a

As Grimani had accepted the red hat without leave of the Venetian Government, he was deprived both of his title of nobility and his property ; only after the peace of Karlowitz (January 26th, 1699) did the Emperor succeed in getting this measure revoked.¹

One of the two reserved *in petto* in 1695, the Maestro di Camera Baldassare Cenci, was proclaimed on November 11th, 1697.² On December 19th, 1698, the Pope proclaimed the elevation of the learned Milanese Barnabite Jacopo Antonio Morigia, since 1682 Archbishop of Florence, who had also been reserved in 1695, together with that of Fabricio Paoluzzi, nuncio at Cologne from 1696 to 1698, who had been reserved in 1697.³

On November 14th, 1699, though gravely ill, the Pope proceeded to the nomination of seven new Cardinals.⁴ The purple was bestowed upon Niccolò Radolovich, Secretary of the Congregation of Bishops and Regulars and an old acquaintance of the Pope ; the Archbishop of Milan, Giuseppe Archinto, nuncio at Florence from 1686 to 1689, then at Venice till 1695 and after that in Spain⁵ ; Andrea Santa Croce, nuncio in Poland from 1690 to 1696 and after that at the imperial court of Vienna ; Marcello d'Aste, nuncio in

“votum”, “non sine admiratione, nempe contra praxim fere semper usitatam.” On those named, see GUARNACCI, I., 466 (with portraits) ; NOVAES, XI., 156 *seqq.* ; MARCHESI BUONACCORSI, 482 *seq.* (on Cornaro). With regard to Portugal, see SCHÄFER, V., 163 (in part wrong presentment).

¹ ROMANIN, IX., 502 *seq.* ; LANDAU, II., 38 *seqq.* The harshness with which Venice gave play to its Caesaro-Papalism under Innocent XII. (*cf. Arch. stor. ital.*, 3 series, II., 101, 106 *seq.* ; HOPF, in *Hist. Taschenbuch*, 1865, 101), was all the more offensive as the Pope had repeatedly assisted the Republic in its war against the Turks. GUGLIELMOTTI, *Squadra ausiliaria*, 472 *seq.*, 478 *seq.*

² **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.* GUARNACCI, I., 491 *seqq.* ; NOVAES, XI., 166 ; MARCHESI BUONACCORSI, 473 *seqq.* (on Archinto).

⁵ His activity there is much praised in the **Vita critica*.

Switzerland from 1692 till 1695¹; Daniello Marco Delfino, nuncio in France since 1696; Sperello Sperelli² since 1698 assessor of the Inquisition and, finally, the General of the Cistercians, Giambettista Gabrielli, a distinguished theologian who had defended Sfondrati's book on predestination.³

At his last creation, on June 21st, 1700, the Pope took into account the wishes of the great Catholic Powers by admitting into the Sacred College the Archbishop of Paris, Louis Antoine de Noailles, Count Philipp von Lamberg and Francis Borgia, a Canon of Toledo.⁴

(4.)

Innocent XII. bestowed much attention on the affairs of Propaganda. Whenever any difficult question had to be

¹ C. DONI, *Vita del card. M. d'Aste*, in CRESCIMBENI, *Arcadi illustri*, IV.; PANDOLFINI, *Vita del card. M. d'Aste*, Roma, 1711. *É dotto, attento, pio, giusto, caritativo, puntuale, officioso e zelante," says the **Vita critica*.

² G. VINCOLI, *Vita del card. Sperelli*, in CRESCIMBENI, *loc. cit.*, III. " *Il vero originale d'un ottimo ecclesiastico," says the **Vita critica*.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ **Acta consist.* and the *Briefs to Leopold I., Louis XIV. and Charles II., dated June 29 and 30 and July 3, 1700, *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. GUARNACCI, I., 522 *seq.*; NOVAES, XI., 172 *seq.* On L. de Noailles, see Gallia christ., VIII. and IX.; SCHILL, *Konstitution Unigenitus*, 50 *seqq.*; BARTHÉLEMY, *L. card. de Noailles d'après sa correspondance inédite*, Paris, 1888; *Études*, XLV., 287 *seqq.*; *Rev. hist.*, CXV., 34 *seqq.* For Card. Lamberg, see *Allg. Deutsche Biogr.*, XVII., 540. Ambassador Lamberg notes in his *diary on June 19, 1700: " At yesterday's audience the Venetian ambassador demanded that Venice should not be passed over at the next creation." The Pope replied that he had already created four vassals of theirs, viz. Noris, Grimani, Cornaro and Delfino, but by way of showing its gratitude the Republic had issued an edict by which the friends of the Cardinals were declared incapable of giving a vote; hence he would not increase the number of vassals until that decree was abolished.

discussed, such as, for instance, the relations of the missionaries with the Vicars Apostolic or the opposition between Portuguese and French interests in eastern Asia, he would himself preside over the meetings.¹

The Pope could look with justifiable satisfaction on the situation of the Church in Central and South America where there existed not only a firmly established hierarchy, but work for the conversion of the remaining pagans also proceeded uninterruptedly. An important event for the future was the preaching of the Gospel in California. This was the work of two gallant Jesuits, the Tyrolese Eusebio Francisco Kino and Juan Maria Salvatierra who met with the greatest obstacles on the part of the Indians but refused to be deterred by them.² No less arduous was the work of christianizing the Mojos of what is to-day Bolivia, which the Jesuits undertook from Peru. The partition of the enormously extended Jesuit Province in the regions of Nuevo Reino and Quito, resulting in the creation of two centres, Bogotá and Quito, also falls into Innocent XII.'s pontificate.³ The Jesuit missionaries on the Marañon River (Amazon) included some German Fathers.⁴ To the north of the river Fr. Antony Vieira continued his splendid apostolate in Brazilian territory up to the time of his death in 1697.⁵

The missionaries had to encounter difficulties of every kind. In Chile it was not only the obstinacy and degradation of the Indians that proved a hindrance, but likewise the ill-will of the Spanish officials. Though in the Philippines the

¹ *Diario*, IX., 84, X., 187, 188.

² ASTRÁIN, VI., 491 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 584 *seq.* It took a whole month to get to Quito from Bogotá.

⁴ Thus Heinrich Richter and Samuel Fritz; *cf.* DUHR, III., 340, n. 2; SOMMERVOGEL, III., 1003; VI., 1834; *Stimmen aus Maria Laach*, I., 208 *seq.*

⁵ On Vieira, see Vol. XXXI., p. 161, n. 5; HEIMBUCHER, II., 216; J. LUCIO DE AZEVEDO, *Cartas do Padre Antonio Vieira*, 3 vols., Coimbra, 1925/28. By the same, a Life of Vieira in 2 vols., 1918.

persecution of the Jesuits by the ill-advised Archbishop of Manila, Philip Pardo, came to an end with the latter's death in 1689, the mission suffered for a long time from the effects of that deplorable episode.¹

A whole series of Briefs to the rulers of Persia are evidence of Innocent XII.'s great concern for the Christian subjects of the Shah, more especially those in Greater Armenia, and of his desire to help them to the best of his ability.² The bearers of these letters were for the most part Capuchin missionaries. In 1698 a Discalced Carmelite took a very friendly letter of the Shah to the Pope.³ Through the Franciscans Innocent XII. sought to bring about the conversion of the Negus of Abyssinia,⁴ and he assigned to Propaganda the sum of 50,000 scudi for the missions in that country.⁵ For the Franciscans the Pope obtained Sultan Ahmed's permission for the erection of a small church in Constantinople. In his letter of thanks he explained to the Sultan, at the latter's request, the fundamental truths of the Christian religion.⁶ The Patriarch of Alexandria was exhorted not to relax his efforts on behalf of the union of the Copts.⁷ On October 7th, 1698, a section of the schismatical Rumenians of Transilvania effected its union with the Catholic Church.⁸ After a long period of persecution the Jesuits

¹ ASTRÁIN, VI., 771 seq., 783 seqq.

² See “*Regi Persarum”, June 7, 1692, January 28, 1695, January 26, 1699, in *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. *Ius pontif.*, II., 183 seqq.

³ Description of the letter in *Diario*, XIV., 180.

⁴ *Ius pontif.*, II., 191 seq. Cf. BERNINO, *Eresie*, IV., 150.

⁵ BERNINO, *ibid.*

⁶ The Sultan's letter and the Pope's reply in *Spicil. Vat.*, I., 580 seq. On Ahmed, see HAMMER, III., 847, 872.

⁷ “*Ioanni Patr. Alexandrino,” March 16, 1697, *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

⁸ See V. HORMUZAKI, *Fragmente zur Gesch. der Rumänen*, III., Bukarest, 1884. On the hopes for reunion raised by a Russian embassy to the Pope in 1698, see PIERLING, in *Civiltà Catt.*,

succeeded in 1692 in once more securing a footing in Tongking and they maintained themselves there in spite of very great difficulties. In 1696 the Pope severed Tongking from the diocese of Macao erected in 1690.¹

In the Empire of the Middle Christianity benefited much by the favourable dispositions of Emperor Kanghi to whom the Pope sent a letter of thanks on September 2nd, 1691.² In the following year the Jesuits succeeded in obtaining an imperial edict allowing the missionaries to preach the Christian faith throughout the Empire and everyone to accept it.³ Thus protected by the Emperor the Jesuits, who were admirably acquainted with the manners, laws and language of the country, worked with redoubled zeal for the spread of Christianity. Unfortunately this promising development, which Innocent XII. seconded with a gift of 100,000 scudi to Propaganda,⁴ was hampered by a recrudescence of the fatal dispute concerning the Chinese rites. It was a French missionary who fanned the flames.⁵

On March 26th, 1693, Charles Maigrot, of the Paris missionary seminary, who had been working in China since 1683 where he had become Vicar Apostolic of Fukiën, published an ordinance which he meant to serve as a guide to the missionaries of his vicariate in their attitude

1921, III., 423 *seqq.* Numerous reports on this subject in E. SCHMOURLO, *Recueil de documents relatifs au règne de l'empereur Pierre le Grand I.*, Dorpat, 1903, 321 *seqq.*

¹ HEIMBUCHER, II., 201; *Jus pontif.*, II., 162, 166.

² " *Ill. et potent. utriusque Tartariae et Sinarum Imperatori," September 2, 1691, *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ LE GOBIEN, *Hist. de l'édit de l'empereur de la Chine en faveur de la religion chrétienne*, Paris, 1698.

⁴ BERNINO, IV., 750. Cf. FORCELLA, XI., 459. In 1696 Innocent XII. cut off extensive territories from the new dioceses of Nanking and Peking; these were put under Vicars Apostolic pending the erection of more dioceses: cf. *Jus pontif.*, II., 158. Cf. JANN, 260 *seqq.*; MEJER, I., 361.

⁵ What follows is based on J. BRUCKER's account in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, II., 2372 *seqq.*, which itself rests on new documents.

towards the Chinese rites until the Holy See should have given a decision. The decree forbade the use of the names *Tien* and *Shang-ti* to designate the true God, as well as the veneration of Confucius and the ancestors. Maigrot asserted that the report on the Chinese rites at one time submitted to Alexander VII. was not in conformity with truth in several respects, hence the missionaries could not permit the veneration of Confucius and that of ancestors which the Holy See had sanctioned under certain presuppositions. On November 10th, 1693, Maigrot forwarded his ordinance to the Pope together with a short memorial on the controversy; at the same time he asked to be allowed to discuss it with the Jesuits in Rome, either personally or through delegates.¹ To this end, at the beginning of 1694, he sent two members of the Paris missionary seminary to Rome, namely De Quénemer and Nicolas Charlot. On their arrival in the Eternal City, Charlot in particular exerted himself greatly with a view to getting Maigrot's ordinance approved. On his own confession Charlot hardly knew any Chinese and had only spent two years and a half in China; for all that he felt so sure of his case that he acted with the utmost resolution, and as he was not lacking in ability, he easily secured a number of followers, though it was questionable how far the majority of these were able to understand the matter in debate.

Innocent XII. referred the disputants to the Roman Inquisition. The revival of the controversy annoyed him; accordingly, on January 15th, 1697, he directed to Maigrot who had just been named titular Bishop of Conon, a Brief in which he paid homage to the latter's apostolic zeal but likewise gave him the significant warning that there was nothing that Christ had more insistently recommended to the Apostles than the preservation of unity; hence he too should live in peace with the other Chinese missionaries.²

¹ Maigrot's *letter to Innocent XII. in *Cod. C.* 7, 26, p. 51 *seqq.*, of Bibl. Angelica, Rome.

² “ *Et quoniam Christus Dominus apostolis suis et aliis operariis evangelicis nihil studiosius commendavit aut inculcavit

The examination of Maigrot's ordinance was entrusted to a special Congregation consisting of Cardinals Casanata, Marescotti, Noris and Ferrari. For its further information the Congregation appealed to various theologians, especially to the Franciscan Giovanni Francesco de Leonessa who happened to be in Rome. This friar had laboured in China since 1684 and had become Vicar-General of the Bishop of Nanking and finally Vicar Apostolic of Hu-Kuang.

In order to arrive at a judgment on Maigrot's ordinance the Congregation summed up the points in dispute in a series of questions,¹ the examination of which was entrusted by the Pope to a commission consisting of the General of the Cistercians, Giambattista Gabrielli, the General of the Augustinians, Niccolò Serrano, the former General of the Discalced Carmelites, Filippo di S. Niccolò, and the former Commissary General of the Reformed Minorites, Carlo Francesco Varese. When Gabrielli was raised to the cardinalate on November 14th, 1699, he resigned his membership of the Congregation. Serrano unreservedly ranged himself by the side of Maigrot; Varese took the part of the Jesuits; Filippo di S. Niccolò defended the use of the names *Tien* and *Shang-Ti* to designate God, but demanded that the veneration of Confucius and the ancestors should be forbidden.²

Whilst these consultations were still in progress Charmot had communicated the questions of the Congregation to Archbishop De Noailles of Paris, whose dislike of the Jesuits was well known. Charmot pressed Noailles to bring about

diligentius, quam ut inter se unum essent et animorum et sensuum coniunctione unitatem ipsam Patris cum Filio imitarentur, enitendum maxime tibi est et quantum potes efficiendum, ut pacem cum aliis in eodem opere occupatis semper retineas ac magis magisque confirmes." *Epist. Innocentii XII.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

¹ " *Quaesita s. Congreg. s. Rom. et univ. Inquisit. proposita," in *Cod. C.* 7, 12, p. 7 *seqq.*, of Biblioteca Angelica.

² BRUCKER, *loc. cit.*, who found a *copy of the reports of the *theologi qualificatores* in *Cod. lat.*, 17610 of the National Library, Paris.

a condemnation by the Sorbonne "as a counter stroke against those of the *qualificators* who might be in favour of the Jesuits". Noailles, as a matter of fact, did obtain, on May 8th, 1700, a condemnation of the Chinese rites by a certain number of Paris Doctors. In order to give greater weight to this document, the signatories of which did not dare to give their own names, a condemnation of five propositions of the Jesuits Le Comte and Le Gobien was obtained from the entire Faculty.¹

But the decision lay not with Paris but with Rome, and Rome was not in the habit of proceeding with such haste. The difficult question concerning which the Jesuits made a direct appeal to the Pope in May 1698,² lay still in the balance at the time of Innocent XII.'s death on September 27th, 1700.

(5.)

At this time Holland could also have been described as a missionary country, though in a wider sense, and that country was the theatre just then of changes the effects of which were destined to be felt far beyond the boundaries of Holland.

It was a disaster for the Catholic Church in the seven united Provinces of Holland when, in the last years of Innocent XII., Peter Codde, a friend of the Jansenists, became its head as Vicar Apostolic and Archbishop of Sebaste. Under his government one innovation quickly succeeded another, the last being this that, contrary to the practice of the Church, the Sacraments of Baptism and Extreme Unction were administered in the vernacular tongue. But the so-called

¹ *Ibid.*, 2374 *seq.*

² " *Libellus supplex a Societate Jesu Sanctissimo [Innocentio XII. Summo Pontifici] oblatus mense Maio anni 1698 super rebus et controversiis Sinensibus, velut compendiolum grandioris voluminis Sacrae Congregationi Sancti Officii antea exhibiti." The original copy passed from the possession of Innocent XII. into the library of Card. Gentili and eventually into that of the Roman antiquary Benedetti, where I saw it in 1908. Copy in *Ottob.* 822, Vat. Lib.

Jansenist penance, which consisted in abstaining from the Holy Eucharist, was likewise introduced. Soon there were those who devoutly thanked God for not having received the Sacrament for two years and there were many who prolonged this penitential abstinence during a period of 12 to 15 years. The Sacrament of Penance was rendered exceedingly irksome and odious to the faithful by an unnecessary delay of absolution and certain liberties with the seal of confession. Pulpit orators expounded before the people the Jansenist teaching on the freedom of the will, grace and predestination, so that women and children began to talk of, and to discuss these subjects. A quantity of publications spread these same Jansenist principles. In 1690 the catechism which had been in use since 1633, was recast in places where it dealt with the primacy of the Pope, Indulgences, the veneration of the Saints, the doctrine of grace, etc. Harsh steps were taken for the purpose of spreading the Jansenist views. Many were barred from Holy Orders, deprived of their benefices, suspended from the exercise of their priestly functions, molested by inquiries or deprived of the Sacraments even on their death-bed, for the sole reason that they refused to adhere to these novelties.

In particular everything was done to rob the religious of the esteem and confidence of the people whilst refugee Jansenists such as Arnauld, Gerberon, Du Vaucel stood in high honour and were listened to by everyone.¹

Of course these things did not go unnoticed and unopposed. The imperial ambassador Campricht reported on them to Pope Alexander VIII. in 1689 and the Polish ambassador Mollo to Cardinal Barberini on December 15th, 1690.² Rome, however, adopted at first a waiting policy, especially as the internuncio in Flanders had drawn attention to the ease with which a certain party spirit might have coloured the various

* ¹ MOZZI, I., 266-275. The alterations in the catechism are put together in **Cod. Vat.* 7405, f. 584-592, Vat. Lib., and in [FONTANA], *Constitutio "Unigenitus"*, IV., 549 *seqq.*

² MOZZI, I., 276.

reports, but a Dominican who had been commissioned by the nuncio to ascertain on the quiet the true state of affairs, sent in a very pessimistic account. On September 5th the Polish ambassador wrote once more to Cardinal Barberini and complaints came from a number of religious, in particular from a certain Capuchin friar.¹

Rome's reserve even now appears from the circumstance that for further information recourse was had to the very man who shortly before had been spoken of in terms of highest praise even by the Jansenists in letters to the internuncio, the Cardinals and the Pope himself—namely Theodore de Cock. Cardinal Cibo wrote to him that reports had come in to the effect that Codde had refused to publish the condemnation of the 31 Jansenist propositions by Alexander VIII. though the Congregation had ordered him to do so; all he had done was to communicate it to a few priests, his confidants, in his own house, so as to be in a position to say that the order had been carried out. De Cock was requested to supply information as to what truth there was in the accusation that the majority of the Dutch clergy held Jansenist opinions.²

Through a misunderstanding this letter fell into the hands of Codde who thereupon conjured De Cock to defend him with Cibo. In his answer De Cock spoke as considerably as possible but admitted that Codde had merely read the 31 propositions to seven priests, by way of a joke, whilst they were at table. De Cock further reported that the majority of the priests of Holland considered Jansenism as a phantom; they condemned the five propositions but denied that they were found in Jansenism and in their view the Pope's infallibility did not extend to facts.³

Innocent XII. was far more impressed by an anonymous but more detailed memorial⁴ than by this testimony of De Cock. A Congregation of Cardinals was set up to deliberate

¹ *Ibid.*, 276–8.

² Cibo to De Cock, October 4, 1692, *ibid.*, 279 *seq.*

³ De Cock, November 14, 1692, *ibid.*, 281 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 282.

on the matter. It instructed its president, Cardinal Altieri, to seek for further information besides that of De Cock, from the nuncios of Cologne and Vienna who had both been nuncios at Brussels. However, at this time neither of them had any direct relations with the Dutch mission¹ so that only De Cock's evidence was of value. Through the imprudence of one of the Cardinals this document fell into the hands of the Jansenist Du Vaucel and thus occasioned all the hatred and persecutions which De Cock had to endure thereafter on the part of the Jansenists. Cardinal Altieri had pressed him to present a full statement on the situation and De Cock had obeyed.² Five points in particular were now discussed in detail in a special Congregation of Cardinals, namely, Codde's loose views on the seal of confession, his failure to publish the 31 propositions of Alexander VIII. as well as the Roman prohibition of Neercassel's book, the accusation that some of the more deserving and older priests were kept back solely because they had been pupils of Propaganda, and lastly the claim that only those confessions were valid which were made to one's own parish priest.³ The Cardinals of the Congregation,⁴ more particularly the reporter, Cardinal Albani, were in favour of the accused. Du Vaucel got his point, namely, that Codde need not go to Rome in person and he was commissioned to communicate to the accused the charges made against him. Codde's answers to the second, fourth and fifth accusation were considered adequate but the other points were judged to require further elucidation.⁵

¹ *Ibid.*, 284.

² *Ibid.*, 284-8.

³ *Ibid.*, 289 *seq.*

⁴ They were Altieri, Barberini, Carpineto, Casanata, Nerli, Colloredo. *Ibid.*, 288.

⁵ "Quantum ad 1 punctum: Examinetur in Congregatione S. Officii, ut praescribatur, quid servandum sit. Ad 2: Satis iustificat se. Ad 3: Melius se iustificet. Ad 4: Non est repertus culpabilis, licet ex numero alumnorum, qui testantur in favorem Dom. Vicarii, quinque vel sex parum faveant in suis responsionibus. Ad 5: Videtur sufficienter respondere." Decree of the

It was not a brilliant judgment for Codde, but it was nevertheless an acquittal precisely because it was not a condemnation. It seemed to embolden the Jansenists. They carried arrogance to such lengths that many parishes felt compelled to expel their Jansenist priests.¹ Fresh complaints on the situation reached Rome; in particular a missionary Bishop then in Holland on business connected with his vicariate, sent a report to the Pope² on the steady spread of Jansenism in that country. It was high time to take action, he wrote; later on it would be impossible to eradicate the sect. Hence a fresh examination of Codde's affair in Rome was inevitable and he himself provided a decisive occasion for such a step.

Two Jesuits, Aerts and Verbiest, in conjunction with a parish priest of the name of Van Wijck, had written a small book on the progress of Jansenism in Holland. A third Jesuit, the Frenchman Doucin, who had accompanied the French plenipotentiary, Count de Crécy, to the Hague on the occasion of the Peace of Rijswijk, translated the work into French, after which it was translated into other languages and given as wide a publicity as possible, especially in Rome.³ The publication caused an enormous sensation and called forth a number of refutations.⁴ Codde deemed it expedient to denounce the book in Rome as a slanderous libel,⁵ but if he hoped that a condemnation in his sense would follow at once, he was mistaken. The Pope charged eight Cardinals, four of Propaganda⁶ and four of the Inquisition, to examine the

Special Congregation, January 15, 1695, MOZZI, I., 292. Codde said later: "Vicarium in omnibus inculpabilem esse repertum," *ibid.*

¹ *Ibid.*, 292 *seq.*

² November 27, 1697, *ibid.*, 293 *seq.*

³ *Mémoire touchant le progrès du Jansénisme en Hollande*, Cologne, 1698. On the book, cf. H. J. ALLARD, in *Studiën*, XXXIV. (1890), 25 *seqq.*; SOMMERVOGEL, I., 61; III., 161; VIII., 586; BRUCKER, in *Dict. de théol. cath.*, IV. (1911), 1800.

⁴ SOMMERVOGEL, VIII., 586 *seq.*

⁵ MOZZI, I., 297. ⁶ May 16, 1698, *ibid.*, 299.

accusations. At Du Vaucel's instance, two others were added to them, one of whom, Cardinal Casanata, was greatly prejudiced in favour of Codde. Du Vaucel did his best to draw out the discussions as much as possible¹ and Hennebel, the agent of the Louvain Jansenists, was also meant to work on behalf of Codde, but by his indolence and prodigality he roused the ire of his friends.² Meanwhile there appeared a book by Quesnel against Doucin and an apology by Codde himself which was printed by the Apostolic press.³ At length in the second year after its formation, the cardinalitial Congregation met on September 25th, 1699, for a discussion lasting five hours, at which it was decided to summon the Vicar Apostolic to Rome.⁴ During his absence De Cock would act as his substitute and the Brussels nuncio was to induce Codde to make the nomination himself: the internuncio was to make the appointment only in case Codde refused to do so. The letter of the Congregation to Codde could hardly be described as a citation: he was invited to come in person to Rome for the jubilee of 1700 and to enlighten the Congregation on the situation in Holland and on a few obscure points.⁵

Quesnel was of opinion that the best thing Codde could do was to send a most respectful letter to Rome with a view to gaining time: the war in Holland, the necessity of requesting the States General for leave to travel, provided sufficient pretexts.⁶ As a matter of fact Codde wrote in this sense to Cardinal Albani.⁷

The Congregation now adopted a sterner tone; the Vicar Apostolic must obey the Pope's command without delay.⁸

¹ Letter to Quesnel, December 20, 1698, *ibid.*, 300.

² *Ibid.*, 300 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 305 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 308-311. Protocol of the session of September 25, 1699, and the citation of Codde, *ibid.*, III., 8 *seqq.*, 10 *seqq.*

⁵ *Ibid.*, 10 *seqq.*

⁶ To Du Vaucel in Rome, October 24, 1699, in LEROY, II., 72. Du Vaucel had given Codde the same advice on October 3; Mozzi, I., 322.

⁷ October 26, 1699, *ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 323.

However, Codde was determined not to go to Rome and looked for another plausible excuse,¹ but his disobedience, which was clearly shown by his letter, determined the Congregation to give him, through the internuncio of Brussels, a formal order to come to Rome and to suspend him from his functions in case of non-compliance.² Innocent XII. approved this decision.³

Even before receiving his instructions, internuncio Bussi had endeavoured, through a third person, to persuade the Vicar Apostolic to set out for Rome, but all in vain. On receiving his instructions from Rome, Bussi decided to wait another eight days, after which he would give the Vicar Apostolic a successor in the person of De Cock.⁴ When Codde was informed that De Cock had been sent for by the internuncio, he decided to seek an interview with Bussi. At Brussels he met with a most friendly reception; the internuncio even went so far as to promise not to appoint De Cock pro-Vicar, provided Codde set out for Rome.⁵ But all efforts seemed once more in vain until Codde's friends urged him to obey. Thereupon Codde asked for a further delay until July 1st and a longer one after his return to Holland. Both requests were granted, but Innocent XII. decided that December 1700, was to be the last respite.⁶ In the end Quesnel himself pressed Codde to keep his word.⁷

¹ " Il est seulement en peine de la manière dont il doit s'en excuser au cas qu'on le presse jusqu'au bout. Du Vaucel to Quesnel, March 13, 1700, *ibid.*, 324.

² Du Vaucel to Codde, April 17, 1700, *ibid.*, 324 *seq.* The following were present at the congregation of March 26, which decreed the order to Codde: Cardinals Marescotti, Albani, Tanara, Ferrari, Noris, Sagripanti, Imperiali; Carlo Barberini, Carpegna and Panfili were absent; *ibid.*, 325.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 327 *seq.*

⁵ May, 1700, *ibid.*, 329. Quesnel to Du Vaucel, May 29, 1700, on Codde's visit to him after his conversation with Bussi, in LEROY, II., 92.

⁶ MOZZI, I., 331-333.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 333.

Du Vaucel had previously written to him that by his continual delays he was only rendering his position worse.¹ He now promised to help him to circumvent the subscription to Alexander VIII.'s formulary which he was afraid would be asked of him,² for it was chiefly this fear that prevented Codde's journey to Rome.³

Codde set out for the Eternal City towards the end of September and arrived there on December 11th.⁴ Innocent XII. had died in the meantime, leaving to his successor the delicate task of putting order in the Dutch situation.

¹ *Ibid.*, 327.

² *Ibid.*, 334.

³ *Ibid.*; Quesnel to Du Vaucel, May 29, 1700, in LEROY, II., 92.

⁴ MOZZI, I., 338.

CHAPTER IV.

MISUNDERSTANDINGS BETWEEN INNOCENT XII. AND THE COURT OF VIENNA—THE PEACE AND THE CLAUSE OF RIJSWIJK—THE ELECTION OF AUGUSTUS, ELECTOR OF SAXONY, AS KING OF POLAND AND HIS CONVERSION TO THE CATHOLIC FAITH—THE QUESTION OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION—DEATH OF INNOCENT XII.

(1.)

INNOCENT XII. considered it one of his most important duties to restore peace in Europe. To this end the nuncios were instructed to exert themselves to the utmost, all the more so as only thus was a disastrous compromise with the Turks to be avoided.¹ The Pope counted especially on the Emperor whose piety and sense of justice he had come to know and appreciate during his nunciature at Vienna [1668–1671].² Leopold I. was so convinced of the friendly feelings of the new Pope that, without waiting for the official announcement of the election, he at once dispatched a letter of congratulations to Rome which Prince Liechtenstein, the Emperor's representative in Rome, presented on August 9th.³ Shortly after the Pope sent the Emperor a contribution of 50,000 scudi for the war against the Turks. He also granted him various other favours and submitted a list of candidates for the Vienna nunciature, for the Emperor to choose an

¹ “*Cifre al Tucci a Vienna,” August 25 and October 13, 1691, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219, Papal Sec. Arch.

² Innocent XII. had announced his elevation to the Emperor by an *autograph letter of July 24, 1691. Liechtenstein's diaries, Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

³ *Ibid.*

acceptable personality, a thing which Alexander VIII. had refused to do.¹ The choice fell on Sebastiano Antonio Tanara who had already acted as nuncio at Brussels, Cologne and Lisbon.²

The Pope took a lively interest in the Emperor's war against the Turks. When news came of Louis of Baden's brilliant victory over the Turks on August 19th, at Salankemen, Innocent gave orders for extraordinary manifestations of joy, consisting of a solemn *Te Deum* on September 10th, the firing of guns from Castel S. Angelo, the ringing of all the bells and the illumination of the papal palace at night. The imperial ambassador celebrated the victory on the 11th with a serenade in Piazza Navona and on the 16th with a solemn function at the Anima at which all the Cardinals assisted, with the exception of the French. The Spaniards also celebrated the victory on the 21st in their national church and the Pope prescribed Requiem Masses for the fallen.³

However, it was not long before relations between Rome and the Emperor became strained. The Pope's negotiations for an ecclesiastical compromise with Louis XIV. roused the suspicions of the imperial Government, just as the latter also resented the Pontiff's exhortations to peace. On December 8th, 1691, Innocent XII. made earnest representations to the Emperor and to the Kings of Spain and France; he painted in moving terms the sufferings of the peoples and implored them to put an end to them. Leopold I. replied on January 20th, 1692, in a resentful tone. The Pope, the letter said, knew from personal experience his—the Emperor's—great love for peace, but peace was only possible by the renewal of the treaties broken by France. Hence the Pope

¹ On August 25, 1691, Liechtenstein expressed his thanks for the subsidy, in the evening the Pope sent the list; *ibid.*

² KARTTUNEN, 263.

³ *Lichtenstein's diaries, *loc. cit.*, where there is also an account of the display in front of Liechtenstein's house, of a "bella macchina rappresentante il principe Ludovico di Baden sopra un destriero che calpestava Turchi sotto un arco di trionfo ornato di aquile, fiaccole e trofei". Cf. also SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 468.

should persuade the King of France, the author of the war, to alter his conduct ; after that he too would do all in his power to induce his allies to accept the Pope's mediation.¹

Although Innocent XII. had occasion already then to complain of the pretensions of the imperial ambassador in Rome,² he nevertheless made a further contribution, at the beginning of August 1692, of the sum of 30,000 scudi towards the fortification of Grosswardein, the taking of which, on June 6th, 1692, he had celebrated in the same way as the victory of Salankemen.³ At the same time he continued to exhort France to peace.⁴

On the difficult question as to the attitude to be adopted by the Pope in regard to Duke Ernest Augustus of Hanover's candidature for the ninth Electorate, opinions were divided in Rome. There were not lacking those who advocated a protest similar to that of Urban VIII. against the eighth Electorate.⁵ On this occasion, however, Rome did not go so far as that. Ernest Augustus had repeatedly expressed most friendly feelings towards the Catholic Church so that his conversion could be hoped for. How much this prospect weighed with the Pope was shown by his conduct when, at the beginning of 1693, information reached Rome that Leopold I. had already given investiture to the new Elector. After exhaustive deliberations it was decided to send a simple remonstrance to the Emperor, but this was of so considerate a nature that the latter could not take offence. This attitude of reserve was all the more insisted upon as the Pope was anxious to avoid any interference with the war against the Turks, as well as all appearance of partiality towards France and that country's steps against the ninth Elector ; otherwise

¹ LÜNIG, *Sylloge negot. publ.*, 1182 seq. ; KLOPP, VI., 9.

² “ *Cifre al Tanara,” June 7 and 14, 1692, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219, *loc. cit.*

³ *Liechtenstein's diaries, *loc. cit.* Cf. * “ Cifra al Tanara ”, August 2, 1692, *loc. cit.*

⁴ “ *Cifre al Tanara,” April 12, July 26, August 9, 23, 30, 1692, *loc. cit.*

⁵ HILTEBRANDT, *Reunionsverhandlungen*, 135 seq.

papal action on behalf of peace would have been rendered impossible.¹ Innocent XII. continued to work for a termination of the disastrous war for he felt convinced that its prolongation meant the ruin of Europe.² However, the prospects of success were as unfavourable as possible.

The most fatal thing of all was the deterioration of relations with the imperial court, for which Leopold I.'s Roman representative, Prince Liechtenstein, was partly to blame. Full of eagerness to serve his sovereign and strongly influenced by the absolutist spirit of the period and its slender friendliness towards the Church, moreover as the first lay representative of his Government in Rome, since during the whole of the previous four decades the Cardinal Protector had also dealt with secular affairs, Liechtenstein believed himself called to play a great rôle. The "prerogatives" of the Emperor must be recovered; the Pope must be confined within the ecclesiastical sphere though at the same time compelled to serve the interests of the Government of Vienna in as large a measure as possible. Liechtenstein thought that he would best realize this aim by adopting a strong, unyielding attitude even when there was question of mere trifles.³ He rejoiced

¹ Cf. the excellent presentment by HILTEBRANDT, *loc. cit.*, 131 *seq.*, 148 *seq.*, 214 *seqq.*, which is completed by some details in Liechtenstein's reports to the court chancellor, Heinrich Strattmann. Liechtenstein writes to him on February 28, 1693, that the Brief (of January 17; see HILTEBRANDT, 218) was written "più per apparenza che per altro". The second Brief, of March 26, in HILTEBRANDT, 221. When at the death in 1698 of Ernest Augustus, his son, George Louis, became the ninth Elector, Vienna did not remonstrate (153). Cf. C. SCHWARTE, *Die neunte Kur und Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel* (Diss.), Münster, 1905.

² Cf. "*Cifre al Tanara" of October 4 and 25, November 1, 22, 29, and December 6, 1692, and numerous *Cifre in January, February, March, April, 1693, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219, *loc. cit.* Jubilee for the peace, December 8, 1693, in *Bull.*, XX., 585.

³ Cf. Liechtenstein's *letter to Strattmann, October 10, 1693: "E per questo ardisco di dire, che quando l'Imperatore voglia mantenere o per meglio dir ricoverare le prerogative che sono

when other States came in conflict with the Holy See as this was calculated to humble and intimidate "the priests". When a conflict broke out in the summer of 1692 between the Pope and the Spanish Government over the Inquisition in Naples,¹ Liechtenstein sided with the adversaries of the Holy See.² In August opposition between Rome and Madrid became less acute. "These priests"—Liechtenstein then wrote, "begin to fear lest the nuncio should be expelled from Madrid, and since all their actions spring either from fear or from interest, they will yield."³ In the draft of a report of August 16th there occur the following words, subsequently crossed out, but which betray Liechtenstein's innermost thoughts: "A little rupture between Spain and the Pope would not have displeased me and I might, perhaps, have derived some benefit from it. These Spaniards know how to deal with the priests, according to the ancient proverb, either with blows or with money."⁴ However, the Emperor

dovute a S. M. in Roma, il principale deve esser di non lasciare passare nè la minima cosa che vi possa esser contraria, con che non si mancherà all'ossequio dovuto alla Sede Apost., ma nè manco si permetterà che si manchi a quel che si deve alla dignità imperiale, come lo praticano gl'altri principi sin al Gran Duca." Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna.

¹ See "*Cifre al Nuntio di Spagna," September 30, October 14 and 28, November 25, 1691, January 6 and 20, February 17, March 2, 16, 30, April 27, June 22, 1692, *Nunziat. di Spagna*, 170, Papal Sec. Arch. Cf. AMABILE, II., 67 seq. The following rare book by Tommaso Menghini is dedicated to Innocent XII.: *Sacro arsenale, ovvero pratica dell'Officio della S. Inquisizione, con l'inserzione di alcune regole fatte e di diverse annotazioni di Giov. Pasqualone*, Roma, 1693. The dispute continued throughout Innocent XII.'s pontificate. Cf. the "*Cifre al Nuntio di Spagna", of January 11 and March 8, 1699, *loc. cit.* On the interference of the secular power with ecclesiastical authority in Portugal, see LÄMMER, *Zur Kirchengesch.*, 173.

² *Liechtenstein to Strattmann, July 26, 1692, *loc. cit.*

³ *Liechtenstein to Strattmann, August 2, 1692, *ibid.*

⁴ *Non m'avrebbe dispiaciuto, se fosse sequita picciola rottura fra queste due corte, e forse m'avrei ricavato qualche vantaggio,

disapproved of his ambassador's exasperation against the Pope who, quite recently, had sent him a money subsidy. Liechtenstein was instructed to cultivate better relations with the Curia,¹ but the attempt was bound to fail because the ambassador lacked the necessary understanding of the spiritual interests which dominated all else in the mind of the Pope. In Innocent XII.'s efforts to put an end to the widowhood of so many French dioceses he only saw partiality for France. He put a similar construction on the Pope's steps in favour of peace, so much so that Innocent XII. saw himself compelled to recommend to the nuncios to observe greater reserve in this matter.² The tension became still more acute in

ma i Spagnuoli hanno troppo mezzi per mortificare questi preti e sono questi accorti per i loro interessi che fugiranno agni cimento et ogni qual volta la corte di Spagna saprà valers della loro viltà quanto vorrà, conforme l'antico proverbio Con preti bastoni o denari." Draft of August 16, 1692, *loc. cit.*

¹ *Liechtenstein to Strattmann, September 13, 1692, *ibid.*

² On May 10, 1693, the following *Instructions were sent to the Spanish nuncio: Sentonsi da V. S. Ill^{ma} i rincontri che da Msgr. Nunzio in Germania l'erano stati recati, si in ordine alla pace generale, come alla particolare d'Italia. Ma poichè tutti gli ufficii, che si sono finora passati per questa particolarmente, hanno in si fatta maniera ingelosite non meno le case Austriache che tutti g'altri principi collegati alle medesime, che par loro che chiunque entra in questa materia altro non intenda che di fare il maggior servizio della Francia, con evidente pericolo di tutti i collegati medesimi. Con tal riflessione si è stimato necessario, per toglier ogni ombra di gelosia alle parti interessate, di comandar, si come di mano in mano si va facendo, a ministri della Sede Apost. di non mai più entrar per hora nella materia di pace particolare d'Italia, onde non mai s'apprenda che quello ch'è puro effetto della sollecitudine pontificia per l'unione e concordia de'principi christiani, per la quiete publica dell'Europa e per la particolare della nostra Italia, si afflitta e desolata per le continue contributioni che le convien pagare, sia mera partialità, anzi mala volontà contro le corone predette e lor collegati e però sia nell'avvenire pur ella contenta di non entrare più in questa materia se non per cagione di rispondere e di far comprendere ad

consequence of the arrest of a servant of the embassy in June 1693. Liechtenstein suggested to Vienna that the most energetic measures should be taken in connection with this affair. Some sharp recriminations took place and the affair was only settled in the autumn, to the satisfaction of both parties.¹ As a proof of goodwill the Pope acted as godfather to the ambassador's son born in October.² But this did not remove Liechtenstein's strong prejudices. He saw French influence everywhere, even in Innocent XII.'s reforming activities,³ and the Pope's repeated exhortations to peace only led to painful recriminations. Relations became still worse when Cardinal D'Estrées returned to France and Cardinal Forbin was made a member of the Consistorial Congregation in his place. Liechtenstein protested against this measure in January 1694, but the Pope sharply rejected his interference.⁴

"The Pope is a friend of France and an enemy of the Emperor": this is the *leitmotif* of all Liechtenstein's reports of the year 1694. He was literally obsessed with the fixed idea that "the good old man" was hopelessly caught in the

un tempo non esser capace il sommo apostolico zelo di N. S. di stendersi più oltre nè in altro se non che in cooperare, per quanto sia possibile, all'unione e pace fra suoi figliuoli e alla quiete publica, come si è detto. Nunziat. di Spagna, 170, f. 97 f., Papal Sec. Arch.

¹ On this affair, *cf.* besides *Diario*, IX., 62, 64, 71, the *reports of Liechtenstein, Rome, May 30, and Frascati (where he had retired), June 6, 20, 27, July 4, 8, 10, 18, 25, August 1, 8, 15, 22, 29, September 12, 19, 25 (*loc. cit.*), and the " *Cifre al Tanara ", May 30, June 6, 13, 27, July 4, 11 (*cf.* also " Lettera al Tanara " of July 18), August 2, 15, 22, September 5, 12, 19, 26, October 30, 1693, Papal Sec. Arch.

² *Liechtenstein's report to the Emperor, October 17, 1693, *loc. cit.* *Cf.* SCHMIDLIN, 546; *Diario*, IX., 74.

³ See his *report to the Emperor, December 5, 1693, *loc. cit.*

⁴ Liechtenstein's *report to the Emperor, January 9, 1694, *ibid.*

meshes of the French.¹ In his nervous anxiety and irritability, he saw everywhere French intrigues and he was for ever comparing the Pope's attitude towards France and the Emperor, when he invariably came to the conclusion that the latter was being unfairly treated.² As early as the beginning of 1694, through the nuncio of Vienna, the Pope had sought to make the Emperor see how one-sidedly and wrongly informed he was on what went on in Rome.³ It is impossible

¹ Already in his *report to Strattmann of July 16, 1692, Liechtenstein speaks of the tricks of the French "per ingannâr il buon vecchio". For 1694, *cf.* especially *the reports to the Emperor of January 9, February 13, March 6, *loc. cit.*

² *Cf.* *ex. gr.* the *report to the Emperor of May 29, 1694. On the Pope's protests against the oppression of the clergy in the territory of Mantua by the imperial troops and General Caprara's threats, of which Leopold I. endeavoured to give soothing explanations, *cf.* the *Cifre al Tanara" of July 17 and 24, August 7, 14 and 21, 1694, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219, Papal Sec. Arch.

³ *Instruction for Tanara, January 9, 1694: "I gravi pregiudizii, ai quali qui si soggiace per cagione di questi mal intentionati ministri di S. M. Cesarea, sicome in altre congiunture so d'haver accennato a V. S. Ill^{ma}, richiedono assolutamente che adoperi Ella tutti i gradi della sua attività per impedirli e rimuoverli. Ciò dee farsi da Lei prevenendo l'animo della Mtà Sua per mezzo di significazioni proprie del suo avvedimento e vevolvi a farle toccar con mano, come pur ampiamente da tutti qui si scorge, esser la volontà de' medesimi interamente inclinata e rivolta a dar ad intendere a cotesta corte che il Papa sia tutto parziale della Francia e che, quando loro si nega per giustizia, siegua a suggestione de' ministri della Francia istessa.

La perfetta cognizione che si ha di ciò, ci obbliga a prevedere e prevenire i mali effetti, che potrebbero produrre le insinuazioni loro, per le quali è precisa necessità di render opportunamente avvertiti non meno i ministri ben intentionati di S. Mtà che la Mtà Sua medesima, e d'indurla a non prestar fede veruna alle maligne e perverse suggestioni di questi che qui risiedono, potendone ben fare ad essi chiara e copiosa attestazione le cose già insinuate da Lei anche allo stesso Imperatore, il quale all'incontro

to say what was the bearing of these strong representations on Liechtenstein's recall which took place in July, 1694, after he himself had made a request to that effect some time before.¹ He nevertheless continued his efforts, for a time, to rouse the

ha si copiose riprove si de' retti e sinceri procedimenti e dell'inalterabile indifferenza della Stà Sua, che del paterno svisceratissimo amore, con cui la medesima ha riguardato sempre S. Mtà, e le convenienze dell'augustissima casa con prove di grazie si speciali impartitele fin dal principio della sua esaltazione al pontificato e nel contegno usato in tante cose intraprese senza riguardo alle ragioni e dritti della S. Sede, che assai ben distinta può farne comprendere la parzialità verso la Mtà Sua.

Il forte motivo, che si ha qui d'imprimer e ordinar a V. S. Ill^{ma} le cose predette, nasce per cagione dell'acri doglianze recate ieri a S. Stà da questo sigr. ambasciatore Cesareo per il luogo concesso dalla medesima al sigr. cardinale di Janson nella Congregazione concistoriale, da lui richiesto dopo la seguita assenza del sigr. card. D'Estrées da questa corte, dando molto fastidio alla Stà Sua che il sigr. ambasciatore intenda d'opporci alla libera et assoluta autorità ch'essa tiene di porre nelle congregazioni qualunque cardinale che le piaccia, come se l'autorità medesima Sua Beat^{ne} non l'avesse.

Dell'avvedimento et efficace zelo di V. S. Ill^{ma} nel valersi delle ragioni e delle buone disposizioni che vi potessero essere in pro del giusto e convenevole, attende N. S. con impatiente desiderio gli effetti soliti, troppo importando a S. Beat^{ne} l'intendere che nelle malfondate, improprie e contrarie insinuationi, che costì venisser fatte, non rimanghi in alcun modo offuscata la mente Cesarea.

Le aggiungo ancora di suggerir alla Mtà Sua, che, quando le occorra e desideri veramente alcuna cosa da Sua Beat^{ne}, si contenti S. Mtà di significarlo a V. S. Ill^{ma}, e non per mezzo d'altro canale, per farle conoscere e sperimentar ad un tempo, quanto sia a cuore alla Stà Sua di secondare in qualunque tempo et occasione, sempre che le sia permesso le soddisfazioni sue, ben certa essendo per altro Sua Beat^{ne} che, ove si offerissero difficoltà al concederle, il sommo zelo e bontà della Mtà Sua saprà rendersene interamente persuasa." *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219, f. 113-15, Papal Sec. Arch.

¹ *Letter to Strattmann, September 29, 1693, Liechtenstein's Archives, Vienna.

Emperor against the Curia.¹ At his farewell audience with the Pope, on 21st August, the Pontiff presented him with an image in chased silver. In the course of the audience Liechtenstein was struck by the fact that on this occasion Innocent XII. spoke in much milder terms of William III. of England.² On September 2nd, 1694, the ambassador left the Eternal City.³ He went away with a conviction that Innocent XII. was slavishly dependent on France whereas the Roman people were greatly attached to the person of the Emperor.⁴ His successor, George Adam Count von Martinitz, was destined to destroy that feeling. In spite of his prejudices against the Curia, Liechtenstein was too much of a diplomatist to push things to extremes: he always knew how to stop at the right moment. Not so his successor.

Count George Adam Martinitz, a nephew of the Governor of Bohemia, immortalized by the defenestration of Prague, was no less devoted to the cause of the Emperor and the absolutist ideas of the period than Liechtenstein, but he had a much more passionate nature.⁵ Even during his brilliant entry in January 1696 he displayed such arrogance that people suspected a desire on his part to provoke a conflict.⁶ This impression was further strengthened when the imperious Count demanded that he should be given precedence of the Governor of Rome at the procession of *Corpus Christi*. In order to avoid a dispute Innocent XII. directed the Governor

¹ *Report to the Emperor, July 17, 1694, *ibid*.

² “*Miratus sum profecto, quod contra solitum de seren. Anglorum rege mitius sit locutus, hunc vigilantem, expertum, strenuum et prudentem dicendo, ad quod ego, inscrutabilia esse Dei iudicia et ideo adoranda.” Report to the Emperor, August 21, 1694. *Cf. Diario, X., 188.*

³ *Liechtenstein's *Diaries, loc. cit.*; *Diario, X., 189.*

⁴ *Cf. his* *final report in Liechtenstein Archives, Vienna, I., n. 3339.

⁵ LANDAU, *Rom, Wien und Neapol.*, II., 267 *seq.*; WURZBACH, XVII., 47 *seq.*

⁶ The Pope ignored this circumstance in his *Brief to Leopold I. of January 21, 1696, on the reception of Martinitz.

to stay away from the procession. Not satisfied with this Martinitz also insisted on the *gentiluomini* of the Cardinal deacons letting him have the place of honour, thereby bringing the whole procession to a prolonged standstill, so that the aged Pontiff, who carried the Blessed Sacrament, was himself exposed to the blustering wind. This painful incident caused a great sensation. In order to prevent a repetition of similar occurrences the Cardinals did not take part in the national procession at the Anima. When news of these incidents reached Vienna, the Emperor Leopold blamed indeed the conduct of his ambassador on the first occasion but declared that the Cardinals' abstention from the procession at the Anima constituted "an insult to his person and to the whole German nation". Lengthy discussions were needed before the able Vienna nuncio succeeded in calming the angry monarch by representing to him that the Cardinals had felt that they would best safeguard the honour due to His Majesty if they avoided giving occasion for further conflicts.¹ This seemed to dispose of the quarrel; hence great was the surprise when in the following spring Martinitz came forward with a demand that the Cardinals should take part in the annual procession at the Anima. The Pope, of course, had to reject such a demand, but he nevertheless listened to the proposal of holding a procession of intercession in view of the Turkish war, and to this the ambassador might invite the Cardinals. For the procession of *Corpus Christi* he abolished every kind of special escort for the Cardinals and the ambassadors, with the sole exception of the absolutely indispensable suite.² Count Martinitz met this conciliatory spirit in his own way. On June 11th, 1697, he had two imperial edicts posted up at his palace to the effect that any person holding a fief of the Emperor in Italy must exhibit, within three months and under pain of devolution, the documents relative to the matter. Innocent XII. saw here an attempt on his sovereignty and declared the edicts to be null and void so far as the States of

¹ Cf. the documented account by SCHMIDLIN, *Anima*, 546 seqq.

² *Ibid.*, 549 seqq.

the Church were concerned.¹ Energetic representations on the part of the Pope² and the nuncio made the Emperor realize that he had gone too far—he recalled the decrees which, in point of fact, had been universally condemned.³ In the following year the dispute was none the less reopened although the Pope assisted the Emperor to the best of his ability in the war against the Turks.⁴

The absolutist tendencies of the imperial representative were clearly revealed by an act of violence executed by Martinitz in the spring of 1697 against the German national church of the Anima. In acting thus he had before him the example of other ambassadors who, as he explains in his apology, without consulting anybody, were in the habit of installing or deposing the officials of their national churches and to beat down inexorably every opposition. For the introduction of this kind of princely omnipotence Martinitz successfully took advantage of some disagreements among the clergy of that church, in fact with his reckless procedure he succeeded in imposing a new constitution on the Anima and to subordinate it entirely to the Emperor's representative in Rome.⁵ Already at the close of 1697 there was talk in Rome of the recall of this violent personage, a step which, as the Secretary of State calmly observed, was more in the Emperor's interest than that of the Pope.⁶ In the spring of 1698, Martinitz went so far as to encroach on the

¹ *Diario*, XI., 108 *seq.*; Noris' letter in *Studi e docum.*, XI., 330.

² Brief to Leopold I. of June 17, 1697 (*Epist.*, *loc. cit.*), in which he says: "Omnem explicationem supergreditur iniuria, quam nuper tuus orator iurisdictioni Nostrae inferre ausus promulgata ac publica affixa in Urbe ante oculos Nostros edictali sanctione tuum nomen prae se ferente."

³ *Diario*, XII., 381; OTTIERI, I., 2, 312 *seq.*; FIEDLER, *Relationen*, II., 432.

⁴ *Diario*, XII., 380, 385, 388 *seqq.*

⁵ Cf. SCHMIDLIN's detailed account, *Anima*, 552 *seqq.*

⁶ " *Cifra al Nunzio di Vienna," December 7, 1697, *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219.

sphere of papal judicature so that the Secretary of State declared that the situation had become intolerable.¹ In the end this strange diplomatist allowed himself in his blindness to be betrayed into adopting an unbecoming and offensive attitude even towards the person of the Pope himself. After that he was no longer received in audience.² When on Christmas Day, 1698, at the conclusion of the papal function at the Quirinal, he walked up to the Holy Father, wished him a happy feast and requested an audience, he received no reply.³ Although the Emperor sought to maintain such an ambassador, an attitude that seemed incomprehensible, the Pope stuck to his decision not to receive Martinitz any longer.⁴ His action met with universal approval. According to a report of the Spanish nuncio dated November 27th, 1698, there was general indignation even in Madrid at Martinitz' conduct. It was felt that it would be in the best interest of the Emperor to recall him as soon as

¹ " *Cifre al Nunzio di Vienna," May 10 and 17, 1698, *ibid.* ; cf. *Cifra of June 21, 1697, *ibid.*

² " *Cifra al Nunziat di Vienna," October 21, 1698, *ibid.* Cf. GALLAND, in *Hist. Jahrbuch.*, III., 217.

³ *Diario*, XIV., 81. Cf. " *Cifra al Nunzio di Vienna." December 13, 1698, *loc. cit.*

⁴ *To the nuncio in Vienna, February 7, 1699 : " Dopo essersi rappresentato da V. S. Ill^{ma}, quanto occorreva alla M^{ta} dell'Imperatore et a' suoi ministri intorno al particolare di non volersi più ammettere da N. S. l'ambasciatore Martinitz alla sua udienda, per le ragioni tante volte addotte e replicate, troppo chiaramente apparisce che nell'animo de' medesimi non sa darsi luogo nè alla ragione ben chiara nè alla giustizia che intieramente assiste alla nostra causa. Onde, non volendosi far tampoco alcun caso del perduto rispetto a Sua Beat^{ne} in faccia sua medesima, nè di tanti altri eccessi commessi dal predetto ambasciatore, fin colla carcerazione de' propri sudditi della Santa Sede, che pur anche tiene in prigione in sua casa, conviene haver pazienza ed applicare la sofferenza ai meriti della passione del Signore, ed attendere appresso i castighi, che con sì notabil petulanza ci vengono minacciati per mezzo del conte Palm, com'Ella qua ci riferisce." *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219 seq., 237, Papal Sec. Arch.

possible,¹ yet a whole year was to go by before the Emperor put an end to an intolerable situation by replacing Martinitz by Count Leopold Joseph von Lamberg, in October, 1699. The measure came too late; it could neither undo the past nor restore the former good understanding which, in the circumstances, was doubly necessary.²

It may be said that no one was more glad of the conduct of Count Martinitz and the unwisdom of the court of Vienna than Louis XIV. Whilst in the words of his Venetian colleague Erizzo, Martinitz, by his rudeness, made himself the best hated ambassador in Rome, France's representative, able and shrewd Cardinal Forbin, displayed all his skill in order to win the favour of the court and the Pope. He affirmed that his sovereign was prepared to defend the Church's sovereign rights with all his power. He added that in view of Martinitz' conduct, there was reason to fear the worst from the Emperor and even more so from his successor. These representations made such an impression on Innocent XII. that he began to incline more and more towards Louis XIV.³ Until then it had been his policy to side neither with France nor with Spain and Germany,⁴ for whilst preserving the strictest impartiality, his one object was to press upon the warring Catholic Powers the need of restoring peace⁵ since only thus could the war against the Turks be energetically prosecuted. But all his efforts remained barren.

The Grand Alliance had held together for quite a long time; it was only sensibly weakened when Duke Vittorio

¹ See the account in GALLAND, *loc. cit.*

² *Cifra al Nunzio di Vienna 17 October, 1699, Papal Sec. Arch.; GALLAND, *loc. cit.*; LANDAU, II., 269.

³ OTTIORI, I., 131; GALLAND, *loc. cit.*, 216.

⁴ “*Il mondo lo (il Papa) suppone per Francese di genio, ma io dico che nè è Francese, nè Spagnolo, nè Tedesco, nè è meno del proprio paese,” says D'ELCE, *Vita*. Library of Einsiedeln.

⁵ *Briefs in this sense were dispatched to the Emperor on December 3, 1695, on December 4 to the King of Spain and on December 6 to Louis XIV. and the Duke of Savoy, *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

Amadeo of Savoy went over to France, with the result that Spain, and eventually the Emperor also, were compelled to conclude an armistice as far as Italy was concerned. Although the Pope was directly interested in Italy's deliverance from the evils of war, he had confined himself, with a view to avoiding the suspicion that he favoured either the one or the other party, to exhortations to a general peace and only after the conclusion of the armistice had he counselled Vienna, at Spain's request, to give its adhesion to it, hence the misrepresentation of his perfectly correct attitude in this affair was bound to give him profound pain.¹

The troops liberated in consequence of the Italian armistice gave the King of France the preponderance in Flanders and in Catalonia. However, he did not intend to take advantage of this fact except in order to impose a favourable peace. As a result of Louis' great promises, William III. and later on Holland also, thanks to Swedish mediation, entered into peace negotiations, and in the end the Emperor himself felt incapable of further resistance.

In these circumstances, on May 9th, 1699, a peace congress

¹ *Letter to the nuncio in Vienna, July 14, 1696: "N. S., e come Papa e come sovrano, che ha tanto stato in Italia e sopra tutti gli altri, e come tale ancora che deve goder molto della quiete e dei vantaggi di essa, poteva adoperarvisi. Nondimeno col riguardo principalmente di non mostrar di pendere più da una parte che dall'altra, e per non darne il minimo sospetto, non si è voluto mai avvanzar ad altro in tutto il corso della presente guerra, se non che in raccomandare e procurare, per quanto li si è reso possibile, la pace generale e la quiete publica dell'Europa. E se nella presente congiuntura, che S. Beat^{ne} sente già conclusa la particolare accennata, non fosse stata supplicata a passar uffici colle M. M^{tà} Austriache, e che anch'esse concorrano ad accettar la neutralità in Italia, non mai vi si sarebbe disposta; siccome non mai ancora ha havuto fin qui il minimo rincontro della trattazione di essa, che pur da molti si sospettava. Onde si fa un gran torto alla Stà Sua a credersi diversamente anche per la somma particolar dilezione et amore, con cui è rimirata da Sua Beat^{ne} l'augustissima casa." *Nunziat. di Germania*, 219 seq., 167 seq., Papal Sec. Arch.

opened in the Orange castle of Niewburg which took its name from the near by village of Rijswijk. In the diplomatic struggle the French exploited the maritime Powers' desire for peace with such skill that Holland, England and Spain signed the peace treaty on September 20th. William III. was recognized as King of England, the Dutch Republic secured important commercial advantages and Spain recovered most of what she had lost to France, whilst the French monarch calculated that before long he would be in possession of the entire heritage of the last Spanish Habsburg. With a heavy heart the Emperor saw himself compelled to sacrifice Alsace together with Strassburg, but all the other territories annexed since the last "reunions" had to be restored to their legitimate owners. Trèves and Lorraine were to be given back to their banished lords, Freiburg and Breisach to the House of Austria and Philippsburg to the Empire. The pretensions of the Duchess of Orleans to the Palatine heritage was to be decided by papal arbitration whilst the archdiocese of Cologne was to remain in the hands of Joseph Clement, Prince of Bavaria.¹ Shortly before the formal conclusion of peace on October 30th, the French diplomatists succeeded in obtaining the acceptation of the so-called Clause of Rijswijk by the terms of which the Catholic religion in all the restored territories was to remain

¹ Joseph Clement, younger brother of Max Emmanuel, Elector of Bavaria, born 1671, was given the administration of the dioceses of Freising and Ratisbon already in 1685, that of Cologne in 1688 and subsequently also that of Liège and Hildesheim. Worldly-minded as he was, this strange lay Bishop toyed for years with the idea of giving up the clerical state. He only became a priest in 1706, soon after which he received episcopal consecration. Cf. SCHRÖRS, in *Annalen des Hist. Vereins für den Niederrhein*, XCVIII. (1916), 1 *seqq.*, who shows that later on Joseph Clement led a religious, nay even an outwardly devout life, and that, on the whole, he fulfilled the duties of his office faithfully. *Ibid.*, XCII. (1912), 125 *seqq.*, XCVII. (1915), 1-77; BRISCHAR, in *Katholik*, 1888, II., 488 *seqq.*; BRAUBACH, in *Bonner Zeitschr. für Theol. u. Seelsorge*, 1929, 234 *seqq.*

in the state in which it was at the time, that is, at the time of the restoration.¹

The first suggestion of this clause came from the Palatine John William of Neuburg. The Pope found it so acceptable that the Paris nuncio Delfino was instructed to urge it with Louis XIV. The latter was not slow in perceiving the political advantages that might accrue from it for France. The clause made a breach in the Peace of Westphalia. If it was possible to induce the Palatine and his Catholic allies to propose it, the latter were bound to make bitter enemies of their Protestant allies. However, John William was unwilling to take the initiative so that Louis saw himself compelled at the last moment to do so himself. He accordingly commanded his plenipotentiary at Rijswijk to get the clause accepted at any cost by the peace congress, with the help of the envoys of the Palatine and the Emperor. The representatives of Leopold I., who acted on their own authority, were of opinion that the demand should only be presented after the conclusion of all the negotiations. It is certain that Louis' action was by no means prompted by the disinterested zeal for the spread of the Catholic faith by which he pretended to be actuated; the truth was that his chief aim was to rekindle the religious dissensions in Germany for the benefit of France's expansionist policy.² The Protestants felt the Clause of Rijswijk as a heavy defeat. In the opinion of Leibnitz never was a peace concluded that was more humiliating for Germany and more dangerous for Protestants than that of Rijswijk.³

¹ Cf. NEUHAUS, *Der Friede von Ryswick*, 1873; KLOPP, VII., 460 *seqq.* On hearing of the conclusion of peace the Pope set aside 100,000 scudi for the imperial troops fighting against the Turks under Prince Eugene (*Diario*, XII., 380). In an autograph letter Louis XIV. communicated to the Pope the terms of the treaty whereupon Innocent XII. expressed his thanks in a *Brief of November 18, 1697 (*Epist.*, *loc. cit.*). M. WAGNER, *Untersuchung über die Ryswicker Religionsklausel* (Diss.), Jena, 1889.

² HILTEBRANDT, *Quellen u. Forsch.*, XIII., 154 *seqq.* On the share of the imperial delegates in the clause, cf. WAGNER, *loc. cit.*

³ JULIAN SCHMIDT, *Gesch. des Geistigen Lebens in Deutschland*, 278.

Not many weeks before, Protestantism had experienced another heavy blow by the return to the Catholic Church of Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony. This conversion, in so far as one may speak of such a thing, was closely connected with the Elector's candidature for the vacant Polish throne.¹

On June 17th, 1696, Sobieski died of apoplexy. Election intrigues began forthwith in the unhappy country in which, in the words of a contemporary diplomatist, everything was in a constant flux from morning till night.² This time also the number of candidates for the throne was very considerable. Besides natives as, for instance, the sons of the late King and the Grand Treasurer Lubomirski, they included some foreigners headed by Prince Conti, a kinsman of Louis XIV.

Innocent XII. followed events in Poland with all the more interest as he had acted as nuncio in that country (1660-8).³ Not only had he failed to settle the long and weary conflict over the right of patronage of monasteries which Poland claimed together with that of nomination to episcopal sees,⁴ but the situation had deteriorated to such a degree that a formal rupture took place in the spring of 1696. When nuncio

¹ For what follows, cf. HILTEBRANDT'S essay in which the documents of the Papal Secret Archives are exhaustively exploited: *Die polnische Königswahl von 1697 und die Konversion Augusts von Sachsen in Quellen u. Forsch.*, X. (1907), 152 seqq.; also HAAKE, *Augusts von Sachsen. Eine Charakterstudie* (1902); ZIEKURSCH, in *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, XXIV. (1903), 86 seqq., 232 seqq.; HAAKE, *Die Wahl Augusts des Starken zum König von Polen*, in *Hist. Vierteljahrschr.*, IX. (1906), 31 seq., X. (1907), 382 seq. (who disagrees in part with Hildebrandt); SCHELLER-STEINWARTZ, in *Zeitschrift für osteuropäische Gesch.*, II., 481 seqq.; HAAKE, *August der Starke im Urteil seiner Zeit*, Dresden, 1922. Many interesting facts are also found in **Memorie sulle turbolenze di Polonia*, 1679 1698, and in *Cod. F.* 42, Boncompagni Archives, Rome.

² See the report of May 14, 1697, in *Sitzungsber. der Münchener Akad., Hist. Kl.*, 1881, II., 217.

³ KARTTUNEN, 256; PIERLING, IV., 133; BAROZZI-BERCHET, *Roma*, II., 442.

⁴ Cf. *Zeitschr. für osteuropäische Gesch.*, IV. (1914), 14 seqq.

Santa Croce, who had vigorously defended the interests of the Church,¹ was about to rejoin his post at Vienna, Sobieski refused him a farewell audience. After his departure a decree of the Senate bearing the King's signature was promulgated, to the effect that the new nuncio would only be admitted after a satisfactory settlement of the question of patronage. The tribunal of the nunciature at Warsaw was also ordered to be closed for the time being. The decree was carried into effect, so that the position of the new nuncio, Giovanni Antonio Davia, was rendered extremely difficult and he only succeeded in getting an audience of the Diet a few days before the election of the King.²

As at previous royal elections in Poland this time also the Holy See observed the strictest neutrality. As a matter of fact the only thing impressed upon Davia was to work for the preservation of tranquillity in the realm and for the election of a good Catholic King, one who would be both ready and able to fight the Turks and to safeguard the Catholic religion against heretics and schismatics.³

The election of Prince Conti would have been of the utmost consequence for Louis XIV.'s anti-Habsburg plans, but the opposition of Austria, Prussia and Russia rendered it increasingly hopeless. In the end the French Prince was robbed of his advantage by a candidate who had risen in a most quiet fashion, namely, Frederick Augustus, Elector of Saxony, because of all the foreign candidates he was the one best able to raise the helpless Republic out of its misery and because he had the support of Austria and Russia. The chief obstacle to his election, the fact of his being a Protestant, was removed by the Saxon Elector when he made profession of the Catholic faith on June 2nd, 1697, at Baden, near Vienna. For the rest there was no question of a formal conversion for the Prince merely renewed a promise which he had made,

¹ *Ibid.*, 17. On the reform of monasteries by Nic. Riccioli (*ob.* 1693), see GAMS, *Kirchengesch.*, II., 620.

² HILTEBRANDT, *loc. cit.*, X., 172 *seqq.*

³ *Ibid.*, 174.

with the utmost secrecy, to his cousin Christian Augustus of Saxony, Bishop of Raab, who had himself become a convert in 1691, namely that in the event of his election he would embrace the Catholic faith. Nevertheless the election only took place after the nuncio had testified to the authenticity of the attestation of the Bishop of Raab, although a majority had declared itself in favour of Prince Conti [June 27th, 1697].¹

Augustus only made open profession of Catholicism on July 23rd, 1697, at Piekar and after his envoy Flemming had sworn to the election capitulation in his name he was crowned at Cracow on September 15th.² But Augustus was not yet by any means master of his realm. Even after the defeat of Prince Conti who had landed at Danzig in the last days of September, he still had to contend with several powerful opponents.

In these circumstances the Pope's attitude was of the utmost importance to him. Innocent had not taken his side at once; on the contrary he had adopted a policy of the utmost reserve because for a time at least he did not believe in the fact of his conversion.³ The only official step by Rome was the dispatch, on August 4th, of a Brief to the Cardinal Primate Radziejowski and the Polish Estates, exhorting them to choose for their King a man whose piety would lead to the spread of the Catholic faith whilst his bravery would protect Christendom from the Turks.⁴ A letter of Augustus to the Pope, dated August 6th, remained unanswered, as did further letters of September 25th and 27th.⁵ Even the ostentatious fervour with which the new King assisted at Mass did not induce the Pope to change his mind. A change only took place when, at the end of October, Augustus'

¹ *Ibid.*, 186 *seqq.*

² HAAKE, in *Hist. Vierteljahrschr.*, IX., 59, 69.

³ HILTEBRANDT, X., 188 *seq.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 189 *seq.*

⁵ These letters are in **Acta consist.* for January 13, 1698, Vat. Lib., those of September are published by THEINER, *Mon. Pol.*, IV., 1 *seq.*

profession of faith, authenticated with the seal of the Elector, was received in Rome.¹ But even then Innocent avoided all direct relations with Augustus ; only to the Bishop of Raab was a letter of thanks sent on November 16th, 1697.²

Augustus' final victory over his opponents at last compelled the Pope to abandon a reserve the continuation of which might have proved injurious to the interests of the Church. On January 13th, 1698, a consistory was held at which Augustus' letters of August 6th, September 25th and 27th were read and the Cardinals informed of his conversion.³ On the 18th a letter of congratulations was sent to Augustus and the Cologne nuncio Paolucci received instructions to repair at once to the Polish court as nuncio extraordinary.⁴ He was to congratulate Augustus, to exhort him to devotion to the Catholic Church and the Holy See, to choose only Catholics for his counsellors, to bring about the conversion of the Electress and the Catholic upbringing of the Elector, to pardon those who had opposed him, to promote only worthy clerics to bishoprics, to respect the Church's immunity and to prosecute the war against the Turks. No demands were made in favour of the Catholic Church in Saxony.⁵ At a later date the King built a magnificent Catholic royal chapel and maintained Jesuits at Dresden and Leipzig. His personal qualities were of an uncommonly high order ; however, his

¹ See also Spada's letter to Santa Croce, November 2, 1697, in HILTEBRANDT, X., 277, n. 1.

² Printed by THEINER : *Gesch. der Zurückkehr der regierenden Häuser von Braunschweig und Sachsen in den Schoss der kath. Kirche*, Einsiedeln, 1843, Urk., 54.

³ **Acta consist.*, *loc. cit.* King Augustus' envoy reached Rome on January 19, 1698 (*Diario*, XII., 383) ; on March 4 the customary *Te Deum* was sung for the new King (*ibid.*, 384). Cf. **Avviso Marescotti* of March 8, 1698, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele, Rome.

⁴ THEINER, *Urk.*, 55, 56.

⁵ HILTEBRANDT, *loc. cit.*, X., 193, 213 *seqq.* ZIEKURSCH, in *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, XXIV., 104, expresses another opinion.

love of pleasure was insatiable and his private life was in such contradiction with the demands of the Christian religion that it is not to be wondered at if Saxony remained a Protestant country as before. Augustus' attitude towards the Curia fluctuated according as he felt in need of its assistance and he broke in the most shameless fashion every pledge given to the Protestant Estates and to the Pope.¹

In the Palatinate also the consequences of the Clause of Rijswijk corresponded neither with the fears of the Protestants nor the hopes of the Catholics. The reason was the same in both cases, that is, because purely worldly interests were cloaked with religious ones. This was promptly perceived by that acute observer, nuncio Delfino of Paris, though the breach in the Peace of Westphalia implied in the Clause of Rijswijk was in itself a great triumph: "Very rarely can the policy of this world be reconciled with the interests of religion, Delfino wrote on December 9th, 1697, to Cardinal Spada, the Secretary of State,² "since the only guiding principle of the former is self-interest, which seeks to turn everything to one's own advantage, regardless of justice and at the expense of religion, men profess indeed with their lips the truth that religion must outweigh every worldly interest, but actually they push it into the background and pride of place is given to ambition and every other human passion."

(2.)

Innocent XII. had counted on the House of Habsburg's traditional devotion to the Church with all the more confidence as he had come to know and value Leopold I.'s sincere piety during his nunciature at the imperial court. Hence it was a bitter disappointment to him when his aid against the Turks

¹ This is strikingly demonstrated by HAAKE, on the basis of the Polish nunciature reports, in *Zeitschr. für Kirchengesch.*, XXIV., 86 seqq., 232 seqq. Cf. also *Zeitschr. für osteuropäische Gesch.*, IV. (1914), 24.

² HILTEBRANDT, *loc. cit.*, X., 138.

was answered by unfriendly acts. After the recall of Prince Liechtenstein it would still have been possible to restore the traditional relations, but when the latter's successor Martinitz sought to enhance his sovereign's prestige by acts of violence, the very opposite was the result. The Holy See is wont to think in centuries in which defeats alternate with victories, hence the worst possible way of obtaining a thing in Rome is to try and create terror by sudden acts of violence, with a view to extorting concessions. Martinitz carried this policy to such extremes as to touch even the sacred person of the Pope.¹ The injury which he thereby did to the Emperor's cause was all the greater as the French Government was pursuing an entirely different policy. Under Innocent XI. the latter had sought to terrorize the Holy See by acts of violence, though with no result. Now it tried another method: the Pope was to be won over in favour of France by a show of conciliatory and friendly feelings.² For this Cardinal Forbin, and after his departure in July, 1697,³ Cardinal Bouillon⁴ were the right men, men incomparably more able and skilful than the representative of the Emperor. They were adepts in the art of exploiting to Louis XIV.'s advantage the tension between Vienna and Rome. Leopold's ambition, they insinuated, led him to look on himself as the heir and successor of the old Roman emperors who had been lords of the world. There was nothing the Holy See had to fear so much as an Austrian Archduke becoming King of Naples. That was why the Popes, more especially Leo X., had always refused to invest the Emperor with that Kingdom. It was enough to call to mind what Clement VII. had had to endure at the hands of the imperialists. On the other hand the Kings of France

¹ Above, p. 669 *seqq.*

² D'ELCE, **Relatione*, Einsiedeln.

³ According to the **Avviso Marescotti* of July 3, 1697, Forbin had succeeded in winning the Pope's sympathy to such an extent that Innocent XII. shed tears at his departure.

⁴ *Brief to Louis XIV., July 1, 1697, Papal Sec. Arch.; F. REYSSIÉ, *Le cardinal de Bouillon*, 1647-1715, Paris, 1899.

had always cherished nothing but goodwill and devotion towards the Holy See. The blood of these Kings flowed in the veins of Louis XIV., the elder son of the Church, a monarch devoted to the papacy, who had nothing so much at heart as the salvation of souls and the exaltation of the Holy See.¹ These representations did not fail to make an impression, and in addition to everything else, the man who was sent to replace Martinitz was in no wise equal to his difficult task.

Count Leopold Joseph von Lamberg, who had represented the Emperor at the Diet of Ratisbon since 1690, arrived in the Eternal City about mid-January, 1700.² It sounds incredible but a report of Lamberg, dated March 27th, 1700, confirms the fact that the new ambassador, who knew nothing whatever of the situation in Rome, found no one to enlighten him. Martinitz, who was very loath to leave Rome, had had the perfidy to send away all his documents so that his successor never saw them—"a thing," Lamberg laments, "which happens in no other embassy, nor have I at hand a single person from whom I might obtain information as to what took place during Martinitz' term of office, a circumstance that might easily imperil the service of the Emperor."³ Only after Martinitz had left Rome, on April 25th, 1700, without farewell visit to the Pope and amid the maledictions of the Italians and the French,⁴ was Lamberg able to enter effectively upon his ambassadorial duties.⁵ On June 21st, 1700, he

¹ OTTIERI, I., 353; GALLAND, *Hist. Jahrb.*, III., 217 seq., information on the Papal-Italian League which did not materialize. Cf. also LANDAU, II., 48 seqq. In the course of the negotiations for the erection of the new dioceses of Alais (1694) and Blois (1697), Louis XIV. made a great show of zeal for the conversion of the Huguenots. *Bull.*, XX., 623, 791.

² LANDAU, II., 33 seqq. On L. J. v. Lamberg, see WURZBACH, XIV., 36 seqq.

³ LANDAU, II., 34.

⁴ SCHMIDLIN, 573.

⁵ "Hence my diary of my embassy to the Holy See begins on this day only, since I arrived on January 13, 1700, and began this *Diarium* at the departure of my predecessor, Count Martinitz (April 25, 1700)." *Cod. D.E.H.*, 59, of Lamberg Archives, in castle Ottenstein.

obtained without difficulty the elevation to the cardinalate of the Bishop of Passau, John Philip, Count von Lamberg,¹ but this was to be his first and only success.

At this time the Pope had recovered from a dangerous illness, but a long reign seemed nevertheless out of the question. Innocent XII. possessed an extraordinarily strong constitution. The unfortunate fall which he suffered at the beginning of his pontificate proved beneficial in the sense that he took more care of himself, with the result that the state of his health remained very satisfactory for a long time.² Amid the constant alternation of happy and sad events he was indefatigable in the discharge of the duties of his exalted office. At the end of 1697, during the celebrations in honour of Prince Eugene's great victories over the Turks in Hungary, he observed that the only thing still wanting was the proclamation of a general peace.³ But the year 1698 was marked by fresh calamities. The Pope was painfully affected by the opposition offered to his efforts for the construction of a harbour at Anzio and even more so by the reports of the oppression of the Catholic people of Ireland by William III. This showed, the French said, how the Prince of Orange understood the protection of the Catholics which he had promised to the Emperor.⁴ By comforting letters⁵ and likewise by generous alms, the Pope sought to assist the banished priests and Bishops.⁶ With a view to relieving their increasing needs he addressed an encyclical, dated June 6th, 1699, to all the Bishops, in which he begged for contributions for the relief of those who had been driven from Ireland on account of their religion.⁷

¹ Cf. above, p. 645. Lamberg had presented the *nomina* of the Bishop of Passau on June 5; see his **Diarium, loc. cit.*

² *Diario*, IX., 83, 89; X., 196; XI., 100; XII., 384.

³ **Avviso Marescotti* of December 7, 1697, Bibl. Vittorio Emmanuele.

⁴ MORAN, *Spicil.*, II., 326.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 353 *seqq.*

⁶ BELLESHEIM, *Irland*, III., 10, 31 *seqq.*

⁷ MORAN, II., 357 *seq.*; BELLESHEIM, III., 35. The papal confirmation in 1696 of the decrees of the "Congregatio

In 1698 Innocent XII. suffered much from gout. At the beginning of November 1699, he fell dangerously ill but this did not prevent him from undertaking yet another creation of Cardinals.¹ After that his health remained so precarious that business suffered a good deal.² This was all the more painful to the Pope as the great jubilee was drawing such numbers of pilgrims to the Eternal City that in the words of a contemporary Rome looked like Paris.³ The improvement in the Pope's health which occurred in January 1700, was so slight that one reporter describes it as a continuation of his illness.⁴ The strong-willed old man still applied himself to affairs and in particular he was anxious that the celebration of the Holy Year should go on undisturbed.⁵ At the beginning of February he had a consistory held in a room adjoining his

particularis circa iurisdictionem Vicariorum Apostolicorum in Anglia contra Regulares", in *Bull.*, XX., 752 seq.

¹ Cf. above, p. 644. Details on the malady in **Avvisi Marescotti* of November 7, 14, 21, 28, 1699, *loc. cit.* Cf. also the **Relazione* in Cod. C. 15 of Boncompagni Archives.

² **Avvisi Marescotti*, December 5, 12, 19, 1699, January 9, 1700, and GRAVINA'S account in *Giorn. stor. della lett. ital. Suppl.*, I., 125 seq.

³ *Diario*, XIV., 189. Cf. **Avvisi Marescotti*, January 2, 6, 1700, *loc. cit.*

⁴ **Avviso Marescotti*, January 30, 1700, *ibid.*

⁵ *Ibid.* The Jubilee was proclaimed on May 18, 1699 (*Bull.*, XX., 876). On October 20 invitations were sent to the Christian princes (*Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.). On the Jubilee of 1700, cf. MANNI, 220 seqq.; NÖTHEN, 149 seqq.; *Giorn. Lig.*, 1888, 214; A. LAICI, *Gli anni santi*, Roma, 1899, 48 seq. On the occasion of the *anno santo*, Innocent XII. founded in the Palazzo Giraud-Torlonia a hospice for poor priests, more particularly for those banished from Ireland (*Bull.*, XX., 883; **Avviso Marescotti* of May 30, 1699; *Diario*, XIV., 183). Cf. RUGGERI, *L'arciconfraternità del Gonfalone*, Roma, 1866, 247 (on its activities during the jubilee); *Unterwaldener Zeitschr.*, IX. (1915) (on pilgrims to Rome). The celebrated poet Filicaja composed some *Laudi* at this time for the confraternity of St. Benedict (NORRENBURG, II., 136).

bedroom. His mien was that of a convalescent, the voice strong, the matter of his address excellent and to the point.¹ At this time the ambassadors were not yet being received in audience. In the last week of February he suffered a relapse which obliged him to suspend for a time both audiences and attention to affairs.² At the beginning of March some Cardinals endeavoured to induce the Pope to admit Archbishop Pignatelli of Tarento into the Sacred College. As they dwelt upon his excellent qualities, Innocent replied: "It is all true, but he is my nephew."³ With this remark the request was rejected. Large bands of pilgrims were continually arriving in Rome for the jubilee,⁴ so the eighty-five years old Pontiff, summoning his energies for a supreme effort, imparted his solemn blessing from the balcony of the Quirinal on April 17th.⁵

Encouraged by the happy issue of so grave a risk, the Pope was anxious to pay a visit to the four principal churches and to the harbour works at Anzio. The journey to the coast was no longer possible but the visit to the churches was made in May 1700, in spite of the opposition of the physicians. He began with St. Peter's, on May 2nd.⁶ He also repeatedly blessed the people from the Quirinal.⁷ On May 23rd an illustrious pilgrim, namely Grand Duke Cosimo III. of Tuscany, was received in audience.⁸ By the middle of June Innocent seemed to be fully recovered.⁹ Once again he visited a number of churches and in July he inspected the new

¹ **Avviso Marescotti*, February 6, 1700, *loc. cit.*

² **Avviso Marescotti*, February 20, 1700, *ibid.*

³ **Avviso Marescotti*, March 6, 1700, *ibid.*

⁴ **Avvisi Marescotti*, March 20, April 10, 1700, *ibid.*

⁵ **Avviso Marescotti*, April 17, 1700, *ibid.*

⁶ **Avvisi Marescotti*, April 24, May 1, 8, 15, 22, 1700, *ibid.*

Cf. Lamberg's *Diarium*, Lamberg Archives, Castle Ottenstein.

⁷ **Avvisi Marescotti*, May 22, June 5, 1700, *loc. cit.*

⁸ Cf. Lamberg's **Diarium*, *loc. cit.*; also for the Pope's presents to Cosimo III.; cf. also **Acta consist.*, *Vat. Lib.*; CONTI, *Firenze di Medici di Lorena*, Firenze, 1909, 537 *seqq.*

⁹ **Avviso Marescotti*, June 19, 1700, *loc. cit.*

fountain near S. Pietro in Montorio.¹ But the Pontiff's chief preoccupation just then was the momentous question of the Spanish succession.

On November 14th, 1698, Charles II., the sickly and childless King of Spain, had designated in his will as his universal heir the Bavarian Elector Joseph Ferdinand, he being the nephew of his sister, the deceased wife of Leopold I. The decision had the Pope's approval for it conjured the risk of a partition of the monarchy as well as the dangerous jealousy between France and Austria. However, on February 6th, 1699, the Elector was carried off by a sudden death. Thus the whole question of the Spanish succession became acute and the news of the sad event called forth in Rome both sorrow and anxiety.²

In Spain there was but one opinion, namely that a partition of the monarchy, as was chiefly desired by England and Holland, must be avoided in the interest both of the nation and of the Church. On the other hand there was no unanimity as to the candidates: the King, as a Habsburg, was in favour of an Austrian Archduke whereas the preference of the grandees and the ministers, above all that of the influential Cardinal Primate Portocarrero, were for a French prince. As in Rome so also in Spain, the Government of Vienna, partly through the fault of its ambassador, had thrown away precious sympathies. At Madrid a revulsion of feeling took place in favour of the King of France. In ever widening circles a conviction grew up that the Spanish monarchy could only be preserved from partition, not by the feeble imperial court but by the mighty ruler of France. Basing itself on this opinion the State Council recommended the proclamation of the Dauphin's second son, Duke Philip of Anjou, as heir of the whole Spanish empire. At Portocarrero's suggestion Charles II.

¹ **Avvisi Marescotti*, June 26, July 3, 17, 1700, *ibid.*

² GALLAND, in *Hist. Jahrbuch*, III., 222 *seqq.* Cf. RIEZLER, VII., 429 *seqq.*, 446. The news reached Rome on February 25, 1699; *Diario*, XIV., 182. *Brief of condolence to Max Emmanuel, March 21, 1699, in *Epist.*, Papal Sec. Arch.

sought the Pope's counsel in this difficult question since the Pontiff was deeply concerned in the affair not only in view of the welfare of the Church but likewise as supreme feudal lord of the Kingdom of Naples and Sicily.

On July 3rd, 1700, the Spanish ambassador, the Duke of Uzeda, presented an autograph letter of his sovereign to that effect. The Pope immediately convened a special Congregation consisting of Cardinals Spada, Albani and Spinola for an exhaustive discussion of the difficult question. The three Cardinals' report was approved by Innocent XII. and used as the basis of an answer dictated by Cardinal Albani, a friend of France, and at once forwarded to Madrid by special courier.¹

To this day the original text of Charles II.'s inquiry and Innocent XII.'s answer have not been found, either in Rome or in Madrid²: the probability is that they were destroyed. The text of the letters published at a later date by the French side³ has recently been described as a forgery of Cardinal Forbin.⁴ This may be true with regard to the wording, but as regards the contents it can scarcely be doubted that Innocent XII. expressed the opinion that the proposal of the Spanish Council of State would best safe-guard both the public welfare and that of the Church.⁵ Whilst the imperial ambassador Lamberg vainly strove to obtain definite information from the

¹ OTTIERI, I., 390; POLIDORI, *Vita Clementis XI.*, p. 40.

² GALLAND, *Hist. Jahrbuch*, III., 228.

³ First in 1875 by HIPPEAU, *Avènement des Bourbons*, II., 227 and 233, and then by LEGRELLE, III., 631 *seqq.*; *cf.* 375.

⁴ Thus by KLOPP (VIII., 635 *seqq.*; IX., 33 *seqq.*; X., 158 *seq.*, 162; XI., 89, and *Hist. Blätter*, LXXXIII. (1879), 25 *seqq.*), and by GALLAND, *loc. cit.*, 229 *seqq.*), who claimed to have had in his possession new "documentary indications and proofs" of the forgery, but did not publish them. Against both, LANDAU, II., 454 *seq.*

⁵ IMMICH, *Staatensystem*, 180; REDLICH, VI., 503. The latter has put an end to the controversy on the authority of the *procès-verbal* of the secret conference of August 23, 1700, at Vienna, printed by GAEDEKE, II., *Akten und Urkunden*, 193, with which the further *procès-verbaux* of August 23 and 24 are in agreement.

Pope and the Secretary of State on the nature of the Pontiff's reply,¹ Cardinal Portocarrero succeeded on October 3rd, 1700, on the ground of the Pope's advice and the views of the majority of the ministers, in inducing the grievously stricken Charles II. to put his signature to a will in favour of Duke Philip of Anjou, in which it was however expressly laid down that Spain must never be united to any other monarchy.

Charles II., a mere shadow of a King, expired on November 1st. Innocent XII. had preceded him into eternity on September 27th. Thus two dying men had decided the future of the world in favour of the Bourbon dynasty.²

In the night of August 1st the Pope was suddenly seized with a serious illness,³ so that the consistory announced for the next day had to be cancelled. If that meeting had taken place Cardinal Bouillon, Subdean of the Sacred College, would have officiated as Dean, that post being vacant in consequence of Cibo's death. Bouillon had involuntarily incurred Louis XIV.'s disfavour.⁴ On August 4th there was an improvement which revived hopes of the Pope's recovery.⁵ But on the 7th his condition again grew worse.⁶ But such was the power of resistance of the nearly eighty-six years old man that the malady dragged on for some time.⁷ During the night

¹ KLOPP, VIII., 507 *seqq.* When Lamberg drew the Pope's attention to the fact that if Naples were to become a French dependency, the Gallican principles would be introduced there, Innocent XII. could only feel confirmed in his opinion that he had given the right kind of advice to Charles II., but that Lamberg's representations had anything to do with the giving of the advice, as DÖLLINGER maintains (*Vorträge*², 313), is erroneous, for Lamberg's audience only took place on July 24.

² RANKE, *Französ. Gesch.*, IV., 144.

³ Cf. Lamberg's **Diarium* on August 1, 1700, *loc. cit.*

⁴ KLOPP, VIII., 511 *seqq.*; GALLAND, in *Hist. Jahrb.*, III., 232 *seq.*

⁵ Lamberg's **Diarium*, August 4, 1700, *ibid.*

⁶ *Ibid.* Cf. **Avviso Marescotti* of August 7, 1700, Bibl. Vittorio Emanuele.

⁷ The most accurate information is in the almost daily entries in Lamberg's *Diarium*.

of the 23rd he received Holy Viaticum and on the 28th he had himself carried into the room in which Innocent XI., whom he held in the highest veneration, had died.¹

His physician, Luca Torzi, a man no less celebrated than his predecessor Malpighi, did all that was possible, but human resources were exhausted. Spiritual assistance was tendered by the Capuchin Casini and to him the Pope made a general confession.² A sensible betterment in the sufferer's condition on September 1st revived hope,³ but this proved illusory.⁴ In the early hours of September 27th, Innocent was released from his sufferings.⁵ The body was removed from the Quirinal to St. Peter's where on October 1st it was laid to rest in the plain sarcophagus chosen for the purpose by the deceased himself. It was only in 1746 that a proper monument was erected by Cardinal Petra aided by Benedict XIV., to a design by Fuga, and adorned with sculptures by Filippo della Valle. The monument faces that of Countess Mathilda of Tuscany.⁶ Though it resembles the monument of Gregory XIII. by

¹ Cf. *Diarium*, on August 23 and 28, 1700, and the **Avvisi Marescotti* of August 21 and 28, 1700.

² NOVAES, XI., *Innoc. XII.*, n. 53.

³ According to Lamberg's diary, on September 1 the Pope said : *Siamo guariti !*

⁴ On September 2, Lamberg reports (*loc. cit.*) an increase of fever and diarrhœa ; on 4th, " very bad " ; on 5th, " better " ; on 14th, " daily weaker " ; on 18th, " no hope " ; the Pope himself said : " *Ingredimur viam universaë carnis.*"

⁵ " To-night, at four, the Pope died " (Lamberg, *Diarium*, *loc. cit.*). " *Relazione anatomica dell'apertura del cadavere d'Innocenzo XII., 28 Sett., 1700," in *Vat.* 8194, p. 93, *Vat. Lib.*

⁶ *Diario*, XIV., 199. Cf. BRINCKMANN, *Barockskulptur*, II., 275 *seq.* (with illustrations) ; FORCELLA, VI., 177 ; CHATTARD, I., 46. A monument was also put up to Innocent XII. in the cathedral of Naples (left transept) ; two *genii* support his portrait (engraving of 1700 ; see *Catalogo de'libri e MSS. del Pr. Pignatelli*, 65). An inscription on a black marble tablet extols among other things his liberality as Archbishop of Naples and the abolishment of nepotism.

Camillo Rusconi, it is by no means in keeping with the importance of a pontificate of nine years so full of successes and difficulties. Heir both of the name and the virtues of Innocent XI., Innocent XII. left behind him the reputation of a father of the poor, a supremely disinterested administrator of the Church's patrimony and a devout and upright priest.

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
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